The diversity and effectiveness of industrial policies in East Asia by Wettasinghe, Asoka Maline


THE DIVERSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICIES IN EAST ASIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND 
1960-1997 
By 
ASOKA MALINIE WETTASINGHE 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
June 2001 
Centre for Strategic Economic Studies 
Victoria University of Technology 
%. 
VKTORIA : 
UMVIMITT 
•. i: 
CIT THESIS 
338.95 WET 
30001007559976 
Wettasinghe, Asoka Malmie 
The di yersity and 
effectiveness of industnal 
pelicies in East Asia : a 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I take this opportunity to acknowledge the following very special people without whose 
inspiration, support, contribution and guidance this thesis would not have been possible. 
First, and foremost, I owe a great intellectual debt to my supervisor Professor 
Peter Sheehan, who has been very supportive at every stage of this thesis. I sincerely 
appreciate his unfailing support, guidance, encouragement, and constructive criticisms 
throughout the progress of this thesis. 
My thanks are due to the Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, for providing 
financial and administrative support. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to 
Professor Bhajan Grewel, Dr. Sardar M. N. Islam for encouragement and helpful 
comments at various stage of this thesis, and Ms. Margarita Kumnick, for editorial 
assistance and helping me to find information on time. The help and support given by 
Jim Lang, the Trade Data staff and fellow students are acknowledged with great 
appreciation. 
A very special thanks goes to Professor Vin De Cruz, Ramya, Padmasiri, 
Navarathne, Chandanie, Sarath, Chitra, Aravinda, Shiromi and Shirani, for the 
encouragement and support extended to me various stages of my student life in Australia. 
Last but not least, I wish to thank my daughter Wansaja for endless patience 
during the time of my thesis, my late husband Mahinda for the encouragement and 
unfailing support given for my education during the time we spent together, and all my 
family members who helped me during this difficult era of my life. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS in 
LIST OF TABLES vn 
LIST OF CHARTS ix 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS xi 
OVERVIEW xiii 
Part A: Diversity and the Theory of Industrial Policy 
CHAPTER 1 
Industrial Policy and the Role of Government 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Industrial Policy and the Role of Government 2 
1.2.1 The Neoclassical View 3 
1.2.2 The Infant Industry Argument 7 
1.3 The Government as Complementary to the Market 10 
1.3.1 Setting up New Industries 11 
1.3.2 The Market Enhancing View 20 
1.4 The Government as a Strategic Player: Strategic Trade Theory 21 
1.5 Development Policy and Some New Growth Models 24 
1.5.1 Basic Characteristics 25 
1.5.2.Variety of Models 27 
1.5.3 Some Implications of New Growth Theory 30 
1.6 The Development State 32 
1.7 Theory, Diversity and Empirical Assessments 36 
1.8 Conclusion- Diversity in Deviations, Instruments and Assessments 38 
CHAPTER 2 
Diversity and the Practice of Industrial Policy 
2.1 Introduction 40 
2.2 What is Industrial Policy? 41 
2.3 Types of Diversity 44 
2.3.1 Deviations from the Market Model 45 
2.3.2 Diversity in Objectives and Policies Across and Within Countries 47 
2.3.3 The Variety of Instruments 49 
2.4 Conclusion 50 
Appendix 2.1 A Profile of Major Post-War Industrialization and Trade Policies in the 
Kiel Sample Countries 52 
Appendix 2.2 Major Export Promotion Incentives, Korea 54 
ni 
CHAPTER 3 
Ignoring the Diversity: Empirical Studies of the Effectiveness of Industrial Policy 
in East Asia 
3.1 Introduction 55 
3.2 Empirical Studies Assessing the Effectiveness of Industrial Policies 57 
3.2.1 Effectiveness of Industrial Policies: Cross-Country Studies 58 
3.2.2 Effectiveness of Industrial Policies: Country-Specific Studies 71 
(i) Effectiveness of Industnal Policies in Terms of Exports 71 
(ii) Effectiveness of Industrial Policies: Using Other Aggregate Measures 75 
3.3 Common Limitations 87 
Appendix 3.1 - Table 1 Real GDP and Export, South Korea 1953-91 91 
Table 2 Cortposition of Manufacturing Output and Exports, South Korea 1971-83 91 
Table 3 Indicators of Trade and Credit Policy, South Korea 1965-90 91 
Appendix 3.2 Credit Access and Borrowing Costs by Sector (percent) 92 
CHAPTER 4 
Assessing the Diversity and the Effectiveness of Industrial Policy: Methodology and 
Scope of the Study 
4.1 Introduction 93 
4.2 Incidence of Industrial Policies 94 
4.3 The Methodology and Scope of the Study 96 
4.4 Data Sources and Limitations of the Study 103 
4.5 Structure of the Rest of the Thesis 105 
Part B: Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies, 1960-1997 
CHAPTER 5 
Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies in the Republic of Korea, 1960-1997 
5.1 Introduction 107 
5.2 Diverse Country-Specific Factors 110 
5.2.1 Objectives of Industrial Policies 110 
5.2.2 Historical Factors 112 
5.2.3 The Decision Making Process 113 
5.2.4 Industrial Strucmre 117 
5.3 Diversity ofPolicies over the Period 1960-1997 117 
5.4 Diverse Policy Instruments 124 
5.4.1 Import Substitution Related Measures 125 
(a) Measures for Promoting Heavy Industries and Industrial Targeting 125 
(b) Measures for Promoting Industrial Structure 130 
(c) Measures for Promoting Small and Medium Scale Industries 132 
5.4.2 Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 133 
(a) Measures for fulfilling Financial Needs 133 
(b) Measures for Promoting Technology Development 136 
IV 
(c) Measures for Promoting Human Resources 143 
(d) Measures for Promoting R&D 144 
(e) Measures for Promoting Marketini' Network 149 
5.5 Conclusion 149 
CHAPTER 6 
Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Pohcies in Malaysia, ^960-1997 
6.1 Introduction 151 
6.2 Diverse Country-Specific Factors 153 
6.2.1 Objectives of Industrial Policies 154 
6.2.2 Historical Factors 156 
6.2.3 Decision Making Process 157 
6.2.4 Industrial Structure 158 
6.3 Diversity ofPolicies over the Period 1960-1997 159 
6.4 Diverse Policy Instruments 165 
6.4.1 Import Substitution Related Measures 165 
(a) Measures for Promoting Heavy Industries and Industrial Targeting 167 
(b) Measures for Fulfilling Financial Needs 170 
(c) Measures for Promoting Small and Medium Scale Industries 171 
6.4.2 Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 173 
(a) Measures for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment 173 
(b) Measures for Promoting Technology Development 177 
(c) Measures for Promoting R&D 179 
(d) Measures for Promoting Human Resources 181 
6.5 Conclusion 182 
CHAPTER 7 
Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies in Thailand, 1960-1997 
7.1 Introduction 183 
7.2 Diverse Country Specific Factors 185 
7.2.1 Objectives of Industrial Policies 185 
7.2.2 Historical Factors 186 
7.2.3 The Decision Making Process 187 
7.2.4 Industrial Structure 189 
7.3 Diversity ofPolicies over the Period 1960-1997 191 
7.4 Diverse Policy Instmments 196 
7.4.1 Import Substimtion Related Measures 197 
(a) Measures for Promoting Industrial Targeting 197 
7.4.2 Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 202 
(a) Measures for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment 202 
(b) Measures for Promoting Technology Development 205 
(c) Measures for Promoting Human Resources and R&D 210 
(d) Measures for Fulfilling Financial Needs 210 
(e) Measures for Promoting Regional Industries 212 
7.5 Conclusion 215 
Part C: Measuring the Incidence and Effects of industrial Policies: 
The Case Study of Korea 
CHAPTER 8 
Measuring the Incidence 
8.1 Introduction 218 
8.2 Diversity ofPolicies: The Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 220 
8.3 Empirical Assessment of Incidence Measures 224 
8.3.1 Assessing the Magnitude of Industrial Promotion with Incidence Measures 225 
(i) Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 228 
(ii) Import Substitution Related Measures 235 
(Hi) Estimating the Rank 239 
8.4 Conclusion 242 
Appendix 8.1 Estimation Procedures 244 
CHAPTER 9 
Identifying Potential Outcome 
9.1 Introduction 245 
9.2 Industrial Performance in Terms of Value-Added and Exports: Comparative Analysis with 
Selected Benchmark Countries 245 
9.2.1 Selection of Benchmark Countries 246 
9.2.2 Evaluating Industrial Performance in Terms of Value-Added and Exports 248 
(i) Value-Added and Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries 248 
(ii) Index of Value-Added and Exports 252 
(Hi) Sectoral Value-Added as a Share of GDP and Sectoral Exports as a Share of 
World Exports 256 
9.3 Conclusion 258 
Appendix 9.1 Estimation Procedures Adopted for Performance Variables 265 
CHAPTER 10 
The Effectiveness of Industrial Policy: An Initial Application of the Framework 
10.1 Introduction 266 
10.2 Differential Performances of Industry Groups by Policy Stance 268 
10.2.1 Differential Performance of Industry Groups based on Export Promotion 
and Growth Related Measures 269 
10.2.2 Differential Performance of Industry Groups based on Import Substimfion Related 
Measures 278 
10.3 Differential Performance of Industry Groups by Policy Periods 287 
10.3.1 Differential Performance of Industry Groups by Policy Periods, based on the 
Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 287 
10.3.2 Differential Performance of Industry Groups by Pohcy Periods, based on 
Import Substitution Related Measures 295 
10.4 Regression Analysis: Industrial Performance and Incidence Measures Using Panel Data 304 
10.5 Conclusion 311 
Bibliography 312 
VI 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1.1 Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Policy 8 
3.1 Actual/Predicted Share of GDP Originating in Manufacturing Sectors 61 
3.2 Signs of Regressions Explaining Change in Value-Added Share of Sectors 65 
3.3 Long TennTFP Growth Rates by Sector 66 
3.4 Thailand: Correlation Coefficients Across Industries - Trade Performance and Policy 72 
3.5 Panel Regressions for Growth Rate of Value-Added Per Worker 81 
3.6 Panel Regressions for Growth Rate of Capital Stock 82 
3.7 Panel Regressions for Growth Rate of Total Factor Productivity 82 
3.8 Correlation Coefficients: Effective Protection and Industry Performance 84 
5.1 Economic Indicators of Korea 1960-1995 108 
5.2 Incentives and Institutional Support for Promoting Industries in Korea 1950-1997 121 
5.3 Targeted/ Strategic Industries in Korea 127 
5.4 Interest Rates on Bank Loans and Inflation Rates in Korea 1962-1991 134 
5.5 Products Identified under the HAN Project in Korea 146 
5.6 Major Contents of Seven Major Promotional Laws in Korea 147 
6.1 Economic Indicators of Malaysia 1960-1995 152 
6.2 Incentives and Institutional Support for Promoting Industries in Malaysia 1957-1997 163 
6.3 Targeted/ Strategic Industries in Malaysia 169 
7.1 Economic Indicators of Thailand 1960-1995 184 
7.2 Incentives and Institutional Support for Promoting Industries in Thailand 1960-1997 195 
7.3 Targeted/ Strategic Industries in Thailand 198 
7.4 Incentives of the Thai Board of Investment 199 
7.5 Key Technologies and Proposed Strategies under the Seventh Economic and Social 
Development Plan in Thailand 209 
7.6 Spatial Aspects of Board of Investment Incentives and Privileges in Thailand 1978-1993 213 
8.1 Estimated Subsidy Effects by Industry, 1963-1983 231 
8.2 Number of Technology Licensing Projects, 1962-1981 233 
8.3 Number of Foreign Direct Investment Projects, 1962-1981 234 
8.4 Average Tariff Rates by Industry, 1966-1983 236 
8.5 Non-Tariff Barriers by Industry, 1966-1983 237 
8.6 Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers by Industry, 1966-1983 238 
8.7 Rank of Industries on the basis of Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 240 
8.8 Rank of Industries on the basis of Import Substimtion Related Measures 241 
9.1 Stmctural Characteristics of Benchmark Countries: 1960-70 247 
9.2 Value-Added in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 250 
9.3 Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 251 
9.4 Index of Value-Added in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 253 
9.5 Index of Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 254 
9.6 Sectoral Value-Added as a Share of GDP 259 
9.7 Sectoral Exports as a Share of Sectoral World Exports 262 
10.1 Differential Performance of Industry Groups, by Policy Stance in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1970-1996 270 
vn 
Table Page 
10.2 Growth Rates by Policy Stance, 1970-96 (Based on export promotion and growth 
related measures) 277 
10.3 Differential Performance of Industry Groups, by Pohcy Stance in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1970-1996 279 
10.4 Growth Rates by Policy Stance, 1970-96 (Based on import substitution related measures) 286 
10.5 Differential Performance of Industry Groups, by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1970-1996 289 
10.6 Growth Rates by Pohcy Periods, 1970-82 and 1982-96 (Based on export promotion and 
growth related measures) 294 
10.7 Differential Performance of Industry Groups, by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1970-1996 296 
10.8 Grov4h Rates by Policy Periods, 1970-82 and 1982-96 (Based on import substimtion related 
measures) 302 
10.9 Panel Regression for Value-Added 306 
10.10 Panel Regression for Exports 309 
vni 
LIST OF CHARTS 
Chart Page 
8.1 Estimated Subsidy Effects by Industry 231 
8.2 Technology Licensing by Industry 233 
8.3 Foreign Direct Investment by Industry 234 
8.4 Average Tariff and Non Tariff Barriers by Industry 238 
9.1a Value-Added as a Share of GDP in Highly Promoted Industries 260 
9.1b Value-Added as a Share of GDP in Less Promoted Industries 261 
9.2a Exports as a Share of Sectoral World Exports in Highly Promoted Industries 263 
9.2b Exports as a Share of Sectoral World Exports in Less Promoted Industries 264 
10.1 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea 1970-1996 (Highly promoted group based on export promotion and 
grov/th related measures) 271 
10.2 Differendal Performance of Value-Added by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea 1970-1996 (Less promoted group based on export promotion and 
growth related measures) 271 
10.3 Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups by Policy Stance 
in Korea 1970-1996 (Industry groups based on export promotion and growth 
related measures) 273 
10.4 Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups by Policy 
Stance in Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 (Industry groups based on export 
promotion and growth related measures) 273 
10.5 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea 1970-1996 (Highly promoted group based on export promotion and 
growth related measures 275 
10.6 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea 1970-1996 (Less promoted group based on export promotion and 
growth related measures) 275 
10.7 Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups by Policy Stance in Korea, 
1970-1996 (Industry groups based on export promotion and growth related measures) 276 
10.8 Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups by Policy Stance in 
Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 (Industry groups based on export promotion 
and growth related measures) 276 
10.9 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea 1970-1996 (Highly promoted group based on import substitution 
related measures) 280 
10.10 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Stance in Benchmark 
Countries and Korea 1970-1996 (Less promoted group based on import substitution 
related measures) 280 
10.11 Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups by Policy Stance 
in Korea 1970-1996 (Industry groups based on import substimtion related measures) 281 
10.12 Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups by Policy 
Stance in Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 (Industry groups based on import 
substitution related measures) 281 
10.13 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries and Korea 
1970-1996 (Highly promoted group based on import substimtion related measures 284 
IX 
Chart Page 
10.14 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries and Korea 
1970-1996 (Less promoted group based on import substitution related measures) 284 
10.15 Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups by Policy Stance in Korea 
1970-1996 (Industry groups based on import substimtion related measures) 285 
10.16 Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups by Policy Stance 
in Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 (Industry groups based on import substitution 
related measures) 285 
10.17 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Pohcy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1970-82 (Highly promoted group based on export promofion and 
grov^h related measures) 290 
10.18 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Pohcy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1982-96 (Highly promoted group based on export promotion and 
grovrth related measures) 290 
10.19 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1970-82 (Less promoted group based on export promotion and 
growth related measures) 291 
10.20 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1982-96 (Less promoted group based on export promofion 
and growth related measures) 291 
10.21 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1970-82 (Highly promoted group based on export promotion and 
growlh related measures) 292 
10.22 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1982-96 (Highly promoted group based on export promotion and 
growth related measures) 292 
10.23 Differential Performance of Exports by Pohcy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1970-82 (Less promoted group based on export promotion and growth 
related measures) 293 
10.24 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark 
Countries 1982-96 (Less promoted group based on export promotion and 
growth related measures) 293 
10.25 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Pohcy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1970-82 (Highly promoted group based on import substitution 
related measures) 297 
10.26 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1982-96 (Highly promoted group based on import substimtion 
related measures) 297 
10.27 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1970-82 (Less promoted group based on import substimtion 
related measures) 298 
10.28 Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries 1982-96 (Less promoted group based on import substitution 
related measures) 298 
10.29 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark Countries 
1970-82 (Highly promoted group based on import substimtion related measures) 299 
10.30 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark Countiies 
1982-96 (Highly promoted group based on import substitution related measures) 299 
10.31 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark Countries 
1970-82 (Less promoted group based on import substitution related measures) 300 
10.32 Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and Benchmark Countries 
1982-96 (Less promoted group based on import substimtion related measures) 300 
Glossary of Abbreviations 
ANU Australian National University 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APITD Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
BOB Bureau of the Budget 
BOI Board of Investment 
CBU Completely Built-Up 
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory 
EAM East Asian Miracle 
EOI Export Oriented Industrialization 
EPB Economic Planning Board 
ERP Effective Rate of Protection 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FIC Foreign Investment Committee 
FTZs Free Trade Zones 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
HAN Highly Advanced National Project 
HCI Heavy and Chemical Industry 
HICOM Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
HRD Human Resource Development 
IC Integrated Circuit 
ICA Industrial Co-ordination Act 
IE Industrial Estate 
lEAT Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 
IFCT Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand 
IMF Intemational Monetary Fund 
IMP Industrial Master Plan 
IRPA Intensification of Research in Priority Areas Programme 
ISI Import Substitution Industrialization 
ISIC Intemational Standard Industrial Classification 
ITAF Industrial Technical Assistance Fund 
JICA Japanese Intemational Cooperation Agency 
JPPCC Joint Public-Private Consultative Committee 
KAIST Korea Advanced Instimte of Science and Technology 
KIST Korea Institute of Science and Technology 
KIT Korea Instimte of Technology 
KLOFFE Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Fumres Exchange 
KLSE Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
KSTIC Korea Scientific and Technological Information Centre 
KTAC Korea Technology Advancement Corporation 
LDC Less Developed Country 
LMWs Licensed Manufacturing Warehouses 
MARA Majlis Amanah Rakyat - Council of Tmst for the People 
MBC Malaysian Business Council 
MEXPO Malaysian Export Promotion Organization 
MIDA Malaysian Industiial Development Authority 
MIDF Malaysian Industrial Development Finance 
MIGHT Malaysia Industry Government Group of High Technology 
XI 
MIMOS Malaysian Instimte for Microelectronics Systems 
MITI Ministry of Intemational Trade and Industry 
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology 
MOSTE Ministry of Science Technology and Energy 
MTDC Malaysian Technology Development Corporation 
MTI Ministry of Trade and Industry 
NCMMT National Center for Metals and Materials Technology 
NDP National Development Policies 
NECTEC National Electronics and Computer Technology Centre 
NEP New Economic Policies 
NEPR Net Export Performance Ratio 
NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board 
NICs Newly Industrializing Countries 
NIEs Newly Industrializing Economies 
NPC National Productivity Corporation 
ODM Own-Designed and Manufacture 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OEM Origmal Equipment Manufacture 
OPP1 First Outiine Perspective Plan 
0PP2 Second Outiine Perspective Plan 
PCC Private Consultative Committee 
POSCO Pohang Iron and Steel Company 
R&D Research and Development 
S&T Science and Technology 
SIRIM Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia 
SMEs Small and Medium Scale Enterprises 
SOEs State Owned Enterprises 
STDB Science and Technology Development Board 
TFP Total Factor Productivity 
TNC Trans National Corporations 
TTA Technology Transfer Agreement 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
WLS Weighted Least Squares 
xu 
Overview 
Diversity and the Effectiveness of Industrial Policies 
The role of industrial policy is one of the contentious issues in applied economics. It 
is acknowledged in the literature that there exist a wide range of factors giving rise to 
deviations from the competitive market paradigm - sunk costs, economies of scale 
and scope, oligopoly, externalities and complementarities, information and 
coordination failures, and incomplete markets. The existence of these factors may 
justify government intervention to generate a more socially beneficial outcome. Yet, 
disagreements are evident on two main matters. Firstly, there is no uniform view 
regarding the empirical importance of these theoretical effects, and on the extent and 
relevance of deviations from the market paradigm in various types of economies. 
Secondly, arguments have been raised about the limitations on the potential role for 
the goverrmient to act effectively to produce a preferred outcome in the face of 
deviations from the market paradigm. Some argue that such deviations are limited 
and are more than offset by the likelihood of government failure, so that it will be rare 
for any improvement in economic activities to be achieved through industrial policies. 
Others argue that deviations from the market are pervasive and that in appropriate 
circumstances a strong and committed government can be very effective, so that there 
is a major role for industrial policies. 
Against this background, assessments of the validity of industrial policy 
ultimately turn on empirical judgements rather than on theoretical differences. 
Economic theories, which are in many ways helpful in comprehending the 
complicated world critically and systematically, are inevitably built on highly 
simplified assumptions. But empirical judgements must come to grips with the 
diversity of real economies and industries, and of the many different types of market 
failure, A wide range of different policy measures and instnmients have been applied 
to address these market failures. Quite different levels of competence exist in 
different governments and agencies implementing industrial policies, and a host of 
xui 
exogenous factors other than the policy itself affect the overall economic outcome. 
Thus, forming well-founded empirical judgements and making justified assessments 
of the impact of policy are complex tasks. 
This empirical challenge, and in particular that of carrying out empirical 
studies while incorporating this diversity, is central to assessing the effectiveness of 
industrial policies. A central theme of this thesis is that this diversity - in deviations 
from the market paradigm, in instruments, in national and industry conditions, in the 
competency of agencies and officials and in the factors affecting economic outcomes -
must be fiilly taken into account in any assessment of the effectiveness of industrial 
policies. 
It is argued below that existing empirical studies of the effectiveness of 
industrial policies in East Asia have largely ignored this important task. In addition, 
the existing empirical studies have so far failed to form a consensus view regarding 
the effectiveness of industrial policies in the East Asian case. In part, the inconsistent 
results of these studies can be ascribed to methodological differences - differences in 
the nature and scope of the studies - and to the lack of a uniform conceptual 
framework. The nature of the various studies - the basis on which the studies are 
carried out, for example, whether they are country-specific or cross-country studies -
may have a significant influence on their outcomes. Naturally, if countries differ in 
some or all of the ways described above, the outcome of a cross-country study may 
differ from that of a country-specific study even if the same analytical techniques are 
applied. As will be clear in the review of empirical analyses of industrial policies in 
East Asia in Chapter 3, all except the East Asian Miracle report by the World Bank 
(1993) are country-specific studies. They have also applied a variety of analytical 
techniques, and show marked differences in scope and in the conceptual framework 
employed. Under these circumstances, and in the context of the diversity of market 
conditions, objectives, instruments and capabilities, the mixed outcome is not 
surprising. Nevertheless, almost all the empirical studies generalised their 
conclusions in terms of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of industrial policies. 
XIV 
More specifically, our review of existing empirical studies highlights three 
specific problems with those studies. Firstly, all the studies except two based their 
conclusions on indirect evidence such as the aggregate performance of exports, 
economic growth and value-added for the country or countries concerned. Such 
aggregate outcomes could be influenced by many other internal and external factors. 
Therefore, the performance of such aggregate measures cannot be considered to be the 
outcome of industrial policies without some attempt to correct for the effects of these 
other factors. Secondly, without applying any systematic basis for identifying policy 
favoured and non-favoured industries, and the timing and intensity of support across 
industries, empirical analyses have been carried out while assuming that particular 
industries (often the heavy and chemical industries) are the policy favoured industries 
for all periods and countries studied. This general assumption is inappropriate since 
industry specific intervention is rarely practiced uniformly by a number of countries 
and even in a given country all the time. Thirdly, the general conclusions reached in 
these studies about the effectiveness of industrial policies have to be taken with care 
because of the diversity within countries. In addition to the wide range of deviations 
from the market paradigm cited in the theoretical literature and noted above, in 
practice many other diversities in industry policy application arise from country-
specific factors. These include the development objectives pursued, the status of 
development of the country, the competence of government agencies, the nature of the 
political economy, the industrial structure and so on, as well as the variety of policy 
instruments and measures employed. These differences between countries may have a 
considerable influence on policy outcomes. Yet, ignoring these diversities, the effects 
of industrial policies have been evaluated by the existing empirical studies while 
assuming that the industrialisation process is a uniform, once and for all event. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
In this context, we consider that to assess the effectiveness of industrial policies 
appropriately it is important not only to identify these diversities for the country being 
analysed but also to ensure that this diversity is allowed for in the analytical 
methodology. The investigation of diversity and the effectiveness of industrial 
policies include in this thesis will contain three main parts. Part A involves a 
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theoretical review which discusses various approaches to the justification of industrial 
policy, the outline of the conceptual framework for the present investigation and an 
analytical review of existing empirical studies. Part B investigates the diversity and 
incidence of industrial policies in Asia in the light of experience of three sample 
countries, namely the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. How industrial 
policies in these countries show diversities are examined primarily through an 
investigation of country-specific factors and of the diversity of policies implemented 
over the period of 1960-1997. In this exercise particular emphasis will be given to the 
incidence of industrial policies - what industries, using what measures, for what 
purposes, at what time and to what extent, have been subjected to industrial 
promotion. 
Given the diversity, this study proposes that an appropriate strategy to assess 
the effectiveness of industrial policy requires three steps: 
• measurement of the incidence of industrial policy in a given country and industry 
at a particular time; 
• development of measures of the potential outcome of industrial policy, by 
excluding the effects of broader factors affecting the industries and countries 
concerned in the particular time periods; and 
• assessment of the effectiveness of industrial policy, by studying whether there is 
evidence of an impact of policies with a given incidence pattern on the potential 
outcomes variables, for a given country. 
Given the data constraints for the other countries, Korea is selected as a case 
study, and in Part C of this thesis a preliminary attempt is made to implement this 
assessment strategy quantitatively. 
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Industrial Policies in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
An examination of industrial policies in sample countries reveals that, in many 
respects, they demonstrate remarkable diversity, especially in the light of the common 
presumption of uniformity. As is evident from the detailed analyses of the incidence 
of industrial policies, tiic sample countries differ significantly, for example, in terms 
of the objectives of the industrial policies that they pursue, of their industrial 
structures, of the role of the private sector and of the level of competence of their 
government agencies. Though all the three sample countries have followed import 
substitution and export promotion measures more or less simultaneously, Korea has 
given priority to economic growth since late 1950s and has followed its policies with 
clearly outlined objectives such as promoting exports and industrial self-sufficiency. 
Thailand, though giving priority to economic growth like Korea, followed no such 
systematic and ambitious approach until at least the mid 1970s. Since then export 
promotion together with spatial balance of manufacturing industries have become the 
major motives for pursuing industrial policies. Concerted efforts for industrial 
promotion have been evident in Malaysia since early 1970s, but it has given priority to 
achieving social equity - stimulating bumiputera participation - at the expense of 
economic growth for nearly two decades. By encouraging Free Trade Zones and 
Licence Manufacturing Warehouses though attempts have been made towards 
promoting exports and increasing value-added since early 1970s, detailed policy 
attention on these policy objectives are evident in Malaysia with the introduction of 
Industrial Master Plan in 1986. 
Similarly, both the industrial structure and the role and the strength of the 
private sector, factors which may have a significant influence on effective policy 
implementation and outcomes, also vary significantly between these countries. The 
industrial structure of Korea is dominated by a small number of large firms - maiidy 
the chaebols which are family ovmed conglomerates. The private sector - both 
domestic firms, the majority are small and medium scale enterprises, and foreign firms 
- plays a dominant role in Thailand. Policy makers of both Korea and Thailand enjoy 
substantial autonomy in decision making (except the minor influences made through 
corruptive practices) are relatively free from the influence of interest groups. In 
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contrast to Korea and Thailand, state owned enterprises played a dominant role in the 
industrial structure of Malaysia until early 1980s, and policy makers in ethnically 
divided Malaysia are not fortunate enough to enjoy substantial autonomy in decision 
making. 
Further, policy measures vary not only between countries but also within a 
given country over the observed period (1960-1997), since countries have to adjust 
their policies in response to internal and external changes, economic imbalances and 
emerging economic, social and technological developments. To cite some examples, 
industry specific intervention has not been uniform across these countries, nor within 
each country over the period. Korean evidence suggests that, starting with certain 
labour intensive industries such as textiles and electronics, industry specific 
intervention shifted towards the heavy and chemical industries until early 1980s. 
More intensive measures - such as preferential treatment, state initiated mergers and 
administrative guidance with performance standards - were also applied in Korea 
during the period to 1982. Since 1982, instead of placing emphasis on specific 
industries, policy attention in Korea has shifted towards promoting industries on an 
equal basis, while giving special attention to technologically advanced products. 
Systematic approaches to industry specific intervention were apparent in Malaysia 
only after 1981. Even then, Malaysia did not follow its policy measures as intensively 
in Korea, and tended to favour both resource and non-resource based industries. 
Industry specific intervention is less evident in Thailand than in either Korea and 
Malaysia, although since the early 1990s it has been taking steps towards promoting 
specifically selected industries. Likewise, significant differences are evident between 
these countries in terms of other policy measures, especially in regard to policies 
towards technology, finance and the promotion of foreign direct investment. 
Finally, this diversity is further demonstrated in the evolution of industrial 
policy in Korea. As will be evident from the empirical analyses based on incidence 
measures, Korea has not followed a uniform approach when applying industrial 
policies. In general terms it is possible to conclude that Korean export promotion and 
growth related measures were biased toward the basic and fabricated metals industries 
and the chemical industry, while import substitution related measures - protective 
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measures - were largely tilted towards promoting light industries. Moreover, the 
incidence measures in Korea appear to be dynamic, in the sense that they tend to be 
frequently varied not only between industrial sectors but also over time, reflecting the 
changes in policy direction and also other social and economic adjustments. Thus, 
contrary to the general perception, the Korean evidence on incidence measures 
suggests that industry specific intervention has not been exclusively limited to the 
heavy and chemical industries. All this implies that careful investigation of incidence 
measures, preferably on a country-specific basis, would be appropriate for analysing 
the real impact of industrial policies. 
Measuring the Incidence of Industrial Policies - the Case of Korea 
The proposed strategy to address the effectiveness of industrial policy in the face of 
pervasive diversity has been outlined above, and in Part C this is applied to Korea in a 
preliminary analysis. The first two steps in the proposed methodology are to assess 
the incidence and the potential outcomes of industrial policies. These are undertaken 
for Korea in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Incidence measures are studied in Chapter 8 for two types of policies, those 
directed primarily at promoting exports and growth and those directed primarily at 
import substitution. As might be expected, the available published data that can be 
brought to bear on the incidence issues are very limited. For the exports and growth 
policies, three measures are explored, across eight manufacturing industries at the 
two-digit level. The first is the incidence of financial and tax incentives, measured in 
terms of estimated subsidy effects on the cost of capital by industry. The second is a 
proxy for technology support programs, being the number of technology licensing 
projects approved by industry. The third measure of the incidence of policy support, 
especially relevant in Korea where foreign investment was strictly controlled, is the 
number of foreign direct investment projects approved by industry. In terms of import 
substitution policies, measures are available for the average nominal tariff rate and for 
the incidence of non-tariff barriers by industry. 
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These measures have severe limitations, but they do allow some broad 
conclusions to be reached about the incidence of industrial policies in Korea over the 
1962-82 period. Firstly, it appears that there is no uniform pattern across different 
types of incidence measures applied for industrial promotion. Of the export and 
growth policies measured - tax and financial incentives and the measures adopted for 
promoting technology development - our results indicate that they v^ere biased 
towards promoting the basic and fabricated metals and chemical industries. On the 
contrary, protective measures were tilted towards promoting light industries such as 
the food and textiles industries. However, caution is required regarding these 
conclusions, since the data representing incidence measures are proxies and may not 
reveal the true picture of the incidence of industrial policy. 
Secondly, these incidence measures appear to be dynamic. They are quite 
frequently subject to change, not only from one industrial sector to other but also over 
time. These characteristics may partly attributed to changes in policy direction and 
also to other social and economic adjustments. 
Thirdly, when the overall impact of industrial promotion is assessed by 
combining both export promotion and growth related and import substitution related 
measures, it is evident that a combination of both basic and fabricated metals 
industries, the chemical industry and light industries have been promoted over the 
others in the case of Korea. The comparatively high level of promotion received by 
the textiles sector suggests that industry specific intervention has not been exclusively 
limited to the Heavy and Chemical sector, as is often assumed. 
Measuring the Potential Outcomes of Industrial Policies - the Case of Korea 
As noted earlier, many factors affect economic outcomes in a particular country, both 
in overall terms and at the sectoral level. Many of these factors - such as global 
economic trends, technology shifts and macroeconomic and cyclical factors - affect 
virtually all countries. Thus it will be a mistake to treat actual economic outcomes as 
the potential outcomes of industrial policies, unless it is possible to correct for these 
common factors. In Chapter 9 we develop a response to this problem, referred to as 
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identifying the potential outcomes of industrial policies, by benchmarking Korea's 
economic performance at the sectoral level against that of comparable countries. 
More specifically, Korea's industrial sector performance in terms of value-added and 
exports, at the two-digit ISIC (Intemational Standard Industrial Classification) level, is 
compared with that of selected benchmark countries over the period 1970-1996. 
Ideally, the comparison should be made with benchmark countries that had not 
pursued industrial policies extensively. Such a comparison would clearly distinguish 
the difference in performance between those which followed policy intervention 
intensively and those which did not. However, this becomes impossible due to the 
non-availability of both policy and outcome information at the sectoral level. In 
addition, practically every country follows some sort of industrial promotion policies 
and hence finding countries which do not follow such policies become an impossible 
task. Under these circumstances a group of developing countries, which exhibits 
similar characteristics with respect to initial per capita, industrial structure and 
industrial composition as compared with Korea, which have had a wide range of 
policy regimes and for which adequate data are available, have been selected as 
benchmark countries. The countries are Taiwan, India, the Philippines, Mexico and 
Chile. 
After discussion of various alternatives, the two central benchmarking 
concepts adopted in Chapter 9 are industry value-added as a share of GDP and 
industry exports as a share of world exports in that industry. Korea's performance on 
these variables, relative to that of the benchmark countries, is used as a measure of the 
potential outcome of industrial policies. As may be expected, in several respects 
Korea's performance in relation to these benchmark countries is remarkable. The 
question now is the extent to which this striking performance can be attributed to 
industrial policies, the incidence of which has been studied in Chapter 8. 
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Assessing the Effectiveness of Industrial Policies - the Case of Korea 
In the final chapter. Chapter 10, three empirical tests are applied to investigate this 
question. The results of the first two tests are consistent with the view that there was a 
strong impact of industrial policies on industrial performance in Korea over the period 
1970-82, although the results of the third test are inconclusive. 
The first test compares the aggregate industrial performance of industry groups 
in Korea, based on the incidence of export promotion and growth measures and of 
import substitution measures respectively, with that of similar groups in the 
benchmark countries. The outcome variables used are industry value-added as a share 
of GDP and industry exports as a share of world exports in that industry. The second 
test separates the period into the high intervention period (1970-82) and the period 
(1982-96) for which industry specific intervention was very much reduced, to assess 
whether relevant differences in performance can be observed in the two periods. 
The results of these first two tests are summarised in Tables 1 and 2, and are 
very striking. For industry groupings defined in terms of export and grow1:h measures 
(Table 1), the striking feature of the table, for both value-added and exports, is the big 
difference between Korea and the benchmark countries in the highly promoted group 
in the interventionist period. For these industries and this period, the value-added 
share rose by 5.9 per cent per annum in Korea but fell 0.3 per cent for the benchmark 
countries, while the export share rose by 15.9 per cent per annum for Korea but by 
only 2.1 per cent for the benchmark countries. For five of the other six cells shovm in 
the table, the benchmark country growth rate was higher than that of Korea. It is only 
in exports in the less promoted group in the early period that Korea also has some 
margin over the benchmark countries. Thus for industry groups defined in terms of 
export and growth related measures, the stronger relative performance of Korea is 
heavily concentrated in the highly promoted industries in the interventionist period. 
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Table 1 Growth Rates by Policy Periods, 1970-82 and 1982-96 
(Based on export promotion and grow1;h related measures) 
Industry Groups 
Highly Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Less Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Average Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
Value-Added as a 
Share of GDP 
1970-82 1982-96 
5.9 3.5 
-0.3 3.7 
0.6 0.1 
0.8 1.9 
Exports as a Share 
of World Exports 
1970-82 1982-96 
15.9 2.1 
2.1 4.2 
6.8 -2.2 
3.6 0.8 
Source: Estimates of the author based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
For industry groupings defined in terms of import substitution measures (Table 
2), the estimates for both outcome variables and for both industry groups in Korea 
show comparatively higher performance during the high intervention period than 
thereafter. During 1970-82 the average annual rate of growth of both the value-added 
and the export share for both groups are also comparatively higher than that of the 
similar groups in benchmark countries. However, substantially opposing results are 
evident in Korea relative to the similar groups in benchmark countries for both 
industry groups after the high intervention period. For three of the four cells in Table 
2 for the 1982-96 period, the growth rate of the relevant variable is higher in the 
benchmark countries than in Korea. But the key point here is there is no difference 
evident in the performance of the highly promoted and the less promoted industry 
groups - for both Korea's performance is stronger than that of the benchmark 
countries over 1970-82 and, with one marginal exception, weaker than that of the 
benchmark countries over 1982-96. 
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Table 2 Growth Rates by Policy Periods, 1970-82 and 1982-96 
(Based on import substitution related measures) 
Industry Groups 
Highly Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Less Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Average Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
Value-Added as a 
Share of GDP 
1970-82 1982-96 
4.3 2.7 
0.9 3.2 
4.7 1.8 
-0.9 1.4 
Exports as a Share 
of World Exports 
1970-82 1982-96 
14.1 2.2 
3.5 3.1 
10.0 -0.8 
2.1 2.1 
Source: Estimates of the author based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB 
(ANU). 
Thus, there is a marked difference in the performance of Korean industries, 
relative to those of the benchmark countries, over the two periods, on most measures. 
However, for groupings defined in terms of export and growth measures, this was true 
for both outcome variables only for the highly promoted group. For groupings defined 
in terms of import substitution measures, there is little discernible difference between 
the comparative performance of the highly promoted and the less promoted group. 
These results are consistent with the view that industrial policies targeting exports and 
growth had a significant impact on Korean industrial development over the 1970-82 
period. But they are not consistent with the view that industrial policies targeting 
import substitution had a similar impact, at least when assessed in terms of exports 
and value-added outcome variables. However, caution is required regarding these 
performance differences since both export promotion and import substitution 
measures have simultaneously been adopted in Korea. 
The third test uses regression analysis on panel data for incidence and outcome 
variables, to test a simple model of the impact of policy measures on outcomes. 
While generally the variables have the expected sign, in most cases they fail standard 
XXIV 
significance te';t3, and the results can at best be described as inconclusive. This is not 
surprising, given the severe limitations on the data available for this purpose. It is 
likely that a much more detailed panel data set, and perhaps a model which takes 
account of other factors influencing the relationship between incidence and outcome 
variables, would be necessary for the impact of industrial policy on sectoral outcomes 
to be assessed by rigorous econometric analysis within the overall fiamework 
suggested here. 
Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the impact of diversity - in deviations from the market 
paradigm, in instruments, in national and industry conditions, in the competency of 
agencies and officials and in the factors affecting economic outcomes - on the 
assessment of the effectiveness of industrial policies, with special reference to East 
Asia. The relevance of this diversity has been illustrated in the theoretical literature 
related to the justification of industrial policy and in the practice of Korea, Thailand 
and Malaysia. It has also been shown that the existing empirical literature on the 
effectiveness of industrial policy in East Asia largely ignores this critical fact. 
A proposed framework for taking account of diversity in assessing the 
effectiveness of industrial policy has been developed, and has been applied in a 
preliminary way, and on the basis of limited data, to Korea. This application 
generates striking evidence consistent with the view that export and growth related 
policy measures were effective in Korea particularly over the period 1970-82, but 
inconsistent with the view that import substitution related policies were similarly 
effective, at least in terms of export and value-added outcomes. Not surprisingly, 
given the data limitations, a panel regression analysis was inconclusive. Overall, this 
application suggests that the proposed framework is sufficiently robust to justify a 
more detailed analysis, using unpublished data sources, if such data were available. 
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Part A: Diversity and the Theory of Industrial Policy 
1. Industrial Policy and the Role of Government 
1.1 Introduction 
Economies, both developed and developing, use a vast array of policy measures to 
stimulate industries. Some policy measures, such as imposing tariffs, are applied for 
the purpose of protecting domestic industries from established rivals. Some other 
policy measures, such as providing tax or financial incentives, are employed for 
directing resources to, or for stimulating investments towards, export promotion, 
technology development or the reduction of regional imbalances. All these policy 
measures, which are in general referred to as industrial policies, tend to be more 
extensive in the case of developing countries. This may be due to the special 
circiunstances of such countries, such as low private savings, dependence on primary 
product exports, declining terms of trade, small internal markets, limited skills, few 
entrepreneurs and so on. Many governments take the view that these circumstances 
force them to take on responsibilities far beyond those advocated by conventional 
economic theories, extending their role beyond economic management, directed to 
promoting growth and ensuring macroeconomic stability, to intervening in the 
allocation of resources and the development of firms and industries. More 
importantly, with the unprecedented economic as well as industrial growth of certain 
Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea^ and Taiwan, many developing countries have 
taken a special interest in the application of industrial policies in East Asia in the 
1980s. 
Despite this interest and the widespread application of various industrial policy 
measures over a couple of decades, the term industrial policy is still surrounded with 
ambiguities. As a result, one cannot find in the literature a single accepted and unified 
interpretation of, nor indeed a precise definition of the concept of, industrial policy. 
Further, no consensus view has been yet established regarding the theoretical 
' Hereafter Korea is used instead of the Republic of Korea or South Korea. 
arguments supporting industrial policies. Some of the general issues - such as 
whether governments, through policy measures, can develop industrial activities more 
effectively than the market mechanism, and under what circumstances and on what 
grounds a government role in economic activities is justified - have been subjected to 
extensive discussion over the years. To be able to understand the role of government 
and of the market in general, and their relative roles in industrial development in 
particular, it may be worthwhile to review some of these theoretical considerations. 
In this chapter, this particular task starts in Section 1.2, with a brief review of 
the neoclassical view and the classical infant industry argument about the role of 
government in industrial development. Then follows a review of recent theoretical 
approaches to the role of government in industrial development. Four recent 
approaches to the role of government are considered. Firstly, the theoretical rationales 
which stress the role of the government as complementary to the market are discussed 
under two themes, namely setting up new industries and the market enhancing view 
(Section 1.3). Next, other recent theoretical rationales, which emphasize the strategic 
role of government in industrial development on the basis of perceived inadequacy of 
market outcomes, are presented in Section 1.4. Some new growth models that explain 
how market outcomes could be sub-optimal and emphasize the potential role of policy 
intervention to obtain the social optimum are briefly discussed in Section 1.5. The 
development state view, which considers the role of government in the context of 
developing countries, is outlined in Section 1.6. The implications of these theoretical 
approaches for empirical work are briefly discussed in Section 1.7. 
1.2 Industrial Policy and the Role of Government 
This section presents two widely known theoretical views: the pure neoclassical view 
and the classical infant industry argument. The former assigns a dominant role for the 
market in economic activities while expecting a minor role from the government. A 
standard extension of that view, the classical infant industry argument, accepts newly 
established industries as the central exception to the pure reliance on market forces, 
and calls for government intervention to promote domestic infant industries. 
1.2.1 The Neoclassical View 
Government action is required in all the economies, for carrying out essential 
economic functions such as providing some physical infrastructure, supplying "public 
goods" such as defence and national security, the legal system and environmental 
protection, contributing to the development of institutions for improving markets for 
labour, finance, technology and so on. Economists generally accept a government role 
in these types of essential economic activities. To carry out these economic activities 
smoothly, functional measures, such as across-the-board R&D incentives, the 
provision of training facilities and incentives to develop a broad-based venture capital 
market are also widely accepted by economists. The neoclassical view, however, 
disputes the role of government intervention in resource allocation, especially in the 
case of the so-called industry specific intervention. Such activities may lead to 
political influence and rent seeking practices, and therefore will distort the price 
mechanism and lead to inefficiencies (Corden 1974; Smith 1995). 
Neoclassical economists hold that prices determined in free markets will drive 
the economy to its maximum production potential and to overall economic efficiency. 
In a situation where the market is functioning effectively, they consider that the theory 
of comparative advantage will determine intemational trade and investment patterns, 
and thereby the optimum industrial development pattern for a particular country. 
Under this line of argument, a country would attain a higher level of welfare if it 
permitted trade at intemational prices, producing those commodities that are 
comparatively cheaper at home and exchanging them for those that would be 
relatively more expensive to produce. Promoting resource allocation as specified by 
this theory, countries will also be able to derive dynamic benefits in terms of leaming-
by-doing, technology acquisition and productivity growth, and will encourage 
resources to be employed efficiently by mobilizing them to most productive 
industries. Instead of extensive government intervention, therefore, the neoclassical 
economists stress the importance of good economic management - such as 
maintaining sound fiscal, monetary and financial policies - as cmcial factors that 
determine the speed and sustainability of growth. The proper role of government is to 
help to create and maintain an environment in which price signals can effectively 
determine resource allocation (Kmeger 1990; Hughes 1993; Helleiner 1992). 
The price mechanism in this sense plays a central role in determining resource 
allocation. Competition between private producers promotes the efficient use of 
resources. However, the smooth and efficient operation of the price mechanism 
requires certain conditions, such as perfectly competitive markets for all goods and 
services, the absence of externalities, free availability of relevant information, free 
entry and exit and so on. Under these assumed conditions, it is asserted that 
individual firms cannot influence the market price, and each firm takes prices as given 
by the market. Free entry and exit, into and from industries, ensures that there will be 
no "pure" profits. In the long run, the theory concludes that competitive market 
equilibrium will deliver the social optimum. 
It is widely acknowledged that, in reality, there are many practical limitations 
to the operation of competitive markets. As specified by the theory, the price system 
is the mechanism by which the production decisions of firms are coordinated. To 
perform this signalling fimction, the price mechanism, among others, requires the 
sharing of information. In perfectly competitive markets, it assumes that information 
is freely available among economic agents and that they imdertake economic activities 
so as to maximize their objectives. However, the market may provide information 
about the price and quantity of a good, but it may not be able to provide sufficient 
information about other relevant aspects, such as the quality or other characteristics of 
goods or of the range of prices available. In practice, therefore, one can find many 
situations where the market alone cannot find best possible outcome. In the case of 
financial markets, for instance, lenders who are concemed with maximizing their 
returns may, due to information asymmetries, allocate credit by a screening and 
evaluation process rather than by allocating credit to the highest bidder. Other 
frequently cited examples include investment involving strategic complementarities or 
mutual linkages. If investments involve large-scale commitments and many inter-
linked technologies, no single entrepreneur may be able to bear the capital required for 
such investments. Where such heavy sunk costs are involved, contrary to the 
expectations of the theory, investment in certain economic activities may take place at 
less than the social optimum. For instance, in the case of investment related to 
knowledge based activities, firms may invest less than social optimum either because 
they are unable to meet the sunk costs involved or they are unable to appropriate all 
the benefits. Likewise, the failure of any other condition assumed by the theory may 
lead to a failure of markets to be efficient, a situation which is often referred to as a 
market failure (World Bank 1993; Itoh et al. 1991; Kim and Ma 1996; Ledyard 1987). 
Economists who have highlighted the practical limitations of markets on 
various grounds have challenged neoclassical theories in recent years. However, 
neoclassical economists initially responded to these market failures with an argument 
supporting the protection of so-called infant industries (see Section 1.2.2). Taking 
these arguments a step further, industrial policy advocates stress the importance of a 
rapid shift of industrial stmcture towards capital and knowledge intensive industries. 
Some of these industrial policy advocates such as (Wade 1988, 1990a, 1990b; 
Amsden 1989) have argued that government has the ability to handle some of the 
activities where market outcomes are limited by market failures. 
However, many neoclassical economists do not accept these arguments 
produced in favour of industrial policies. In particular, they are sceptical about the 
government's ability to implement an efficient solution for solving market failures. 
Although they acknowledge the fact that there are certain inherent market failures and 
that in such a situation government interference could be necessary, they are in favour 
of implementing functional or across-the-board measures to overcome such market 
inefficiencies. They believe that such measures create less harmful effects on the 
economy than the measures advocated by industrial policy theorists. 
Just as markets may fail, so there may also be government failures. Although 
there are theoretical grotmds for government to intervene in certain economic 
activities, strong counterarguments also exist indicating possible government failures. 
That is, for various reasons government policy may be no more effective in reaching 
an efficient outcome than the market which it seeks to correct. One such argument is 
based on rent seeking. This argument contends that government intervention creates 
economic rents for parties that receive privileges (e.g. a monopolist position. 
government directed credits or subsidies). The existence of these rents induces rent 
seeking activities that are socially wastefiil. 
Another major argument of this type is government information failure. To be 
able to rectify market impediments effectively, among other things government should 
be able to gather accurate information regarding the segment of the economy in which 
the functional impediment appears, as well as being able to determine the cause and 
extent of the distortion. Information related to private economic activities - technical 
knowledge of producers, consumer preferences, resource availability - is dispersed 
individually among producers, consumers and resource ovmers. Therefore, it may be 
impossible in practice for the government to make the original holders of such private 
information divulge it accurately and quickly (Itoh et al. 1991). Thus it may be 
impossible for the government to assemble the necessary information to intervene 
effectively. 
Another source of market failure, and of potential government intervention, is 
coordination failures. But the coordination problems are more complex than is often 
assumed by the theoretical models. As Matsuyama (1996, p. 136) notes "coordination 
problems are inherently difficult; coordination failures are everywhere; whatever 
coordination mechanism is put in place, they are so pervasive that there is plenty of 
room for improvemenf. Even the most advanced economies fail in coordination and 
even the least developed economies achieve a certain degree of coordination. There 
may be a great variety in the manner in which different economies cope with the 
coordination problem. In fact, there may be situations where government, with its 
coercive power, can sometimes improve coordination. However, as Matsuyama 
notes: 
as a consequence of the fundamental difficulty of the coordination problem, it 
is inevitable that any mechanism, including the Invisible Hand of the price 
mechanism, supplemented by the Visible Hand of entrepreneurs and of 
bureaucrats, cannot find the efficient economic system. (1996, p. 145) 
In other words neither the market nor the government alone may be able to find 
complete solutions for coordination failures. 
In sum, as the previous discussion suggests, the neoclassical economists assign 
a dominant role for the market in economic activities. By contrast many others argue 
that, if there are increasing retums to scale, other nonconvexties, informational 
asymmetry, externalities, and significant market power on either the supply side or 
demand side of the economy, market forces alone will not assure the efficiency of the 
economy. Since there is a self-regulating mechanism involved with the market 
mechanism, it is considered that market outcomes could be improved with 
government support. Some recent theoretical approaches therefore advocate a role for 
government where markets are deficient, so as to generate an improved outcome. 
Some of these new theoretical rationales, which basically challenge neoclassical 
orthodoxy, will be discussed in the forthcoming sections of this chapter. A brief 
taxonomy of these theoretical rationales for industry policy, and the associated 
deviations from the pure competitive model, is provided in Table 1.1. In the face of 
these various rationales, however, many neoclassical economists will continue to 
stress the likelihood of government failure if an interventionist approach is adopted. 
1.2.2 The Infant Industry Argument 
The best known and most widely accepted rationale for government intervention in 
the industrial stmcture is the classical infant industry argument. This argument rests 
on dynamic learning effects which are presumed to be effective in shifting the 
economy's transformation curve over time, so that an industry that is not currently 
competitive may achieve comparative advantage after a temporary period of 
protection. Infant industries, as the proponents of this argument posit, carmot 
compete successfully with more established foreign firms, due to lack of know-how 
and the initial small level of output. Temporary support from the government, mainly 
in the form of tariff protection, is then justified for these industries until they grow in 
scale and become 'mature' to the point where they can stand on their own feet. 
^ As cited by Leuedde-Neurath (1986, p. 19) the infant mdustry argument "was origmally credited to 
Hamilton (1791) and to List, whose German book on this topic appeared in 1841. Yet the acceptance 
of the infant industry doctrme by orthodox economists only followed its endorsement by John Smart 
Mill, who stated that the only case in which, on mere principles of political economy protectmg duties 
can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially m a young and rising nation) in 
hopes of naturalising foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country" 
(Mill 1848, p. 918). 
Table 1.1 Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Policy 
Rationales for Industrial 
Policies 
1. Infant industry argument 
2. Market complementary 
- Setting up new industries 
3. Market enhancing 
4. Strategic trade theory 
5. New growth models 
6. The development state 
- Governing the market 
Deviations from the 
Purely Competitive Model 
Sunk costs, economies of scale 
and increasing remms 
Sunk costs, economies of scale 
and oligopoly 
Information failures 
Externalities and 
complementarities 
Information failures 
Coordination problem 
Oligopolistic industries and 
market power 
Strategic competition 
Economies of scale and scope, 
increasing remms 
Incomplete markets 
Information asymmetry 
Coordination problem 
Market power - oligopoly 
Pervasive deviations from purely 
compethive market, with special 
implications for development 
process 
Policy Requirements 
Support ends when industry matures 
Adequate government information 
and competency 
Socialization of risk 
Goverrunent support to private sector 
solutions of information and 
coordination problems 
Theoretical effects only - policy 
relevance widely doubted 
Theories show the possibility of 
diverse economic outcomes in the 
context of complex growth dynamics 
of mdividual economies 
A strong unified and highly 
competent state 
With the passage of time, it is believed that the scale of production will 
gradually expand, so that firms will be able to reap the benefits of economies of scale. 
That means that when output expands cost per unit will fall gradually. As the 
industi-ies progress they leam through their past experience. Through the benefits that 
can be achieved through leaming-by-doing and economies of scale, coupled with the 
support of government, it is further expected that these infant industries will be able to 
become intemationally competitive (Itoh et al. 1991; Meier 1987). 
In order for this argument to be theoretically defensible two conditions must be 
satisfied. First, when the industry is protected and matures, making use of the benefits 
of dynamic scale economies, the private firms in the industry must be able to make a 
profit. In other words, the industry must reach intemational competitiveness after a 
period of time. This condition is knovm as Mill criterion. However, the likelihood of 
achieving intemational competitiveness is not a sufficient condition for choosing an 
industry to develop, because fulfilling such a criteria does not necessarily mean that it 
has provided net benefits to the domestic economy. Therefore, secondly, the 
discoimted present value of the future social benefits from the industry must exceed 
those of the costs during the period of government support. This criterion is known as 
Bastable criterion (Itoh et al. 1991, p. 43; Alavi 1996, p. 102). 
A renewed interest in this infant industry argument became evident during the 
1950s. At that time, it was widely believed that primary exports receive low prices 
and have low income elasticities. Most of the developing countries were thus seen to 
be in a disadvantageous position, due to the fact that most of their world exports 
consisted of such primary products. To overcome the adverse repercussions arising 
from this situation, it was argued that developing countries had to diversify exports 
and to lower their dependence on primary product exports. In other words, some form 
of industrialization was considered necessary for these economies. Therefore, a 
number of development economists, such as Hirschman, Myrdal, Nurkse, Singer and 
Prebisch, argued that protection should be an integral part of development strategies 
(Leuedde-Neurath 1986). As a result, a significant number of developing countries 
began to emphasize an import substitution industrial strategy during this period. 
However, there are fundamental differences between these development 
economists and the neoclassical economists regarding the appropriate tool for infant 
industry promotion. As noted earlier, neoclassical economists generally advocate 
across-the-board measures - preferably modest subsidies - which promote 
comparative advantage. Such measures, they claim, create less harmfiil effects to the 
economy, in particular to the price mechanism. Proponents of the infant industry 
argument agree that those activities corresponding to comparative advantage should 
be promoted. In addition, however, they also recognise the need to promote other 
industries which may not be intemationally competitive in the short or medium term 
for technical or leaming-time reasons. The latter view stresses the importance of 
protection to promote infant industries, noting that industries which possess 
comparative advantage will require lower levels of assistance than one involving high 
technical barriers to entry or long leaming periods (Leuedde-Neurath 1986). 
Counter arguments, however, have been levelled against this infant industry 
argument, as well as against the industrial strategy - import substitution - primarily 
based on this doctrine. As the critics argue, policy instmments such as quantitative 
restrictions, tariffs etc., lead to price distortions greater than those arising from the 
provision of production subsidies. Besides, a vast array of literature (for instance 
Meier 1987; Balassa 1980; Kmeger 1981) claims that import substitution strategies 
are excessively costly, impact adversely on industrial development and export 
promotion and, more generally, that the promotion of industries through protection 
has limited the rate of development of many countries. 
1.3 The Government as Complementary to the Market 
The neoclassical orthodoxy, outiined in the Section 1.2, considers that the market is 
the best method for handling resource allocation. By contrast, some of the new 
theoretical rationales, for instance the 'development state view', that will be presented 
below in Section 1.6, draw attention to pervasive market inefficiencies, and contend 
that government may have the capacity to overcome those market inefficiencies 
effectively. 
It is widely agreed that, in certain circumstances, markets do not perform 
effectively. Whether government can find solutions when markets fail is also a 
question which has been subjected to much controversy. Highlighting the importance 
of the private sector in economic activities, a number of recent studies, including 
Worid Development Report 1991,^ Itoh et al. 1991 and Aoki et al. 1996, argue that 
^ This view, known as the 'market friendly view', suggests that where the market works the government 
role should be minunum and where markets do not work effectively the government role should be 
intensified. It is fiirther added that the appropriate role of government is to ensure adequate mvestments 
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govemment should play a complementary role in fostering market outcomes. The 
special characteristics of this view, which is primarily based on the experience of 
Japan and other East Asian coimtries, will be reviewed in the following section under 
two headings: setting up new industries and the market enhancing view. 
1.3.1 Setting up New Industries 
Taking into account the distinct characteristics of industrial stmcture in Japan, and 
describing how initial set up costs may become a constraint on industrial 
development, Itoh, Kiyono, Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1991) argue that 
govemment intervention, which helps to socialize risk, enables countries to reap the 
benefits of trade and also to increase economic welfare. They argue that private 
incentives alone are often not sufficient to establish an industry, due to imperfect 
information and to certain other market failures associated with technology. 
Explaining the importance of economies of scale, the presence of extemalities and the 
way in which industrial set up costs may become a barrier for infant industries, these 
economists claim that industrial set up costs tend to be more prevalent in: (1) 
oligopolistic industries characterized by considerable scale economies; (2) industries 
with a greater number of interrelated sectors; and (3) related industries which are 
themselves oligopolistically organized such that prices alone cannot relay all the 
information required (Itoh et al. 1991, p. 70). 
This approach has a number of special characteristics which are worth 
exploring. First of all, this rationale considers industrial policies as policies which are 
necessary only when market failures prevent the market mechanism from attaining the 
most desirable resource allocation and income distribution. In this sense, the 
govemment role is considered as complementary to, rather than as a substitute for, the 
market. Acknowledging the fact that there is no assurance that industrial policy 
intervention will raise economic welfare in the event of market failure, this rationale 
also emphasizes that the improvement of welfare through govemment intervention 
depends on certain conditions, such as government's ability to obtain accurate 
in people, provision of a competitive climate for enterprise, openness to intemational trade and stable 
macroeconomic management. 
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information, its administrative capacit)' and its ability to foresee the long-term effects 
of policy initiatives. 
The incorporation of the distinctive characteristics of the industrial policies of 
Japan into their model can be considered as another special feature of this approach. 
The authors emphasize that Japanese industrial policies have had unique features, in 
the sense that they not only recognized the importance of assembly industries such as 
household electronics and automobiles in their efforts towards developing industrial 
stmcture, but also made efforts to link with the formation of an ideal industrial 
stmcture for the Japanese economy as a whole. 
The assembly industries, which are at the core of this approach, are composed 
of a large number of parts and processes. For these types of industries, large-scale 
production provides the opportunity to set up a network of specialized firms 
producing individual parts. As the output of the industry expands, production costs 
and prices will fall. Consequently, the long run market supply curve for the industries 
with extemal economies becomes downward sloping, as the industrial set up costs are 
spread over an increasing level of production. When industrial set up costs are high, 
the resulting entry barriers may discourage newcomers. In such circumstances, 
provided that domestic demand is sufficiently high, this theoretical rationale argues 
that it is possible to raise the economic welfare of a country through govemment 
intervention, either in the form of subsidies or import restrictions, even if these 
products are at an infant stage of production. 
Further they add that industries which involve huge set up costs result in 
multiple equilibria, with coimtries either gaining a substantial position in a given 
industry or playing only a very minor part in it. In such circumstances "the 
equilibrium that finally emerges depends on factors such as the collective information 
shared by the participants of the game and the coordination enforced by those outside 
the game" (Itoh et al. 1991, p. 71). Explaining the difficulty in finding accurate 
information for the private sector as well as the govemment, they point out that the 
information exchanges made possible through deliberation councils or other official 
committees have been greatly beneficial to firms in the case of Japan. 
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Moreover, this rationale considers that industrial stmcture and the stmcture of 
intemational trade is not determined only on the basis of comparative cost principle. 
Instead, other factors such as which country takes the lead in setting up the industry 
and other non-economic factors (such as culture and history) determine the pattem of 
intemational trade. Claiming that Westem theories of economic policies (theory of 
trade, analyses of subsidies and taxes etc.) have a limited value in bringing out the 
essence of Japanese industrial policies, these authors consider that it is necessary to 
formulate a model incorporating the distinct features of Japanese industrial policies. 
This model is noteworthy on several respects. Firstly, it claims to illustrate 
systematically why govemment intervention is necessary for an economy like Japan 
and how govemment intervention contributes to the economy. Secondly, and perhaps 
most importantly, the contribution of this model is notable because of its presentation 
of a welfare analysis, which has been overlooked by many other arguments supporting 
industrial policies. 
Due to the novelty of these concepts in the industrial policy literature, it may 
be worthwhile to review this model in detail. Explaining the way in which the 
advancement of industrial stmcture affects the economic welfare of a country, Itoh et 
al. (1991, p. 82) use multisector Ricardian model to elaborate their arguments. Under 
this model, it is assumed that the stmctiu-e of production - the supply side - produces 
an infinite number of goods, which are indexed by a number n, lying in the interval [0, 
N] and that labour is the only factor of production. There are two trading countries: 
the home country (Japan) and a foreign coimtry. The production technology for each 
of the goods in each country is described by a fixed input requirement coefficient. 
Thus for producing good n, the model assumes that labour input coefficients a„ and 
a„* are used by the home and foreign country respectively. It is assumed that these 
labour input coefficients represent all the supply side conditions, including the 
technological levels and the industrial stmcture of the two countries. 
Under diese assumptions, die relative wage rate w/w*, where w and w* 
represent the domestic and foreign wage respectively in terms of the home currency, is 
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considered as the only endogenous variable in this model. As specified by this model, 
the pattem of trade under the conditions of perfect competition and free trade is 
determined as follows: 
The home country exports good n if a„w <a„*w* 
The foreign country exports good n if a„w >a„*w* 
Given these conditions, the home country exports goods for which a„*/a„ is 
greater than w/w*, and imports goods for which a„*/a„ is smaller than w/w* (Itoh et al. 
1991, p. 83). These conditions are illustrated in Chart 1.1. Accordingly, the forward-
falling curve represents the supply-wage curve for a given set of production co-
efficients a„*/a„. The curve is forward-falling due to the fact that the goods are 
indexed such that a„*/a„ is a declining function of n. So that as the relative wage of 
the home country falls for a given set of production co-efficients, the home country 
will be competitive in more industries. This supply-wage curve further represents the 
relationship between the trade pattem and relative wage rate w/w* in the two 
countries. As illustrated in Chart. 1.1, for instance, if relative wages are given by 
point A, the commodities indexed by 0 to n will be home country exports, and those 
by « to N will be foreign country exports. In this situation, good n is termed as the 
marginal good,'* 
Presenting the demand side, the model further assumes that both countries 
have fixed labour endowments. Thus, L and L*, and wL and w*L*, represent labour 
endowments and income of the home and foreign country respectively. The 
proportion of expenditure, the most cmcial demand variable in this model, spent on a 
good n in the domestic and foreign country is defined by Sn and ^ * respectively. For 
simplicity, the model assumes that the expenditure proportions are fixed (Cobb-
Douglas type utility function). With these specifications, the model requires that the 
It is assumed that Japan is in the process of catching up with the foreign country. It has to make 
decisions out of three goods namely, good 1, good 2, and good 3. Production of good 1 requkes simple 
technology, in which Japan has comparative advantage while for good 3 requires fakly advanced 
technology, which foreign country possesses comparative advantage. Technology for good 2 lies 
between that of good 1 and good 3, and both countries are equally competitive for producing good 2. It 
is expected that Japan produces good 1 and 2 while foreign country produces goods 2 and 3 (Itoh et al. 
1991, p. 76). 
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proportion of income spent on all goods, is equal to (will integrate to) unity (Itoh et al. 
1991, p. 84). 
The above mentioned condition is presented as: 
l's„dn = l's:dn = l (1) 
Under the assumption of balanced trade (the value of home country imports must 
equal the value of foreign country imports) between the two countries and with the 
marginal good n representing the boundary between exports and imports, equation (2) 
is formed as: 
{l^„S„dn)wL = {ils:dn)wL (2) 
In equation (2), the left side gives home country imports, and the right side represents 
foreign country imports. Rearranging, the equation (2) we get: 
(wL) l{w L') = {II Si dn) /(J-^  5. dn) (3) 
Or, equivalently: 
w/vv* = [{tXdri)l{^Sndn)\L'IL) (4) 
The demand-wage relationship illustrated by equation (4) is further 
demonstrated in Chart 1.1 with an upward-rising curve. This curve emerges from the 
relationship between the relative wage w/w* and the trade pattem (given n as the 
marginal good). This demand-wage curve is always upward-rising, as the model 
claims "the larger the share of foreign expenditure on the home country goods (or the 
smaller the share of home country expenditure on imported goods), the higher is the 
relative wage, w/w*, and relative income ratio wL/w*L* for the home country" (Itoh et 
al. 1991, p. 84). 
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Trade equilibrium, as demonstrated in Chart 1.1, occurs for the two countries 
at the point of intersection of the supply and demand wage curves. In the end, the 
index of the marginal good n, which represents the trade pattem, and w/w*, the 
relative wage, are determined by the technology and industry stmcture parameters [a„ 
and a„ ] and the parameters representing the pattem of demand [ 4 and 6„*]. 
Within the framework specified in the model, it is claimed that the home 
country relative wage rises when there is diversification of the home country export 
menu accompanying a rise in the index of marginal good n. In other words, "if 
diversification of the home country export menu leads to greater demand, derived 
demand for the home country's factors of production will also rise, pulling up incomes 
in the home country" (Itoh et al. 1991, p. 85). 
How the pattem of trade and gains from trade are determined with this model 
are further explained by Itoh et al. (1991, p. 85) while introducing the concept of 
'technology gap', with the aid of Chart 1.2. The curve, Ai A2, represents the supply-
wage curve at the initial state of industrial development of the home coimtry. At this 
stage the relative wage of the home country is extremely low (OBi) and it produces an 
only a small number of industries. If home country establishes a number of industries, 
which enable it to diversify its industrial stmcture, it is possible to shift the supply-
wage curve Al A3 With the shift of the supply-wage curve, for a given demand-wage 
curve, now the equilibrium occurs at C2. "As a result the goods indexed by interval 
[ ni to Yii] are added to the home country export menu, and home country relative 
income (relative wages and wage levels in the home country's currency) rises by the 
amount of expenditure on these goods in line with the demand-wage schedule" (Itoh 
etal. 1991, p. 86). 
Itoh et al. (1991) also claim diat there exist other theoretically possible pattems 
of industrial development.^ For instance as a result of R&D or equipment investment 
^ Another alternative theoretical outcome could emerge with the reaction of the foreign country. If 
foreign country react in a different way such as takmg actions to reduce the technology gap, the home 
country is affected either positively or negatively depending on the degree to which the shift in 
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in industries where the home country (Japan) held a comparative advantage, the 
supply wage curve may shift from Ai A2 to A4 A2 The equilibrium in this case occurs 
at Ci, and the stmcture of comparative advantage or the relative wage will hardly 
change. This is a case in which policy leads the home country to become more 
efficient in existing industries (to be competitive at a higher wage) but not to enter 
production in additional industries. 
All in all, Itoh et al. claim that the industrial development accompanied by 
diversification of the home country export menu, may be beneficial to the home 
country in several ways than other theoretical possibilities noted above. Because it 
raises the relative wage in the home coimtry, it generates benefits in the form of 
lowering the cost of consuming the goods produced by the newly developed 
industries, and increases in income allow imports of more goods. Further, "if 
industrial development centers around marginal industries with high expenditure 
shares, the chances that the home country's relative income rises sharply and the 
foreign country bears losses are greater" (Itoh et al. 1991, p. 87). 
With the aid of the model presented above, Itoh et al. (1991) then analyse how 
the changes in the Japanese industrial stmcture could contribute to increased 
economic welfare. They argue that the industrial stmcture of Japan can change in two 
different ways: either specializing on good 1 where they have comparative advantage 
or specialising the marginal industry (good 2). Accordingly, if the Japanese industrial 
sector specializes in good 1, the resulting competitive advantage would unlikely 
enhance the economic welfare. Because, the price elasticity of demand for 
technologically simple goods are in general tend to be low. In such a case, even if the 
prices of these goods fall due to the specialistion, foreign demand for these goods is 
unlikely to rise. If the proportion of expenditure spent on these products from a 
foreign country remains unchanged, one cannot expect substantial changes (increase) 
in relative income in the home country. 
technological coefficient a„ is concentrated in the margmal industries and the share of these marginal 
industries in total demand. 
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By contrast, if Japanese industrial development is based on increasing 
competitiveness in the marginal industry (good 2) this may lead to substantially 
different welfare effects. When Japan specialises in good 2, the supply source (for a 
part of this good) shifts from the foreign to the home country. Japanese exports of this 
product will increase, while exports of good 2 will contract in the foreign country. 
Since Japan is able to replace part of these goods, that was originally obtained from 
the foreign country, the amount Japan spent on importing (the proportion of 
expenditure) will be reduced relative to that of the foreign country. If foreign coimtry 
continues importing these goods then there will be substantial differences in relative 
income in these two countries. As we noted earlier, stmctural changes in favour of 
good 2 is beneficial to the home country because it raises the relative wage in the 
home country, generates benefits in the form of lowering the cost of consuming the 
goods produced by the newly developed industries, and increases in income allow 
imports of more goods. These favourable effects are more likely to be materialised if 
the price elasticity for good 2 is greater than 1. In such a case, a fall in price will lead 
to an increase in the share of expenditure allocated for this good by the foreign 
country, raising the relative income of Japan. However, Itoh et al. express their 
doubts regarding the effects of economic welfare of the foreign country. In response 
to these changes foreign countries may either retaliate by imposing trade restrictions 
or provide production subsidies. Such actions may provoke further retaliations from 
Japan thus resulting the contract of world trade. Foreign country can however react in 
a different way that is by promoting development of advanced industry. 
This theoretical rationale stresses that countries could achieve substantial 
benefits if industries which require huge initial investments but initially possess less 
comparative advantage, are supported by the govemment. It also notes that import 
controls can also be used as a device for export promotion if the domestic market is 
large enough. Since it is impossible to treat all the infant industries equitably for 
promotion for a developing country which faces resource constraints, Itoh et al. argue 
that it is necessary to set up priorities and promote certain industries. Promoting 
industries which possess high income elasticities would be beneficial since it will 
raise the relative income of the home country. 
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1.3.2 Market Enhancing View 
As outlined previously, it is often held that neither the market nor the govemment 
alone can handle economic activities effectively and efficiently. Highlighting the 
practical limitations of both the neoclassical orthodoxy and the development state 
view, therefore, an argument described as its authors as the 'market enhancing view' 
contends that the role of the market as well as that of the govemment is necessary for 
the effective and efficient operation of economic activities. 
Introducing this view, Aoki, Murdock and Okuno-Fujiwara (1996), state that 
market failure can be more pervasive than the market friendly view tends to suggest, 
but that this does not unconditionally justify the immediate substitution of state led 
coordination. They argue that neither the market nor the govemment alone can 
adequately handle market imperfections. In their words "govemment is not a neutral, 
omnipotent agent that can correct market or organization failures. Govemment itself 
is constrained in its capacity to process information" (Aoki et al. 1996, p. 1). 
Governments may also face the same informational and incentive constraints as other 
economic agents in the system. Therefore, the effectiveness of govemment in 
promoting the efficiency of private coordination cannot be taken for granted. 
Instead of viewing the govemment and the market as the only altematives and 
as mutually exclusive substitutes, this 'market enhancing view' considers that 
govemment should play a role which facilitates or complements private sector 
coordination. They assert that private sector institutions have comparative 
advantages, while the govemment has the ability to process locally available 
information. Like others, they agree that private sector institutions do not solve all 
important market imperfections and diat this is particularly tme for economies in a 
low state of development. Since the private sector has built-in self-regulating features 
such as competition, entiy and exit that the govemment does not have, this view 
considers that it is advisable to allow private sector institutions to solve coordination 
problems whenever possible. In that respect, policy intervention should be limited to 
solving coordination problems depending on the level of development of the country. 
Like die 'development state view', Aoki et al. (1996) contend that when an economy 
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is in a low state of development, the ability of the private sector to solve challenging 
coordination problems may be inadequate. In such economies the availability of 
intermediaries is limited, the capabilities of firais are modest, and the efficiency of 
markets is hampered by poor integration. Under these circumstances, there may be 
more scope for govemment policy to facilitate development. "From this perspective, 
it is not the government's responsibility to solve the coordination problem. Rather, 
the government's role is to facilitate the development of private sector institutions that 
can overcome these failures" (Aoki et al. 1996, p. 9). 
In essence, the ideas expressed by this market enhancing view, like the other 
theoretical rationale presented in this section (Itoh et al. 1991), seem to be more 
practical since they take into account the actual experience of Japan and other East 
Asian countries. Lack of formal analysis may, however, be regarded as one of the 
limitations of this contribution. Moreover, though they recognize the significance of 
both private and govemment roles, they have not specified the ways in which 
govemment can help to foster the private sector. 
1.4 The Government as a Strategic Player: Strategic Trade Theory 
Since the early 1980s, a considerable body of literature has stressed the importance of 
selective govemment intervention in promoting industrial development. Much of this 
literature highlights the supposed fact that, due to certain market failures arising from 
the stmctural rigidities of developing coimtries or from imperfectly competitive 
market conditions, industrial development in certain industries will be slow if left to 
the market forces alone. In the literature which emphasizes the importance of 
selective govemment intervention, two approaches are most notable. They are 
'strategic trade theory' and the 'development state view'. 
Contrary to the theoretical rationales presented in section 1.2, 'strategic trade 
theory' argues that a country that promotes industries characterised by economies of 
scale and extemalities can help to shift its pattem of comparative advantage, and can 
thereby promote economic growth. This rationale, initially introduced by Brander and 
Spencer (1981) and later extended by Kmgman (1984, 1986, 1987), is based, like 
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other approaches, on the presence of extemalitie.< ,^ imperfect markets and economies 
of scale. However, there exist certain differences in presenting their arguments in 
support of industry specific intervention. More specifically, this new rationale, 
formulating a model in an imperfectly competitive environment - an oligopolistic 
competitive model with a domestic and a foreign firm, where competition occurs 
through prices (the Coumot model) - explains the way in which strategic interactions 
can give rise to the possibility of beneficial policy. 
In a perfectly competitive world, prices are determined by the market, and the 
eamings of equivalent factors in different sectors are equalised through competition 
over time. In the case of an imperfect competition, where there are a small number of 
producers in the market, producers can influence prices. If they set prices above the 
marginal cost there will be excess profits. Under competitive markets, these excess 
profits will attract new firms, and will continue to do so until the excess profits 
disappear, A similar process may not happen if the market is imperfectly competitive. 
The existing entry barriers, either based on the requirement of large-scale investment, 
or on the presence of economies of scale, prevent newcomers entering into the market. 
Consequently, the equalisation of factor and product prices may not necessarily occur 
in this type of market. 
Presenting their theoretical model in a similar fashion, the authors assume that, 
in some goods and services markets, there are relatively few firms engaged in 
production. As a consequence, it is possible for firms to cam profits above the rate of 
retum earned in purely competitive industries. For instance, as Kmgman (1986, p. 15) 
notes, trading pattems are now more likely to be influenced by the important role 
being played by economies of scale and the advantages of experience and innovation. 
In particular, due to the increased role of technological competition, labour or capital 
will sometimes eam significantly higher retums in some industries than others. 
By incorporating a Coumot model in which competition between one domestic 
firm and one foreign firm occurs through setting prices, strategic trade theory argues 
that the profits of each firm depend on strategic interaction with the rival firm. The 
model then shows that if the lower cost firm expands its output, the rival will contract. 
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By identifying certain types of strategic sectors which are facing foreign competition, 
and imposing trade policies so as to increase domestic participation in these 
industries, it is thus possible that countries will be able to reap the benefits of 
economies of scale. Govemment intervention, in such circumstances, benefits the 
country in a number of ways. Govemment policies enable it to secure for the nation a 
large share of the rent implicit in the oligopolistic competition. In particular, with the 
help of appropriate policies it is possible to shift the profits from oligopolistic foreign 
firms to domestic firms, thus improving the profitability of the latter. This is possible, 
as Spencer (1986) argues, because govemment policies that increase domestic 
capacity are likely to serve as a signal to foreign firms, indicating that there will be 
threats in the future to the retums they can eam in the industry. These signals in turn 
might have the effect of reducing the foreign firm's capacity, even if they had been 
expecting to expand their production further. 
The likely procedure, as explained by Brander, is as follows: 
When one firm expands output supported by a credible threat, the other firm 
has no reason to believe the increased competitiveness is only temporary. The 
best it can do is respond to the lowered leftover demand that it sees by 
reducing output. This in turn helps the lower cost firm. In effect this firm 
benefited twice from lower cost. In the first instance, it simply gained directly 
because costs fell. In addition the lowered costs improved its strategic position 
in the market and indirectly induced the rival to contract. This contraction by 
the rival increases the price that the expanding firm can obtain for any given 
output level and causes profit to rise through that channel. Thus the firm with 
lowered costs benefits by more than the amount of cost saving. (1986, p. 28) 
Through govemment policies it may also be possible to reduce the extent of 
spillovers of domestic R&D to foreign firms. If there is oligopolistic rivalry between 
foreign and domestic firms, as Spencer (1986) notes, any spillover of domestic R&D 
to the foreign firms is likely to reduce the rents earned by domestic firms in 
intemational markets. In those industries where there are major problems from 
appropriation of retums from R&D, it is argued that by providing incentives it is 
possible to maintain the required level of R&D. 
Explaining furtiier the ways in which govemment policies are influential to the 
domestic economy, 'sttategic trade theory' contends that, by systematically promoting 
those industries in which economies of scale and extemalities are present, countries 
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are able to overcome entr>' barriers, reap the benefits of economies of scale and 
enhance productivity. In effect, firms as well as an economy will be better off if the 
domestic firm is able to lower its costs through more efficient methods of production. 
These economists argue that, through export subsidy or production subsidy, it is 
possible to create similar effects to a lowering costs. A subsidy to the cost of 
producing extra output makes it in the firm's interest to expand output. The 
expansion of output then leads to a lowering of marginal cost sufficient to create 
domestic advantage, where otherwise it might not have existed. In effect, the subsidy 
makes it possible for the domestic firm to stake out a larger market share of a 
profitable intemational market than it otherwise could. Providing subsidies to all 
industries, they argue, would not be effective and therefore they stress the importance 
of 'picking winners', though they themselves admit it as a difficult task. Further they 
point out that protective policies can be also used as a source of export promotion. 
For instance, Kmgman (1984) and Brander (1986), introducing a strategic 
interpretation to the infant industry argument, suggest that restricting a particular 
market or subset of a market to domestic producers will help them to reap the benefits 
of economies of scale. 
1.5 Development Policy and Some New Growth Models 
The theoretical approaches to industrial policy presented above highlight a variety of 
ways in which actual markets may perform less effectively than the purely competitive 
paradigm implies, and this raises the possibility that govemment intervention is 
necessary to achieve certain economic goals. In a similar vein, many 'new growth 
theories' suggest ways in which economic growth could possibly be lower than the 
social optimum under competitive markets, again raising the possibility of policy 
intervention. 
Following the lead of Arrow's seminal 1962 paper on leaming-by-doing, 
Romer (1986) introduced new growth theory, or endogenous growth theory, by 
developing a growth model with extemalities in the production function. Lucas 
(1988), in another seminal paper in the development of the new growth models, 
introduced another parallel model with extemalities in the leaming process. The 
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theoretical insights provided by these models have inspired the development of a wide 
range of new growth models based on a variety of assumptions. A quite extensive 
analysis of these new growth models can be found in Romer (1990, 1994a), Barros 
(1993), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Sheehan (1993, 2000), Pack (1994), 
Verspagen (1992), Hammond and Rodriguez-Clare (1993), Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995) and Lucas (1999). Relaxing some specific assumptions of neoclassical theory, 
these new growth models provide diverse policy implications in relation to growth, 
trade and investment while still operating broadly within a neoclassical framework. 
Due to the extensive and diverse nature of the new growth literature, 
presenting the specific contribution of even a reasonable selection of the new growth 
literature is far beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, this section will review 
briefly aspects of the way in which some of these models depart from the basic 
neoclassical view of growth, emphasising ways which might be seen to provide a 
rationale for industrial policies. 
1.5.1 Basic Characteristics 
Prior to the introduction of these new growth theories, the prevailing neoclassical 
theory of economic growth (the Solow/Swan model) was one in which per capita 
growth was determined by technological change, which was assumed to be 
exogenous. Though it is widely accepted that the role of technological change is 
important in determining economic growth, the mechanism by which it influences 
economic growth remains unspecified in the Solow/Swan model. Other than labelling 
the residual - that element of economic growth which was left unexplained after 
accounting for the contribution of growth in factor supplies - as technical progress, 
this model had little to say about policies that might significantly influence long run 
growth. 
Thus one central motivation for the development of new growth theories was 
to show how endogenous technological change might drive growth. These new 
models continue, in most cases, to use neoclassical approaches such as a general 
equilibrium framework and the assumption that a representative economic agent 
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optimises his or her welfare over an infinite horizon. In many instances, these models 
involve two capital goods, one good representing physical capital, which is also a 
substitute for consumption, and another good which has various interpretations from 
one model to the other, representing human capital, production designs, intermediate 
goods facilitating the production of differentiated products and so on. Thus, contrary 
to the neoclassical model, which assumes that economic goods are both rival and 
excludable, some of these new models consider a set of goods some of which are non-
rival yet excludable, such as production designs (Romer 1990). Indeed, Romer 
(1994a) has argued that most important new element in the new growth theory lies in 
the relaxation of the standard assumption that the set of goods is fixed, and hence the 
modelling of the endogenous creation of new goods. 
In this framework these models variously illustrate how steady state growth 
can be endogenously generated within the economy by leaming-by-doing, by the 
creation and use of new products or new process technologies, by the creation and use 
of human capital development and so on. These theories thus not only provide an 
explanation as to how economic growth may be endogenously determined but also 
illustrate some mechanisms by which such factors can generate sustained economic 
growth. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that new growth theory remains 
formally within the neoclassical tradition, and continue to make most of the 
assumptions and characteristics of that tradition. 
In explaining the possibility of continuous endogenous growth, most of these 
new models make use of increasing retums.^ Thus in most of these models the 
marginal product of capital is bounded away from zero. A necessary condition for 
continuing endogenous growth in the representative agent model is that the marginal 
product of capital (or more generally of the factors which can be accumulated) 
remains constant at some level sufficient to preserve the incentive to invest. In a 
standard neoclassical framework, endogenous growth must eventually cease at some 
point in time, because diminishing marginal retums to capital means that at some 
point the retums to investment no longer exceed to costs of capital. 
* However, some models of endogenous growth, for instance Jones and Manuelli (1990) show that 
increasing remms are neither necessary nor sufficient for endogenous growth. 
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Economists have recognized the presence of increasing retums, and their 
significance, for quite some time. Because of the technical difficulties, incorporating 
increasing retums to a formal model has been difficult. Overcoming these difficulties 
to a certain extent, mainly by using advances in the mathematical analysis of dynamic 
optimisation problems, Romer (1986) and subsequent new growth models apply 
various strategies to handle these increasing retums in a modelling context. Basically, 
two approaches are applied in these models. One is to treat increasing retums as 
extemalities. Accordingly, increasing retums are extemal to the firm but intemal to 
the industry. Under these conditions, the decision-making process of a firm can be 
handled within a competitive market framework. The more fundamental approach 
applied in new growth theory is to treat increasing retums as arising in the context of 
monopolistic competition, using the formalization of monopolistic competition 
developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
1.5.2 Variety of Models 
Incorporating the above noted basic characteristics, a wide variety of models have 
been developed to interpret endogenous growth. These models have been categorised 
in the literature in a number of ways (Hammond and Rodriguez-Clare 1993; Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin 1995; Lucas 1999). For instance, these endogenous growth models 
have been categorized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) as one-sector models and 
two sector models, and others have used the basis of technological change, such as 
models with an expanding variety of products and an increasing diversity of quality of 
products. However, in this section, following Sheehan (1993, 2000), endogenous 
grovsth models will be discussed briefly under three main categories related to their 
approach to increasing retums. 
Firstly, there are models that generate endogenous growth with constant 
retums to scale, and do not require increasing retums to scale. In these types of 
models all the factors used in producing output can be accumulated. In this 
framework, with one factor of production, the model due to Rebelo (1991) shows how 
steady state grov^h emerges. In diese models there is a constant retum to the 
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accumulated single factor of production, so that the marginal retum does not fall and 
growth continues over time. 
Secondly, there exist many new growth models that are centred around the 
concept of extemalities. For instance, introducing his first model Romer (1986) 
pointed out that investment in new knowledge may create extemalities. The creation 
of new knowledge by one firm is assumed to have positive extemal effects on the 
production possibilities of other firms, because knowledge cannot be perfectiy 
patented or kept secret. Following Arrow's paper of (1962), Romer (1986) assumed 
that the output of the representative firm is a function of both the firm specific capital 
stock, labour inputs and of the aggregate capital stock in the economy. Further he 
assumed that new knowledge is a product of research technology that exhibits 
diminishing retums. The key idea behind this model is that it is possible that all 
agents face a convex production function, yet at the same time there is a non-
convexity in the aggregate production function of the economy. Using three elements 
- extemalities, increasing retums in the production of output and decreasing retums in 
the production of new knowledge - Romer then illustrates how steady state growth is 
obtained. However, this equilibrium is not Pareto optimal, and govemment policy 
may generate an improved social outcome. Likewise one can find variety of models, 
for instance (Lucas 1988; Barro 1990) that are primarily based on the presence of 
extemalities. 
Thirdly, there are many other models which have emphasized the generation of 
endogenous growth in the context of monopolistic competition. Romer (1987, 1990), 
initiating these models, identifies two components of knowledge: human capital, 
which is rival, and technological knowledge, which is non-rival. As he notes, this 
non-rival characteristic of the latter has two important implications for the theory of 
growth. First, non-rival goods can be accumulated without bound. Second, treating 
knowledge as a non-rival good makes it possible to talk sensibly about knowledge 
spillovers, that is incomplete appropriability of the benefits arising from knowledge 
(Romer 1990, p. 75). 
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The Romer (1990) model has three .",ectors: the research sector, which 
produces new knowledge; the intermediate-goods sector, which uses the designs from 
the research sector and is assumed to be monopolistic with increasing retums; and a 
final good sector, which uses labour, human capital and the set of producer durables 
that are available to produce final output, and is assumed to show constant retums to 
scale. 
According to this model knowledge enters into production in two ways. 
Firstly, new designs enable the production of a new good that can be used to produce 
output. Secondly, these new designs increase the total stock of knowledge and 
thereby increase the productivity of human capital in the research sector (Romer 1990, 
p. 84), Despite the presence of the extemality, this model claims that private agents, 
in particular the research sector, will invest in research because of the retums available 
from the application of designs to production. 
Like previous models, this model shows how a balanced growth equilibrium 
can be derived in competitive conditions. In the steady state, it is expected that 
consumption and the capital stock grow at a single constant rate equal to the rate of 
growth of the stock of designs. This model thus shows that growth occurs at a rate 
equal to the rate of endogenous innovation. However, in this model the social 
optimum rate of growth is higher than that generated by the market alone. Hence 
there is again a possible role for policy. 
Many other models that have emphasized endogenous growth under 
monopolistic competition can be found in the literature. For instance, Grossman and 
Helpman (1989, 1991a) have introduced variety of models. Some of these models use 
improvements in product quality and others use improvements in product variety, and 
the basic model has been extended to explore endogenous growth in the context of 
intemational trade. 
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1.5.3 Some Implications of New Growth Theory 
Despite the presence of a variety of models which are in tum based on diverse 
assumptions, these new growth models overall emphasize the presence of extemalities 
and increasing retums, and show how endogenous growth can arise in large part 
because of intentional actions taken by economic agents who respond to market 
incentives. However, in most of these models the equilibrium growth rate under pure 
market conditions is lower than the optimal growth rate. As a result, they imply that 
govemment policies such as subsidies to R&D, to investment or to human capital, can 
increase the equilibrium growth rate, up to the level of the optimal growth rate. In 
other words, the emergence of new growth models, stressing the role in growth of 
economies of scale, human capital accumulation, increasing retums and endogenous 
technological progress has brought new elements into the analysis of the ways in 
which trade, industry and other national policies affect long run economic growth. 
Several aspects of the contribution of new growth theories are noteworthy. 
First of all, they provide some new insights into the understanding of the mechanisms 
of development economics and growth theory. Under its assumed conditions -
primarily the diminishing marginal productivity of capital - earlier neoclassical 
theories predicted that the income levels of different coimtries, and ultimately the 
growth rates, should converge in the long mn. Contrary to these expectations, there 
appears to be persisting inequality in incomes between countries. Explaining the 
possible reasons for such continuing diversity in per capita GDP levels, some new 
growth theories claim that it is possible to have sustained differences in both levels of, 
and rates of growth of, national income (Pack 1994). As Barros (1993) notes, the 
inclusion of increasing retums in the production function, and the differences that 
arise between the optimal and equilibrium paths, have exposed a new horizon for the 
assessment of development policies and strategies by these new growth models. 
Kmgman (1992) has pointed out that the significance of extemal economies 
and strategic complementarities, and their influence on economic development, had 
been discussed extensively by a number of development economists in the 1950s, 
such as Rosenstein-Rodan and Hirschman. He suggests that their ideas were not 
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carried further in economic analysis partly because the founders of development 
economics failed to make their points with sufficient analytical clarity and with formal 
models. In that respect, it is considered that these new growth theories have provided 
a step forward in developing a common framework which can bring together 
development economics and growth theory. As Sheehan notes: 
many of the models thus envisage a potential role for policy much more in line 
with various development programs than with traditional economic theory, 
such as the encouragement of leading sectors by policy action or the co-
ordinated expansion of a number of sectors in a big push for growth. But the 
value of the modelling lies not in the recommendation of any given policy, but 
in providing a setting in which the conditions for the success of any such 
strategy can be explored. (1993, p. 59) 
In addition, these new growth models are also valuable since they allow the 
possibility of analysing the role of trade and other national policies affecting growth. 
For several decades, for instance, intemational trade theory highlighted the fact that 
there are gains from trade. However, the mechanisms by which trade affects 
economic growth was not clear, since the standard theories were built up completely 
independently of national policies. New growth models, as many economists note 
(Edwards 1993; Hammond and Rodriguez-Clare 1993), not only provide logical 
explanations but also extend the possibility of empirical investigations in many policy 
related areas, such as trade, technology and innovation. 
Apart from providing logical explanations and introducing a variety of models, 
mechanisms and linkages driving growth, these new growth models have widened the 
potential policy combinations that can be considered to boost growth. Economies 
may vary from one to another, depending on their resource endowment, political 
economy, status of development, technology and so on. With these differences there 
emerge a wide variety of factors which may influence the growth mechanism. In this 
respect, the intuitions presented by the variety of new growth models are of 
significance, because they provide insights with which to explore the complex growth 
dynamics of individual economies. More importantly, the variety of new growth 
models suggest that relevant mechanisms may vary greatly from coimtry to country, 
given variations in initial conditions, technology and firm stmcture, expectations and 
ambitions and so on (Sheehan 1993). 
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1.6 The Development State 
Another strand of the literature has begun from a detailed analysis of the strategies, 
institutions and successes of various East Asian countries, and has developed a 
supportive view of the role of industrial policy. This approach has been identified 
under various terms - 'stmcturalist', 'revisionist', 'statist', 'new political economy', 
and 'development state', and the latter term will be used here. The starting point of 
this approach was Johnson's (1982) seminal account of the role of MITI in Japan's 
post-war industrialisation. Other important studies include Amsden 1989; Wade 
1988, 1990a, 1990b; Leuedde-Neurath 1986 and Chang 1994. 
This approach, while challenging neoclassical orthodoxy in the context of 
developing countries and taking the outstanding economic success of countries such 
as Japan, Korea and Taiwan as evidence, argues that governments can have a 
significant effect by intervening aggressively to develop industrial sectors, particularly 
the capital and knowledge intensive sectors, thereby enhancing export opportunities 
and growth. 
As Wade (1988), one of the pioneers of this view, notes, governments with a 
powerful set of policy instruments and effective coordination have developed the 
capacity to guide economic activities effectively - notably the rapid restmcturing of 
the economy towards higher technology production. Expressing a similar view, 
Amsden (1989) states that govemment in developing Asian coimtries was not only 
involved in resource allocation but also deliberately distorted the price stmcture by 
use of subsidies, protection, price controls and restrictions on finance and investments. 
She argues that the key East Asian countries differ from other developing countries 
which adopted such measures in that, to prevent potential negative effects of those 
distortions, they imposed performance standards on private firms so as to reward 
winners and punish losers. 
Under this line of argument, the broad rationale for govemment intervention in 
industrial development again lies in the perceived inadequacy of market outcomes, 
especially in developing countries. Due to the various characteristics discussed above 
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- extemalities, increasing retums with evAry barriers and decreasing marginal costs, 
failures in information and in the mobility characteristics of factors - the actual 
economy departs significantly from the perfectly competitive model assumed by the 
conventional theories. Therefore, this rationale strongly supports govemment 
intervention in particular industry specific sectors, in order to overcome market 
failures. However, instead of producing a formal theory, these authors justify' their 
approach by highlighting several aspects of the stmctural characteristics of developmg 
countries. 
Firstly, this rationale points out why relying on market mechanisms may not be 
a suitable option for developing countries for their industrial development. If left to 
market forces, or if countries rely on comparative advantage, these countries may be 
more inclined to stick within a narrow range of familiar product lines rather than 
branch into new industries and products. Thus their pace of economic development 
may be slower than that of countries which concentrate on emerging products. 
Stressing the significance of technology development, this new rationale further adds 
that in many industries competitive advantage seems to be determined neither by 
underlying national characteristics nor by the static advantages of large-scale 
production, but rather by the knowledge generated by firms through R&D and 
experience. As Wade (1988, p. 153) notes, national comparative advantage is not 
simply the result of a given endowment of capital, labour and natural resources, but is 
also the result of govemment promotion. Some sectors and products are more 
important to a country's growth prospects than others, he argues, mainly due to the 
presence of extemalities, 
Govemment intervention at an early stage is recommended by these advocates, 
so as to induce economic agents to shift from a short to a longer term investment 
horizon and thereby to speed the process of industrialization. If domestic producers 
are given assistance to enable them to compete successfully against foreign suppliers 
in the domestic market, despite higher costs, it is asserted that they may be able to 
expand their production. With large-scale production, it is expected that firms will be 
able to price exports at below current average costs and thereby gain market share 
against foreign rivals. This process could in tum lead to a rapid shift in the industrial 
33 
stmcture. When the intemational productivity frontier is advancing rapidly, as in the 
case of electronics, the time needed for an infant industry to catch up may be long and 
the amount of assistance required may be large. To reap the maximum benefits from 
the support provided, govemment assistance on a selective basis rather than in the 
form of across-the-board assistance is advocated. Introducing his 'goveming the 
market' approach. Wade stresses that: 
given a world of technical change, falling cost curves and differential rates of 
growth across industries, it can be rational for a govemment to select from 
within the plausible industries those which have high growth potential and to 
use the powers of govemment to supplement those of the market in marshalling 
resources for entry and successful participation. (1990b, p. 355) 
Secondly, stressing the sub-optimal investment in industries that involve high 
initial costs, the proponents of this view argue that govemment intervention is 
required for developing capital and knowledge intensive industries in these countries. 
As they point out, firms are reluctant to invest in the type of industries that involve 
high initial costs, since they involve high risks and a large commitment of time. 
Extemalities and the resulting lower private retums that can be captured by the 
investor are also cited as reasons for sub-optimal investment in these types of 
industries. Extemalities may take the form of benefits created by a firm, in the form 
of goods, services or technological capacity. For instance, the production activities of 
one firm generates experience and tacit knowledge which is useful to other firms. 
Altematively, the results of one firm's research and development can be used by other 
firms to improve their own technology. Though capturing all the benefits may not be 
possible for the investing firm, other firms within the industry, as well as the firms in 
other industi-ies within the national economy, may be able to reap some of those 
benefits. Underdeveloped capital markets may also be a barrier, in the case of 
developing countries, to stimulating investment in industries that require high initial 
set up costs. Nevertheless, it is believed that investment in these types of industries 
could be promoted through govemment coordination of investment decisions or 
through providing incentives for additional investment. Thus, in cases where 
technology and industrial investments are sub-optimal, for this reason the 
development state view considers that tax incentives may be used to increase private 
rates of retum on investment. In cases where die scale of investment required is 
beyond national private firms, govemment coordination of public and private 
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technology development activities is advocated (Wade 1988, 1990a, 1990b; Helleiner 
1992; Stem 1990). 
Thirdly, these economists stress the importance of the coordination of 
economic activities, especially in the context of developing countries. It is argued that 
in many cases a firm's potential gains from an investment are contingent upon 
complementary decisions by other firms. For example, the production decisions of a 
large upstream plant may depend upon the decisions of several other dovmstream 
firms, and vice versa. Hence they stress the importance of govemment intermediation 
in activities where simultaneous extemalities (complementarities) occur. A 
govemment role at this stage, as they argue, is required since information may not be 
ftilly share and private decisions will not take account of all social benefits. Further, 
they add that by selecting industries which have potential linkages with other 
industries, countries are able to reap the benefits of positive spillovers (Wade 1988, 
1990b, 1994; Stem 1990; Pack and Westphal 1986). 
As is clear, the previous discussion suggests that, to develop capital and 
knowledge intensive industries in developing countries, govemment intervention is an 
alternative option. In other words, these authors consider that governments can 
overcome market failures and efficiently improve economic activities. More 
importantly, taking certain distinguished characteristics of the Japanese economy such 
as long-term vision, efficient bureaucracy, appropriate institutions, administrative 
guidance etc, as an example, they emphasized that govemment could play an 
influential role in industrial development. Further, they claim that the potential 
harmful effects of govemment intervention, such as rent seeking, can be controlled 
when govemment intervention is based on well-specified and effectively enforced 
mles, Govemment coordination failures can be minimized when the number of 
players involved is small, the homogeneity of products is high and the charmels that 
permit information exchange between the govemment and the private sector function 
effectively (Kim and Ma 1996). 
As previously mentioned by Matsuyama (1996), there may be situations where 
govemment with its coercive power can handle coordination failures successfully, but 
35 
this does not necessarily mean that govemment can efficiently handle all the 
situations. For example, coordination failure, a point often highlighted in the 
literature calling for govemment intervention, requires very detailed information on, 
among other things, market conditions and the relationships among various private 
agents and activities. Such information is not likely to be available to the govemment 
and it may therefore not be able make the best judgement. If this is the case 
govemment may also fail to perform the coordination of economic activities any more 
effectively than the market mechanism. 
Further, the govemment decision making process may be constrained by the 
political economy of its institutions and interactions with the private sector. Some 
parts of the state may express independent preferences while others, often the larger 
parts, may reflect different societal interests. No state is completely autonomous from 
the pressures of societal interests (Lim 1998; Aoki et al. 1996). Moreover, correcting 
market failure through govemment intervention may lead to economic 
mismanagement. This is because govemment intervention creates artificial returns 
that may be captured through 'unproductive' rent seeking activities by private interest 
groups (Helleiner 1992). Above all, the policy makers may know little about scale 
economies, extemalities and the prospects of leaming in particular industries, and in 
that respect market forces may be better at picking winners (Alavi 1996), 
Furthermore, as Okuno-Fujiwara (1996) and Lim (1998) note the 
'development state view' seems conjectural. It expresses the author's beliefs without 
providing an analytical framework. Moreover, they try to substantiate their arguments 
in terms of narrow objectives like how to enhance export opportunities, industrial and 
economic growth, while ignoring other overall effects such as consumer welfare and 
price distortions. 
1.7 Theory, Diversity and Empirical Assessments 
In essence, what all these theoretical approaches suggest is that the market alone may 
not provide efficient and effective outcomes for all the economic activities. Though 
there are certain differences when presenting their arguments, as can be seen from 
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Table 1,1, in general all agree that in situation where extemalities, entry barriers, 
economies of scale and scope, information asymmetries and so forth are present, 
markets may perform at a sub-optimal level. In such situations it is believed that 
policies could play an influential role in improving the outcomes. 
However, there exist different views regarding the role of govemment among 
these approaches. For instance some consider that govemment should play a minor 
role. Some others consider that, due to certain factors such as resource constraints, 
stmctural rigidities, and certain peculiar characteristics of some industrial sectors such 
as high growth potential, rapid technology development, entry barriers and economies 
of scale, policy intervention should be sector or industry specific.^ 
It is important to note that, like markets, no policy or set of policies, no matter 
how good, can work for all countries and at all times. In other words, there may be 
situations where govemment failures could occur. Further, the outcome of policies, as 
many economists point out (for instance Lau 1996; Kwon 1994), will depend on 
diverse factors such as resource endowonent, level of development, technology, 
extemal conditions, the potential size of the domestic market, the initial size 
distribution of the enterprises, and the stmcture of political institutions. These factors 
further influence the suitability and the effectiveness of govemment policies, and also 
the choice of appropriate policies. 
Theoretical models certainly provide guides to the possible economic 
implications of markets and/or policy intervention. Yet these models are built on 
assumptions chosen for their simplicity. In empirical work, however, we face more 
diverse and complex economic situations - many different types of market failure and 
a variety of policy instruments that have used to address these failures - than assumed 
by the theoretical models. Hence empirical judgements may sometimes be different 
from the conclusions of theoretical models. For example, as some theoretical 
rationales argue, it is tme that developing coimtries can benefit through promoting 
^ It is important to note that some approaches (development state view and strategic trade theory) have 
emphasized the importance of policy intervention without specifying overall social implications. For 
instance Wade (1990b, p. 350) states that the objective of policy intervention is not efficient allocation 
of resources in a Pareto optimum sense but growth and mnovation. 
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capital and knowledge intensive products. However, govemment intervention is itself 
not sufficient to the long-term survival of these industries. To maintain 
competitiveness these industries require up to date technology, skilled manpower and 
huge R&D investment. In the absence of these factors, govemment intervention 
would provide little benefits to the economy. This is the situation that countries such 
as Korea and Taiwan are now facing. In their early stages of their technology 
development they can depend on developed countries. These latecomer firms build up 
relationships with foreign manufactures and buyers, in their search for technology and 
access to markets. However, now these firms are facing an increasingly complex, 
sometimes hostile, intemational technology and market environment (Hobday 1995, p. 
4). 
Moreover, evaluating the impact of policy intervention is not so simple as it 
seems. On the one hand govemment rarely uses clean, transparent tools for promoting 
industries. On the other hand there is no simple way to tell whether a given policy has 
itself raised national income. Eventual competitiveness, one of the most popular tools 
which used to indicate the effectiveness of industrial policies, does not, as Kmgman 
(1987) argues, necessarily provide justification for policy intervention, since it may 
reflect forces that had nothing to do with industrial policy. 
1.8 Conclusion - Diversity in Deviations, Instruments and Assessments 
The question of whether and in what circumstances industrial policies can be justified 
remains one of the most hotly disputed question in economics today. Yet at one level 
there appears to be a measure of agreement. Most of those concemed acknowledge a 
wide range of deviations from the competitive market paradigm - sunk costs, 
economies of scale and scope, oligopoly, extemalities and complementarities, 
information and coordination failures, incomplete markets - which may justify 
govemment intervention to generate a more socially beneficial outcome. Thus the 
theoretical possibility of industrial policies is not in dispute. Rather, the 
disagreements tum around two main matters. The first is the empirical importance of 
diese various deviation from die market paradigm in various types of economy. The 
second is the potential role for the govemment to act effectively to produce a preferred 
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outcome, rather than to make matters worse. Some argue that these deviations are in 
practice limited and that govemment is ineffective, so that there is virtually no role for 
industrial policy. Others argue that the deviations are pervasive and that in 
appropriate circumstances a strong govemment can be very effective, so that there is a 
major role for industrial policy. 
Thus the different assessments of the viability of industry policy ultimately 
tum on empirical judgements rather than on theoretical differences. But whereas 
theory cuts through the complexity to provide a simple, compelling model, empirical 
judgements must come to grips with the diversity of real economic and industries, of 
many different types of market failures, of a wide range of different instruments to 
address these failures, of quite different levels of competence in different governments 
and agencies, and of the factors other than policy which affect economic outcomes. 
The central theme of this chapter is the wide range of potential deviations from 
the market paradigm acknowledged in the literature, and the range of approaches to 
industrial policy to which they give rise, dependent on judgements of the empirical 
evidence and of the potential role of govemment to generate an improved outcome. 
The diversity of potential market failures in tum gives rise to diversity in a wide range 
of factors related to the key empirical judgements about industrial policy 
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2. Diversity and the Practice of Industrial Policy 
2.1 Introduction 
The central conclusion that emerges from the previous chapter is that there are 
different ways in which potential deviations from the market paradigm could occur. 
Along with these deviations, there emerge a range of approaches to industrial policy. 
Some of these approaches consider that deviations from the market are pervasive and 
that in appropriate circumstances a strong and committed govemment could play an 
influential role to generate an improved outcome. Some others are however sceptical 
about the potential role of govemment in situations where market deficiencies occur. 
Many of these theoretical approaches are built on assumptions choose for their 
simplicity. They are certainly helpfiil for analytical purposes because they assist us to 
examine the complicated world critically and systematically. 
In practice, policy makers face much more complex situations than are implied 
by the theories. The ways, in which governments may be able to improve market 
failures and the policy instmments they can apply, will depend on the nature of 
market deficiency. In addition, the extent and form of policy choices may vary from 
one country to another. They are likely to be influenced by a variety of country-
specific factors, including the development objectives pursued, the economic 
conditions faced and the political commitment to, and administrative capability for, 
market intervention. Complicating this situation further, variety of policy 
instmments, sometimes combinations of several policy instmments, are applied by 
countries with varying degree of intensity to achieve their desired objectives. 
Therefore, in practice, wide variations in policy applications can be observed between 
countries and also within a given country over a period of time. 
In this chapter, the practical aspects of diversity in relation to industrial 
policies will be briefly outlined. This task starts in Section 2.2 with a review of 
definitions of industrial policies. In Section 2.3, the types of diversity will be 
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reviewed briefly under three categories namely, (a) deviations from the market model, 
(b) diversity in objectives and pohcies across and within countries and (c) the variety 
of instmments. 
2.2 What is Industrial Policy? 
As is clear from the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 1, industrial poHcies 
have been subjected to extensive debate over the time. Despite these debates the 
terms "industrial policy" and "industry specific intervention" are still surrounded by 
ambiguities. Partly these ambiguities arise due to the lack of precise definitions of 
these terms. 
One can find a vast array of definitions of industrial policies in the literature. 
The definitions used in the early 1980s are often broadly based,' in the sense that they 
tend to include all govemment actions which affect industry. Moreover they reflect 
the characteristics of industrial policies practiced by "advanced capitalist countries" 
such as the UK, France and USA. For instance, Pinder, a British proponent of 
industrial policy, regards all of the following as components of industrial policy: 
general industrial support policies such as manpower policy; fiscal and 
financial incentives for investment; public investment programs; public 
procurement policies; fiscal incentives for R&D; firm level policies such 
as specific R&D support; antitrust policy; merger policies to create 
'national champions'; support for small firms; regional policies such as the 
development of physical and social infrastmcture and the establishment of 
industrial complexes; generalised trade protection; sectoral policies such 
as the organisation of recession cartels in depressed industries; product 
upgrading in labour intensive industries. (1982, p. 52) 
In the context of studies of industrial development in Japan, however, some 
changes became evident regarding the definition of industrial policies. Departing 
from the popular practice of including virtually every policy adopted by the 
govemment in the definition of industrial policy, several studies (for example Adams 
and Bollino 1982 and Johnson 1984) applied a more focused definition. Accordingly, 
industrial policies were classified into two categories, namely general policies and 
'Several researchers, for example, Donges (1980), Corden (1980), Grant (1982), Amdt (1987), Caves 
(1986), Komiya et al. (1988), Stem (1990) have defined industrial policies as broadly covering all 
govemment actions which affect industry. 
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selective policies.^ Although this categorization led to an improvement in the clarity 
of the concept, there was still no consensus regarding the contents included in each 
category.'^ For instance Johnson (1984) defines the term "industrial policy" as:'' 
a summary term for the activities of governments that are intended to 
develop or retrench various industries in a national economy in order to 
maintain global competitiveness (p.7)... industrial policy has its own 
macro and micro aspects. At the macro level it provides governmental 
incentives for private saving, investment, research and development, cost 
cutting, quality control, maintenance of competition, and improvements in 
labour management relations. At the micro level it seeks to identify those 
technologies that will be needed by industry in twenty to thirty years and 
to facilitate their development, and on the other hand to anticipate those 
technologies that will decline in importance and to assist in their orderly 
retreat or to support them as a matter of social necessity, (p. 9) 
These two groups, as Patrick elaborates, are as follows: 
The term "macro industrial policy" has been used to describe policies, 
especially incentives to save, to invest, and to engage in R&D, that 
increase the productive capacity of the economy in the longer run while 
leaving it to the market place to allocate resources among specific 
industries. Macro industrial policy accordingly is focused on the supply 
side of the economy, in distinction from aggregate demand management, 
which typically uses fiscal and monetary policy insfruments... A broad 
definition of macro industrial policy includes any macroeconomic policies 
to increase the quantity and especially the quality of the factors of 
production - labor, capital, and natural resources - and the general level of 
technology. This definition incorporates educational policy as an 
important element. 
Industrial policy more typically is defined in micro terms: identification of 
certain specific industries deemed to have sufficient national importance to 
merit and receive differentially favourable policy treatment in order that 
those industries have access to resources in degrees or timing different 
from what would occur through the normal operations of the market place. 
A range of policy instruments can be used: direct subsidy payments, tax 
benefits, govemment-supported financing, protection from imports or 
promotion of exports, direct govemment purchases, funding of relevant 
R&D, special regulatory provisions, and so forth. (1986, pp. 4-5) 
These two categories are also referred as functional and selective/industry specific intervention or 
industrial targeting. 
For other definitions with different contents see Adams and Bollino (1982), Kmgman (1987), 
Okimoto (1986), Vestal (1995), Yue (1995), Wint (1998), Kim (1985), Itoh (1991) and World Bank 
(1993). 
The micro aspect - so called "industrial targeting"- has been further specified as the dynamic 
anticipation of the economically efficient allocation of resources for the futore. Targeting thus does not 
mean the promotion of technologies that are unlikely to develop at all on their own; it means, rather, 
helping them rapidly to achieve the necessary economies of scale and manufacturing efficiency without 
which they can never become intemationally competitive (Johnson 1984, p. 10). 
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As these definitions imply, the first category largely consists of macro 
economic policies, while the later includes micro policies designated for specific 
sectors. By the early 1990s, however, it was common to exclude macroeconomic 
policies from the definition of industrial policies. For instance, Wade, another well-
known researcher in the area of industrial policy, interprets industrial policies as 
follows: 
Macroeconomic policies affect overall demand and while they affect 
different industries differendy, they are not aimed at producing such 
differential effects. Industrial policies aim to aid industries, either to grow 
faster or to decline less disruptively, by affecting production and 
investment decisions of decentralized producers (and hence are more 
limited than the total of all govemment policies that affect industry). I 
distinguish second, between functional and industry-specific industrial 
policies. Functional industrial policies aim to affect a function across all 
or many industries (so they might also be called generic or horizontal 
industrial policies). Examples are subsidies for manpower training or for 
research and development. Industry specific (or selective, sectoral, or 
vertical) industrial policies target particular industries. Examples are 
promotion plans for steel, petrochemicals or semiconductors. (1990a, pp. 
233-234) 
Lall defines industrial policies as including: 
all actions taken to promote industrial development beyond that permitted 
by free market forces. Industrial policy can be thought of as having two 
elements: functional interventions and selective interventions. Functional 
interventions are those that remedy market failure without favouring any 
one activity over another. Selective interventions are designed to favour 
individual activities or groups of activities in order to correct suboptimal 
resource allocation, in a static or a dynamic sense. (1994b, p. 65) 
Broadening sector-specific policies further, Adams and Vemon note that it is useful to 
think about industrial policies in the following way: 
Industrial policies in general: This category includes all policies that have a 
deliberate industrial or sectoral impact. It excludes broad macro and social 
policy initiatives intended to affect demand or income. The broad grouping 
may be divided into two types of policies. 
Sector-specific policies: These are policies directed at particular industries or 
sectors. They may be focused on an entire sector, microelectronics, for 
example, or they may be more narrowly targeted. Typically, these industrial 
policies are seen as "picking the wirmers" the so-called sunrise industries, 
but an important function, particularly in Japan, has also been to provide a 
smooth transition for the losers, the "sunset" industries. 
Activity-specific policies: These policies promote particular activities, like 
investment, research and development (R&D), and exports, but do not focus 
deliberately on a particular sector. (1999, p. 53) 
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All in all, it is clear that, broadly defined, industrial policies include a vast 
array of measures, which incorporate both macro and microeconomic policies. There 
is no doubt that all of these policies could have imphcations for industrial 
development, although it is difficult to identify clear boundaries between these two 
categories. Including all these policies into a definition of industrial pohcies, in fact, 
overloads the concept of industrial policy, rendering it unduly broad and leaving it 
with a limited use for practical purposes. Therefore, in practice, researchers tend to 
limit the concept of industrial policy to the narrow category - Johnson and Patrick's 
micro industrial policy, Wade's industry-specific policies, Lall's selective 
intervention and Adams and Vemon's sector-specific policies. 
With these considerations in mind and for the purpose of hmiting its scope, 
this study also wishes to confine its analysis to the selective policies. Therefore a 
definition introduced by Chang, which incorporates industrial policy objectives and 
also narrows down the scope to sector specific intervention, has been selected as a 
suitable definition for this study. This is: 
a policy aimed at particular industries (and firms as their components) to 
achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the 
economy as a whole. (1994, p. 60) 
This definition is appealing for practical purposes in a number of ways. 
Firstly, by excluding the general policies and emphasising particular industries and 
firms, this definition allows the concept of industrial policy to be more focused. 
Secondly, it stresses the guiding principle of industrial policy, that is, to obtain 
increased efficiency for the economy as a whole. Finally, (with the phrase 'perceived 
by the state') it allows the definition to incorporate diversity and dynamic aspects of 
industrial policies, and the government's awareness of changing circumstances 
evolves over time. 
2.3 Types of Diversity 
As the various theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 1, pointed out, there are 
many situations in which markets alone may not produce the best possible outcome. 
In such situations, policy intervention may be helpful to improve the situation. The 
ways in which govemment may be able to assist, and the policy instmments it can 
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apply, will depend in part on the nature of the market deficiency. In addition, the 
preferred policy intervention may differ from one country to another, as policy 
decisions are likely to be influenced by a variety of factors such as demographic 
characteristics, resource endowment, level of development, level of technology, size 
distribution of enterprises, private sector versus govemment ownership, changes in 
political regimes, the quality of domestic institutions and officials, and so on. 
Moreover, public policies are not solely based on pure economic aims such as profit 
maximization, but often need to take into account broad social objectives. With these 
various factors it is inevitable that there will be a variety of policy choices made in 
different countries. These diversities are discussed here briefly under three sub-
headings: deviations from the market model, diversity in objectives and policies 
across and within countries and the wide variety of instmments available. 
2.3.1 Deviations from the Market Model 
As we noted in Chapter 1, a deviation from any condition assumed by the theory of 
perfect competition - such as the existence of entry barriers, the presence of 
extemalities and information asymmetries and so on - may lead to the market 
outcome being inefficient. As the various models pointed out there are many ways in 
which govemment could act to improve such situations, but also many ways in which 
that actions could fail to be successfiil. . 
Under the competitive markets, for example, it is assumed that there is free 
entry and exit but in practice there are many constraints facing firms interested in 
entering a given market. As many economists note, entry barriers arise largely due to 
the need for large-scale investments, which in tum generate economies of scale. 
Generally, when initial set up costs are high, the private sector may be reluctant to 
invest as such investment involves a high risk and a large commitment of time. In the 
context of developing countries, where financial markets are underdeveloped, 
obtaining finance for such investments may become even more difficult. In such 
circumstances, with certain policy measures such as providing subsidies, tax 
concessions or direct finance, it may be possible that private sector participation can 
be induced. Otherwise, the govemment might take initiatives in setting up such 
investment activities itself, in industries involving high set up costs. This has been the 
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case in setting up of basic industries such as steel and chemicals in Korea, Malavsia 
and Taiwan. 
In addition to resource constraints, rapid changes in technology make entry 
into the existing market even more difficult. In such circumstances, setting up or 
encouraging investments involving high initial costs may not be sufficient to 
overcome existing barriers. In many industries competitive advantage seems to be 
determined more by the knowledge generated by firms through R&D and experience 
than on the basis of the comparative cost principle. To overcome these situations, 
initiatives such as encouraging imperfect competition, govemment procurement, and 
govemment sponsored R&D could be applied. In the early stage of their industrial 
development, for instance, both Japan and Korea encouraged an oligopolistic market 
stmcture in certain industries such as the automobile industry, and electronic 
products, arguing that they would help local firms to challenge foreign rivals which 
possess advantages in technological knowledge and innovation. 
Moreover, even if adequate resources and technology are available, sometimes 
investment in certain activities, particularly those activities relying on technology and 
innovation, may be discouraged because of extemalities and the resulting wedge 
between private and social rate of retums. In such situations firms may be unable to 
capture most of the retums arising from their investments and under competitive 
conditions, investment is likely to take place at a sub-optimal level. However, with 
some form of support, such as the provision of subsidies for R&D, or of tax 
concessions, firms might be compensated for the dissipated retums and the socially 
optimum level of investment could be attained. 
These examples suggest that there are many ways that market deficiencies 
could occur. Depending on the particular character of an economy, there thus may 
exist a wide variety of circumstances to which policy makers may see a need to 
respond. These market deficiencies may also vary within a given nation over time. 
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2.3.2. Diversity' in Objectives and Policies Across and Within Countries 
Every economy pursues policies that, in practice, significantly affect both the 
industrial stmcture and the aggregate productive capacity of the economy. These 
policies are influenced by host of factors within each country such as the state of 
development, the size distribution of enterprises, the level and nature of resource 
endowment, the nature of the political economy and so on. Thus different countries 
are likely to have different objectives, and one cannot expect to find a uniform set of 
policies that are best to meet the objectives of all economies. 
In the context of developing countries, the resources that are required for 
industrial development such as finance, technology, and skills are scarce or 
inadequately developed. Therefore they require more support from the govemment 
than that of developed countries. The policy choices of countries may further differ 
reflecting the state of development, the objectives, the nature of the political and 
social organization, and the resources specific to each country. While addressing their 
economic and social needs more often developing countries try to achieve multiple 
objectives such as export promotion, technology development, employment creation, 
and regional development through industrial policies. Developed countries where 
private sector initiatives are prominent, financial and other markets function 
reasonably well pay their attention on increasing market share and establishing 
competitive edge through implementing industrial policies. 
The priority given to each development objective varies from country to 
country, depending on the social, political and economic situation of the country, thus 
resulting in further differences in strategies. As a country deficient in natural 
resources, for instance, Korea paid considerable efforts to achieving economic growth 
through its industrial policies, while emphasizing the importance of export promotion, 
national sovereignty and upgrading the industrial stmcture. Better endowed with 
natural resources, Malaysia by contrast has paid more attention on redressing social 
imbalances - particularly towards stimulating Malay participation - over economic 
growth in the process of industrialization. In Korea, govemment officials have 
enjoyed more autonomy in their decision making process, and were generally free 
from the influence of interest groups, thus they were able to focus more on economic 
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growth than social objectives (Adams and James 1999; Kwon 1994: Crone 1994; 
Boyd 1994; Lad 1996; McKay and Missen 1995). 
These country-specific differences in objectives can also be reflected in 
diversities due to the application of the same instmment with varying degree of 
intensity. Let us take sector specific intervention, which is considered to be prevalent 
among Asian countries, as an example. Sector specific intervention appeared to be an 
integral part of the industrialization process in countries Uke Japan and Korea (at least 
in their early stages), being used for developing a number of strategic industries such 
as steel, cement and chemicals. Other countries in the region have, however, 
followed these poUcies with varying degrees of intensities. Some countries have 
limited these sector specific intervention policies to gain a competitive advantage in 
certain industries, such as the Proton Saga automobile in Malaysia and technology 
leapfrogging in the aircraft industry (scrapped in 1998) in Indonesia. Some other 
countries, such as Hong Kong and Thailand have paid little attention to sector specific 
policies. Likewise, great diversities can be found in regard to policies affecting 
domestic and foreign investment, trade and finance. For instance, though foreign 
direct investment is widely used as a tool for promoting exports and technology, some 
countries use liberal policies while other countries apply a restrictive approach 
(Adams and James 1999; Adams 1999; Adams and Vemon 1999; Crone 1994; Boyd 
1994). 
Responding to the political and economic changes, competitive threats and 
resource constraints, objectives may change and industrial policies may also vary 
from time to time within a given country. A country, starting its industrialization 
process with import substitution strategies, may shift to export promotion strategies 
due to a recognition of limited domestic market capacity and of other limitations 
associated with this strategy. Similarly, a country promoting light industries, may 
shift towards technology intensive products due to the emergence of competitive 
threats and of shortages of labour. Further, as industrialization progresses some 
economies may face regional disparities and as a result may introduce policies that 
favour the development of backward regions. In recent years, for example, Indonesia 
has concentrated on encouraging companies to invest in the less developed Eastern 
islands while Thailand offers various incentives to investors to locate outside 
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Bangkok. Thus, economies adjust their objectives along with social economic and 
political changes, introducing new and more sophisticated policy instmments, and 
sometimes altering the existing ones to achieve these revised objectives (Adams 1999; 
Adams and Vemon 1999). 
2.3.3 The Variety of Instruments 
As we noted earlier, the appropriate policy intervention depends on the nature of the 
market deficiency, on country specific factors and on other dynamic factors. 
Consequently, a vast variety of policy instmments are applied in practice. As noted in 
section 2.2 many authors employ a broad definition of industrial policy. In the 
context of industrial policies broadly defined, the available instmments include those 
aimed at promoting industrial activities in general (macro policies) as well as those 
aimed at for specific industries (micro policies). 
Though in general broadly confined to those two categories, one can find a 
vast variety of classifications of industrial policy instmments in the literature.^ For 
example, Bhattacharya and Linn, identify ten broad categories of industrial policy 
instmments as follows (1988, p. 103): 
1. Macro economic policies (fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies) 
2. Trade policy (protection and export promotion policies) 
3. Financial sector policies (including policies affecting the financial sector as a whole, and 
policies direcdy affecting the supply and demand for industrial finance) 
4. Labor market policies 
5. The tax stmcture 
6. Industrial investment incentives 
7. Industrial regulation and licensing 
8. FDI (foreign direct investment) policies usually involving a combination of 2, 6, and 7 
above) 
9. Direct govemment investment and ovmership (covering state enterprises activities and 
public investment in large industrial projects) 
^ For other classifications see Itoh et al 1988; Okimoto 1986; Greenaway and Milner 1993; Adams and 
Bollino 1982). 
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10. Lifrastmcture (including physical infrastructure such as utilities, transport, etc. and 
"software" support such as R&D, marketing and technology development policy more 
generally). 
Including both general and selective instmments, Donges (1976) classifies 
these instmments under five categories: production, factor market, foreign investm.ent, 
imports and exports (see Appendix 2.1 for details). This latter classification, together 
with Appendix 2.2 which shows major export promotion incentives in Korea clearly 
demonstrate how industrial policy instmments, in practice, are complex, dynamic, and 
diverse not only across different countries but also within a given country 
These diversities may be very important in terms of the assessment of the 
effectiveness of industrial policies. The objectives for policy and the industries 
selected for promotion may differ from one country to another, and they also differ 
within a given country from time to time. Therefore, to assess the effectiveness of 
industrial policies appropriately it is important not only to identify these diversities for 
the country being analysed but also to ensure that this diversity is allowed for the 
analytical methodology. Some further information on how this particular task could 
be addressed may be provided through a detailed examination of the diversity and the 
incidence of industrial policies in a given country and industry at a particular time. In 
this respect, this thesis will investigate in forthcoming chapters the diversity and the 
incidence of industrial policies in three sample countries - South Korea, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Supplementing the theoretical arguments presented in the previous chapter, this 
chapter highlights the practical aspects of diversity of industrial policies. As evident 
from the discussion of this chapter, in practice, the extent and form of policy choices 
may vary not only between countries but also within a given country over a period of 
time, due to the combination of various factors. First and foremost, they could be 
expected since market deficiencies may arise in a wide variety of forms. Secondly, 
county-specific factors could certainly have a significant influence on policy choices. 
Combined with these two factors, thirdly, a variety of poHcy instilments, which are 
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constantly changing in response to political, economic social and tecbmological 
changes, create further diversities in policy choices. 
These variations in policy choices may create a considerable impact on 
industrial performance. Therefore, to assess the effectiveness of industrial policies 
appropriately it is important not only to identify these diversities for the country being 
analysed but also to ensure that this diversity is allowed for the analytical 
methodology. To what extent the existing empirical studies have paid attention to this 
important aspect when assessing the effectiveness of industrial policies will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 2.1 
A Profile of Major Post-War Industrialization and Trade Policies in the Kiel 
Sample Countries 
Type of Policies 
Production 
1. Industrial licensing system under which the 
establishment, expansion, and both sectoral and 
geographical alteration of industrial activities 
require governmental approval 
2. Selective promotion (generally by tax incentives) 
of industries designated as "essential", "desirable", 
or "pioneering" 
3. Creation of industrial estates 
4. Price controls (at times) on selected industrial 
goods required as inputs by "priority" sectors 
5. National plans for economic development over 
three and more years (indicative for the private 
sector, compulsory for the public sector) 
6. Direct govemment investment in industry (public 
enterprises) 
Factor Market 
1. Minimum wage legislation (including high social 
charges and severance pay regulations) 
2. Interest rate ceilings and/or credit rationing (not 
determined by the business cycle considerations) 
3. Tax benefits for business income derived fi-om 
investment such as tax holidays lasting several 
years reduction of income or profit tax exemptions 
or ceilings loss carry forward provisions allowances 
for accelerated depreciation 
4. Exemption fi-om or reduction of customs tariffs 
on capital goods, which are not domestically 
produced. 
Foreign Investment 
1. Prohibition of private foreign investment 
2. Investment proposals made subject to 
govemment approval 
3. Requirement of domestic majority ovmership and 
const-aints on profit remittances abroad and capital 
repatriation 
4. Exclusion of foreign investment from certain 
(key and or inessential and or saturated industries) 
5. National treatment with virtually no foreign 
exchange restrictions and domestic ownership 
requirements 
6 Direct subsidies and tax incentives 
Countries Concerned 
Brazil, Egypt (since 1957), India, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Spain (relaxed since 1963) Taiwan (gradually lifted 
after 1954) 
All countries but Hong Kong 
India, Korea (since 1966), Malaysia, Singapore Spain 
(since 1964) Taiwan (since 1965), Turkey (since 1963) 
Brazil (since 1964), Colombia, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia 
Brazil (since 1964), Colombia, Egypt (since 1957), 
India, Israel (since 1958), Korea, Malaysia (since 1955), 
Mexico, Pakistan, Spain (since 1964), Turkey (since 
1963), Yugoslavia 
All countries but Hong Kong, Israel, Korea and 
Singapore 
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan (since 1969), Spain (since 1963) 
Brazil (relaxed since 1964), Egypt (since 1957), Korea 
(relaxed since 1965), Mexico 
All countries but Hong Kong and Yugoslavia, to 
varying degrees 
Brazil (since 1957), Egypt, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Taiwan, Turkey 
Yugoslavia (until 1967) 
Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia (since 1973) 
Mexico, Spain (until 1959) Turkey, Yugoslavia (since 
1967) 
Colombia, Egypt (gradually liberalized after 1967), 
India, (selective) Mexico, Spain (until 1959), 
Yugoslavia (since 1967) 
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, hidia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia (since 1967) 
Brazil, India, Israel, Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain 
(since 1959), Turkey, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan, 
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Imports 
1. Import licensing combined with quotas and/or at 
times with prohibitions of certain imports 
(considered either as luxuries or as locally 
available) 
2. Tariffs (generally ad valorem) and other price 
measures (such as indirect taxes, surcharges or prior 
deposit requirements) generally with escalating 
rates form lower to higher levels of fabrication 
3. Multiple exchange rates 
Exports 
1. Licensing for exports (totally or partly) with or 
without minimum export price requirements 
2 Taxes and or customs duties on export 
3. Fixing of export targets 
4. Remissions and compensation of tariffs on 
imported products used in finished exports and 
exemptions from indirect taxes on domestic 
production 
5. Export vouchers for import replenishment with 
premiums on their resale, priority allocation of 
foreign exchange to exporters for the importation of 
necessary input or foreign exchange retention 
quotas 
6. Income tax concessions for eamings from export 
(including special depreciation allowances) 
7. Export credits (at preferential conditions) and 
credit insurance 
8. Exchange rate policy of gradual devaluation 
(shding peg) 
9. Establishment of export processing zones 
10. Participation in intemational free trade areas 
11. Govemment assistance to marketing abroad 
All countries but Hong Kong and Singapore to varying 
degrees, gradual liberalization in Brazil after 1967, 
Israel after 1962, Korea after 1960, Spain after 1959 and 
Taiwan after 1958 
All countries but Hong Kong to varying degrees 
Brazil (1953-57), Colombia, Egypt (1957-62), Israel 
(1952-55), Korea (until 1964), Spain (until 1959), 
Taiwan (until 1963), Turkey (until 1960), Yugoslavia 
(until 1961) 
Brazil (until 1964), Colombia (since 1973), Egypt (since 
1959), hidia, Malaysia (until 1969), Pakistan, Spain 
(untill959), Taiwan (until 1958), Turkey (gradually 
liberalized after 1958), Yugoslavia 
Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Spam (until 
1959), Taiwan (until 1954) 
Korea (since 1962), India (since 1970), 
All countries mostly starting in the early sixties 
Colombia, Egypt (temporarily since 1960), India, Korea 
(until 1960), Mexico, Pakistan, Taiwan (until 1963), 
Turkey (since 1968), Yugoslavia (since 1966) 
Brazil (until 1971), Colombia (since 1967), India (since 
1960), Israel (since 1965), Korea (since 1961), 
Malaysia, Mexico (since 1958), Pakistan (since 1963), 
Singapore, Taiwan (since 1960), Turkey (since 1969) 
All countries but Hong Kong and Singapore, to varying 
degrees and starting in the sixties 
Brazil (since 1968), Colombia (since 1967), Israel (since 
1975), Korea (since 1965) 
Colombia (since 1970), Hong Kong, India (since 1972), 
Korea (since 1970), Malaysia (since 1972), Mexico 
(since 1962), Singapore, Taiwan (since 1966) 
Brazil (since 1961), Colombia (since 1961 and 1969), 
Hong Kong, India, Israel (since 1975), Malaysia, 
Mexico (since 1961), Pakistan, Singapore, Turkey 
(since 1964) 
All countries to varying degrees and generally 
beginning in the sixties. 
Source: Donges and Riedel (1976, cited in Donges 1976, pp. 630-631). 
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Appendix 2.2 
Major Export Promotion Incentives, Korea 
Types of Incentives 
Tax incentives 
Commodity tax exemption 
Business tax exemption 
Reduction of corporation and income tax by 50 per cent on eamings 
from exports 
Accelerated depreciation on allowance for fixed capital directly used 
for export production in mining, fishing, and manufacturing 
Tax credit for foreign market development expenditures 
Foreign market development reserve system expanded 
Overseas business loss reserve system established 
Overseas investment loss reserve system established 
Tariff incentives 
Tariff exemptions on capital equipment for export production 
Tariff payments on an instalment basis for capital equipment used in 
export production 
Tariff exemptions on raw material imports for export production 
Tariff drawback on imported raw material used for export production 
Wastage allowance 
Deferred payment system for tariff 
Financial incentives 
Financing for export sales 
Export shipment financing 
Export promotion fund financed by counterpart fund 
Financing imports of materials to be used in export production 
Export credits (trade credit before 1961) 
Financing suppliers of U.S. offshore military procurement 
Fund to promote export industry 
Fund to convert small and medium size firms into export industries 
Fund to prepare exports of agriculmral and fishery products 
Foreign currency loans 
Financing exports on credits 
Automatic export financing system introduced 
Differentiated export financing for large versus small and medium 
companies 
Overall export financing system introduced 
Other promotion schemes 
Foreign exchange deposit system 
Trading license based on export performance 
An export bonus with preferential foreign exchange 
Payment of export subsidy 
Discount on railroad freight rates 
Monopoly rights on exports of specific items to specific areas 
Creation of exporters associations for various export products 
Financing KOTRA 
Export -import link system 
Discount on electricity rates 
Waiver issuance for shipping 
Local L/C system 
Differential treatment of traders based on export performance 
Export insurance 
Export-import bank 
Special loan privileges for small and medium exporters' raw material 
imports 
Export financing for big corporations discontinued 
Source: Hong, (1979, cited in Sakong 1993, pp. 238-239). 
Duration 
April 1950-1973 
January 1962-1973 
January 1961-December 1972 
January 1961-1973 
August 1969-1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
March 1964-December 1973 
January 1974-
April 1961-June 1975 
July 1975 
July 1965-
July 1975-October 1988 
Febmary 1948-July 1955 
June 1950-July 1955 
November 1959-January 1964 
October 1961-Febmary 1972 
June 1950-
September 1962-
July 1964-September 1969 
Febmary 1964-
September 1969-
May 1967-
October 1969-
1976-
October 1986-
October 1985-
June 1949-January 1961 
January 1953 
1951-May 1961 
1954-1955 and 1960-65 
1958-
April 1960-November 1980 
September 1961-
March 1962-
November 1962-March 1965-66-
1965-1976 
1965-
March 1965-
Febraary 1967-
January 1969 
June 1976-
August 1987-
Febmary 1988-
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3. Ignoring the Diversity: Empirical Studies of the Effectiveness of 
Industrial Policy in East Asia 
3.1 Introduction 
The analysis undertaken so far suggests that neither the market nor the govermnent 
can alone handle economic activities efficiently. In particular, there is a wide variety 
of ways in which markets may fail, and hence in which the competitive markets alone 
may not achieve the social optimum. As a result, various theoretical approaches to 
industrial policy claim that it is possible to improve the outcome, in cases where 
market deficiencies occur, through policy intervention. Given the diversity" of possible 
market failures, and of the instruments available to governments, there are many ways 
in which govemment could intervene. As a result one could expect diversity in policy 
applications. At the same time, govemment policies may fail to achieve their 
objectives, just as markets may fail, so that there is no guarantee that these 
interventions will be effective. 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that these diversities are even more 
complex in practice than is implied by the theoretical rationales. This is especially so 
in the context of industrial policies, since they are influenced by the various country 
specific factors. As a result, one cannot expect to find uniform policies between 
countries. Policies in a given country are also likely to change over a period of time, 
since they are adjusted to changing political, economic and technological 
developments. 
By implementing industirial policies countries, in particular the developing 
countiies, expect to achieve multiple objectives. Among other objectives, the 
majority of these policies are aimed at: (a) changing industrial stmcture through 
influencing resource allocation; (b) increasing exports; (c) technological development 
through policies designed to correct market failures and overcome imperfect 
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information; (d) raising economic welfare and (e) satisfymg political demands, such as 
increasing indigenous participation, regional distribution and so forth. To achieve 
these objectives a combination of trade, fiscal and financial instruments are ofi;en 
used, depending on the objectives, the relative status of development, the resource 
endowment, and the political and economic stmcture of the country. As noted in the 
previous chapter, these instmments and their applications may vary across countries 
and also within the same country over time. These variations may have a considerable 
impact on industrial performance. The performance of the industrial sector may 
fiirther be influenced by the selective industrial promotion exercised by certain 
countries, in the belief that shifting industrial stmctures toward new and more modem 
sectors increases the opportunities for capturing the dynamic scale economies that 
resuh from leaming. Many other factors, both national and intemational, may also 
affect the growth performance of a particular country over a given period. 
These issues, especially in relation to the role of industrial policies in East 
Asia, have been the focus of a considerable body of literature. In a number of studies, 
the analysis has been focused on changes in policy direction, major reforms in policy 
instruments, the degree of industrialisation, the changing pattem of manufacturing 
activities, and the role of the institutions of industrial policy in relation to the resulting 
evolution of the industrial stmcture (Smith 1994; Kim 1985; Boyd 1994; Crone 1994; 
Chowdhury and Islam 1993; Brown 1993; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990a, 1990b; Petri 
1993; Thomas and Wang 1993; Chang 1994). Despite an outpouring of literature, 
only a handfiil of studies have analysed the effectiveness of industrial policies through 
a detailed empirical analyses. The majority of the existing studies not only base their 
conclusions on implicit evidence but also produce their results while assuming that 
industrial policies were a once-and-for-all event. More generally the existing 
analytical approaches for assessing empirically the effectiveness of industrial policies 
have paid limited attention to the diversity of industrial policies. In this chapter we 
argue that this as one of the main limitations of these empirical studies. 
The main objective of this chapter is to review each of the available empirical 
studies to document their findings on the effectiveness of industrial policy and to 
assess the adequacy of their methodologies. With this in view. Section 3.2 explores 
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die empirical studies that have been undertaken so far on newly industrializing Asian 
countries, focusing on their methodologies, findings and limitations, if any. The first 
part of this section will examine the cross-country studies, and this will be followed 
by an examination of country-specific studies. The latter will be discussed under two 
broad headings: the effectiveness analysis in terms of exports and in terms of other 
aggregate measures. Common limitations and gaps in the enipirical literature are 
presented in the Section 3.3. In effect, this type of analytical review will help to set 
the context for finding an altemative technique for assessing the effectiveness of 
industrial policies, which this study aims to do. 
3.2 Empirical Studies Assessing the Effectiveness of Industrial Policies 
By using various indicators such as the performance of exports, changes in the 
industrial stmcture and changes in productivity, a number of attempts have been made 
to evaluate empirically the effectiveness of industrial policies in East Asia. The 
results of these studies are mixed. Some studies (Agrawal, Gokam, Mishra, Parikh, 
and Sen 1996; Amsden 1989; Chang 1994) concluded that the industrial policies had a 
positive impact on these economies. Other studies (Wade 1988, 1990a, 1990b; 
Westphal, Rhee and Pursell 1981), which examined the institutional framework in 
more detail, also concluded that the wide range of govemment intervention - from 
planning, direct involvement in production, providing a conducive atmosphere 
through incentives and other institutional reforms, to formulating industry specific 
policies - has played a significant role in East Asian economic growth. 
These claims are questioned by several other studies. Based on the overall 
pattem of changes in value-added, employment and exports for the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan, Dollar and Sokoloff (1994), argued that, while govemment policies are 
acknowledged as being cmcial in ensuring a sound macro environment, industry 
specific interventions have not been an important cause of growth. Using changes in 
industrial stmcture and in productivity as measurements, the World Bank study (1993) 
also expressed a similar view, stating that the selective policies were ineffective. 
Some country-specific studies (Stem 1990; Imai 1986; Okimoto 1986), which 
analysed the effectiveness of industrial targeting on a case by case basis, concluded 
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that some industry specific interventions were effective while others were not 
effective.' 
As this evidence, and the forthcoming empirical analyses, suggest, 
controversies regarding the effectiveness of industrial policies remain unresolved. 
These inconsistent results may be partly attributed to methodological differences and 
to the lack of an explicit conceptual framework. To understand these shortcomings 
more clearly, each of these comprehensive empirical studies that have placed 
emphasis on analysing the effectiveness of industrial policies will be reviewed in the 
following sections. 
3.2.1 Effectiveness of Industrial Policies: Cross-Country Studies 
Of the studies undertaken so far, the East Asian Miracle (EAM) report of the World 
Bank (1993) is the most well known. This study produced an overall analysis of both 
economic and industrial policies of a number of East Asian countries (Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand). According to 
this study, industry policies were defined as "govemment efforts to alter industrial 
stmcture to promote productivity-based growth" (World Bank 1993, p. 304). For 
analytical purposes this study classified industries into two categories, as promoted 
and non-promoted sectors. Capital and technology intensive industries were included 
in the former category while the latter contained all other industries. Under this 
conceptual framework, the EAM report employed three empirical tests - the first two 
tests analysing the changes in industrial stmcture and the third assessing productivity 
growth - to analyse the effectiveness of industrial policies. 
Using cross-country regression analysis, the EAM report firstly examined 
whether the shares of value-added in promoted industries were greater than the level 
' Okimoto (1986) and Imai (1986) produced a descriptive analysis on individual industries, based on 
the experience of Japan. Stem (1990), on the basis of Korean experience, analysed a number of heavy 
and chemical industries, comparing the economic rate of return and opportunity cost of capital of 
individual industries. 
^ These two categories were however not clearly specified in the EAM study. In general, iron and steel, 
automobiles, metal products, shipbuilding, machmery, electronics, and industrial chemicals were 
classified as selectively promoted sectors. 
58 
which was predicted by their factor endowment. To ascertain the transformation of 
the sectoral stmcture of the manufacturing sector in the sample Asian countries this 
study utilized estimates based on the following equation, which was introduced by 
Chenery (1960) and later modified by Syrquin and Chenery (1989): 
log(K4, / GDP) J = bo + b, log{GDP IPOP)^ + b2{P0P)j {1) 
where VAi is value-added originating in sector i in economy y, GDP is gross domestic 
product, and POP is total population. As the study pointed out this equation, which 
captures the influence of demand elasticities and the evolution of supply, provides a 
benchmark to determine whether the relative importance of industrial subsectors in the 
sample economies differed significantly from intemational norms. The underlying 
assumption when applying this equation is that if industrial policies are successfiil it 
will alter the sectoral composition differently than that of the market based principles. 
For this purpose, the actual shares of value-added of various industrial sectors 
for the East Asian economies were compared with the intemational norms predicted. 
The estimates, which were obtained by using the Syrquin and Chenery 1989 equation 
for each industry across a set of countries having a similar level of income (per capita 
GDP), were taken to represent the intemational norm in this study .^  To examine 
changes relative to this norm, a set of indicators were established, as follows: values 
equal to 1 represent conformity to the intemational norm; values less than 1 indicate 
that the sector is smaller than predicted; and values greater than 1 indicate that the 
sector is larger than predicted. The results were presented in the form of the ratio of 
actual v'^ , to predicted v'', shares of value-added (reproduced here as Table 3.1). 
Based on the findings, this test concluded that: 
^ In his theoretical model, Chenery (I960) attempts to incorporate changes in both demand and supply 
conditions into the growth model. This model is expressed for empirical purposes as 
logK/ - \ogfi.„ + fiJogY + fi.^ log//, where V, is per capita value added, /9„ is the growth elasticity 
'y/^ and fi,^ is the size elasticity T;/ . As this equation outlines, per capita value added 
/ T) i' ~ 
depends on per capita income and population, which represents the size of the domestic market. Later, 
in the study Syrquin and Chenery (1989) all the components are expressed as shares of GDP. As a 
result, the first term in this equation is expressed as a share of GDP. 
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three economies known as manufacturing powerhouses have larger overall 
manufacturing sectors than intemational norms based on the intemational 
norms for economies with sim.ilar incomes would predict: Hong Kong (1.26), 
Korea (1.26), and Singapore (1.38). (Worid Bank 1993, p. 327) 
Analysing the effects of selective promotion, and based on the findings 
reproduced here in Table 3.1, the report declared that the results were not particularly 
impressive. More specifically, it asserted that despite the government's extensive 
efforts to encourage capital and technology intensive sectors in Korea and Singapore, 
labour intensive sectors, particularly the textiles and garments sector (one of the non-
promoted sectors) were bigger than intemational norms predicted in 1988. In its 
concluding remarks stressing the poor performance of selective promotion, the report 
fiirther added that "during the same period, Korea merely maintained the intemational 
norm in chemicals, a heavily promoted sector; while other heavily promoted sectors, 
basic metals and metal products and machinery, achieved only modest improvements" 
(p. 313). 
Secondly, changes in industrial stmcture were also analyzed in the EAM 
report by examining the relationship between wages per worker and the growth of the 
share of value-added in each industrial sector at the beginning and end of die 
intervention period. For this purpose, four simple regressions for each economy were 
run, across industry sectors for given periods, using the form: 
v*,-f(x,) (2) 
where v*, is the change in the current price share of value-added in sector /, relative to 
value-added in all manufacturing. The independent variable x, represents, in the four 
regressions, the wage per worker at the beginning {wb) or at the end of the intervention 
period {we), and the value-added per worker at the beginning {vob) or at the end of the 
intervention period {voe), for industry / (p. 330). Since all of the 
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countries under observation are relatively labour abundant, in this test it is assumed 
that if industrial stmcture is determined primarily by market forces, low wages and 
low capital intensity at the beginning of the period of active industrial policy will 
predict the pattem of industrial growth. In such a case, it is predicted that the 
condition dvt* /dwt and dvt* /dvat < 0 will hold and there will be a negative 
relationship between the variables observed. That is, higher growth will have been 
expressed in industries with lower starting wage or value-added levels. On the other 
hand, it was also assumed that if selectively promoted industries, in which the starting 
wage rates would have been relatively high, were successful, then there would be a 
positive relationship between these two variables. Hence, the data should show that 
dvi* /dwt > 0 and/or dvi* /dvab> 0. Altematively, the impact of selective promotion is 
examined by using wages and value added at the end of the intervention period. Thus, 
if the sectors that grew most exhibited a high capital or high wage intensity at the end 
of the period, as might be implied by the selective promotion strategy, the data should 
satisfy the dvj* /dwg or dvt* /dvog > 0 condition. Thus for all four sets of regressions a 
positive coefficient on these variables is supportive of the success of a selective 
promotion strategy, while a negative coefficients is the reverse. 
The test, using a two-digit ISIC classification of industrial sectors based on 
equation (2), was performed on each of the four Asian tigers plus Japan. Based on die 
regression results reproduced here in Table 3.2, the EAM report concluded that: 
Our effort to differentiate between a comparative-advantage based evolution of 
industrial stmcture versus one characterized by significant intervention is 
notable mainly for a number of negative results. In particular, in Korea - the 
economy for which significant intervention is best documented - during 1973-
80 the most rapid growth in sectoral shares of value-added occurred in lower-
wage or lower value-added per worker sectors. In Korea at the two-digit level, 
sectoral growth was broadly market conforming in terms of traditional factor 
intensities... In Singapore, for the period 1980-89, output grew more rapidly in 
more capital and knowledge intensive sectors, supporting the view that the 
Singaporean authorities successfully intervened to encourage increasingly 
capital-intensive development. But, given the rapid growth in the capital-labor 
ratio in Singapore, this result also conforms to factor proportions theory 
predictions. (Worid Bank 1993, pp. 314-315) 
In the light of the evidence of both tests, which examined the changes in the 
industrial stmcture, the EAM study concluded that selective policies did not have 
much of an impact on changing the resource allocation in the observed countries. 
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Thirdly, the EAM study examined whether the growth rates of total factor 
productivity (TFP) were higher in promoted sectors. The underiying assumption of 
this test was that if rates of productivity change in industry were low overall or in 
promoted sectors, industrial policy was ineffective. The growth accounting 
procedures used in this study implied that: 
aggregate TFP in any period can be decomposed by weighting each sector's 
level of total factor productivity. A/,/ by the sector's share in value-added, v,., 
The growth of TFP will then depend on changes in A,,, and changes in v,,,. 
Algebraically, this relation can be written as: 
MogA = S;(v,/log^,,, - v,.,-i log^,,,_,) (3) 
Thus equation (3), gives the growth in A due to the increase in productivity of 
existing sectors, log A,,, > log A,, ,.\, or the growth in the value-added share of 
these sectors, v,,, > V,,M whose productivity is growing, (p. 328) 
Under this framework it is postulated that if industrial policies are successful 
favoured sectors (f) will have higher growth of TFP than non-favoured sectors {b). 
Then, the condition A// > A/ M and A/, > A b.t will hold.'* 
The results of this productivity test as reproduced here in Table 3.3, 
demonstrated that the TFP growth was high by intemational standards in the observed 
countries (Japan, Korea and Taiwan). However, the report asserted that productivity 
change has not been higher in promoted sectors except in Japan. In the case of Korea, 
for example, the report pointed out that: 
although the Korean govemment selectively promoted chemicals and iron and 
steel (included in basic metals), the large growth in the share of iron and steel 
was accompanied by quite low TFP performance between 1966 and 1985; 
textiles and clothing, conversely, had very high rates of TFP growth, (p. 315) 
Like the other two tests outlined previously, these findings were also attributed to the 
combination of competitive discipline and well functioning factor markets. 
The EAM report undoubtedly made a valuable contribution, especially by 
producing a conceptual framework for discussing the role of the market and the 
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govemment, and by investigating key issues such as the role of investment- exports 
and industrial policies in East Asian countries empirically. However, the conclusions 
based on the empirical tests of the effectiveness of industrial policies in general, and 
of selective promotion in particular, have to be taken with care for two main reasons: 
the presentation of selective evidence and the limitations of the methodologies applied 
in this study.^ 
The presentation of empirical evidence appears to be selective in all the three 
tests reported in this study. As we noted previously, for its first test the industrial 
performance of sample countries was compared with an established intemational 
norm. In terms of the standards specified by this test, if the estimated figures were 
greater than 1, that particular sector was considered to be larger than the intemational 
norm. As can be observed from Table 3.1, in the textiles and clothing sector six 
countries out of the sample of eight have satisfied the criteria of superior performance 
relative to intemational norms. The other labour intensive sectors rarely satisfied the 
specified criteria. Despite this limited evidence, the EAM report concluded that 
labour intensive sectors perform better than capital intensive sectors. 
Moreover, in the case of Korea, the frequent example they cited to substantiate 
their arguments, the evidence is contrary to their conclusions. As the estimates 
indicate, a number of promoted sectors in Korea (basic metals, metal products and 
machinery, which cover a wdder range of sectors as the report itself defined (p. 308) 
including, iron and steel, electronics, machinery and transport equipment) reported 
satisfactory progress in line with the assumptions imposed by the study. In fact, the 
metal products and machinery sector's ratio in 1988 is slightly higher than that of the 
textiles and clothing sector. In addition, the conclusions were based on the 
comparison of two selected years which varied from country to country for data 
reasons. For instance, in the case of Korea performance results were compared with 
1968 and 1988. The performance of the year 1988 may not solely be attributed to 
'' This smdy defines two types of sectors: those favoured by govemment policy/ and those subject to 
benign neglect b (p. 328). 
' See Lall (1994), Amsden (1994), Wade (1994), Rodrik (1994b), Kwon (1994a), Perkins (1994), 
Yanagihara (1994) and Agrawal et al. (1996), for criticism regardmg the EAM smdy. 
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Table 3.2 Signs of Regressions Explaining Change in Value-Added Share of 
Sectors 
Economy 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Korea, Republic of 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Period 
1973-80 
1980-88 
1973-88 
1953-63 
1963-73 
1973-80 
1980-89 
1968-73 
1973-80 
1980-88 
1973-88 
1969-73 
1980-89 
1973-89 
1966-86 
W B 
+ 
-
_ 
-1-
-
-1-
** 
~ 
+ 
+ 
-
W E 
-1-
-1-
-1-
_ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
~ 
** 
+ 
+ 
-
VB 
+ 
-
_ 
-1-
-
-1-
*** 
«* 
-1-
-1-
-
V E 
-1-
-1-
-i-
. 
+ 
-f-
-f-
-1-
*• 
-1-
* 
-1-
« 
-1-
-
Notes: + and - signs are sign of coefficients. 
•Significant at the 0.10 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Signs without stars are not significant even at the 10 per cent level. 
WB(E) = Wage per employee at the beginning (end) of the period. VB(E) = Value-added per 
worker at the beginning (end) of the period. 
Source: Pack (1993, as cited in Worid Bank 1993, p. 332). 
65 
Table 3.3 Long Term TFP Growth Rates by Sector 
Sector 
Food 
Beverages 
Tobacco 
Apparel 
Textiles 
Leather 
Shoes 
Wood 
Furniture 
Paper 
Printing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum 
Rubber 
Non metallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Iron and Steel 
Metal products 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Electrical equipment 
Transport equipment 
Precision instruments 
Plastic products 
Other manufacturing 
Average 
Notes: - Not available. 
a. Food and beverages 
b. Rubber, petroleum, and wo< 
c. Paper and paper products 
d. Petroleum ref and coal 
e. All machinery 
f Plastic 
TFP Growth Rates 
Korea 
7.30 
7.90 
13.40 
-
10.70 
12.60 
-
9.40 
12.10 
8.20 
10.70 
13.10 
-0.30 
11.40 
2.80 
-
3.70 
7.60 
8.00 
10.70 
-
11.20 
-
-
7.50 
8.8 
3d products 
Japan 
1960-79 
-1.76 
0.0 
-
1.98 
0.47 
1.03 
1.03 
2.81 
1.74 
1.44 
-0.18 
3.36 
-3.55'' 
1.02 
-
-
1.34 
3.41 
2.30 
5.37 
-
4.32 
-
0.92' 
-1.76 
1.2 
Taiwan, 
China 
1966-86 
2.0' 
-
-
10.5 
7.6 
-
-
0.3" 
-
2.3'= 
-
3.3 
o.o" 
6.3" 
2.4 
7.2 
-
4.4 
6.7* 
-
7.1 
2.7 
11.0 
0.0 
4.6 
Time period for Korea is not indicated in the table. However, according to the information in 
page 315 the time period is 1966-1985. 
Source: Pack (1993, as cited in World Bank 1993, p. 307). 
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govemment intervention, since the Korean govemment shifted its policies 
dramatically after 1980. 
Similarly, the second test, which was based on wages and value-added per 
worker, made inferences by taking into account stmctural change over various 
periods. As can be seen in Table 3.2, of the five countries observed, statistically 
significant results (even at the 10 per cent level) were reported only in two countries. 
Of these two, the Korean results were inconsistent with successful selective promotion 
while Singapore were consistent with the findings.^ However, the results were 
generalised focusing more on the Korean than the Singaporean experience. Also, with 
the data in Table 3.3, one cannot find strong evidence to justify the EAM report's 
arguments that selective promotion is ineffective. In fact, a number of promoted 
sectors (for example chemicals, electrical machinery, transport equipment and so 
forth), achieved quite high TFP grovs1:h rates during the observed period (1966-85) in 
Korea. In the presence of insufficient and sometimes contradictory evidence, 
however, the EAM study concluded that the manufacturing sectors have evolved 
roughly in accord with neoclassical expectations and that selective industrial policies 
are not effective. 
In addition to criticisms based on selective evidence, the resufts of the EAM 
study on the effectiveness of industrial policies can be questioned on the ground of 
methodological shortcomings. Firstiy, this study considered capital and technology 
intensive industries as promoted industries and the rest of the industries as non-
promoted industries, and for each of the various periods studied, without presenting 
supplementary information for justifying this classification. Industrial policies, as we 
noted in Chapter 2, are not only diverse from country to country but also vary within a 
given country over the time, depending on factors such as status of development, 
resource endowment, objectives of industrial policies and social, economic and 
political background. These diversities may have a considerable impact on the 
selection of industries for promotion. As Perkins (1994) noted, despite its frequent 
mention of the diversities of the countries under observation, the EAM report 
For more details see Yanagihara (1994, p. 667). 
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generalized the results by assuming that all the sample countries selected industries on 
a similar basis. 
Secondly, the indicators applied (the intemational norm based on value-added, 
changes in sectoral shares of value-added and changes in the growth rates of total 
factor productivity) have their own limitations for making inferences, either about 
market conforming or industrial policies. On the one hand, it is impossible to attribute 
performance in relation to any of these indicators directly to market forces or to 
interventionist policy without an explicit analysis, since performance in relation to 
these indicators is influenced by a host of both intemal and extemal factors. On the 
other hand, these indicators also have limited value for making such inferences due to 
certain methodological shortcomings. These shortcomings are prominent in two of its 
empirical tests. For its first test, for instance, the EAM report applied the results of 
the Syrquin and Chenery equation as standard norms, based on averages across many 
middle income countries, to determine whether the sectoral composition of output was 
consistent with market forces or govemment efforts. Given data constraints, 
comparing the performance of the East Asian countries with standards established for 
other developing countries with similar characteristics, would be useful to assess the 
distinctiveness of sectoral composition of output, and to judge the success of policy 
initiatives. However, the sample of countries used to generate these norms included 
many which did adopt interventionist policies, such as India, Brazil and Argentina. 
The norms based on such a sample cannot be taken as the purely endovraient driven 
baseline as the EAM report assumed (Wade 1994; Agrawal et al. 1996). 
Moreover, as Yanagihara pointed out: 
the Chenery equation may be understood to reflect a market conforming 
evolution a la quasi-dynamic version of the Hecksher-Ohlin model and 
deviations from the Chenery regression line may signify static Hecksher-
Ohlin model predictions as well as influences of policy, past and present, 
among other country specific factors. In theory, and to the extent that the 
above presumption holds, the ratio of the actual to predicted shares could 
capture relative strengths of market forces and policy influences. But, as 
EAM admits (p. 327) the nature of the cross economy analysis is too rough to 
test the statistical significance of deviations from the norm. Estimation of the 
regression line itself is subject to large margins of error and more 
fundamentally, its double log specification has no particular theoretical 
underpinnings. (1994, p. 669) 
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Likewise, the third test, that based on TFP, by its very nature is vulnerable to 
criticism on various fronts. As is well knovm, the results of TFP calculations largely 
depend on assumptions like competitive markets, constant retums to scale and factors 
being paid their marginal products, and so forth. In practice, however, it is impossible 
to satisfy these assumptions. As an altemative, therefore, when estimating production 
functions, weights are used for estimation. There is ample evidence suggesting that 
the resuhs of the TFP are highly sensitive to different types of weights, especially to 
the various levels of the elasticity of substitution. Sheehan (1995) for instance, taking 
two sample studies, has shovm how the measurement of TFP differs when different 
types of weights are used. Similarly, Rodrik (1997) pointed out that it is impossible to 
disentangle factor-augmenting technological change from the shape of the production 
fimction. Thus, more often by misattributing labour-augmenting technical change to 
an assumed elasticity of substitution, TFP grow t^h is underestimated.' The TFP 
measures may further vary considerably even among estimates for the same economy 
and the same industrial sector depending on the estimation technique, as noted above, 
and the data used - the choice of output (value added vs gross output) and use of 
capital (capital stock vs flow of capital services) (Kwon 1994a). In addition to these 
possible measurement errors, Rodrigo (2000) argues that the way technological 
change is conceptualized does not capture useful information about aggregate 
technical change, since the growth accounting process overlooks the cmcial 
investments made in individual, organizational and social leaming that translate into 
productivity enhancing human and social capital. 
Besides these inherent limitations, the interpretation of TFP resuhs presented 
in the EAM report has been further questioned on several other grounds. The very 
basis of the comparison of TFP growth rates across different industries, it is argued, 
has no theoretical basis. There may well be systematic variation in TFP grov^h across 
industries in many countries. As Wade (1994) noted, instead of comparing the TFP 
results between promoted and non-promoted industries, if the comparison had been 
^ Rodrik (1997) also illustrated how the TFP growth changes with the various levels of elasticity of 
substitution and particularly he pointed out that the lower the level of elasticity of substimtion, the 
higher the TFP growth rates. 
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undertaken with the same industry in the rest of the world, the results may have been 
more sensible and meaningful. Further, factor productivity, or the residual in the 
production fimction, may be influenced by many different factors such as better 
management, economies of scale and higher rates of importation of advanced 
technology. Based on empirical evidence of TFP estimates of a number of Asian 
economies, for instance, Dowling and Summers (1997) claimed that estimates of TFP 
are sensitive to a number of extemal factors such as the process of technological 
transfer, the extemal trading environment, the level of economic growth, and the 
distortions and biases inherent in the measurement of capital and labour in developing 
economies. 
In addition to the limitations discussed above, the findings of this study were 
largely confined to limited aspects, primarily on the changes in industrial stmcture, 
ignoring most other important contributions such as the contribution of exports. As 
latecomers. East Asian countries placed heavy emphasis on increasing exports as a 
method of solving the balance of payments problem and of generating knowledge and 
experience through their industrial policies. There is ample evidence to suggest 
(Rodrik 1994; Agrawal et al. 1996; Lall 1994; Wade 1994) that export promotion was 
one of the goals towards which several instmments - in particular, credit and fiscal 
incentives were allocated on the basis of export performance - were employed. 
Stiidies such as Sheehan and Tikhomirova (1996, p. 13) have shown that the overall 
growth in merchandise exports, especially in technology intensive sectors, was higher 
in both East Asia and ASEAN countries compared to other countries in the world, 
over the period of 1980-1994. They also demonstrated that, in terms of the index of 
specialisation of high tech exports and the index of knowledge composition of 
exports. East Asian economies have a proven record of success. In the light of this 
evidence, one can speculate that there might be some association between this 
superior performance in exports and technology and industrial policies. Therefore, the 
EAM report would have been more meaningful if it had incorporated the overriding 
policy objectives of these countries, such as increasing exports. 
' Though the EAM report pomted out that in terms of exports East Asian countries were successful, 
tests for the effectiveness of industrial policy were not developed m terms of exports. 
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3.2.2 Effectiveness of Industrial Policies: Country-Specific Studies 
The effectiveness of industrial policies has also been examined using a wide range of 
indicators on a country-specific basis. A number of these studies will be discussed in 
the current section under two broad headings: (i) the effectiveness of industrial 
policies in terms of exports and (ii) the effectiveness of industrial policies using other 
aggregate measures. 
(i) Effectiveness of Industrial Policies in Terms of Exports 
Recent studies by Warr (1995) and Agrawal et al. (1996) have examined the effects of 
industrial policies in terms of exports, on a country-specific basis. Using net export 
performance as an indicator Warr (1995) analysed the impact of industrial policies, 
based on the experience of Thailand during the period of 1974-89. The main 
objective of this study was to find out whether industrial policies contributed to export 
success in Thailand. For this purpose, a measure based on the earlier work of Balassa 
and others on 'revealed' comparative advantage, and knovm as the net export 
performance ratio (NEPR) was formed as follows: 
(x;-MD/^T (4) 
where yv; denotes Thailand's NEPR for industry/ xjand M] denote Thailand's gross 
exports and gross imports of commodityy, respectively, XJ denotes world exports of 
commodityy, Xl denotes Thailand's total exports of all goods and X' denotes total 
worid exports of all goods. This index thus measures the degree to which Thailand's 
net exports of commodity/ as a share of worid exports of that commodity, exceed or 
fall short of Thailand's share of worid exports in general (Warr 1995, p. 18). 
Using a direct approach this study investigated the correlation between net 
export performance of industries (including agriculture) and several industrial policy 
instruments namely, the effective rate of protection (ERP), the industry share of 
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Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) approved loans, die industry share 
of total Board of Investment promoted projects, the industry share of total tax 
drawbacks of funds and industry share of total tax rebate fiinds. Except for the ERP, 
all other four instmments were divided by value-added, to allow for the different sizes 
of the industry. To examine the correlation this study use average sectoral net export 
performance ratio data for four periods including the periods of 1970-74, 1975-79, 
1980-84 and 1985-89 and the average sectoral level of industry policy instmments as a 
share of value-added for different period intervals depending on the availability of 
data. As can be seen from Table 3.4, for instance the effective rate of protection is 
represented by three different years as 1974, 1984 and 1987, whereas IFCT loans are 
represented by the data for the intervals 1960-79, 1980-85 and 1986-90. Having 
examined the correlation between net export performance and different industry 
policy instruments, this study concluded that export performance was negatively 
related to all five measures, over time (see Table 3.4). Interpreting these results. Wan-
suggested that this may be due to the promotion of poor performers by using industrial 
policy instruments. 
Table 3.4 Thailand: Correlation Coefficients Across Industries - Trade 
Performance and Policy 
NEPR 
1970-74 
1975-79 
1980-84 
1985-89 
Effective Rate of 
Protection 
1974 1984 
-0.06 -0.02 
-0.07 -0.11 
-0.06 -0.16 
-0.04 -0.14 
1987 
-0.08 
-0.14 
-0.15 
-0.15 
1960-79 
-0.16 
-0.18 
-0.16 
-0.17 
IFCT 
Loans 
1980-85 
-0.03 
-0.09 
-0.11 
-0.15 
1986-90 
-0.02 
-0.08 
-0.11 
-0.25 
BOI 
Projects 
1983-85 
-0.24 
-0.26 
-0.23 
-0.28 
1987-89 
-0.39 
-0.47 
-0.52 
-0.52 
Tax 
Draw-
backs 
1986-89 
-0.16 
-0.12 
-0.11 
-0.03 
Tax 
Rebates 
1986-89 
-0.46 
-0.39 
-0.40 
-0.35 
Source: Warr (1995, p. 21). 
This analysis appears to be significant on several grounds. Firstly, it assessed 
the impact of industrial policies by using direct measurements: the correlation 
between net export performance and industrial policy instruments. Secondly, the 
instruments contained in this study covered overall aspects of industrial policies such 
as foreign investment, tax incentives and protection thus incorporating country-
specific and other diverse characteristics of industrial policies. In that respect, this 
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study shed lights on the incidence and diversity of industrial policies and their 
implications. Despite these positive remarks, the conclusions derived through this 
study have to be taken with care, for a number of reasons. First of all, though export 
performance would be an appropriate indicator for gauging the effectiveness of 
industrial policies in the case of Thailand, since it has placed considerable emphasis 
on promoting exports through industrial policies since early 1970s, the indicators 
applied in this study may not be suitable for making inferences on the effectiveness of 
industrial policies for several reasons. On the one hand, Thailand like other 
developing countries, depends on imported raw materials and machinery, and it is a 
relatively new comer in the industrialization field. Against this background, one 
cannot expect improvement in their trade balances or competitive advantage within a 
short period of time. On the other hand, just because there is a negative correlation 
between aggregate sectoral net export performance ratios and industrial policy 
instmments, such evidence is not sufficient to generalise the results as implying an 
ineffective outcome of policy instruments without examining other objectives, such as 
promoting value-added, industrial and economic growth. 
Thirdly, it is doubtful whether certain industrial policy instruments, for 
example, BOI projects, tax drawbacks and rebates implemented in the 1980s, should 
be expected to have any impact on the net export performance of industries, 
particularly during the early periods such as 1970-74, and 1975-79. Fourthly, due to 
the aggregate nature of the presentation - correlations between averages of each 
industiy instruments and net export performance over five year periods - one cannot 
get a clear idea about the contribution of each individual industrial sector. 
Taking export performance as an indicator, Agrawal et al. (1996) also studied 
the impact of industrial policies at both aggregate and commodity levels for different 
policy regimes, for a sample of four countries including the Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia and India. This study contained two segments. In its first segment, 
it discussed three instmments of selective intervention including: (i) the provision of 
virtually a free trade regime in terms of the input requirements for the promoted 
industries; (ii) the provision of subsidized credit and (iii) the provision of fiscal 
incentives (Agrawal et al. 1996, p. 4.6). The outcome of these instruments and 
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selective policies were then examined using some aggregate measures such as 
comparing average armual growth of GDP, total exports manufacturing output as a 
share of GDP and so on. In addition to that, the costs of selective intervention were 
also examined by applying indicators such as balance of payments problems arising 
from trade discrimination, the monetary effects of financial repression and the 
consequent expansion of credit, and the fiscal effects of subsidies and tax concessions. 
The second segment of this study explored the institutional aspects. It mainly 
discussed the nature of the constraints imposed on various producers to achieve 
efficiency and how these constraints affected the behaviour of both policy makers and 
producers. 
Primarily based on aggregate quantitative evidence (secondary data extracted 
from various studies) for different policy periods, Agrawal et al. reported that 
although industrial policies created a positive impact in terms of exports, there is a 
mixed record of success for selective policies. Yet again, these findings have to be 
taken with care, due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the conclusions on the 
effectiveness of industrial policies are derived in this study on the basis of indirect 
evidences. As can be seen from Table 1 and 2 of Appendix 3.1, in the case of Korea, 
the effectiveness of industrial policies are examined through aggregate measures such 
as average annual GDP and manufacturing output as a share of GDP and so on for 
four different policy periods. Such aggregate performance measures cannot be purely 
attributed as a policy outcome without carrying out an explicit analysis. Secondly, 
though this study mentioned three selective policy instruments, no explicit attempts 
has been taken by this study for identifying the potential impact of these policy 
instruments on outcomes other than listing of the trade and credit policy indicators as 
shovm in Table 3 in Appendix 3.1. Overall, the quantitative indicators applied in this 
study are not only indirect but also inadequate to reveal the potential outcome of 
industrial policies in the sample countries. 
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(ii) Effectiveness of Industrial Policies: Using Other Aggregate Measures 
In addition to the studies mentioned earlier, several other studies have analysed the 
effectiveness of industrial poHcies on a country-specific basis, by using a variety of 
indicators. A number of these studies, such as Dollar and Sokoloff (1994), Stem 
(1990), Lee (1996), Hill (1997) and Cho and Kim (1995), are most notable for their 
theoretical and empirical contributions. 
Dollar and Sokoloff (1994) analysed industrial performance in Korea and 
Taiwan using several indicators such as grov^h of value-added, labour productivity 
and exports of the manufacturing sector. In this analysis they characterised "industrial 
targeting" as those policies that focus on the end result of industrialization - stmctural 
change - and encouraged the growth of particular industries. Within this 
specification, import protection, subsidized credit and public investment initiatives 
that are targeted to specific industries are considered as examples of industrial 
targeting. Under this framework, the basic objective of their study was to examine 
whether there were substantial differences in performance between targeted industries 
and other industries in generating economic growth in the sample countries. In this 
process they have compared the industrial performance of heavy and light industries in 
Korea and Taiwan, using labour productivity and value-added growth over the period 
1961-79. With these analyses this study concludes that industry specific interventions 
have not been an important cause of growth in either economy. 
Applying the economic rate of retum and opportunity cost of capital as 
indicators, Stem (1990) made an effort to measure the success of industrial policies by 
taking eight heavy and chemical industries, in which such policies were applied, as a 
sample for the case of Korea. For analytical purposes, industries have been classified 
into two groups, as successfiil and unsuccessful. If the economic rate of retum is 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital, those industries were classified as 
successfiil. If the economic rate of retum is lower than the opportunity cost of capital, 
such industries were classified as unsuccessful industries. On the basis of these 
criteria, the study concluded that five out of eight sample industries selected are 
successfiil and industrial policies played a part in achieving this outcome. 
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Commenting on three unsuccessful industries. Stem (1990) pointed out that certain 
exogenous factors such as shift in prices and decline in demand has largely influenced 
those industries and therefore cannot be solely interpreted as a policy outcome. He 
further added that the success of some of the heavy industries in Korea is at least 
partly due to exogenous changes (easy access to US markets) and other favourable 
factors such as the presence of a strong infrastmcture, an educated and disciplined 
labour force and experienced entrepreneurs, and therefore caimot be entirely viewed as 
a result of Korea's industrial policy. 
In effect, both these studies (Dollar and Sokoloff 1994 and Stem 1990) have 
made a valuable contribution to the empirical literature in assessing the effectiveness 
of industrial policies. The former based its conclusions on three different indicators 
while extending its empirical analysis to the sectoral level. Departing from common 
approaches, the latter study has assessed whether industry specific intervention was 
successfiil or not, taking the economic rate of retum and the opportunity cost as 
measurement criteria. The analytical approach of Stem (1990) is particularly 
noteworthy, because it viewed the success or failure of policy outcome in a broad 
perspective, considering how both intemal and extemal factors determined the 
outcome of policies. 
In one of the most significant studies to date, Lee (1996) investigated the 
association between direct measures of govemment intervention and total factor 
productivity for Korea at the sectoral level between 1963-83. In this study Lee 
illustrated how to incorporate policy intervention into a growth accounting 
framework, as outlined below. 
The theoretical approach begins with a constant-retums-to scale production function 
of value-added in sector / : 
Q, = F (A , ,K , ,H , ,L , ) , /=1...N, (5) 
where Q„ K/, H/, and L,, represent the quantities of value-added, physical capital, 
human capital and raw labour input used in the production of good / respectively. The 
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level of technology in the sector i is denoted by A,. Simplifying the production 
function in terms of ratios per unit of labour input: 
q, =f(A,-,k,-,h,), /=1 N, (6) 
where q,- (=Y/ /L,-) denotes labour productivity, k,- (=K,- /L/) denotes capital intensity ot 
industry / and h/ (=H, /L,) denotes the level of human capital stock, all per unit of 
labour input. 
Following the conventional growth accounting framework introduced by 
Solow and developed by Denison and others, the growth rate of value-added in sector 
/ is decomposed into the contribution of the increase in factor inputs plus a residual. 
Applying this to the equation (6) yields a form of growth accounting: 
%,^"%^-X. • <^ ' 
where the parameter a^ and an denote the elasticity of output with respect to physical 
and human capital respectively. Equation (7) thus decomposes labour productivity 
growth into a weighted sum of growth in neutral technological progress and in 
physical and human capital stock. However, considering the data limitations on 
human capital stock, equation (7) is modified to: 
A / ^ /ki /TFPi ' 
where the sum of W and an % . is put into a residual, which is typically referred to 
/ Ai / hi 
as the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). 
In the simple Solow-type neoclassical growth model technological progress is 
assumed to be exogenous. In this model, the rate of technological change determines 
the rate of the steady state growth in per capita GDP. But economies may also be at 
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times far from the steady state path so that actual growth rates may involve catch-up to 
that path. 
The growth rate of output per worker may be a result of two sets of variables: 
first, initial levels of state variables, such as the stock of physical capital and the 
stock of human capital; and second, control or policy variables, which are 
considered to influence the steady-state level of per worker output and thus 
change the growth rate over the transitional interval. (Lee 1996, p. 397) 
Lee argued that a similar framework can be applied to explaining growth of 
sectoral capital and output, especially in the case of Korean manufacturing industries, 
since they had initial output and capital stocks that were far away from the steady-state 
ones. The growth rates of sectoral output and capital stocks are influenced by the 
initial level of the capital stocks. Govemment policies such as industrial and trade 
policies may affect the growth rate of capital stocks and output by influencing both the 
steady-state level of capital stocks and the speed of accumulation. Incorporating 
policy variables, for empirical purposes, the equation (8) is specified as follows: 
Y, =P,7 +yX, +(t)Z,+U,v, /=1...N, t=l, T (9) 
Here, the dependent variable Y,, represents either labour productivity growth [ ^ ^.1 or 
one of its components, growth of capital stock \^/A or growth of TFP [% +«"^;, 
in each period t. 
The vector of independent variables X,, include following initial state variables: 
X, =[log(^,0,log(^„)], (10) 
where q,-, is value-added per work hour in the initial year of period t, and k„ is capital 
stock per work hour in the initial year of period t. Since data on human capital h are 
not available, log (k,-,) and log (q,-,) are included assuming that these variables would 
capture the effects of initial differences of capital stocks and output per worker across 
industries on the consequent sectoral productivity growth. 
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The vector Z„ denotes a set of govemment policy variables and they include 
following variables. 
Zu = [NTB,„ TARIFF,,, TAXING,,, CREDIT,,], (11) 
where NTBjt, TARIFFit, TAXINCjt, and CREDITjt represent a measure of non-tariff 
barriers, an average tariff rate, an estimate of tax incentives, and an estimate of 
financial incentives that were provided for the industry / respectively. The first two 
policy measures, according to this study, were classified as trade policy measures 
while including the latter two as industrial policy measures. As Lee pointed out, 
correlation between policy variables and output growth could come from two effects: 
First, the govemment policy may influence capital accumulation and thus output 
grovs1;h. Second, the goverrunent policy could affect the output grovv1:h by influencing 
TFP growth (p.399). 
Further, by assuming industry and time specific fixed effects, the intercept is 
specified as follows: 
A = i^ + A + A,. (12) 
As stated: 
the industry and time specific constant terms may capture unmeasured 
disturbances to growth of capital stocks or of productivity. The industry 
intercept p, is likely to capture unmeasurable industry-specific elements, such 
as the share of trade and the geographical location of each industry. And the 
time intercept A., may reflect technological progress common to all industries 
and period specific disturbances such as oil shocks in the 1970s. (Lee 1996, p. 
398) 
The impact of govemment policies was evaluated in this study by estimating 
equation (9) using panel data and the weighted least squares (WLS) technique, which 
corrects for cross equation heteroscedasticity. 
Equations were estimated for both the growth rate of sectoral value-added and 
of its components - the growth rates of capital stock and of total factor productivity. 
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The regression results revealed that there was a strong negative effect of trade 
protection, a positive effect of tax incentives and no significant effect of financial 
incentives on the growth rate of value-added per worker (see Table 3.5). Investigating 
the association of these industrial policy instmments separately with growth rate of 
capital stock and the growth of TFP, this study further reported that tax incentives 
affect the accumulation of physical capital (positive effect) but not TFP growth. 
Trade protection, however, has a significant negative effect on both capital 
accumulation and TFP growth. Financial incentives had no significant effect either on 
capital accumulation or TFP grov/th (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
Overall, this study concluded that tax incentives positively affect output 
growth rates by stimulating capital accumulation, but not by affecting TFP growth, 
whereas trade (protection) policies decrease the growth rates of output by decreasing 
both the TFP and the accumulation of physical capital. Further, it found that Korean 
industrial policies (particularly tax incentives) though helped the stmctural 
transformation of the economy, they have not been successfiil in promoting 
productivity growth. 
In effect, this empirical analysis has also made a valuable contribution: it 
presented a theoretical approach incorporating the role of policy intervention in the 
analysis; it used a direct approach in assessing the impact of govemment intervention 
by using specific intervention measures; and it employed the three-digit level ISIC 
classification. 
Above all, this study is particularly noteworthy for its explicit attempts to 
examine the association between industrial performance and incidence measures. 
Despite these positive attributes, there are a number of points which deserve attention. 
Firstly, industrial policies are perceived differently in this study. Of the four policy 
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Table 3.5 Panel Regressions for Growth Rate of Value-Added Per Worker" 
Independent Variable'' 
Log (Initial Value-Added) 
Log (Initial Capital) 
Non-tariff Barrier 
Tariff 
Tax Incentives 
Bank Loans 
Growth Rate of Capital Stock 
Estimation Technique'^ 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient (Standard Errors) 
(4.1) 
-0.092 
(0.017) 
-0.050 
(0.019) 
-0.144 
(0.037) 
-0.035 
(0.081) 
0.239 
(0.133) 
-0.083 
(0.164) 
WLS 
146 
(4.2) 
-0.109 
(0.014) 
0.094 
(0.024) 
-0.058 
(0.033) 
-0.082 
(0.067) 
0.011 
(0.119) 
-0.011 
(0.139) 
0.693 
(0.086) 
WLS 
146 
(4.3) 
-0.112 
(0.019) 
0.049 
(0.023) 
-0.251 
(0.040) 
-O.I 11 
(0.061) 
0..312 
(0.140) 
-0.110 
(0.232) 
3SLS 
146 
(4.4) 
-0.163 
(0.014) 
0.172 
(0.024) 
-0.092 
(0.030) 
-0.118 
(0.039) 
-0.099 
(0.111) 
-0.084 
(0.169) 
0.990 
(0.092) 
3SLS 
146 
Notes: a. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of real value-added per hour over each five-
year period (1963-1968, 1968-1973, 1973-1978, 1978-1983) from 1963 to 1983. There are 
146 observations (thirty-eight industries and four time periods; two missing industries for three 
periods). 
b. The independent variables are as follows: Initial Value-Added is real value- added per hour in 
the initial year of each period; Initial Capital is real value of net capital stock per hour in the 
initial year of each period; Non-tariff Barrier is the ratio of tariff subject to discretionary import 
approval to the total number of items in the mid year of each period; Tariff is the output 
weighted average of legal tariff rate m the mid year of each period; Tax incentive is the period 
average of ratio of difference between legal and effective marginal corporate tax rate; Bank 
Loans is the period average of ratio of subsidized bank loans to total assets ;GroH'r/j Rate of 
Capital Stock is the aimual growth rate of capital stock per hour over each period. 
c. The weighted least squares (WLS) technique corrects for the cross equation 
heteroscedasticity. The three stage least squares (3SLS) technique uses log values of initial 
value-added and capital and one period lagged policy variables as instmments. Industry and 
period specific effects are controlled. 
Source: Lee (1996, p. 400). 
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Table 3.6 Panel Regressions for Growth Rate of Capital Stock* 
Independent Variable'' 
Log (Initial Value -Added) 
Log (Initial Capital) 
Non-tariff Barrier 
Tariff 
Tax Incentive 
Bank Loans 
Estimation Technique'' 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient (Standard Errors) 
(5.1) (5.2) 
0.035 0.025 
(0.013) (0.014) 
-0.195 -0.209 
(0.015) (0.017) 
-0.131 -0.159 
(0.028) ((0.028) 
0.056 -0.029 
(0.062) (0.038) 
0.382 0.499 
(0.122) (0.105) 
-0.188 -0.019 
(0.138) (0.200) 
WLS 3SLS 
146 146 
Notes: a. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of net capital stock per hour over each five-
year period (1963-1968, 1968-1973, 1973-1978, 1978-1983) from 1963 to 1983. 
b. See note b to Table 3.5. 
c. See note c to Table 3.5. 
Source: Lee (1996, p. 401). 
Table 3.7 Panel Regressions for Growth Rate of Total Factor Productivity" 
Independent Variable Coefficient (Standard Errors) 
(5.1) (L2I 
Log (Initial Value-Added) 
Log (Initial Capital) 
Non-tariff Barrier 
Tariff 
Tax Incentive 
Bank Loans 
Estimation Technique*^ 
Number of Observations 
-0.144 
(0.146) 
0.071 
(0.017) 
-0.072 
(0.032) 
-0.079 
(0.069) 
0.044 
(0.110) 
-0.019 
(0.138) 
WLS 
146 
-0.153 
(0.015) 
0.078 
(0.018) 
-0.167 
((0.033) 
-0.113 
(0.048) 
0.074 
(0.113) 
-0.123 
(0.181) 
3SLS 
146 
Notes: a. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of total factor productivity over each five-
year period (1963-1968, 1968-1973, 1973-1978, 1978-1983) from 1963 to 1983. It is derived 
from the growth accounting of value added. 
b. See note b to Table 3.5. 
c. See note c to Table 3.5. 
Source: Lee (1996, p. 401). 
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variables applied, this study considered two variables namely, tax and financial 
incentives as industrial policy instmments. In fact, trade policies also play an 
important role in promoting industries, in particular infant industries in Korea. When 
all the policy variables are taken together it is fair to conclude that industrial policy 
instmments generate mixed results for promoting productivity growth in Korea. 
Secondly, TFP as a measurement indicator, has been subjected to criticism due to 
possible measurement errors. 
In investigating industrial policy and performance in Chapter 12, Hill (1997) 
also focused on industrial policy instmments. Those policy instmments that were 
identified as the instmments of selective industrial policies included: (a) control over 
the formal capital market, both in terms of the rates set and of the allocation of funds 
between industries; (b) trade and protection policy; (c) the fiscal regime employed, 
ranging from extensive direct investment to fiscal incentives and (d) other additional 
instruments, including a highly selective foreign investment regime, specific measures 
to encourage industrial agglomeration and industry associations, labour market 
restrictions and training, and support initiatives. The main question which the 
empirical analysis seeks to answer was whether the rapid industrial growth of 
Indonesia could be attributed to selective industrial policy. Having examined key 
instruments of selective industrial policies of Indonesia descriptively, and analysing 
the correlation between effective rate of protection - represented by data for years 
1987 and 1990 - and several aggregate measures such as the real output growth, 
exports and the TFP in the manufacturing sector, Hill concluded that those 
instruments have made very little contribution to the industrial and export success. 
Some explanation is warranted regarding these empirical results. Firstly, of 
die instruments mentioned above, he included only one instrument, protection, in his 
quantitative analysis. The conclusions in respect of the other instruments were based 
on descriptive analysis. In relation to protection, this study used the effective rate of 
protection (ERP) for 1987 and 1990. The correlation between this measure and 
several other variables (such as the real output growth, exports and the TFP) across 
industries was examined. The ERP data for 1987 and for 1990 was correlated with 
die growth of manufacturing output for the period 1980-90, the percentage increase in 
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the index of export specialization, and the annual growth in TFP for the period 1982-
91, respectively. It was hypothesized that for industrial policy to have been 
successfiil, protection and the growth in all three variables noted above would be 
positively correlated. The results indicated that none of the correlations was 
statistically significant, and only the correlation between TFP growth and ERP has the 
expected sign for both periods under observation (see Table 3.8). As a supplement, 
however, this study discussed the level of protection and their outcomes in some key 
industries including steel, plywood, garment and weaving. On the grounds of this 
evidence, this study concluded that there is little support for selective industrial policy 
through protection. 
Although these findings are generally consistent with the other studies (for 
example Lee 1996 and Kwak 1994), the central question is to what extent the 
correlation coefficient figures presented between the ERP in the year of 1987 or 1990, 
and the other variables which use average growth figures broadly between 1980-90, 
are reliable. According to the author, the figures for ERP reflect the effects of 
protective regime over the 1980s, since no major reforms had been undertaken during 
the period observed. 
Table 3.8 Correlation Coefficients: Effective Protection and Industry 
Performance 
Variable ERP 1987 ERP 1990 
Output 0.017 -0.032 
Exports -0.046 -0.088 
TFP 0.073 0.064 
Notes: ERP= Effective rate of protection. 
None of the correlations is significant (with ERP) at the 10% level. 
Source: Hill (1997, p. 308). 
In the presence of contradictory evidence, however, the validity of this 
assertion may be questioned. As the author himself pointed out elsewhere, there have 
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been inter-industry variations over time in the level of protection in Indonesia. As he 
stated: "there has indeed been significant reform of Indonesia's trade regime. For 
example, average tariff rates declined significantly over the period 'pre-1985' (that is 
before the reforms had commenced) to mid 1992, from 37% to 20% and 29% to 13%) 
on an unweighted and weighted basis respectively" (p. 351). Similar evidence is 
presented in APEC (1995b). Indeed the data (in Table C.4, p. 142) showed that there 
was substantial variation in the level of tariff and non-tariff barriers during the 
observed period. For example, mean tariff rates (unweighted averages) were 31.3, 
19.4 and 22.5 in the periods of 1980-83, 1984-87 and 1988-90 respectively. In light 
of this evidence, the simplification used and therefore conclusion derived from it, 
have to be taken with care. 
Cho and Kim (1995), in another country-specific study, examined the 
effectiveness of credit policies, one of the most popular industrial policy instruments, 
in Korea. This study covered various aspects of credit policies, while stressing the 
importance of credit policy as an instrument of corporate govemance and risk 
management. Also it discussed the cost and legacy of credit policies, particularly the 
resulting effect of contributing to an inefficient banking system and economic 
concentration. In analysing the effectiveness of credit policies this study mainly 
focused on two themes: the contribution of credit policies to the growth of industries 
by easing access to subsidies and capital, and their impact as an instmment of 
industrial policy in securing private sector compliance with govenunent policy goals. 
To assess these themes, this study firstly explored whether these policies did indeed 
increase access to, and reduce the cost of capital for, the targeted sectors. For this, it 
compared the access to credit (defined as consisting of total bank loans and foreign 
loans^ divided by the total assets of each sector) and the average cost of borrowing 
across policy favoured and non-policy favoured sectors during 1973-90. Policy 
favoured sectors consisted of export promoting, heavy and chemical and large-scale 
industries whereas non-policy favoured sectors included domestic, small-scale and 
light industrial sectors. On the basis of this evidence, the study found that during the 
Foreign loans were also considered as policy directed finance facilities. 
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observed period, policy-favoured sectors had both greater access to capital and a lower 
cost of borrowing than non-favoured sectors (see Appendix 3.2 Table 1). 
Secondly, this study examined whether credit support spurred the growth of 
the policy favoured sectors. To address this issue, it employed three indirect 
measures, the impact of credit support on: (a) the take-off of exports; (b) on the rapid 
growth of HCIs in the 1970s; and (c) the development of an infant industry (the steel 
industry by using Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) as a case study). 
Analysing the growth of exports and the amount of financial subsidies for exports for 
the period 1965-1990, this study reported that though the amount of credh subsidies 
was comparatively high, no apparent contribution to the take off of exports from credit 
support could be observed. Comparing the composition of bank loans with the 
changes in industrial stmcture and composition of exports by the HCI sector with that 
of light industrial sector during the period 1970-88, this study concluded that: 
the expansion of HCI in the 1970s is striking. Within a decade, its share of 
total industrial output grew more than two and half times, and its share in 
exports tripled. It is obvious that without government intervention in the 
allocation of credit, quick transformation of the industrial composition, and a 
discrete jump in the level of industrial development, would not have been 
possible, (p. 56) 
Finally, confirming positive effects in relation to the steel industry, it was 
further declared that "govemment led financial support was the most critical source 
of funds for the successful transformation of POSCO, into one of the world's most 
efficient steel producers" (p. 59). 
Overall, this study provides a comprehensive picture of credit policies, their 
effects and consequences, thus covering a wide spectmm which may be useful in a 
number of respects. Firstly, departing from the popular classification of industries this 
study used a broad, but sensible classification for identifying policy favoured and non 
favoured sectors, which were mainly based on the access to credits and the cost of the 
credit. Secondly, industrial performance was analysed on the basis of the stages of 
industrialization, which might have significant impact on the policy outcome. 
However, the aggregate measures applied in this study (growth of exports, changes in 
industrial stmcture and so on) have limited value for evaluating the effectiveness of 
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credit policies, since the performance of aggregate measures could be influenced by a 
host of other factors. 
3.3 Common Limitations 
Owing to the differences in coverage, methodology, concepts and data, direct 
comparison of the studies outlined above is not possible. However, a number of 
points which deserve attention will be noted in this section. As is clear from the 
previous discussion, the existing analyses of the effectiveness of industrial policies 
show inconsistent results. In part, these inconsistencies could be attributed to the 
methodological differences evident in these studies in terms of the nature and scope of 
the studies, and to the lack of a uniform conceptual mechanism. 
The nature of the study (the basis which the studies are carried out, for 
example, country-specific or cross-country) will be a significant influence on its 
outcome. Naturally, the outcome of a cross-country study may differ from that of a 
country-specific study, even if the same technique is applied. As was clear, all of the 
comprehensive studies outlined above except the EAM report are not only country-
specific studies but also apply a variety of techniques. In addition, the scope of the 
studies vary considerably. For example, the EAM study argued that industrial 
policies, in particular selective promotion, are ineffective on the basis of changes in 
industrial stmcture and productivity. Somewhat similar conclusions are found in 
Warr (1995) and Hill (1997), on the grounds of exports and other aggregate measures. 
On the contrary, Cho and Kim (1995) and Agrawal et al. (1996) declared that 
industiial policies are effective in terms of their effect on exports but used different 
indicators as well as different methodologies. 
The lack of a uniform conceptual framework regarding industrial policies in 
general, and more importantly regarding industry specific intervention, has been 
another factor that contributed to the mixed results. For instance, the absence of 
uniformity with reference to the coverage of industry specific intervention can be 
observed clearly with the following examples. The EAM report (p. 88) provides a 
relatively broad definition of selective intervention including four types of policies 
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under this category: (i) export push; (ii) financial repression; (iii) directed credit; and 
(iv) selective promotion. Hill (1997) identifies a list of instruments of selective 
industrial policies including: (a) control over the formal capital market both in the 
rates set and in the allocation of funds between industries; (b) trade and protection 
policy; and (c) the fiscal regime employed ranging from extensive direct investment to 
fiscal incentives and so forth. Lee (1996) considers tax and financial incentives as 
industrial policy instmments excluding tariff and non-tariff measures whereas Warr 
(1995) includes foreign direct investment and the effective rate of protection as 
industrial policy instmments in addition to the variables representing tax and financial 
incentives. With different interpretations and different instruments one can inevitably 
expect different outcomes. 
All in all, with differences noted above, it is not surprising to find inconsistent 
results. Although these results might be taken as having an important message - that 
industrial policies work well in certain circumstances and in certain other 
circumstances do not produce the expected results - almost all the studies generalise 
their results in terms of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of industrial policies. 
These interpretations can be questioned on several grounds. The analytical 
techniques applied by the majority of the existing empirical studies have limited value 
for making inferences about the effectiveness of policies, for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, all of the empirical studies noted previously, except Warr (1995) and Lee 
(1996), base their conclusions on analysis of factors such as die aggregate 
performance of exports, economic growth and value-added. Such aggregate 
performance could be influenced by several other intemal and extemal factors. 
Therefore, the outcome of these variables carmot be solely attributed to the industrial 
policies, without an explicit analysis which takes account of the other possible factors 
determining these outcomes. 
Secondly, no systematic and logical basis has been evident for identifying 
selectively promoted industries in these empirical studies. To determine the 
effectiveness of indusfrial policies, in particular industry specific intervention, it is 
required to identify industries that have been preferred over the others. However, 
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without providing any logical basis, almost all the studies (except Cho and Kim) 
classify industries as promoted and non-promoted industries on the basis of including 
heavy and chemical industries on the former and other industries to the latter. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, industry-specific intervention is rarely practiced 
uniformly among countries. Due to the various country-specific factors - such as 
natural resource endovmient, political economy, status of development, policy 
priorities and so forth - industries that have been subject to preferential treatments 
differ between countries and also over time. Both Malaysia and Thailand, as natural 
resource rich countries, emphasised promotion of resource-based industries, while 
also promoting labour intensive industries. In addition, developing coimtries as 
latecomers often start their industrialization process by placing emphasis on labour 
intensive industries while applying various measures to promote other industries. For 
instance, as Rodrik (1994) pointed out, the textile industry was not only designated as 
a strategic industry, but also promoted heavily both in Japan and the Republic of 
Korea in their early development periods. In other words, policy favoured sectors 
have not been exclusively limited to heavy and chemical industries, even in the case of 
Korea. Under these diverse circumstances, the generalization of heavy and chemical 
industries as promoted industries and the others as non-promoted industries, will not 
be appropriate for all countries at all times. 
Therefore, to determine the extent of industry specific intervention, it is 
necessary to establish some kind of clear conceptual framework. This task would 
require understanding the incidence of industrial policies - what industries, at what 
time, to what extent and using what measures have been subjected to industrial 
promotion. Instead of applying such a specific approach, the effects of industrial 
policies have been evaluated by existing empirical studies while assuming the 
industiialization process to be a once and for all event. 
Summing up, the available empirical studies have derived their conclusions on 
die basis of the analyses of broad economic aggregates while ignoring the diversity of 
factors affecting those outcomes, and the diversity of the incidence of industrial 
policies across nations and industries over time. As a result, the empirical evidence 
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about the effectiveness of industrial policies remains inconclusive. Inter alia, an 
appropriate strategy to assess the effectiveness of industrial policies appears to 
require: (a) developing a logical basis to identify the incidence of industry policies, 
having regard to the particular characteristics of industrial policies in a given country 
at a particular time; (b) developing measures to assess the potential outcomes of 
industrial policies, which take account of the impact of other factors aiid (c) evaluating 
the impact of industrial policies with further analysis. While taking into account the 
specific characteristics of industrial policies (the diversity of instruments and 
outcomes and the incidence of industrial policies), forthcoming chapters in this study 
will attempt to develop an altemative method for evaluating the effectiveness of 
industrial policies. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Table 1 Real GDP and Export, South Korea, 1953-91 
Average annual 
growth 
GDP (%) 
Total exports (%) 
End of period shares (%) 
Manufacturing 
output/GDP 
Manufacturing exports/Total 
exports 
Tot export/GNP 
1953-62 
3.9 
16.1 
11.7 
27.0 
2.4 
1962-71 
10.4 
39.3 
21.8 
86.0 
11.6 
1971-81 
11.5 
34.8 
31.3 
92.9 
31.9 
1981-91 
9.8 
12.9 
27.5 
95.4 
25.6 
Source: Nam (1993) as cited in Agrawal et al. (1996, p. 4.57). 
Table 2 Composition of Manufacturing Output and Exports, South Korea, 
1971-83 
Year 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
% of Manufacturing Output 
Light Heavy 
59.5 40.5 
50.1 49.9 
49.3 50.7 
43.7 56.3 
40.7 59.3 
% of Manufacturing Exports 
Light Heavy 
86.3 13.7 
66.8 33.2 
68.4 31.6 
60.1 39.9 
45.7 54.3 
Source: Amsden (1989) as cited in Agrawal et al. (1996, p. 4.57). 
Table 3 Indicators of Trade and Credit Policy, South Korea, 1965-90 
Year 
1965 
1971 
1975 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1985 
1990 
Trade 
Nominal 
Exchange 
Rate 
(won/US$ 
265.4 
347.7 
484 
484 
618.5 
781.2 
870 
707.7 
policy indicators 
Gross 
Export 
Subsidies 
(Per US$) 
39.2 
103 
81 
93.1 
131.6 
na 
na 
na 
Import 
LiberalLzati 
on 
Ratio 
35.8 
55.2 
54.7 
55.8 
65.3 
70.5 
78.7 
87.6 
Interest Rates by Loan Category 
General 
26 
22 
15.5 
16 
20 
10 
11.5 
12.5 
Export 
8 
6 
9 
8 
15 
10 
10 
11.5 
Heavy 
Industry 
na 
na 
12 
14 
19.5 
10 
11.5 
10 
Source: Kim (1994) and Cho 1995 as cited in Agrawal et al. (1996, p. 4.58). 
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Appendix 3.2 
Table 1 Credit Access and Borrowing Costs by Sector (per cent) 
Access to borrowing (a) 
Manufacturing 
Large firms 
SMCs 
(A) -(B) 
Export 
Domestic 
(C)-(D) 
HCI 
Light Industry 
(E) -(F) 
Average borrowing cost 
Manufacturing 
Large firms 
SMCs 
(G) -(H) 
Export 
Domestic 
(l)-(J) 
HCI 
Light Industry 
(K) - (L) 
Memo items: Wholesale 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
(F) 
(b) 
(G) 
(H) 
(I) 
(J) 
(K) 
(L) 
, retail, & hotel 
1973-81 
40.4 
40.9 
32.7 
8.2 
45.1 
37.6 
7.5 
40.7 
39.8 
0.9 
13.3 
13.0 
14.9 
-1.9 
12.6 
14.0 
-1.4 
12.1 
14.9 
-2.8 
17.3 
1982-86 
31.5 
31.6 
31.3 
0.3 
35.9 
28.8 
7.1 
32.2 
30.3 
1.9 
14.0 
14.0 
14.2 
-0.2 
12.7 
14.8 
-2.1 
13.5 
14.9 
-1.4 
16.9 
1987-90 
27.7 
27.0 
31.4 
-4.4 
30.3 
26.3 
4.0 
28.2 
27.0 
1.2 
13.0 
12.6 
14.3 
-1.7 
12.6 
13.2 
-0.6 
12.7 
13.5 
-0.8 
15.3 
Notes: (a) Bank loans and foreign loans/total assets. 
(b) Average borrowing cost = financial cost/(corporate bond + foreign loans + loans from the 
financial institutions). 
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis, various issues as cited in Cho and Kim (1995, 
p. 52). 
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4. Assessing the Diversity and the Effectiveness of Industrial Policy: 
Methodology and Scope of the Study 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, the various theoretical rationales for industrial policy 
imply that there can be many different types of policy intervention. Beyond these 
theoretical considerations, differences in policies applied between countries, and also 
within a given country over the time, are both possible and likely as noted in Chapter 
2. These variations are due to a number of reasons, such as the variety of country-
specific factors and dynamic changes arising from economic, political and 
technological developments. These diversities may have a considerable impact on the 
outcomes of industrial poHcies. If the effects of poHcies are viewed while 
overlooking the significance of these various forms of diversity, the resulting analysis 
will not reveal a tme picture of the effectiveness of industrial policy. Nevertheless, 
empirical studies have so far paid little attention to exploring this diversity and its 
effects. This is clearly evident in the review of empirical studies with regard to the 
impact of industrial policies undertaken in Chapter 3. In this context, we conclude 
that to assess the effectiveness of industrial policies appropriately it is important not 
only to identify the diversities for the country being analysed but also to ensure that 
this diversity is allowed for in the analytical methodology. 
As a first step, this study argues that it is important to examine the incidence 
of industrial policies. As will be specified later in this chapter, the term 'incidence of 
industrial policies' refers to the specification of what industries, using what measures, 
for what purposes, at what time and to what extent have been subjected to industrial 
promotion. On the basis of this incidence analysis, attempts will be made to identify 
the industries that have been preferred over the others in a particular setting. Having 
identified industries according to the magnitude of industrial promotion, as a second 
step this study will explore the potential outcome of industrial policies of Korea 
compared to countries with similar characteristics, using value-added and exports as 
indicators. Since such analyses provide evidence, under the given data constraints. 
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only of potential outcomes, further analyses need to be undertaken to determine the 
impact of industrial policies, that is, the extent to which policies with a given 
incidence actually contributed to these outcomes. 
This chapter, outlining the concepts and methodologies to be used in assessing 
the diversity and the effectiveness of industrial policies, initially reviews, in Section 
4.2, the incidence of industrial policies and how it applies in the present study. In 
Section 4.3, the methodology that will be applied for examining the diversity and 
measuring the incidence of industrial policies, for assessing potential outcomes and 
for analysing the impact of industrial policies will be reviewed briefly. Data sources 
and limitations are discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, the stmcture of the rest of the 
thesis will be outlined in section 4.5. 
4.2 Incidence of Industrial Policies 
The term incidence is widely used with reference to taxation and also for policy 
intervention (protection or promotion). The term tax incidence is usually applied to 
identify who actually bears the burden of the resources transferred to the govemment 
by the tax system, and basically refers to the study of the effects of a particular tax or 
tax system on the distribution of economic welfare. Several approaches, such as 
analyses of factor groups, labour and capital, and consumption and income groups, are 
employed to assess taxation incidence. The important lesson provided by this type of 
analysis is that there is no necessary correlation between the individual who pays the 
tax and the person who bears the tax burden. In the case of an excise tax, on a single 
good in a competitive market, for example, the actual burden depends on the relative 
magnitude of the supply and the demand elasticities. 
Likewise, the term incidence of protection is used to identify the ultimate 
bearers of policy intervention. Countries may apply a variety of methods to stimulate 
or protect industries, including promotional policies such as subsidies and other 
incentives and protectionist policies such as tariffs and quotas. Typically, these 
policies are employed without considering their impact on the overall industrial 
stmcture or on the economy as a whole. A particular pohcy measure designed to 
protect or promote one sector could result in harming another sector. The import 
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tariff charged on importers, for example, may finally end up being an expense for 
exporters. Such effects have long been analysed in much the same way as tax 
incidence. 
Engaging in a somewhat related exercise, Balassa (1982, p. 9) noted that one 
may undertake two distinct tasks in evaluating a system of incentives': gauging ihe 
incidence on product prices of the incentive measures applied, and predicting their 
economic effects. The first task involves ascertaining whether and to what extent the 
incentives applied favour (or disfavour) a particular activity which receives net 
incentives (disincentives) as compared with the neutral state of affairs. The second 
task entails analysing the effects of the incentives on the allocation of resources and 
other economic variables. 
Ideally, all of those incidence analyses noted previously should be carried out 
in a general equilibrium framework. The same may equally apply and would be more 
appropriate in analysing the ultimate incidence of industrial policies. Undertaking 
that kind of exercise is, however, beyond the scope of the present investigation for 
several reasons. Firstly, finding the data and information for assessing the incidence 
of industrial policies under general equilibrium framework for the sample country 
(Korea) is a difficult task. Secondly, even if sufficient data are available, policies are 
assigned a limited role within the general equilibrium models, which are largely based 
on neoclassical, market clearing mechanisms. Moreover, the dynamic and spillover 
effects are hardly captured by existing neoclassical instmments. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, industrial policies are not theoretically justified in this type of framework. 
Further, it is hard to find economy wide models incorporating policy effects based on 
the deviations from the market paradigm discussed in Chapter 1. 
Given the data and other limitations noted above, and taking into consideration 
the broad insights provided by prevailing incidence analyses, this study considers that, 
however it would be appropriate to view the incidence of industrial policies under two 
broad categories namely 'primary incidence' and 'final incidence'. The first category, 
'primary incidence' implies the direct impact of industrial policy measures on 
Incentives were defined in the Balassa study as govemment measirres that affect the allocation of 
resources among economic activities and their orientation between foreign and domestic markets. 
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particular industries in a given country. Broadly speaking, it refers to the 
specification of what industries, using what measures, for what purposes, at what 
time and to what extent have been subjected to industrial promotion. The other 
category, 'final incidence' refers to the impact that will presumably created through 
'primary incidence' measures on economy wide or industry specific performance 
variables such as GDP and exports. Under these specifications, the present study will 
examine 'primary incidence' in relation to three sample countries, namely Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand. Due to the data limitations, the analysis of 'final incidence' 
will be limited to Korea. To simplify the terminology the term 'incidence of 
industrial policies' will be used in this thesis only to refer to 'primary incidence', 
while the 'final incidence' of industrial policy will be referred to as the outcomes, or 
the impact of industrial policies. 
4.3 The Methodology and Scope of the Study 
The present investigation of the diversity and effectiveness of industrial policies 
includes three main parts. Part A of this thesis has covered theoretical arguments, a 
conceptual framework and an analytical review of empirical studies. 
Part B of this thesis will investigate the diversity and incidence of industrial 
policies in East Asia in the light of the experience of three sample countries, namely 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. These sample countries are appropriate for studying 
diversity and incidence of industrial policies in East Asia for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is well documented that all these three countries have recorded 
remarkable success in terms of economic and industrial growth, particularly during 
the period 1970-1996. It is also well known that they have vigorously appUed a 
variety of industrial promotion measures. Nevertheless, very few empirical studies 
have been carried out to assess the effects of industrial policies on these economies. 
Secondly, there is a perception that East Asian countries could be taken as a 
model for other developing countries and, indeed, that various East Asian countries 
achieved their success following a similar path. In fact, as Perkins (1994) noted these 
Asian countries demonstrate great diversity in the various dimensions of policy and it 
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is hard to find a single model that can be emulated by other developing countries. As 
previously argued, the diversity of industrial policies is another issue that has not been 
adequately covered in the literature. Since these three countries demonstrate quite 
distinctive pattems in their appUcation of industrial policies, an investigation of the 
industrial poUcies of these countries could provide a sound basis for identifying 
similarities and differences within East Asia. 
Thirdly, the sample countries are relatively large, compared to for example 
Hong Kong and Singapore, and contain characteristics similar to other developing 
countries. Therefore, implications drawn from these countries may provide useful 
insights for other developing countries. 
Finally, the data and information required for assessing the diversity and 
effectiveness of industrial poHcies in these countries are readily available, and more 
easily accessible than for some other countries in East Asia. 
As noted in Section 4.2, this exercise will emphasise on the incidence of 
industrial policies - 'primary incidence', as part of a broader methodology. 
Given the importance of diversity, this study considers that an appropriate strategy 
to assess the effectiveness of industrial policy requires: 
• measurement of the incidence of industrial policy in a given country and industry 
at a particular time; 
• development of measures of the potential outcome of industrial pohcy; and 
• assessment of the impact of industrial policy. 
Selecting Korea as a case study. Part C of this thesis will attempt to measure these 
aspects quantitatively for this particular case. 
(a) Assessing the magnitude of industrial promotion with incidence measures 
Supplementing the detailed discussion of incidence of industrial policies of sample 
countries, as an initial step in the empirical assessment process, an attempt will be 
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made to examine the incidence of industrial policies quantitatively. The primary 
purpose of this exercise is to identify what industries, using what measures, for what 
purposes, at what time and to what extent have been subjected to industrial 
promotion. In effect this task will be important from a number of aspects. 
Firstiy, it was clear from the review of empirical studies in Chapter 3 that few-
attempts have yet been made to assess the incidence of industrial policies and their 
impact on particular industrial sectors or on the overall economy of these sample 
countries, from the perspective of diversity. Secondly, the examination of the 
incidence of industrial policies will assist us in understanding industrial policies 
broadly, since it considers details such as the extent to which instmments are applied, 
and the objectives for which industries have been promoted and so forth. Thirdly, it 
provides useful insights in assessing the new theoretical paradigms - the diverse role 
of policy intervention - relating to industrial policies. More importantly, with this 
type of analysis, it is possible to view policy intervention in a broad perspective. This 
means departing from established perceptions that policy intervention is uniformly 
good or bad for economies, to a type of analysis where it is possible to identify 
situations where policies work well and those where policies fail. 
Given the comprehensive and dynamic nature of the incidence of industrial 
policies as noted in Section 2.3, selecting appropriate indicators for analytical 
purposes becomes a difficult task. Nevertheless, placing particular emphasis on 
certain important characteristics such as pohcy reforms, policy priorities, associated 
incentive measures and the selection of key/targeted industries of Korea, a number of 
proxies will be selected to represent incidence measures under two broad categories: 
(a) export promotion and growth related measures and (b) import substitution related 
measures. 
Setting up the context under these two main categories is useful for a number 
of reasons. Firstiy, it helps to limit the scope of the study and focus on key poUcy 
objectives. Secondly, most of the incidence measures are aimed towards achieving 
those two primary objectives in the case of Korea. Thirdly, these two objectives are 
commonly found in many developing countries, and therefore this analysis may 
provide useful insights for other developing countries too. 
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Having selected proxies for representing incidence measures, the next step in 
this study involves ranking industries on the basis of the magnitude of industrial 
promotion received by each industrial category (at the two-digit level). This process 
enables us to draw conclusions about whether promoted industries are exclusively 
limited to capital and knowledge intensive industries and v/hether industrial 
performance differ significantly between the promoted industries and those which 
were not. In this process, industries will be grouped on the basis of the ranks of (a) 
export promotion and growth related measures and (b) import substitution related 
measures, and will be further classified as highly promoted groups and less promoted 
groups for analytical purposes. 
(b) Analysing the potential outcome of industrial policies 
Taking value-added and exports as primary measurement criteria to reflect industrial 
performance, the potential outcome of industrial policies in Korea will be analysed, as 
a next step, in comparison with benchmark countries during the period 1970-1996. 
Value-added and exports are widely used as criteria for measuring industrial as well 
as economic performance. For the purpose of analysing the effectiveness of industrial 
policies, these indicators (the increase in value-added or exports) have limited value, 
since the improvement of these indicators for a particular country may be a result of a 
combination of factors which are interconnected and not only of the impact of 
industrial policies. Changes in these variables may be due to a favourable extemal 
environment, or it may be due to favourable intemal factors such as sound macro or 
micro policies, including industrial policies, economic and pohtical stability, policy 
reforms and so forth. 
Therefore, the improvement of value-added or exports over time does not 
provide sufficient grounds for justifying the effectiveness of industrial poUcies. 
Comparison of the performance of value-added or exports with benchmark countries 
at this stage becomes useful, since it provides some way of taking account of the 
common extemal events such as favourable world demand conditions, world 
recessions, technological changes that might have influential effects on the industrial 
performance of a particular country and so on. It may also provide useful insights of 
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different intemal macroeconomic policies between benchmark and the sample 
country. It will thus provide a base on which to identify what we will call the 
potential impact of industrial policies. If the performance of the industrial sector in 
the sample country is relatively higher than that of benchmark countries, that relative 
performance may be attributed to intemal circumstances such as the impact of 
industrial policies. Such relative performance will be referred to here as the potential 
impact of industrial policies. 
Ideally, it would have been better if the comparison had been made with 
benchmark countries that had not been pursuing industrial policies extensively. This 
is because such a comparison would highlight the performance differences between a 
policy implementing country and a country which has not followed policies 
intensively. However, this becomes impossible due to the non-availability of data at 
the sectoral level. After all, practically every country follows some sort of industrial 
promotion policies and hence finding countries which do not follow such policies 
becomes a difficult task. Under these circumstances a group of developing countries, 
which exhibit similar characteristics with respect to initial per capita, industrial 
stmcture and industrial composition as compared with three sample countries (Korea, 
Thailand and Malaysia) is selected as benchmark countries (details about the selection 
of benchmark countries will be included in Chapter 9). 
In this analysis, we assume that if intemal factors, and in particular industrial 
policies, had any impact on industrial performance in Korea, the performance of 
value-added and exports in Korean industries in general, and in promoted industries in 
particular, will be higher than that of benchmark countries over the period for which 
the policies had effect. If there is supportive evidence to justify the above 
assumption, then we may be able to make inferences regarding the potential outcome 
of govemment intervention. 
To investigate the above noted assumption in relation to industrial 
performance in Korea compared to benchmark countries, using sectoral value-added 
and exports, a number of measurement criteria will be estimated. These measurement 
criteria, in each case relative to benchmark countries, will include: (i) Value-added 
and exports in Korea; (ii) Index of value-added and exports; and (iii) Sectoral value-
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added as a share of GDP and sectoral exports as a share of sectoral world exports. 
AH these estimations will be carried out over the period 1970-1996, using data (in 
thousand US dollars) obtained from the Australian National University data base, at 
the two-digit ISIC (Intemational Standard Industrial Classification) level. 
(c) Assessing the impact of industrial policies 
To what extent can the relative value-added and export performance of Korean 
industries be attributed to industrial policies? To answer this question it is necessary 
to examine the association between industrial performance and incidence measures. 
Owing to the limited availability of data on incidence measures, however, it is 
difficult to carry out such an explicit analysis fully at this stage. 
Nevertheless, three altemative methods will be applied in this thesis, to make 
inferences about the association between industrial performance and industrial 
poHcies. These three altemative methods include: (a) the examination of performance 
differences between industry groups by policy stance in Korea compared with 
benchmark countries; (b) the examination of performance differences in Korea by 
policy periods compared with benchmark countries; and (c) the investigation of the 
relationship between incidence measures and industrial performance using a 
regression analysis with panel data. 
These three altemative tests will be used to make inferences regarding the 
effectiveness of industrial policies. More specifically we consider that if govemment 
intervention, especially industry specific intervention, has any impact on industrial 
performances in Korea then: 
(a) highly promoted groups will show positively higher performance than similar 
groups in benchmark countries, and also than that of less promoted groups within 
Korea; 
(b) industrial performance in Korea in general, and that of the highly promoted groups 
in particular, will be better relative to that of benchmark countries during the high 
intervention period (1970-82), but this relative performance will be less marked 
after the scaling down of intervention (1982 -1996); and 
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(c) there should be a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
incidence measures and relative industrial performance measures over the policy 
intervention period. 
As the first step in empirical tests for analysing the impact of industrial 
policies, the differential perfomnance of industry groups will be investigated by policy 
stance. Performance will be evaluated by estimating aggregate indicators of value-
added and export performance for highly promoted groups and less promoted groups, 
with these groups being defined in terms of various incidence measures (export 
promotion and growth related measures and import substitution related measures) for 
benchmark countries and Korea respectively during the period 1970-1996. In 
addition, the average annual grov^h rates of value-added and exports will be 
compared for the above mentioned groups. The purpose of these exercises is to 
examine whether highly promoted groups in Korea perform comparatively better than 
that of a similar group of benchmark countries, and also compared with less promoted 
groups in Korea, during the observed period. 
For the second test, indicators of value-added and exports will be compared 
for poHcy periods. Taking policy changes in Korea as guidance, for this test, two 
poHcy periods will be identified as the high intervention period and the period 
following high intervention. Available evidence that will be presented in Chapter 5 
Section 5.3 frequentiy cites 1970s as the high intervention period for Korea. 
Beginning with stabilization measures introduced in 1982, however, Korea began to 
reverse its existing policy package. Thus the period between 1970-1982 will be 
referred to as the high intervention period. For this period, value-added and exports 
data will be estimated taking 1970 as the base year. The period between 1982-1996 
will be referred as the period following retreat from the high intervention. Data for 
comparison purposes for this period will be estimated taking 1982 as the base year. 
The differential performance of industry groups that are based on incidence measures 
(export promotion and growth related measures, and import substitution related 
measures) in Korea for the two periods will be compared with that of similar groups 
in benchmark countries. In addition, average annual growth rates of value-added and 
exports for industry groups in Korea will be compared with that of benchmark 
countries for the two policy periods. The purpose of this exercise is to see whether 
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there are apparent differences in performance between Korea and benchmark 
countries during the so- called high intervention period and the period thereafter. 
The third empirical test will examine the association between industrial 
performance and incidence measures using a regression analysis with panel data. 
Primarily, in this section six regression analyses will be carried out. These include: 
(1) the examination of the relationship between value-added and incidence measures 
(both export promotion and growth related measures, and import substitution related 
measures); (2) the examination of the relationship between value-added and export 
promotion and growth related measures; (3) the examination of the relationship 
between value-added and import substitution related measures; (4) the examination of 
the relationship between exports and incidence measures (both export promotion and 
growth related measures and import substitution related measures (5) the examination 
of the relationship between exports and export promotion and growth related 
measures; and (6) the examination of the relationship between exports and import 
substitution related measures. The purpose of this exercise is to test whether 
industrial poHcies as quantified by the incidence measures, have a significant effect on 
industrial performance in Korea. 
4.4 Data Sources and Limitations of the Study 
The empirical analyses, in particular the quantitative analyses that will be applied 
here, are not free from limitations, for a number of reasons. First of all, these 
empirical analyses may not reveal the tme nature of the potential outcomes or the 
effectiveness of industrial policies, due to the limitations of the data. Finding the 
required data in relation to incidence measures and industrial performance, covering 
the period 1960-1997, has been a difficult task for aH the sample countries. Owing 
to this, quantitative analysis of the incidence of industrial policies will be limited to 
Korea, as has been noted earlier. Even this task has severely suffered from the lack 
of data at the sectoral level. As a result, not only did we have to depend on several 
proxies while making assumptions when using data, but also we had to limit the 
period of investigation of incidence measures to 1960-1980 and the analyses of the 
potential outcome to the period between 1970-1996. The inferences made through 
the empirical analyses are therefore subject to these qualifications. 
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Owing to the paucity of data, the analytical techniques used in this study, 
especially the methods applied for assessing the impact of govemment intervention, 
are also not free from limitations. For instance, data applied for analysing the 
potential outcomes are available in US dollars at the Intemational Economic Data 
Bank (lEDB), Australian National University. These data may not reflect the 
industrial performance values correctly since the exchange rate of a particular 
country may not necessarily determined freely for all the countries. In addition, due 
to the unavailability of data on production indexes for each individual benchmark 
countries, the data applied for the present investigation are converted into real values 
by using the production price index of the US. Moreover, the lack of data at 
disaggregated level, has severely restricted the selection of benchmark countries for 
comparison of policy outcome. The sample countries may have limitations in 
representing the neutral policy base and therefore interferences that will be made in 
this study are subject to qualifications. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10, for the first empirical 
test, industries are classified on the basis of limited evidence of incidence measures 
as highly promoted groups and less promoted groups of Korea. The second 
empirical test will compare industrial performance between the two policy periods 
The inferences made on the basis of the first test may subject to qualifications due to 
the classification bias. Similarly, the resuhs of second test are required caution since 
the base years selected for comparison are selected on the basis of policy priorities in 
Korea which may not equally reflect the tme outcome for benchmark countries. The 
third empirical test, the regression analysis based on pooled data is also not free 
from limitations. In a regression involving pooled data where time series and cross 
sectional observations are combined, it is implicitly assumed that the regression 
parameters do not change over time and that they do not differ between various cross 
sectional units. However, the data for incidence measures and performance 
variables in the sample we applied vary significantly between industrial sectors and 
also from time to time and significant outliers are evident in the case of incidence 
measures. Moreover, simple models that will be applied in this study will not 
provide tme picture, if incidence measures are related each other and if there is a 
feedback from performance variables to incidence measures. 
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Thirdly, by analysing economic effects themselves one cannot gauge the 
effectiveness. In parallel with positive or negative economic effects, industrial 
policies may create some other desirable or undesirable results in the economy. For 
instance, industrial poHcies may create desirable or undesirable effects on income 
distribution, the balance of payments, relative price levels, spatial distribution of 
production and so on. In such circumstances, though a full cost-benefit analysis 
would be more appropriate, even such an analysis is not free from limitations. In 
these and other respects the conclusions derived in this study may not represent the 
tme nature of effectiveness. 
4.5 Structure of the Rest of the Thesis 
The objective of the rest of the thesis - the empirical analysis - is to explore the 
various forms of diversity of industrial poHcy in the light of experience of three East 
Asian countries, namely Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. To test the appHcabiHty of 
these, this thesis will: 
• document the diversity of objectives, incidence, and the factors affecting the 
economic outcomes of these countries (Chapters 5-7); 
• measure the incidence of industrial policies for Korea (1960-1983) (Chapter 8); 
• develop a basis for assessing the potential outcomes for Korea (1970-1996) 
(Chapter 9); and 
• use these two elements (evidence in both Chapters 8 and 9) to undertake a 
preliminary analysis of the impact of industrial policy in Korea (Chapter 10). 
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Part B: Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies, 1960-1997 
5. Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies in the Republic of 
Korea, 1960-1997 
5.1 Introduction 
The Republic of Korea^ became an independent nation in 1948 after 36 years of 
Japanese occupation (1910-45). Though Korea inherited some of its industrial 
production capacity from colonial mle, much of this capacity had been destroyed over 
the three years (June 1950 to July 1953) by the Korean War (Suh 1981). This war 
devastated economy was largely dependent on foreign or mostly US aid throughout 
the 1950s. Until it began its industriaHzation process with the First Five Year 
Development Plan in 1962, Korea had remained an economy primarily based on 
subsistence agriculture. As the available evidence suggests, in 1960 agricultural, 
forest and fishery constituted 47.2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product, while 
manufacturing activity constituted only 7.2 per cent (Koo 1982, p. 4). Starting from 
such a small industrial base and meagre resources, the spectacular economic and 
industrial performance achieved by Korea during the past few decades has often been 
cited as a miracle. 
As can be seen from Table 5.1 (column 2), Korea has achieved remarkable 
growth in terms of its GNP per capita. In 1970, Korea's GNP per capita was $US 
974. After a decade, Korea managed to increase this more than twofold. With 
continuous progress, Korea has recorded more than sixfold increase of its GNP per 
capita by 1995. Korea has also maintained high economic growth over the past three 
decades as demonstrated in Table 5.1 (column 3). 
Likewise, the manufacturing sector has displayed a very strong performance 
both in terms of value-added and exports. As the data in Table 5.1 (column 5) 
illustrate, manufacturing sector value-added as a percentage of GDP increased from 
14 per cent in 1960 to 21 per cent by 1970 and to nearly 30 per cent by 1990. After 
1990, the manufacturing sector contribution in terms of growth of value-added has 
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somewhat slowed down in comparison to the previous three decades, yet remains at 
comparatively higher levels. Manufacturing sector exports have remained prominent 
throughout past three and half decades. As Table 5.1 (column 7) indicates, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for nearly 60 per cent of merchandise exports in 
Korea in 1965. After three decades almost all of its export income from goods is 
derived through the manufacturing sector. By 1995, the manufacturing sector 
accounted for 93 per cent of Korea's merchandise exports. 
Table 5.1 Economic Indicators of Korea, 1960-1995 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
GNP per 
capita 
($US,1987) 
-
-
974 
1378 
1894 
2588 
4097 
5584 
GDP 
(% growth)* 
-
-
9.0 
7.5 
5.8 
6.6 
7.7 
5.6 
Manufacturing 
Value-Added 
(% growth)* 
-
-
17.7 
13.7 
11.9 
9.1 
9.2 
6.2 
Manufacturing 
Value-Added 
(% GDP) 
13.6 
17.5 
20.8 
26.1 
28.7 
29.3 
29.2 
26.8 
Agriculture 
Value-Added 
(% GDP) 
35.8 
37.2 
25.4 
24.1 
14.5 
12.5 
8.7 
6.5 
Manufacturing 
Exports 
(% merch. exp) 
-
59.3 
76.5 
81.4 
89.5 
91.3 
93.5 
93.3 
Manufacturing 
Exports 
(% growth)* 
-
-
24.7 
19.7 
8.6 
7.0 
6.5 
12.3 
Notes: - data not available. 
* Five Year Average (data are in constant $US, 1987 prices). 
Source: Worid Tables, World Bank, ANU. 
This outstanding manufacturing sector and overall economic performance 
have been attributed in the published literature to a variety of intemal and extemal 
factors. Some commentators (Boyd 1994; Amsden 1989; Wade 1988, 1990a, 1990b; 
Cheng 1994; Stem 1990) claimed that pmdent state economic poHcies including 
trade, macroeconomic and industrial policies have been largely influential for 
achieving such success. Others (World Bank 1987; Chang 1994; Yu 1995; Kim 1985; 
Petri 1993; Nugent 1989) pointed out that numerous other factors - including an 
outward orientation, a skilled labour force, an efficient bureaucracy and institutions, 
favourable world economic conditions, historical factors, private sector initiative and 
entrepreneurial ability to maintain competitive advantage and the size distribution of 
Hereafter Korea is used instead of the Republic of Korea and South Korea. 
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manufacturing plants - had also created a favourable impact on industrial and 
economic outcomes in Korea. However, no coherent view has yet been established 
regarding the factors behind this phenomenal success, partly due to the lack of explicit 
empirical evidence. 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the ways in which the 
govemment assisted economic activities by applying industrial policies in the 
economy of Korea over the period 1960-1997. This exercise will be helpful for 
further investigation of industrial policies in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
examination of the incidence of industrial poHcies will provide useful insights for 
developing altemative techniques to analyse the effectiveness of industrial policies 
empirically, which this study attempts to do in three later chapters (Chapters 8, 9 and 
10). Secondly, this analysis, together with incidence analyses of Malaysia and 
Thailand, will help to identify the similarities and differences of industrial policies 
between these countries. Thirdly, investigations of the incidence of industrial policies 
should provide useful insights in making inferences relating to industrial policies, 
such as whether the experience of sample countries provides supportive evidence for 
recent theoretical concepts of industrial policies and why similar policy strategies may 
generate diverse results in different situations. Fourthly, the incidence of industrial 
policies has not been adequately discussed in the literature and therefore these 
analyses will help in broadening the perspective of that discussion. 
This chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 5.2 includes a brief 
review of various country-specific factors, such as the objectives of industrial policies, 
historical factors, industrial stmcture, and so on, that could possibly influence the 
outcome of industrial policies. How industrial poHcies changed over the period of 
1960-1997 is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the diverse policy 
instruments applied by Korea. These policy instmments are discussed under two sub-
headings, namely import substitution related measures and export promotion and 
growth related measures. 
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5.2 Diverse Country-Specific Factors 
Initial conditions and certain other country-specific factors create an influential 
impact on poHcy implementation in any economy. Some of the important factors will 
be briefly reviewed in the following section. 
5.2.1 Objectives of Industrial PoHcies 
Prior to 1960s, the main concem of the Korean govemment was to reconstmct its war-
devastated economy. No systematic effort towards industrialization was therefore 
evident (other than the emphasis placed on import substitution in basic necessities 
such as flour-milling, sugar refining, and textile manufacturing) until the early 1960s. 
The decline of US aid and associated foreign exchange constraints, however, led 
Korea to rethink its economic strategies. As a resource poor country, in order to 
alleviate some of its prevailing economic problems, Korea decided that more 
systematic and concerted efforts towards industriaHzation were necessary. 
Consequently, several major economic reforms were initiated in the Korean economy 
in the early 1960s. 
More importantly, as part of the reform process, Korea chose an export 
oriented growth strategy in 1962, beginning with its First Five Year Development 
Plan (1962-66). With the primary objective of industrialization through 
modernization of industries, this plan also aimed at: (1) attaining self sufficiency in 
the production of food; (2) expansion of key industries (coal, cement, fertilizer, steel 
ingot and refined petroleum), electricity and transportation; (3) increased 
employment; (4) improvement of the balance of payments through export expansion; 
(5) maximizing mobilization of domestic resources and increased foreign capital 
inflow (Hong 1979, p. 39). Like their predecessors. Five Year Development Plans 
intioduced subsequently continued their emphasis towards promoting key/strategic 
industries. In addition to this primary objective, for instance, the Second Five Year 
Development Plan (1967-71) emphasized the importance of: (1) increasing domestic 
savings; (2) promoting exports of labour-intensive industries; and (3) import 
substitution of food and capital goods. Continuing similar objectives, the Third Five 
Year Development Plan (1972-76) stressed the importance of promoting heavy and 
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chemical industries. 
The Korean govemment believed that the cause of the balance of payments 
problem lay in the underdevelopment of the capital and intermediate goods industries. 
With the objective of overcoming this constraint, and of becoming an independent 
economy - driven by strong economic nationaHsm - and also of achieving rapid 
economic growth in a short period of time, Korea wanted to increase its exports and 
also to upgrade its industrial stmcture (Cheng 1994). Therefore, essentially all the 
Five Year Development plans introduced after 1962 have more specifically 
emphasized two poHcy goals, namely: (1) export promotion in the manufacturing 
sector and (2) the promotion of industrial self-sufficiency in selected heavy and 
chemical manufacturing industries (Suh 1981, p. 20). These two objectives were 
given paramount importance and continued until the mid 1970s (Westphal 1990; 
Amsden 1989; Suh 1986). 
With the introduction of the Fourth Five Year Development Plan of 1977-81, 
however, policy objectives began to shift towards promoting industries beyond the 
assembly stage and emphasising product quality. This plan also emphasized the 
importance of achieving a complete self-reliance in investment financing, and a 
current account surplus (Hong 1979, p. 43). By the latter half of this planning period, 
partly as a result of the second oil shock and several intemal factors, the Korean 
economy experienced stmctural problems and macroeconomic imbalances. Inflation 
accelerated and many heavy and chemical industrial projects suffered from weak 
export competitiveness, overcapacity and large operating losses. Against this 
background, the govemment considered that some changes in its policy orientation, in 
particular certain stmctural adjustments were necessary. With the objective of 
maximizing the efficiency of resource allocation, therefore, in the Fifth Five Year 
Development Plan (1982-86), policy makers stressed the importance of (a) 
continuing high grov^h; (b) price stability and (c) improvement in income distribution 
(Suh 1986, p. 36). 
Since the early 1990s, a consensus has been developing among businessmen, 
policy makers and economists that innovation is one of the most critical sources of 
potential growth in Korea. Consequently, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) 
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announced in 1994 that it would reorient from an export-driven to a technology-
driven industrial policy. Subsequently, in 1995, the MTI introduced a development 
plan for industrial technology development and for the development of technology 
infrastmcture.^ Along with this plan, Korean policy makers stressed the importance 
of providing infrastmcture for irmovation (Seong 1997). 
In sum, export promotion and achieving industrial self-sufficiency in certain 
key/strategic industries have been major motives of Korean industrial policy ever 
since it began its industrialization process. Since the mid 1970s, with the objective of 
realising the potential growth benefits of technology driven products, development 
plans also aimed to transform the industrial stmcture from simple assembly type 
industries to technologically advanced and innovative products. Overall, as is clear 
from the above discussion, Korea pursued its industrialization process with clearly 
outlined policy objectives, although these varied in some respects over time. 
5.2.2 Historical Factors 
As the available evidence suggests, historical factors such as Japanese colonial mle, 
US aid, the Confucian tradition, the long tradition of centralisation and the 
authoritarian military regime, have been very influential in the process of building up 
the industrial sector in Korea (Edwards 1992a; Cathie 1989; Amsden 1989). Of these 
factors, Japanese colonial mle, for instance, appears to be important for Korean 
industrial development in many respects. Firstly, though there were certain 
restrictions on the development of indigenous capital, Japanese colonial mle had 
considerable impact on the economic, political and industrial development of Korea, 
especially in creating a modem infrastmcture in the areas of finance, transportation 
and commerce. Secondly, the colonial period enabled Koreans to acquire substantial 
knowledge about modem industries. Thirdly, a number of attributes such as Korea's 
unitary and intemally cohesive nature, its strength and desire for autonomy, and the 
similarity of Korea's industrial poHcies and stmcture to that of Japan, are believed to 
The Five Year Development Plan series did not continue after the Fifth Five Year Development Plan. 
Two other plans were however initiated in the early 1990s. In 1993, a five year plan for the new 
economy, was initiated with the objective of expanding market liberalization and to internationalized 
economic regulations and practices. In 1994, the "Foreign Exchange Reform Plan" was initiated to 
facilitate the liberalization of foreign exchange and opening of the capital market (Park 1996, p. 32). 
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be inherited from the Japanese colonial occupation (Moon 1994; Westphal et al. 
1981). Moreover, many of the decisions concerning which industries should be 
promoted were also based on Japanese experience (Stem 1990). 
Likewise, massive US aid has played a dominant role in the economy of 
Korea, especially by providing foreign excHange for buying raw materials, capital 
equipment and know-how, and for setting up production and education facilities. This 
facilitated a rapid expansion of the industrial sector during the reconstmction period 
after the Korean war. Also, the relationship with the US has enabled Korea to 
enhance its technological status through technical advisers and through the local 
procurement program operated by the US military authority, and has assisted the 
export of Korean products to US markets (Edwards 1992a; Westphal et al. 1981; Kim 
1985; Stem 1990). 
5.2.3 The Decision Making Process 
Compared to other developing countries, the decision making process of Korea has a 
number of unique distinguishing features. Firstly, the Korean process differs from 
others in its centralized decision making stmcture. This mainly consists of the Blue 
House (Office of the President), the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI) and the Ministry of Finance, which are staffed by the best 
managerial talent available in the economy, are relatively free from strong pressure 
groups and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in decision-making. 
Of these, the EPB, which plays a dominant role in the decision making process 
in Korea, is responsible for economic planning, national budgeting, foreign capital 
management, technical cooperation and statistics administration (Whang 1986, p. 4). 
Thus, most of the essential tasks needed for decision making are handled by the EPB. 
This centralized decision making process works well in the case of Korea and appears 
to be more effective than that of comparable countries, because of certain peculiar 
characteristics. The comprehensive procedure adopted in the preparation of plans 
enabled Korea not only to maintain the effectiveness of plarming but also to build up 
confidence about the economic policies envisaged by the plans. To prepare Five Year 
Development Plans, for instance, the EPB generally provided preliminary guidelines 
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in terms of major policy targets and directions, together with macroeconomic 
projections for both the intemational and domestic environment of the economy 
during the plan period and beyond. Individual ministries prepared their own sectoral 
plans according to these specifications. In this task, the Korean govemment made 
extensive use of working committees whose members were experts drawn not only 
from govemment ministries but also from industrial associations, financial 
institutions, universities and research institutes (Whang 1986). To ensure the further 
effectiveness of planning, the govemment of Korea monitored the progress of plans 
closely and adjusted the policy direction where necessary. As Yu (1989) noted, these 
planning processes - identifying prevailing problems and weaknesses, setting targets 
to achieve outcomes within a proper time frame and then formulating development 
strategies and policies to achieve these targets - played an important role in the 
development of industries in Korea 
Maintaining the effectiveness of both the planning and decision making 
processes was further possible due to the authority inherited by the EPB, together with 
the organization of most essential functions in decision making under the control of 
the EPB. Begirming in the mid 1970s, the formulation and implementation of heavy 
industry planning was highly centralized in the Blue House and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry bypassing the Economic Planning Board. With the political changes in 
the 1980s, economic policy making was again centralized in the Economic Planning 
Board. As a central authority in decision making, the EPB was more powerful since it 
is operated directly under the Prime Minister and other ministries were expected to 
support its policies. The smooth operation of the planning and decision making 
process was further ensured by the fact that both these functions were under the aegis 
of the EPB. Overall, this centralisation of economic policy making power in the 
hands of the EPB eliminated conflict of interests, improved communication and 
mutual understanding between planning and industrial ministries, and facilitated more 
effective implementation of industrial poHcies (Whang 1986; Amsden 1989; Haggard 
and Moon 1990). Furthermore it allowed the govemment bureaucracy to make 
speedy decisions and to adjust flexibly the direction of current policies when a major 
problem arose. 
Secondly, the decision making process of Korea is also different from that in 
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other countries because of its extensive interference in private sector decision making. 
This is specially the case for decisions affecting industrial development. In general, 
economic planning outlined most of the important issues affecting industrial 
promotion, in particular the development of key industries, modemization of the 
industrial stmcture and creation of an infrastmcture. In addition, most of the private 
sector entrepreneurial functions, ranging fiom planning, coordinating and even 
making decisions about the expansion of the industries, industrial diversification, 
capacity reduction and mergers, have been influenced substantially by the 
govemment. Since the business class was weak and heavily dependent on state 
support, the Korean government was able to consolidate its power easily for these 
types of activities, especially during their early period of industrialization (Edwards 
1992a; Amsden 1989). In spite of govemment control, "private businesses 
maintained a close, long-term, cooperative relationship with the govemment but not 
on an equal footing: the state is pace setter and guide, while business follows" (Moon 
1994, p. 143). Such a close relationship between govemment and large firms was 
believed to be more effective than the market mechanism for achieving development 
goals (Lee 1993). 
Thirdly, to avoid the potential negative effects of govemment intervention, 
Korea has followed Japan in adopting administrative guidance, which often involves 
certain performance standards. The Korean experience suggests that providing 
protection or generous incentives is not sufficient to achieve satisfactory progress. 
The extent of the monitoring procedure is equally important too. Unlike other 
countries, incentives were not given lightly to firms in Korea. In order to take 
advantage of and to continue to receive govemment support, firms were required to 
fulfil certain govemment targets - usually quarterly export targets. Whether 
successful or not all industries, including infant industries, had to start their 
production with the intention of exporting their products. In the case of the 
automobile industry, for example, all investment projects had to prepare a plan to 
export at least 50 per cent of output, and the minimum local content ratio was required 
to increase to 70 per cent (Maclntyre 1994). Firms were subjected to consistent and 
comprehensive govemment monitoring processes, which were carried out for 
individual commodities, markets and firms. For example, the progress of the policies 
was monitored at monthly meetings of cabinet members, business people and 
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govemment officials, chaired by the President of Korea. These meetings - the 
Monthly Economic Review, the Monthly Export Promotion Conference, and the 
Quarterly Science and Technology Promotion Meeting - further served as a 
mechanism for sharing information and enhancing coordination not only among 
individual ministries but also between the govemment and the private sector. To 
prevent violations of these requirements, pressure and penalties were imposed. For 
example, violators of restrictions and regulations could be heavily punished with the 
revocation of licenses, fines and, in some cases, prison sentences (Chang 1994). 
Moreover, the Korean state has been willing and able to withdraw support whenever 
performance lagged. Such state discipline, intimately combined with investment and 
trade policies, acted as a powerful incentive for firms to enhance their capabilities 
(Amsden 1989; Wade 1990b). 
Fourthly, the Korean decision making process departs from some others in its 
ability to use a combination of govemment intervention and the market mechanism. 
One might think that there is no role for the market mechanism due to the 
overwhelming role of the govemment in Korea. But Korea did not entirely depend 
either on the market mechanism or on the role of the state. Though the policies 
adopted in Korea encouraged and favoured a large scale, oligopolistic industrial 
stmcture, the govemment not only encouraged competition between domestic firms 
but also instmcted them to prepare their products for the export market from the 
outset. Realising the potential benefits of the market mechanism, the govemment 
paid attention to improving market mechanisms, in particular activities related with 
intemational markets from the early 1970s. The greater role of market mechanisms 
has in fact partly been necessary to overcome certain stmctural weaknesses, such as 
the underdevelopment of the financial sector and insufficient development of small 
and medium size firms. It was also important in reducing uncertainties and risks 
related to business, disseminating information about opportunities and minimizing the 
overall price, trade and macroeconomic distortions. With the introduction of a series 
of comprehensive institutional reforms, such as the devaluation of the exchange rate, 
promotion of foreign direct investment and the reduction of preferential treatment for 
industries, further attempts have also been made to improve the market mechanism in 
the 1980s. Korea has thus demonstrated its ability not only in mixing policies but also 
in identifying and implementing appropriate policies at different times. 
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5.2.4 Industrial Structure 
The industrial stmcture of Korea is dominated by a small number of large firms -
mainly the chaebols, which are family-owned conglomerates. Nine of the ten largest 
companies are privately held domestic conglomerates. This dominant stmcture, 
established immediately after the Japanese colonial period, emerged as a result of 
generous policy incentives, cultural influences (embedded Confucian values) and 
regime dynamics (adjusting to the changing economic and political circumstances of 
Korea) (McKay and Missen 1995). Whatever the factors, the encouragement of the 
chaebol was largely influenced by the strong nationalist sentiment, which was anti-
communist as well as anti-Japanese. 
The four major chaebols include Hyundai (automobiles, constmction, cement, 
shipbuilding and steel), Samsung (entertainment, hotels and newspapers), Daewoo 
(constmction, electronics, shipbuilding), and Lucky Goldstar (plastics and 
electronics). Of those Samsung is the biggest chaebol. The activities of large firms 
are diversified and highly coordinated. In many respects they resemble the Japanese 
Zaibatsu. Each of these firms has a number of affiliates. For example. Lucky 
Goldstar contained sixty-two companies while Samsung had thirty-seven related firms 
in 1988. 
5.3 Diversity ofPolicies over the Period of 1960-1997 
Korea began its industrialization process during the 1960s by following Import 
Substitution hidustrialisation (ISI). The majority of the industries started in this 
period were non-durable consumer and intermediate goods and these were largely 
promoted using quantitative restrictions rather than tariffs. With the decline of US aid 
and associated foreign exchange constraints, and also due to the distortions created by 
the prevailing ISI policies, Korea realized that limiting production to the small 
domestic market would no longer be advisable. As a result, a series of poHcy reforms 
had been initiated by the mid 1960s (Kim 1985; Suh 1986) including: (a) the 
3 
In the hteramre this is also referred as "jaebol". 
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exchange rate reform (the unification of exchange rate); (b) devaluation of the 
currency and the liberalization of exchange controls; (c) liberalization of trade 
involving cuts in tariffs and the abolition of quantitative restrictions and (d) a 
substantial increase in real interest rates. 
Along with these policy changes, from 1961 onwards, the policy emphasis 
gradually shifted towards export oriented industrialization. Light, labour intensive 
manufacturing industries promoted over the 1961-70 period were encouraged largely 
through govemment regulations such as those goveming wages, suppressing trade 
unions, providing preferential credits and generous incentives,'* and designating a 
certain number of manufacturing industries, for example textiles and consumer 
electronics, as strategic industries (Schive 1990; Rimmer 1995; Suh 1981). Several 
other measures have also been introduced so as to offset disadvantages arising from 
the protective measures. For instance, Korea's Tariff Act allowed tariff exemptions 
and rebates on imported inputs for export production; the tariff drawback system 
enabled domestic exporters to avoid the erosion of export competitiveness caused by 
cost increases stemming from import protection; while import substituting industries 
were largely protected through non tariff barriers. 
By the early 1970s, Korea reahsed that it was losing its comparative advantage 
in labour intensive industries largely due to the rapid increase in domestic wages. 
Rising protectionism against light industrial products also acted as another limitation 
to expanding such industries. In order to increase the independence of the economy, 
and also to emerge as a technologically advanced nation, Korea felt that it was 
required to develop capital intensive and intermediate good industries. Consequently, 
the export orientation was more biased towards capital-intensive heavy industries 
from the early 1970s (Stem 1990; Chang 1994). 
The Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive,^ which began in 1973 and 
continued through 1979, was implemented and encouraged using subsidized credit. 
For more details about incentives see Table 5.2 
Although attempts had been made to initiate heavy industries since the 1960s, financial and technical 
assistance sought from various sources including the World Bank, Japan and some European countries, 
were mmed down on the grounds that the domestic market would be too small to support an economic-
sized plant, there were no domestic supply of raw materials and there was a lack of experience and 
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special tax policies,^ selective protection, entry restrictions, granting of infant industry 
status in new industries, and guaranteeing finns a monopoly position, together with 
direct govemment involvement in industrial decision making. At the same time, 
attempts were made to scale down govemment support for labour intensive industries. 
For example, the 50 per cent reduction in corporate and income tax on export eamings 
for labour intensive industries was aboHshed in 1972. By mid 1975, the tariff 
exemptions for imports of raw materials for export production were also reduced (In-
Joung 1989; Suh 1986; Rhee 1987; Edwards 1992a; Chang 1994; Seong 1997; 
Westphal 1990; Rimmer 1995). 
By the year 1979, the Korean economy faced severe stmctural problems and 
macroeconomic imbalances, as a consequence of both intemal and extemal events. 
The industrial policies of the 1970s were partly responsible for creating high 
inflationary pressure in the economy. Also, as a result of a massive investment boom, 
the Korean economy was flooded with inefficient firms. In particular, the HCI drive 
led to declining export performance, excess capacity and unstable financial stmctures 
in many manufacturing industries. The banks were plagued by accumulating non-
performing loans. These circumstances were further aggravated by sharply increasing 
real wages and the appreciation of the real exchange rate (Seong 1997; Haggard and 
Moon 1990; Suh 1986). 
To overcome these problems, the govemment announced, in 1980, the 
Comprehensive Stabilization Programme,^ comprising conservative fiscal and 
monetary policies. The major contents of this program included: restrictive budget 
management with expenditure cuts; restrictive monetary policy with the aim of 
improving the operation of preferential policy loans and interest rates, and plans to 
adjust investment in the heavy and chemical industries (Nam 1984, p. 24). Further, a 
task force, set up to deal with the problems, forced inefficient firms into mergers, 
sales and liquidation. At the same time there was mounting foreign pressure over 
unfair trade practices. In response to this pressure, the govemment introduced several 
skilled workers. 
Among the numerous tax incentives provided, the set of incentives provided by the Tax Exemption 
and Reduction Control Law since 1975 under the heading of "Special Tax Treatment for key 
Industries" has been the most powerful in directing investment resources into several key industrial 
sectors. (Kwack 1985). 
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policy reforms, including the lifting of restrictions on bank management by divesting 
equity shares in five commercial banks, and lifting some previous restrictions on 
foreign direct investment. 
Along with these changes, Korean industrial policy has gradually changed 
from industry specific intervention to a functional approach (general industrial 
support without bias) since the early 1980s. The preferential policies, such as 
subsidised loans, special tax, and tariff concessions, which were applied to promote 
particular industries begun to disappear during this period. For instance, the 
govemment reduced the subsidy elements in the preferential loans, by lowering the 
interest rates on non-preferential loans faster than the rates on policy loans. As a 
result, the interest rate differential between the two kinds of loans largely disappeared. 
Similarly, with the reforms introduced in the tax system in 1981, the preferential tax 
treatment was also largely eliminated. Tariff incentive schemes underwent similar 
changes with the revision of the Tariff Act in 1983. The special laws which promoted 
machinery, electronics, textiles, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, petrochemicals and 
shipbuilding industries were either abolished altogether or replaced in 1986 by the 
Industrial Development Law, which was based on the principle that policy support to 
specific industries should be abandoned in favour of providing general industrial 
promotion support. It also aimed at gradually phasing out declining industries (Nam 
1992; Kim 1989a). A shift of emphasis from large chaebol to small and medium size 
enterprises was also apparent.^ 
These stabilization measures were, however, undermined by rapid intemal 
changes, particularly political instability caused by the assassination of President 
Park. This situation was further affected by unfavourable extemal conditions, 
including the second oil shock, the resulting worldwide recession and rising interest 
rates. Nevertheless, the comprehensive stabilization program could be viewed as the 
turning point that steered economic policy in a new direction. 
For more details of this comprehensive stabilizahon program see Nam (1984). 
* For more details see Yoo (1990), Stem et al. (1995), Rhee (1987) and Nam (1984). 
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Table 5.2 Incentives and Institutional Support for Promoting Industries in 
Korea, 1950-1997 
1950-1960 
Main Strategy - Import Substitution 
Tariff incentives, credit assistance, protection 
1961-1972 
Main Strategy - Promotion of Light Export Industries/Import Substitution 
Incentives: Tariff exemptions on imported raw materials, intermediate and capital goods imported 
for export production; accelerated depreciation allowance for fixed capital and for manufacturing 
firms that eam more than 50 per cent of the revenue in foreign exchange; preferential rates on 
overhead inputs, such as electricity and transport; quantitative restrictions on imports of goods and 
capital; foreign currency loans to finance exports on long-term credits; export insurance; short-
term preferential loans at interest rates below the commercial bank discount rate for exports; 
automatic loan approval and medium and long-term preferential loans for capital investment for 
export production; an export-unport link system in which certain specified items were granted an 
automatic approval of the importation of certain items; the wastage allowance system by which 
certain proportion of raw materials imported duty free for export production was allowed for 
domestic use; special provisions for large trading companies that exported more than the annually 
adjusted export target and met the commodity and market diversification 
Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (1962) - promoted Korean products through displaying, and 
intemational trade fairs, and sending trade missions 
Korea Scientific and Technological Information Centre (1962) - collected and disseminated 
scientific and technical information 
Export Industrial Estate Development Law (1964) - promoted exports 
Interest rate reform (1965) - raised interest rates on deposits from 15 per cent to 30 per cent to 
increase savings 
Foreign Capital Investment Act (1966) - imposed regulations regarding technology licensing and 
foreign direct investment 
Korea Institute of Science and Technology (1966) - carried out applied research, project feasibility 
studies, technical service for small and medium scale industries, pioneered new products and 
processes, adapted and improved foreign technologies 
Tariff reform (1967) - changed from a positive list system to a negative list system and under this 
system all items not subjected to restrictions were automatically approved 
Science and Technology Promotion Law (1967) - promoted science and technology 
Machinery Industry Promotion Law (1967) - promoted investinent in the machinery sector 
Electronics Industry Promotion Law (1969) - promoted electtonics industry 
Preferential tteatment for key/strategic industries through tax, finance, exemption for R&D 
expenditure, tariff exemption or deduction (deduction rate of 100-80 per cent) for facility 
equipment, machine, raw material, parts and components 
1973-1981 
Main Strategy - Promote Heavy Industries through Import Substitution and 
Export Promotion 
Incentives: Ban on imported products; introduced generous incentives for heavy industries: below 
20 per cent tax rate; complete exemption of corporate and income tax for the first three years and 
50 per cent exemption for another two years; accelerated depreciation up to 100 per cent of the 
normal depreciation allowances; preferential credit assistance with low interest rates, preferential 
depreciation; tax-free reserves for investment; tax credit or exemption for R&D expenditure; tax 
free reserves for expenses in technology development; tariff deduction (deduction rate of 90-70 
per cent) for facility equipment, machine, raw material, parts and components 
• Heavy and Chemical Industries Act (1973)- promoted heavy and chemical industries 
• First Free Export Zone in Mazan (1970) 
• Interest rate reform (1972) - reduced the rate of interest (continued) 
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• Technology Development Promotion Law (1972) - decided the incentives for promoting 
iimovative activities, upgraded industrial capabilities 
• Engineering Services Promotion Law (1973) - promoted the development of local engineering 
capabilities, enforced performance standards on local engineering firms 
• National Technical Qualification Law (1973) - promoted the stams of professionals in technical 
fields by a system of examination and certifications 
• Human capital development - promoted overseas training for Korean managers and engineers, 
enacted a law that made in-plant fraining compulsory, established the Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science (1971) 
• Price Stabilization and Fair Trade Act (1974) - controlled prices in the private goods market 
having a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry stmcture to lower the inflation and to restrict 
collusion or conspiracy and unfair frade practices 
• Free Export Zone - Iri (1974) 
• National Investment Fund (1974) - provided funds to purchase machinery and additional funds for 
exports on deferred payments 
t Tariff drawback system (1975) - provided facilities to enable domestic exporters to avoid the 
erosion of export competitiveness caused by the cost rise stemming from import protection 
• Comprehensive Stabilization Program (1979-81) - shifted emphasis from industiy specific 
intervention to functional approach, lifted restrictions imposed on FDI 
1982-1997 
Main Strategy - Export Promotion/Import Substitution (high value-added/ 
technology intensive industries with less emphasis on industrial targeting) 
Improving market mechanism - liberalization, devaluation of exchange rate, reduction of 
preferential treatment for sttategic indusfries 
Financial market liberalization - elimination of subsidized policy loans, privatization of 
commercial banks 
Foreign Capital Inducement Act (1984) - imposed liberal policies towards promoting FDI such as 
the introduction of positive list of indusfries which open to FDI and a negative list of industries 
that were resfricted to foreign investors, automatic approvals (for the projects where foreign 
ownership is less than 50 per cent, and projects that invest less than US$ 1 million) 
The Small and Medium Industry Systemisation Law (1982) - promoted sub-contracting through tax 
and financial incentives, local content requirement 
Promoting small and medium scale uidusfries and reducing bias towards large firms - financial 
incentives for R&D, marketing and indusfrial expansion activities directed towards small and 
medium scale indusfries 
Law of Coordination of Business Activities of Small Enterprises - prevented competition between 
small indusfries, and small and large industries 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (1981) - baimed collusive or enfry limitations, take-
overs, competition limiting joint activities and unfair frade practices 
Industrial Development Law (1985) - changed industrial policy from selective intervention to 
ftinctional intervention 
Research and Development - Amended Technology Development Promotion Act in 1977 and 1981 
Incentives for R&D: 10 per cent tax credits for expenses for R&D and capital expenditure on 
R&D; accelerated depreciation allowances, reduced tariffs for imported R&D equipment; 
preferential financial facilities; firms are allowed to set aside 20 per cent of its profits before tax 
for R&D in any one year to be used for its R&D work in the following two years; income tax 
exemption for reserve for technology development, income eamed from engineering services, local 
govemment tax, royalty income; income tax; deduction of 10 per cent on expenses used for 
technical human resource development; income tax deductions on expenditures paid to technology 
related institutes; allowed exemptions from military service for their R&D personnel 
HAN/G7 project - promoted science and technology capabilities to the stams of advanced 
countries 
Preferential freatment - technologically leading indusfries tariff deduction (deduction rate of 65-55 
per cent) for facility equipment and machine 
Sources: In-Joung (1989), Edwards (1992a), Amsden (1989), Kim (1989), Yoo (1984, 1989), I^e (1993), Westphal (1990), Chu 
(1994), Dollar and Sokoloff (1994), Maclntyre (1994), Salazar (1989), Kim (1985), Suh (1981), and Rhee (1987). 
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In particular, it involved shifting emphasis from the promotion of particular industries 
(industry specific intervention) to a greater reliance on the market and overall 
economic efficiency. 
However, since the mid 1980s, with the assistance of favourable extemal 
factors (the gradual devaluation of the Korean Won in real tenns against the US 
dollars in world markets and lower interest rates in world financial markets), the 
economy regained growth momentum. The economy of Korea in fact witnessed 
strong economic performance particularly during 1986-88. Encouraged by a low 
price of oil, low intemational interest rates and low value of the yen, not only had the 
annual GNP growth rate remain above 12 per cent but Korea also recorded sizeable 
current account surpluses during this period (Park and Kim 1992, p. 11). This 
favourable situation, especially Korea's trade surpluses, triggered calls from foreign 
countries for further liberalizations. At the same time, wage increases and work 
stoppages, appreciation of the Korean Won, protectionist pressures from major 
industrial countries and deregulation of direct foreign investment created serious 
threats to Korea's intemational competitiveness. In response to this situation Korea 
accelerated its liberalization schedule. Facing with the new economic environment, 
such as the launching of the World Trade Organization and the acceleration of 
globalization in the 1990s, the Korean goverrmient rearranged its industrial support 
system more in line with intemational standards, placing more emphasis on the 
strengthening of intemational competitiveness and the advancement of industrial 
stmcture. With Korea's entry into the OECD in 1996, the govemment has fiirther 
advanced its opening of the capital and foreign exchange market (Kim 1996; Kim and 
Kang 1997). 
In the lafter part of 1997, and in the midst of these policy changes, Korea also 
faced a financial crisis, like several other countries in the region. This crisis, as many 
pointed out (Grewal 1998; Jolley 1998b; Hahm 1998; IMF 1997) was caused by a 
combination of extemal and intemal factors. Short-term extemal financing had been a 
major source of funding for Korea for some time. This led to rapid increases in short-
term debt. The inadequacy of pmdential supervision also exacerbated the problems 
further, creating foreign exchange liquidity problems. A highly leveraged corporate 
financial stmcture and the failure of several of the conglomerates {chaebol) have also 
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been identified as other factors which contributed to the financial crisis in Korea 
Making matters worse, major terms of trade shocks hit the economy with the 
collapse of export prices in 1996 and 1997, significantly damaging the corporate 
sector. A combination of all these factors undermined the financial position of many 
Korean companies and destabilized financial markets, ending up with a financial 
crisis in Korea. In an effort to overcome mounting foreign exchange problems and 
rapid deterioration of the nation's credit standing, the Korean govemment decided to 
resort to assistance from the IMF. Together with the IMF program, steps were taken 
to improve the financial transparency of corporate firms.^ These developments are 
beyond the scope of the current study. 
5.4 Diversity of Policy Instruments 
As noted in Chapter 1, in certain circumstances, such as investments that involve huge 
initial investments and strategic complementarities, and in the presence of 
extemalities, entry barriers, information asymmetries and so on, market outcomes 
may often not be optimal. It is widely believed that in such circumstances the 
situation could be improved with the support of the govemment. Since governments 
see these various market deficiencies in many different ways, they take a variety of 
measures. 
Korea, for instance, pursued its industrialization process by simultaneously 
promoting both export promotion and import substitution industries, while using a 
variety of policy instmments. These instmments primarily included: (a) protective 
measures such as import restrictions on competing products, reductions in tariffs on 
raw materials and ownership controls; (b) measures adopted for achieving optimum 
production scale, such as restrictions on entry and on capacity expansion, state 
initiated mergers, coordinated capacity scrapping and or exit and market sharing 
arrangements and (c) measures aimed towards improving productivity, such as 
capacity upgrading, encouraging production for export markets, and providing 
generous incentives and institutional support for technology, R&D and human capital 
development. How and why such diverse policy instmments were applied in the case 
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of Korea is discussed in this section, under two sub headings: as im.port substitution 
related measures and export promotion and growth related measures. Yet, it is 
important to note that organising the measures adopted for industrial promotion under 
these two categories becomes difficult, since Korea simuHaneously applied measures 
for both import substitution and export promotion. 
5.4.1 Import Substitution Related Measures 
As it is obvious from the discussion of Section 5.3, and Table 5.2, Korea pursued 
import substitution measures since 1950s, more often simultaneously with export 
promotion. Yet, the periods between 1950-60 and between 1973-81 were considered 
to be more biased towards import substitution than other periods. Measures adopted 
during the lafter period will be discussed in the following section along with the 
industrial targeting. 
(a) Measures for Promoting Heavy Industries and Industrial Targeting 
As one means of overcoming the worsening trade balance, the initiative towards 
building up Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) came into effect with the 
introduction of the Heavy and Chemical Industry promotion committee in 1973.'° 
The motivation for promoting these industries appeared to be both economic - to 
develop production capacity for intermediate materials and capital goods - and 
strategic - to increase defence capability and to serve as a future source for the 
development of strategic export industries (Worid Bank 1993; Suh 1986; Yoo 
1990). With these objectives in mind, the govemment of Korea played an intensive 
role in planning, monitoring and inducing private firms to invest in HCI industries, 
most of which were referred to as targeted industries. 
Successive development plans in Korea specified the targeted industries (see 
^^ For more details see Hahm (1998) and IMF (1997). 
Several other reasons such as concem for national security, rising protectionism in industrial 
countiies, the likely erosion of Korea's competitiveness, and some political factors have also 
influenced the Korean govemment to apply the HCI pohcies in the early 1970s (Yoo 1990). 
In a press conference. President Park presented "as the goal to be achieved by the HCI policy, 
exports of $10 billion and per capita GNP of $1000 by 1980. These were considered to be ambitious 
goals, given the total exports of $1.62 billion and per capita GNP of $318 in 1972" (Yoo 1990, p. 4). 
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Table 5.3 for targeted industries specified under each plan). The composition of the 
target set of products changed with time, from unsophisticated products (such as 
radios) to sophisticated products (such as VCRs); from consumer products (such as 
colour TVs) to industrial products (such as semiconductors) and so forth. In general, 
the Hst of industries that were considered to be suitable for promotion included: (a) 
petro-chemical industries located in pretrochemical parks, which are covered by the 
Petrochemicals Industry Promotion Law; (b) ship-building industries Hsted by the 
Shipbuilding Promotion Law; (c) machinery industries Hsted by the Machinery 
Industries Promotion Law; (d) electronics industries listed by the Electronics Industry 
Promotion Law; (e) steel and related industries listed by the Steel Industry Promotion 
Law; and (f) other numerous industries such as automobiles listed by the relevant laws 
and presidential decrees (Suh 1981, pp. 21-22). Criteria used for selecting targeted 
industries were, however, not explicitly clear in the case of Korea. According to the 
available evidence (Amsden 1989; Yu 1989; Chang 1994), targeted industries were 
selected on the basis of a number of criteria, namely product life cycles, vertical and 
horizontal integration, technology spin-offs, market niches, high growth potential and 
competitive advantage. In the 1990s, targeted products are mainly selected on the 
grounds of (a) those that require intensive R&D efforts; (b) those that require support 
for mass production and (c) those where efficiency and productivity have to be 
increased in order to remain competitive. 
These industries were promoted through a number of measures including 
import protection, preferential treatment, inducing production for export markets and 
through the measures adopted for achieving optimum production scale. Since the 
majority of the industries initiated under the HCI drive were characterised as infant 
industries (in which Korea possess low comparative advantage), it was deemed 
necessary to protect these industries from their established rivals. Therefore, these 
industries were largely assisted through the protection from imports in their early 
stages of development. For instance, in the case of the automobile industry, importing 
of completed automobiles was prohibited. Once local production met govemment 
standards, automobile parts and component items sectors were also protected under a 
complete import ban. 
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Table 5.3 Targeted/Strategic Industries in Korea 
Period Industries 
1962-66 (First Five Year Development Plan) Coal, Cement, Fertilizer, Oil Refining Chemicals, 
Iron and Steel, Machinery 
1967-71 (Second Five Year Development Plan) Iron and Steel, Refined Petroleum, Aluminium, 
Fertilizer, Soda-ash, Cement, Motor, Automobile, 
Shipbuilding, 
1972-76 (Third Five Year Development Plan) Iron and Steel, Copper, Lead, Zinc, Cement, Sheet 
Glass, Pulp, Working, Constmction, Farm and 
Electrical Machinery, Automobile, Shipbuilding, 
Synthetic Fiber, Fertilizer, Petrochemicals 
Electtorucs, 
1977-81 (Fourth Five Year Development Plan) Steel Products, Finished Metal Products, 
Electtonics, Elecfrical and Non-Electtical 
Machinery, Shipbuilding, Transport Equipment 
1982-86 (Fifth Five Year Development Plan) Machinery, Automobile, Chemicals, Electtonics, 
Biotechnology; Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding, 
Aviation Industty 
1987- to date (HAN Project - 1991) Seven high- technology products and seven based 
technology products are identified as targets (see 
Table 5. 5 for details) 
Sources: Chang (1994, p. 114); Yu (1995, p. 93-94); Amsden (1989, p. 82); Hong (1979, pp. 39-44); 
Rhee (1987, p. 32). 
The targeted industries had priority in acquiring subsidised credits, foreign 
exchange, state investment funds, preferential tax treatments and other supportive 
measures including import protection and entry restrictions (see Table 5.2 for details). 
Setting up of targeted industiies was fiirther encouraged by creating huge differences 
in the incentives for different classes of industries. For example, the marginal tax rate 
was set below 20 per cent for HCI industries whereas it was around 50 per cent for 
non-HCI industries (Dollar and Sokoloff 1994). 
Also, the targeted infant industries were encouraged to produce for export 
markets from the inception. Two strategies were implemented for this purpose; 
industries were primarily encouraged to target developing country markets and they 
were encouraged to adopt a differentiated pricing scheme. Under this latter policy, for 
instance, automobile manufacturers were encouraged to set the export price well 
below the cost of production, while setting prices for domestic consumers at 
substantial profit margins. Encouraging industries for export production was expected 
to expose them to intemational pressure and thereby help them to adapt to 
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competition. 
To realise the potential benefits of economies of scale, firms were often 
instmcted to build plants of efficient production scale. Whenever firms were thought 
to be smaller than the minimum efficient scale, the state made steps to initiate mergers 
or limited production to a handful of producers. There are a number of examples of 
this nature. In the case of automobile industry, the MTI restricted manufacturing of 
small passenger cars to three primary auto firms: Hyundai, Kia and GM-Korea. These 
three firms were required to cooperate with each other in developing standardized 
parts and components and were required to set annual targets (Chu 1994). Likewise, a 
merger process was applied in industries such as PVC producers, fertiliser, shipping 
and constmction industries until the 1980s (Chang 1994; Amsden 1989; Suh 1986). 
Govemment support was not only restricted to times when businesses were 
flourishing. When the economy experienced hard times, for example in recessions, 
the govemment induced healthier firms to absorb insolvent firms by providing various 
incentives to avoid business failures. In particular, under the rationalisation program 
implemented during the mid 1980s, declining industries were assisted through state 
led mergers, capacity reduction, specialisation and liquidations. As part of the 
rationalization plan, for example, the MTI ordered Kia to stay out of small passenger 
car production until 1987 while giving it monopoly power in producing light tmcks; 
tmcks over five tons were given to Hyundai and the Daewoo group (Chu 1994). Of 
the three companies which produced naval diesel engines, one group (Daewoo) was 
asked to exit while the other two groups (Hyundai and Ssangyong) were forced to 
split the market into two segments and to specialise (Chang 1994, p. 122). As part of 
the shipping rationalization program (1983-1985), the govemment reorganized the 
industry, determining the number of surviving firms (63 firms into 17 firms), and 
setting capacity reduction targets for those surviving ones (Kim 1989a, p. 30). If 
firms refused to accept govemment initiated measures, the govemment threatened to 
withhold financial and other incentives. 
12 
Those indusfries which were subjected to rationalization mainly included heavy power generating 
equipment, motor vehicles, vessel diesel engines, elecfronic exchanges, copper smelting, shipping, 
overseas constmction and fertilizers. 
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In essence, rationalizing declining industries was seen as necessary for Korea 
to prevent widespread unemployment, and to boost confidence in the industrial 
market. However, as Kim (1989a) pointed out, these bail out procedures could create 
a significant "moral hazard". Given the prospect of govemment rescue in the event of 
adverse business conditions, firms were more willing to undertake risky strategies. 
Further, government-imposed industry restructuring placed more emphasis on 
mergers than industrial exit or conversion, which in tum tended to delay the needed 
adjustments, resulting in more inefficient resource allocation. Moreover, the troubled 
firms were mostly taken over by large business groups, contributing to the 
concentration of economic power (Nam 1992). 
Realising these limitations, with the enactment of the Industrial Development 
Law of 1986, the rationalisation programs were designed to place more emphasis on 
addressing the needs of individual industries. To effectively manage these programs 
and to improve the industrial support system, as the law implied, the govemment was 
expected to intervene in areas where market failure occurred, and in industrial sectors 
whose intemational competitiveness was vital to the economy but which were not 
expected to be competitive if left to market forces. Accordingly, industries which 
needed technology upgrading and also involved large investments, for example 
automobiles and heavy constmction machinery, were provided assistance on an 
individual basis either in the form of state led market sharing arrangements, or entry 
restrictions and subsidies on investment and R&D (Chang 1994; Seong 1997). 
Along with this Law, attempts were made to phase out declining industries 
such as textiles, dying, ferro-alloy and fertilizers. As a part of this process, industries 
such as textiles and dying were encouraged to substitute old equipment with new and 
automated machinery. To improve the operating ratio of the ferro-alloy industry, two 
firms were merged to monopolize the copper smelting market, three firms were 
designated to specialize in manganese steel, and a long-term supply contract with 
Pohang Steel Company was arranged by the MTI. Further, all these rationalization 
programs were limited to a three-year period. To avoid unilateral govemment 
intervention in the rationalization process, an "Industrial Development Deliberative 
Council", which comprised experts on industrial policy from the private sector, and a 
"Deliberation Committee on Industrial Policy", which coordinated views on 
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rationalization of policy among concemed govemment organizations, were 
established. After consulting both the above mentioned council and committee, the 
MTI drafted a rationalization plan, including special loans, mergers, collusive 
behaviour, capacity reduction, import restriction and entry barriers (Kim 1989a). 
Some economists (Stem 1990, 1995; Cho and Kim 1995) argue that in some 
respects, such as transforming its industrial sector from one dominated by labour 
intensive manufacturing to one with substantial capacity in capital intensive products, 
while maintaining rapid industrial growth and continuing to develop new export 
markets, the industrial targeting process of Korea has been successful. On the 
contrary, others (for instance Suh 1986; Yoo 1990; Rhee 1987) consider that the HCI 
policy drive did not succeed as expected and was a policy mistake. As they point out, 
excessive incentive schemes in tax, tariff and bank financing led to over investment or 
investment duplications, and to under utilized capacity, and generated severe 
distortions and waste in the allocation of investment resources. Further, the HCI drive 
led to the rapid inflation and a deterioration of economic performance resulting from 
eroding competitiveness. These deficiencies, they argue, arose partly due to the 
excessive govemment intervention while ignoring market principles. The HCI drive 
and industrial targeting process in Korea provide an example of how goverrunent 
intervention may create both favourable as well as unfavourable effects on the 
economy. 
(b) Measures for Promoting Industrial Structure 
Some key characteristics of the Korean economy, such as the oligopolistic industrial 
stmcture and vertically integrated pattem of industrial development, developed as an 
outcome of deliberate measures. Thinking that a handfiil of large firms might be 
helpful in penetrating as well as challenging developed country markets, especially 
the United States and the Europe, Korea intentionally made efforts to promote an 
oligopolistic industrial stmcture. For that purpose, take-overs were not only allowed 
but also encouraged by the govemment. The collusive behaviour was particularly 
encouraged in promising industries that needed to increase R&D, to improve quality 
and to attain efficient production scale, and also to scale down the capacities in 
declining industries (Chang 1994). Despite these attempts, competition was 
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encouraged among firms, mostly on the basis of non-price variables such as quality 
and location. 
Vertical integration, the other key characteristic of Korea's industrial stmcture, 
was promoted largely by tying up Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) to the 
large scale sector through sub-contracting - instmcting the chaebol to establish supply 
and vendor networks. To develop these activities, the Small and Medium Industry 
Systemization Law was enacted in 1982. This Law empowered the MTI to reserve 
certain industry spheres for small and medium size sub-contractors. Also, it 
instmcted chaebols to procure designated parts and components through SMEs and 
not make them in-house, and provided conditions that prevented prime contractors 
from swallowing up sub-contractors through stock ownership. Additionally, the 
govemment imposed certain guidelines on fair trade practices, such as the frequency 
of payments and the length of sub-contracts. By providing various tax and financial 
incentives, it encouraged sub-contractors to update their technological know-how. 
Sub-contracting SMEs were exempted from stamp tax and were granted tax 
deductions for a certain percentage of their investments in laboratory and inspection 
equipment, and for the whole of their expenses for technical consultancy. Growth and 
stability of sub-contractors was fiirther enhanced by the exchange of personnel 
between prime contractors and sub-contractors and by setting up sub-contracting 
promotion councils to help SMEs in terms of contractual relationships, arbitrate 
disputes and the monitoring of confract implementation (Amsden 1989; Westphal 
1990; LaH 1996). 
Since the early 1980s, the government's stance on favouring large firms was 
moderated. Instead of promoting large firms, financial incentives for R&D and for 
marketing and industrial expansion activities were directed towards SMEs. The 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act enacted in 1981, introduced certain changes 
in the prevaiHng policies. Accordingly, collusive or entry limiting activities of firms, 
take-overs of competing firms, competition limiting joint activities and unfair trade 
practices in dealing with retailers or suppHers were banned. 
Realising this deficiency, this Act was amended in 1986 with stronger 
restrictions on cross investments between members of the same conglomerates. 
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Industry associations that would lead to limiting competition were also prohibited. At 
the same time, more reforms were announced to reduce business concentration. 
These included the forced sale of 'idle' real estate held by the chaebols, the 
rationalisation of the chaebols corporate stmcture through the forced sale of non-
essential subsidiaries, tight control over big business, and stringent supervision of 
loans given to the chaebol (Moon 1994). By the early 1990s, the govemment 
announced the Industrial SpeciaHsation Plan under which, by January 1994, each of 
the top 30 conglomerates had to nominate their 'core' businesses. Through this 
process it was expected to enhance fiirther speciaHsation of the chaebol, facilitate 
further growth in key industries, reduce concentration and corporate debt, and 
consolidate the financial position of the key players in the Korean economy. The 
response to this new plan appeared to be positive since several companies announced 
expansion plans within their key areas (McKay and Missen 1995). These included 
Samsung's announcement of large scale investments in production of non-memory 
chips, and Hyundai's plan to be one of the top 10 car makers in the world by the year 
2000). 
(c) Measures for Promoting Small and Medium Scale Industries 
Apart from the sub-contracting measures noted earlier, a number of institutional and 
other supports were initiated for the purpose of promoting SMEs. These mainly 
included: (a) "Small Industry Centres" were set up in each province for helping and 
guiding SMEs, improving their management and production activities; (b) the Small 
and Medium Industry Bank was established for providing financial support, either in 
the form of equity capital or convertible bonds, for training managers of SMEs and 
improving their operational activities such as market surveys and feasibility studies 
and (c) various other institutional facilities were established to undertake research, 
1 o 
develop techniques and skills, and provide management services. Govemment 
support for SMEs was further extended by granting a collective monopoly over 
certain products including leather products, shoes, towels and toys to this sector. If 
large businesses wished to extend their production in any of the products that had 
'^  These instimtions include, the Korea Rural Industty Development Centte, the Korea Advanced 
Instimte of Science and Technology, the Small and Medium Industiry Promotion Corporation and the 
Korean Production Technology Service Corporation. 
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been granted such privileges for small businesses, they were required to obtain 
permission (Kim 1985). Also, under the factory lease system, model plants were built 
in industrial estates, and were leased or sold to small entrepreneurs. The Law on 
Coordination of Business Activities of Small Enterprises prevented competition 
between small industries and also between small and large industries (Salazar 1989; 
Ouh 1986). 
5.4.2 Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
(a) Measures for Fulfilling Financial Needs 
Control over the allocation of loanable funds has been one of the most influential 
tools that affected the pattem of industrial development in Korea in its early stage. 
This was deemed necessary for Korea, largely because of the scarcity of capital and 
the underdeveloped capital market. Extensive intervention in the financial sector 
began in Korea with the interest rate reform in 1965'^ * and the nationalization of 
commercial banks. The National Investment Fund was set up in 1974 to mobilize 
public employee pension funds and a substantial share of banking funds, and 
development banks played a key role in fulfilling financial needs of the private sector, 
especially large scale investments. These steps seemed to have had a significant 
impact on industrial development, since they mobilised financial resources for 
productive purposes and allowed the govemment to determine where, when and how 
much should be invested in which industries. 
In essence, the policies adopted in Korea in relation to the financial sector 
appear to be different from that of many other comparable countries in several 
respects. Firstiy, through credit policies Korea tried to achieve specific poHcy goals, 
in particular promoting exports and strategic industries. For this purpose, provision of 
finance to target areas was encouraged and was provided at preferential interest rates. 
As indicated in Table 5.4, Korea kept its interest rates at comparatively low levels for 
policy loans until the early 1980s. Compared with the rate of general bank loans, the 
'" Interest rates on deposits raised from 15 per cent per annum to 30 per cent with this reform (In-Joung 
1989, p. 49). 
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Table 5.4 Interest Rates on Bank Loans and Inflation Rates in Korea, 1962-1991 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991* 
General 
loan 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
22.0 
15.5 
15.5 
15.5 
15.5 
16.0 
16.0 
19.0 
19.0 
20.0 
17.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-13.0 
10.0-12.5 
10.0-12.5 
10.0-12.5 
Export 
9.13 
-
8.0 
6.5 
-
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
7.0 
9.0 
9.0 
8.0 
8.0 
9.0 
9.0 
15.0 
15.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
lO.O 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.5 
Policy Loans (lending rates) 
Machinery 
Promotion 
Fund 
-
-
-
-
-
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
-
-
lO.O 
12.0 
13.0 
13.0 
15.0 
20.0 
11.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
National 
Investment 
Fund 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
12.0 
12.0 
14.0 
14.0 
16.0 
16.0 
22.0 
16.5-17.5 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
10.0-11.5 
Curb 
market 
rate 
52.6 
61.8 
58.7 
58.7 
56.5 
56.0 
51.4 
49.8 
46.4 
37.0 
33.4 
40.8 
41.3 
40.5 
38.1 
39.3 
42.4 
44.9 
36.3 
32.8 
25.8 
24.8 
24.0 
23.1 
22.9 
22.7 
23.7 
20.6 
21.4 
Inflation 
rate 
18.4 
29.3 
30.0 
6.2 
14.5 
15.6 
16.1 
14.8 
15.6 
12.9 
16.3 
12.1 
30.4 
24.6 
21.2 
16.8 
22.8 
19.6 
24.0 
16.4 
7.1 
5.0 
3.9 
4.2 
2.8 
3.5 
5.9 
5.2 
10.6 
10.9 
Notes: Inflation rate - GNP deflator 
- Data is not available 
After the period 1991, interest rate data are available only under two categories namely, general 
loans and specialized loans. Interest rates remain the same for both categories after 1991. 
Source: Sakong (1993, pp. 34, 244); Korea Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
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curb market rate and the inflation rate, the privileges enjoyed by policy industries 
were pronounced during this period. Along with stmctural reforms introduced in the 
eariy 1980s, these interest rate differentials began to disappear. As Table 5.4 
demonstrates, by mid 1980 significant differences in interest rates were no longer 
evident between general loans and policy loans. Nevertheless, the curb market and 
financial repression continued to exist through the rest of the 1980s. 
Secondly, the financial institutions of Korea, especially the commercial banks, 
were subjected to more extensive interference than in many countries. Financial 
institutions were required to provide finance to specified sectors, according to the 
lending criteria set by the govemment. In cases of bad loans even the decision 
whether to continue lending or not lay in the hands of government.'^ Moreover, until 
recent times, the govemment was directly involved in persormel, budget and other 
managerial decisions of commercial banks. 
Thirdly, the govemment of Korea has adopted certain measures to avoid funds 
flowing to what it sees as non-productive investments. For instance, land reform 
limited large-scale investment in land, while there were no opportunities for making 
profits through trade and foreign exchange, especially under the Park regime. 
Attempts have also been made to restrict consumption demand so as to ensure that 
funds are directed towards investment.'^ 
Fourthly, Korea has made deliberate attempts to fulfil their financial needs 
through borrowing of foreign funds. Korea borrowed heavily from overseas in order 
to overcome balance of payment crises, to maintain its long-term growth trend and to 
finance its industries, especially when it began its heavy industrialization programme. 
To stimulate lending to Korea, the goverrunent amended the Foreign Capital 
Inducement Law in 1962 and provided govemment guarantees to lenders, which 
eliminated the risks of defauft and of exchange rate depreciation (Amsden 1989, p. 
73). Like other financial measures, capital flows have been tightiy regulated in Korea 
'^  In terms of supervising and regulating all the activities of the banking system, the Ministty of 
Finance played a direct role while tiie Economic Planning Board was indirectly involved in deciding 
the criteria for granting bank loans to prioritised sectors. 
'* To repress consumption demand, resfrictions were imposed on providing consumption loans to the 
banks; foreign holidays and luxury goods were harmed. 
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with a view to maximizing the efficiency of foreign borrowing in terms of both cost 
and use. For non-financial private corporations, foreign borrowing has mainly been 
confined to financing imports of capital goods and raw materials. For financial sector 
corporations, foreign borrowing has been restricted to funds for re-lending to firms in 
foreign currencies (Nam 1992, p. 10). The value of extemal debt has not become a 
burden, since most of the overseas loans were on a long-term basis and export growth 
was sufficient to pay them back, until the recent financial crisis in late 1990. 
Overall, though these policy measures were claimed to be instmmental in 
achieving rapid industrial growth, they impeded the development of an efficient 
banking system. Banks were plagued with substantial amounts of non-performing 
loans. These non-performing loans have been a continuing problem for the banking 
sector in Korea, since these lending institutions had little incentive for serious credit 
evaluation or ex-post monitoring due to excessive interference from the govemment. 
Concem over instability in financial markets further led to delay in taking appropriate 
action against these non-performing loans. Moreover the uncertainty surrounding the 
government's continuing role as risk partner failed to eliminate the 'moral hazard' 
problem. The restmctured firms were reluctant to reduce their capacity, and tended to 
pursue risky strategies in anticipation of another govemment rescue in the case of 
failure (Nam 1992). 
Faced with this situation, and with the objective of promoting competition and 
efficiency, since the early 1980s several reforms have been introduced in the financial 
sector. As part of this reform process many restrictions on bank management were 
lifted; the govemment divested its equity shares in all nationwide city banks, 
transferring ownership to private sector; entry barriers were lowered and most 
preferential interest rates applying to various policy loans were abolished; and 
financial intermediaries were allowed to determine their own lending rates (Nam 
1992, pp. 10-20). 
(b) Measures for Promoting Technology Development 
At the beginning of its industriaHzation process, the technological status of Korea was 
not much different from that of a typical developing counfry. Nevertheless, Korea has 
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been able to achieve considerable progress in its technological status over the last two 
decades. Achieving such progress in technology development was partly possible for 
Korea due to its concerted policy measures. In essence, these policy measures could 
be viewed differently from that of comparable countries owing to Korea's restrictive 
policy stance towards foreign direct investment (FDI), its concerted efforts towards 
maximizing the potential benefits of FDI, and its emphasis on other ahemative 
comprehensive measures to develop indigenous technology. 
Though Korea encouraged FDI, as did other developing countries, as an 
altemative for developing its technology status, it adopted less liberal poHcies. It 
neither encouraged FDI at a large scale nor promoted Free Export Zones,'^ 
particularly in the early stages. Until the late 1950s, FDI, especially foreign majority 
ownership, was not allowed. As a result, FDI has played a relatively minor role, 
except in electronics. With the introduction of the Foreign Capital Inducement 
Promotion Act^^ of 1960, this pohcy stance though was relaxed, the resulting liberal 
poHcies did not last for long. Anticipating a potential surge of Japanese investment 
with the resumption of diplomatic relations with Japan, the Korean govemment 
introduced various measures to regulate both the quantity and quality of foreign 
capital. Subsequently, the Foreign Capital Inducement Act of 1966 regulated both 
foreign licensing and FDI. Further, the Law of Importation of Foreign Capital 
specified that FDI should be restricted to priority industries, infant industries, 
industries using large amounts of imported raw materials, consumer (luxury) goods 
industries, polluting industries and agriculture and fishery (Chang 1994). 
Since the eariy 1970s, with the hope of mitigating the perceived adverse 
effects of FDI to the domestic economy and of maintaining considerable 
independence both in terms of ownership and the absorption of technology, Korea 
began to place emphasis on other technology enhancing methods such as joint 
ventures, importing technology and technology Hcensing. Consequently, from 1973 
onwards, joint ventures were given greater priority than wholly owned foreign firms. 
' ' Korea has established two free frade zones, namely Masan in 1970, in which the predominant 
industty is electtonics and electtonic goods and Iri in 1974, where textile enterprises are predominant 
(Rhee, Katterbach and White 1990). 
'* Under this act, for the first time various incentives including equal tteatment with domestic firms, tax 
holidays, guarantee of profit remittances and withdrawal of the principals, and tax incentives for 
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At the same time very specific 'General Guidelines for Foreign Direct Investment' 
were introduced. These guideHnes were specifically focused on three areas: project 
eligibility, foreign ownership, and investment scale. 
Under the project eligibility criteria certain projects such as: (1) projects which 
would dismpt domestic demand and supply of raw materials and intennediate 
products; (2) projects which compete in overseas markets with domestic firms; (3) 
projects which aimed solely at financial support for existing domestic enterprises and 
(4) projects which aimed solely at profit from land use, were designated as non-
eHgible projects for foreign direct investment. 
Under the foreign ownership criteria, the foreign participation level was 
basically limited to 50 per cent, except in the case oft (1) entirely export oriented 
projects which did not compete with domestic firms in overseas markets; (2) 
technology intensive projects which produced or induced production of important 
exporting or import substituting products; (3) multinational projects which invested 
only in the form of wholly ovmed subsidiaries in other countries; (4) projects which 
contributed to regionalization of domestic industrial stmcture and which were beyond 
the capacity of domestic investors, due to the large capital or advanced technology 
involved; (5) projects from a country which was expected to make increased 
investment in the future; (6) projects undertaken by Korean residents abroad and (7) 
projects in Free Export Zones and some other specific Industrial Estates designated by 
the govemment (Koo 1982, pp. 7-8; Lee 1987, pp. 20-21). 
In addition to the above noted eligibility and ownership criteria, a local 
participation of more than 50 per cent was required for projects which were: (1) 
purely labour intensive; (2) purely bonded processing; (3) dependent on domestic 
resources for major raw materials and (4) oriented toward local market sales. Along 
with these requirements the minimum amount of investment was also set in 1973. 
This requirement initially began at US$ 50,000 and was gradually raised to US$ 
500,000 by the end of 1970 (Koo 1982, p. 8). 
technology licensees were provided to foreign investors (Koo 1982, p. 4). 
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This restrictive poHcy stance began to change, however, in the early 1980s. 
ReaHsing the potential benefits of promoting more competition in the domestic 
market, contrary to former poHcies, a number of measures were initiated to stimulate 
FDI. Liberalization measures introduced in the 1980s opened many new industries to 
foreign investors. The new (revised) Foreign Capital Inducement Act, which came 
into effect in 1984, introduced new guidelines for FDI. Accordingly, 3 positive list of 
industrial activities open to FDI and a negative list of industries prohibited for or 
temporarily closed to foreign investors were introduced. The negative list system 
demonstrated the government's intention to eventually open all domestic markets to 
foreigners. At the time of the introduction of this Act, the negative list included 297 
of the 957 industries Hsted, leaving 660 industries open to FDI. Later, the govemment 
gradually reduced the number of industries on the negative list (Yoo 1989; Lee 1988). 
Prior to the introduction of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act foreign ownership 
was restricted to less than 50 per cent, except for firms established in the free export 
zones. However, along with this Act foreign equity sharing up to 100 per cent was 
aHowed for projects that involved high levels of technology and projects that involved 
a substantial level of exports. 
With the introduction of an automatic approval system and reducing 
restrictions on policies regarding technological licensing, fiirther attempts were also 
made to stimulate FDI in the 1980s. For example, projects where foreign ownership 
was less than 50 per cent, the amount of foreign investment was less than US$ 1 
million and the projects that were not on the negative list were given automatic 
approval by the Ministry of Finance without consulting other ministries concemed 
(Yoo 1989; Lee 1987). Certain exemptions were granted to foreign enterprises from 
income, corporate and capital gains taxes. Outward remittances of dividends and the 
repatriation of capital were also guaranteed. Such a drastic reversal of govemment 
policy, especially with regard to FDI, was mainly intioduced by the govemment with 
the primary purpose of promoting competition with domestic firms, enhancing 
efficiency and productivity, and promoting technological development of 
sophisticated industries. 
In addition to the initial restrictive policy stance, Korean policy measures are 
often considered to be special and to differ from those of many other countries in 
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terms of the strategies adopted for minimizing the ill effects of FDI. Though 
countries largely encourage FDI, as an altemative measure for promoting 
technological status, in general FDI is criticised on the grounds of certain iH effects 
such as reinforcement of dualism, introduction of inappropriate products and or 
technologies, weakening of domestic entrepreneurship and so on. With the hope of 
minimising such ill effects, Korea adopted certain strategies. The govemment of 
Korea tried to maximize the contribution of FDI, by allowing it only when the 
purpose of the investment was deemed compatible with the objectives of the 
development plans. For instance, though the majority of infant industries were, at 
least initially, dependent on FDI, the govemment was influential in admitting new 
entrants, which were granted entry through the decisions regarding the development 
of related lines of activity, and also enforcing them to adapt to national priorities. In 
this process the Govemment of Korea paid more attention to the quality rather than to 
the quantity of investment flows. 
To maximize the potential benefits of FDI, further efforts such as tight 
investment screening and extensive govemment reporting requirements and other 
control measures were also appHed. Accordingly, before the FDI projects received 
final approval, every project had to be approved by the Ministry of Finance after 
consultation with various other relevant ministries. That process not only involved a 
considerable amount of time but also was subjected to tight investment screening. 
Carrying out this type of task was possible for Korea, because its highly skilled 
personnel were capable of identifying the technical feasibihty of FDI projects. In 
addition to these selective and quality ensuring measures, to protect domestic 
producers, competition with domestic firms was seldom allowed in both domestic and 
intemational markets. Along with these measures, maintaining a minor role in FDI 
was partly made possible by the stmcture of the industry - the instmmental role 
played by the large private conglomerates in technology development in the country 
(Koo 1982; Lee 1987) 
Apart from these measures, purchasing foreign technology and importing 
capital goods were encouraged through various tax incentives. Firms were 
19 
Those tax incentives included deductions on ttansfer costs of patent rights and technology import 
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instmcted to obtain the latest equipment and technology. Technology licensing, 
another popular form of technology transfer in Korea, was associated with mature 
stages of technology in the advanced countries, mainly geared towards obtaining 
patent rights (about half of the technological licensing), and acquiring brand names to 
penetrate import barriers (Lee 1988, p. 195). Even those technological Hcenses were 
allowed only if local technological capabilities were not strong enough in that 
particular industry. To strengthen domestic buyers and to maximise the participation 
of local consultants in engineering contracts to develop basic process capabilities, the 
govemment directly intervened in the negotiation of major technological contracts 
(Lad 1996). 
Contrary to most other developing countries, which rely heavily on FDI and 
joint ventures to satisfy their technological requirements, Korea looked for altemative 
avenues to promote technology development. As part of this process, for instance, in 
the 1980s Korea encouraged the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacture) and ODM 
(Own-Design and Manufacture) systems. These systems, which operated as an 
altemative form of joint venture, helped Korean firms to train engineers (through 
strenuous in-house efforts and on the job training) to select equipment, supply 
materials and capital goods, and supply production and design technology. In 
particular, these systems were helpfiil in building the skills of Korean firms in 
consumer electronics, computers and microwave ovens. Under the conditions 
imposed by the OEM and ODM, production had to be the highest quality at the lowest 
price. Initially Samsung and others invested heavily for little or no retum, just to win 
their first small export orders (Hobday 1995, pp. 63-68). 
Informal technology transfer was another popular method widely applied in 
Korea for obtaining technology transfer. This included the hiring of foreign engineers 
and independent consultants, and the recmiting of locals trained in foreign 
multinational companies. These expatriates lived and worked in Korea as employees, 
helping to resolve technical problems. Short-term consultants, mostly obtained from 
Japan and either retired or still in the permanent employment of a Japanese enterprise, 
provided a valuable service, since they were free from the constraints of teaching firm 
fees, and tax exemptions on the income from technology consulting and from foreign engineers (Lall 
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to firm technology transfer techniques (Amsden 1989). In addition to these measures, 
Korea had been successful in absorbing technology while using links with foreign 
buyers of exported products (Westphal et al. 1981). In adapting and modifying local 
technologies according to their specifications, more often foreign buyers tended to 
offer advice and assistance, and sometimes even made regular visits to inspect 
facilities in the factories, provide local companies with blueprints and specifications, 
and with information on competing goods and production techniques, as well as 
feedback on design, quality and performance. With the expansion of chaebol 
activities, overseas investments became another form of technology transfer. For 
example, Samsung and Hyundai purchased a number of high technology firms, and 
set up laboratories abroad. This enabled them to enhance their technological 
capabilities by developing new products or processes jointly with a foreign partner 
and also to acquire skilled engineers and equipment (Hobday 1995). By setting up 
Science Research Centres and Engineering Research Centres at universities around 
the country to support R&D activities, facilitating common utilisation of advanced 
R&D facilities by smaller private firms, constmcting science towns (Daeduk Science 
Town, Kwngju Science Town), and organizing the quarterly Presidential conference 
for the Promotion of Science and Technology to facilitate effective inter-ministerial 
coordination, further measures were taken to stimulate technology development (Lall 
1996; Yu 1995). 
In addition to these comprehensive measures, Korean efforts towards 
developing technology could also be viewed differently from others because of its 
heavy emphasis on improving indigenous technology. Realising the potential danger 
of relying on foreign technology and also with a view to maintaining independence, 
by adopting certain strategies including unpacking imported technology, and copying 
foreign products through 'reverse engineering', Korea made vigorous attempts to 
improve its indigenous technological status (Jenkins 1992a). For example, to reach its 
present level of technology Samsung underwent a leaming process incorporating 
several stages. Firstly it began production in the electronics industry while mastering 
simple assembly techniques with imported parts, sourcing some of the components 
from suppliers, or modifying the engineering and design of imported products. Then 
it used reverse engineering processes to manufacture products through in-house 
1996). 
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efforts, without direct reliance on foreign firms. Later, it was able to apply the reverse 
engineering method process innovatively (Yu 1989). 
In this process, like Japan, Korea demonstrated her ability to adapt and absorb 
technological needs according to domestic requirements. This ability was proven in 
the areas of choosing which technologies to import, of adapting foreign technologies 
to local conditions and of generating new technologies domestically. Demands made 
on foreign capital good suppliers for thorough training and skills transfer (O'Conner 
1995), and compilation of a database on sources and prices of technology supply 
further strengthened Korea's ability to build her technology base. Technology 
diffusion v/as further advanced by the Korea Institute for Economics and Technology, 
which collected, processed and disseminated scientific and technical information to 
industry (Lall 1996). 
(c) Measures for Promoting Human Resources 
As part of this indigenous technology development process, the Govemment of Korea 
actively promoted human capital by stimulating the overseas training of Korean 
managers and engineers. More importantly, the govemment vigorously encouraged 
the education of high level technical manpower by setting up institutions such as the 
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) at the postgraduate 
level and the Korea Institute of Technology (KIT) at the undergraduate level (Lall 
1996). The former was under the control of the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) and its faculty and students were fully supported by the govemment. 
Moreover, in 1974, the govemment enacted a law that made in-plant training 
compulsory for all industrial enterprises with 300 or more workers. Under this law, 
enterprises could either establish vocational training institutes and trained their own 
skilled workers or they were levied costs to train such employees. In this endeavour, 
the govemment even determined the number of workers to be trained by each firm 
(Kim 1989b). Larger firms showed not only a positive response to in-house training 
but also made steps to establish their own formal secondary schools within their own 
premises. 
To strengthen indigenous technology capabilities, a number of institutional 
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supports have also been initiated in Korea since the inception of its industrialization 
process. Building an indigenous teclmology capability started with the establishment 
of the Korea Scientific and Technological Information Centre (KSTIC) in 1962. Its 
main activities included the intemational transfer of scientific knowledge by 
collecting, processing and disseminating scientific and technical information. The 
Korea Institute of Science and Teclmology (KIST), initiated in 1966, contributed to 
technological development by carrying out applied research, including project 
feasibility studies, technical services for small and medium scale industries and 
engineering studies on a pilot plant scale. Additionally, KIST was helpful to 
industries through pioneering new products and processes, and adapting and 
improving foreign technologies. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
set up in 1967, was responsible for formulating basic poHcies on research and 
development, intemational technical cooperation, the development of research 
organizations and resources, and the creation of a favourable societal climate for 
science and technology promotion. These institutional supports were further 
strengthen through the establishment of specialised research institutes related to 
machinery, metals, electronics, nuclear energy, resources, chemicals, 
telecommunications, standards, shipbuilding and marine sciences (Lall 1996). 
(d) Measures for Promoting R&D 
Realising the potential benefits of irmovation, and as an altemative avenue to reducing 
the dependence on Japanese firms, policy measures stressed the importance of 
promoting R&D since the early 1970s. For this purpose, the Technology 
Development Promotion Act was enacted in 1973 and later amended in 1977 and 
1981; generous tax incentives and finance facilities were introduced as prime 
motivators for stimulating R&D activities. Among others, for example, firms which 
spent on R&D were entitled to claim 10 per cent of current R&D expenditures as tax 
credits and special accelerated depreciation for capital expenditure used in R&D. 
They were also permitted to set aside reserves for future R&D, provided that it was 
spent on R&D projects within four years (see Table 5.2 for details) (Yoo 1989; Lall 
1996; Rhee 1987). 
In addition to generous tax incentives, R&D was promoted through generous 
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financing schemes that involved both grants and loans. Accordingly, the Designated 
R&D Program, launched in 1982, supported private firms undertaking research in 
core strategic technology development projects in the industrial area which were 
approved by the MOST. It funded up to 50 per cent of the R&D costs of large firms 
and up to 80 per cent for SMEs. The Industrial Technology Development 
Programme, started in 1987, subsidised up to two-thirds of the R&D costs of joint 
projects of national interest between private firms and research institutes. The Highly 
Advanced National Project (HAN), initiated in 1992, supported the development of 
specific high technology products and core technologies (see Table 5.5 for details) 
considered essential for the economy in which Korea wanted to achieve an 
independent innovative base. For this, a separate fund, the Science and Technology 
Promotion Fund, was established in 1993 to provide finance for firms and research 
institutes undertaking the HAN projects (Song 1995).^° Most of these funded projects 
were conducted jointly by industry, public research institutes and the govemment, and 
covered activities such as semiconductors, computers, fine chemicals, machinery, 
material science, telecommunications, energy and plant system engineering (Lall 
1996; Hobday 1995). The response to these incentives was remarkable, with large 
firms keen to estabHsh their own R&D laboratories. Private sector participation in 
establishing R&D laboratories, for example has increased from 12 in 1976 to 122 by 
1983 and to over 1000 by 1991 (Kim 1989b; Yu 1995). 
Institutional support was further strengthened by enacting a number of laws: 
the Science and Technology Promotion Law of 1967, defined the government's role in 
promoting science and technology, and the Technology Development Promotion Law 
of 1972, which specified the incentives to private firms for irmovative activities and 
for upgrading industry capabiHties.^' The prime objective of these incentives was to 
^^  Besides this, two other fiinds: the Industrial Development Fund, provided low interest loans for long-
term productivity improvement and technology indusfries, and the SME Foundation Formation Fund of 
1994, supported technology development and enviroiunental investment by smaller furms. The Korea 
Technology Development Corporation and commercial banks provided necessary finance while the 
Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund offered credit guarantees for loans made to help firms 
develop or commercialise new technology. 
Other legislative measures included, the Science and Technology Development Promotional Law (for 
private sector R&D instimtes), the R&D Consortium Law for Industrial Technology Promotion, the 
Government Supported R&D Institutes Law, the Special Provisional Law for Structural Adjustment 
and Management Stability of Small and Medium Business, the Industry Development Law (for support 
of basic indusfrial technology), the Substitute Energy Development Promotional Law, the Software 
Development Promotional Law, the Genetic Engineering Promotional Law, the Aerospace Industry 
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Table 5.5 Products Identified under the HAN Project in Korea 
Product Oriented Technology Development Projects 
1. For the elecfronics industty, develop 256 megabit DRAM chips by 1996 and 1 gigabit DRAM chips 
by 2000 
2. For the telecommunications industry, develop an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) using 
ATM digital switching system 
3. For the consumer electtonics industty, develop high-definition TV (HDTV) receiver technology by 
1993 and also develop flat panel display technology by 1997 
4. For the automobile industty, develop a battery operated passenger car by 1996 
5. For the computer industty, develop an artificial-intelligence-based computer capable of performing 
two-way voice ttanslation by 2000 
6. For the fine chemical industty, develop one or two new antibiotic materials by 1997 
7. For the mechattonics industty, develop a computer-integrated manufacturing system (CIM) by 1996, 
and also develop an intelligent manufacmring system (IMS) by 2000 
Base Technology Development Projects 
1. In the new material area, acquire technologies related to electtonics, information and energy 
2. In the machinery area, acquire technologies related to ttansportation, machinery and critical parts 
and components 
3. In the bioengineering area, acquire base technologies related to functional biomaterials 
4. In the enviroiunental area, acquire base technologies related to envfronmental conttol and 
preservation 
5. In the energy area, acquire base technologies related to highly efficient, clean energy systems that 
will affect the industtial stmcture 
6. In the atomic power area, acquire base technologies related to the next generation nuclear reactor 
that will be used for the supply of stable energy, replacing fossil materials 
7. In the human engineering area, acquire "high touch" technologies that will enhance the quality of life 
in post-industtial society 
Source: Yu (1995, p. 93-94). 
Development Promotional Law, and the Basic Law for Oceanology Development. These laws were 
aimed at tteating target technologies differently from others m terms of fiscal and fmancial support. 
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Table 5.6 Major Contents of Seven Major Promotional Laws in Korea 
Major contents 
(Year of enactment) 
Machi-
nery 
Elec-
tronics 
Industry 
Fabric Iron &, 
steel 
Non-
ferrous 
metal 
Petro-
chemi-
cal 
Ship 
build 
ing 
1967 1969 1979 1970 1971 1970 1967 
Promotion 
Regulation of incorporation (entry) 
Regulation of facilities 
Setting up facility standards 
Approval and coordination of expansion 
Encouraging use of domestic facilities 
Production regulations 
Regulation of materials imports 
Production standards and inspection 
Reporting and inspection 
Industrial Rationalization 
Rationalization program 
Joint R&D project 
Replacement of old facilities 
Technological Assistance 
subsidizing R&D activities 
Contents of Assistance 
Special purpose fund 
Financial assistance 
Subsidy 
Direct subsidisation 
Reducing public utility rate 
Tax preferences 
Special depreciation 
Reduction and exemption 
Special industrial complex 
Administrative assistance 
Facilitating overseas activities 
Purchase of raw materials 
Business association 
Source: Ministty of Trade and Industty (cited in Kim 1989a, p. 34). 
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reduce the cost of foreign technology imports and of industry's in-housc R&D work 
by allowing reduced tariffs on the import of R&D equipment. Further, the 
Engineering Services Promotion Law of 1973 was devoted to promoting the 
development of local engineering capabiHties by protecting local markets, as well as 
by enforcing performance standards on local engineering firms. The National 
Technical Qualification Law of 1973 promoted the status of professionals in technical 
fields by a system of examination and certifications. The former stressed that where 
possible all local engineering projects should be given to local firms, and overseas 
firms would be given opportunities only if local firms were not capable enough. Even 
in the overseas firms' operated projects, local firms were to be given opportunities to 
participate. These policies indicated the national interest of promoting engineering 
capabilities (Kim 1989b; Yu 1995; Lee 1986b). 
In addition to this, to promote specific industries, which primarily included 
motor vehicle, ship building and electronics, several laws and other measures were 
introduced (see Table 5.6 for details). These laws provided a basis for long-term 
plans in relation to market, production and technology development. To promote the 
electronics industry, for example, the following measures were taken: the Electronics 
Industry Promotion Law was enacted in 1969; an industrial estate for the production 
of semi-conductors and computers was established and the Electronics and 
Telecommunication Research Institute was set up to promote technology (Amsden 
1989; Lee 1986b). 
The R&D investments enabled the chaebol to develop some new products and 
to reduce their dependence on OEM and licensing in some areas. More importantly, 
in-house R&D enabled some firms to negotiate strategic partnerships on a more equal 
footing with overseas leaders of technology. Although the chaebol were able to 
narrow the gap between themselves and the market leaders through a painstaking, 
incremental process which accelerated rapidly during the 1980s, much corporate R&D 
was devoted to acquiring and assimilating foreign technology, while irmovation was 
concemed with continuous improvements to processes and product designs, rather 
than the generation of radical new products through basic research (Hobday 1995). 
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(e) Measures for Promoting Marketing Networks 
As a late industrializing country, it was necessary to strengthen Korea's marketing 
networks, especially with developed countries. The OEM system, in which firms 
produce a finished product to the precise specification of a foreign firm, enabled 
Korean firms to export large volumes of goods under foreign brand names and use 
foreign firms' distribution channels. To promote marketing, especially to create brand 
awareness abroad, chaebol themselves advertised widely in most of their main 
markets. Building up connections with foreign buyers was fiirther enhanced by the 
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation set up in 1962, and was expanded to about one 
hundred intemational trade centres by the early 1980s, through the initiation of 
contacts, providing product samples and company information (Hobday 1995; Lall 
1996). 
5.5 Conclusion 
South Korea was not different from a typical developing country, where the economy 
was primarily based on subsistence agriculture, until it began its industrialization 
process in the late 1950s. With meagre resources and a limited industrial base, the 
stmctural transformation was undertaken with careful planning, which always aimed 
to achieve industrial self-sufficiency. 
The incidence of industrial policies examined in this chapter suggests two 
important points that may be valuable for assessing the potential outcome and impact 
of industrial policies. Firstly, in its efforts towards overcoming supposed market 
deficiencies, the Govemment of Korea applied diverse measures. The measures 
applied in Korea, though having some affinities with those of Japan, were however 
different from that of most other countries at similar level of development. Policy 
measures - such as the measures undertaken for building an oligopolistic industrial 
stmcture, for promoting an optimum production scale, for promoting an indigenous 
technological capability, for maximizing potential benefits of foreign direct 
investment and technology transfer and for providing finance - are in many respects 
not only unique to Korea but also illustrate how different social, economic and 
political circumstances led the Govemment of Korea to apply a variety of measures. 
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Secondly, another related, and important point provided by the discussion of 
the incidence of industrial policies in Korea is that the extent, form and the intensity 
of policy applications depend on country-specific factors, and also on the changing 
social, economic, political and technological developments faced by the economy, in 
addition to the nature of the market deficiency. The examination of the incidence of 
industrial poHcies in Korea demonstrates how many of the country-specific factors, 
for example historical factors such as the Japanese occupation, American aid and 
many other factors such as the efficient bureaucracy, the autonomy in decision 
making, the resilient private sector, clearly outlined objectives and strict policy 
guideHnes, have been influential in industrial sector development. 
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6. Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies in Malaysia, 
1960-1997 
6,1 Introduction 
By the time Malaysia gained independence in 1957, it had inherited a dualistic 
economy - an externally oriented primary production sector centred on the mines and 
plantations which mainly used foreign capital, and a subsistence economy. Like other 
developing countries, it was largely dependent on a limited range of exports, primarily 
mbber and tin. There was virtually no industrial development, except for a few 
processing industries. However, due to the relative prosperity generated by the 
resource economy, there was not much interest in developing the industrial sector, 
even after independence, except the incentives provided under the Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance of 1958 and the measures introduced by the Federal Industrial 
Development Authority which was set up in 1965, 
When the level of export income obtained through primary exports began to 
deteriorate by the mid 1960s, Malaysia realised that relying on that income was no 
longer viable. Moreover, there was strong pressure from the local community for 
govemment intervention in economic activities, due to the predominance and growing 
importance of the Chinese community.' As part of a strategy to address these pressing 
needs, Malaysia took an interest in promoting manufacturing industries by the late 
1960s (Bowie 1994), The initiative for increasing the contribution of industrial 
production became clearly evident after 1971, with the introduction of the New 
Economic Policies (NEP). 
Against this background, as a late industrializing country, the industrial as well 
as economic progress achieved by Malaysia over the past few decades has again been 
quite remarkable. As can be seen from Table 6.1, the manufacturing sector, both in 
Malaysia has three main ethnic communities: indigenous bumiputeras, immigrant Chinese and 
Indians, and they represent 48, 36, and 9 per cent of total population respectively, by the early 1990 
(Bowie 1994). 
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terms of value-added and exports has made a significant contribution to the economy 
of Malaysia. As the data indicate (column 5), manufactiiring sector value-added as a 
percentage of GDP was relatively small in comparison with the figure for the 
agricultural sector in 1960. Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector has been able to 
significantly increase its share over the past few decades. Despite a sluggish growth 
record in early to mid 1980s, the value-added contribution of the manufacturing sector 
surpassed that of the agriculture sector by the early 1990s.^ The manufacturing sector 
has also witnessed a success in term of exports. As the data in Table 6.1 (column 7) 
illustrate, manufacturing sector exports accounted for nearly 5 per cent of merchandise 
exports in 1965. With continuous progress, manufacturing exports accounted for 
nearly 75 per cent of merchandise exports in 1995, indicating a nearly fifteen-fold 
increase in their share over three decades. 
Table 6.1 Economic Indicators of Malaysia, 1960-1995 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
GNP per 
Capita 
($US,1987) 
-
967 
1215 
1627 
1757 
2199 
2937 
GDP 
(% growtii)* 
-
4.5 
6.0 
6.2 
3.7 
6.5 
7.0 
Manufacturing 
Value-Added 
(% growth)* 
-
8.9 
8.0 
4.2 
12.0 
10.4 
Manufacturing 
Value-Added 
(% GDP) 
7.7 
9.1 
11.9 
16.9 
20.6 
18.5 
25.7 
32.5 
Agriculture 
Value-Added 
(% GDP) 
33.3 
27.9 
28.5 
28.0 
21.9 
19.3 
18.7 
13.0 
Manufacturing 
Exports 
(% mercii.exp) 
5.2 
6.5 
17.3 
18.8 
27.2 
53.8 
74.7 
Manufacturing 
Exports 
(% growth)* 
-
6.2 
5.6 
6.4 
7.3 
12.1 
11.6 
Notes: - data not available. 
* Five Year Average (data are in constant US$, 1987 prices). 
Source: World Tables, World Bank, ANU. 
Similarly, its recent economic growth record has enabled Malaysia to be 
recognized as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. As the figures in 
Table 6.1 (column 3) suggest, in general Malaysia has maintained positive and 
satisfactory economic growth during the last three decades. Except for sluggish 
The sluggish manufacturing growth in the mid 1980s has been atttibuted to the global recession, the 
crash of the electtonics industry due to global overcapacity, and the appreciation of the ringgit. 
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growth records evident in the mid 1980s, overall, its rate of economic growth is stable 
and remained around 6 per cent. Equally impressive results are also reported in terms 
of per capita income. As the data in Table 6.1 indicate GNP per capita was US$ 967 
in 1970, in 1987 prices. It had recorded more than a three-fold increase by 1995. All 
in all, all the performance indicators in Table 6.1 show very strong performances since 
the late 1980s. 
Several studies (Fong 1989; Brown 1993; Petri 1993; Crouch 1994; Ahmad 
1990) have attributed this overall economic and industrial progress to a combination 
of factors, including: (a) the government's commitment and development policies, 
particularly industrial poHcies; (b) overall stability of its socio political environment -
continuity in govemment policies despite the changes in political leadership; (c) vast 
natural resources and (d) favourable extemal demand for manufactured exports. 
Like the previous chapter, the main objective of this chapter is to explore the 
ways in which the govemment assisted in industrial promotion in the economy of 
Malaysia over the period 1960-1997. The practical experiences of industrial poHcy 
applications in Malaysia covered in this chapter will provide valuable insights as to 
how and why diverse policy instmments and policy initiatives were applied in 
practice, in their efforts towards improving economic outcomes in areas where market 
deficiencies which perceived as occurring. This chapter is organized in the following 
manner. Section 6.2 includes a brief review of various country-specific factors, such 
as the objectives of industrial policies, historical factors and industrial stmcture, that 
could possibly influence the outcome of industrial poHcies. Section 6.3 reviews major 
poHcy changes over the period 1960-1997. Section 6.4 outlines the diverse policy 
instmments applied in Malaysia, under two subheadings: import substitution related 
measures, and export promotion and growth related measures. 
6.2 Diverse Country-Specific Factors 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the situations where govemment can assist in improving 
the economic outcomes may vary from country to country, depending on the nature of 
deviations from the market paradigm. The form and extent of govemment assistance 
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may further depend on certain country-specific characteristics. As in Chapter 5, some 
of the important country-specific factors that could have impact on industrial policy 
outcomes will be briefly reviewed in the following section. 
6.2.1 Objectives of Industrial Policies 
Prior to the introduction of the New Economic Policies (NEP), addressing domestic 
market needs was the main driving force behind industrial growth in Malaysia. 
Beginning with the NEP and the First Outiine Perspective Plan (OPPl) in 1971, 
policy makers were mainly concemed with redressing social imbalances (alleviating 
poverty), and removing ethnic identification of an economy, specifically with 
stimulating Malay {bumiputera) participation and increasing their share in terms of 
income, employment, and ownership.^ The NEP's explicit objective of wealth 
redistribution continued to be more important than the economic growth objective 
even in Malaysia's Five Year Development Plans - until the Third Five Year 
Development Plan (1976-80). Under the guideHnes of the NEP, manufacturing 
industries were considered as major sources of (i) national economic growth; (ii) 
employment growth; (iii) bumiputera participation; and (iv) regional growth and 
balance (Taylor and Ward 1994b; Islam and Chowdhury 1997). 
This strong presence of the NEP tended to diminish somewhat after the 
recommendations of the government's two commissioned studies, namely the 
Malaysian hidustrial Policy Studies and the hidustrial Master Plan (IMP). These 
studies evaluated the achievement of the NEP and the existing tax and tariff incentives 
(Edwards 1992b). Along with these recommendations and with political change in 
1981, Malaysia established a firm commitment to economic growth. The Industrial 
Master Plan (IMP), introduced for the period of 1986-95, can be considered as a major 
turning point in the industrial promotion process in Malaysia, since it focused on 
forming govemment policies towards the development of the manufacturing sector 
with more specific objectives. Measures specified by the IMP included: promoting 
active investment through incentives; stimulating foreign investment; promoting 
^ New Economic Policies were clearly outlined in the Second (1971-75) and the Third (1976-80) Five 
Year Development Plans. 
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export led industrialisation with emphasis on employment; promoting high value-
added product mix and foreign exchange savings; promoting resource based 
industries; strategic utilisation of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and Licensed 
Manufacturing Warehouses (LMWs); promoting small scale industries; dispersal of 
manufacturing firms to less developed areas; and promoting bumiputera participation 
(UNDP 1985). 
The IMP has been further responsible for initiating several other major 
changes in relation to industrial poHcies. For the first time in its industriaHzation 
process, Malaysia placed an emphasis on developing specific manufacturing sub-
sectors which included both resource and non-resource based sectors. Departing from 
the limited objective of encouraging industrial sectors for fulfilling domestic market 
needs, under the IMP industrial policy instmments have been focused on promoting 
industrial linkages, exports and human resources. Further the IMP stressed the 
significance of reviewing promoted sectors continuously, and rationalising and 
restmcturing industries which showed evidence of declining competitiveness. The 
second IMP which is planned for the next decade, in addition to the specific objectives 
of the first MP, as LaH (1996) noted, will emphasise upgrading certain critical factors 
that are required for further industrial development such as skills and fraining, 
technical support finance and quality improvement, and more targeted import 
protection (Islam and Chowdhury 1997; Brown 1993). 
The subsequently introduced National Development Policies (NDP) and the 
Second Outline Perspective Plan of 1991 (0PP2), have further stressed the importance 
of having more commitment towards economic growth and also carrying out 
industrial policies on specific guideHnes. Consequently, the govemment dropped all 
limits on minimum percentage of bumiputera participation in approved projects. 
Recognizing the shortage of Malays with relevant management and technical 
quaHfications, the NDP, in conjunction with the Fifth (1986-90) and the Sixth (1991-
95) Five Year Development Plans, stressed the importance of promoting human 
resources. The importance of technology and R&D development were stressed in the 
Action Plan for hidustrial Technology Development (APITD) introduced in 1990. 
With a view to reducing the dependence on foreign investment and technology, the 
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Seventh Five Year Development Plan (1996-2000), in addition to placing emphasise 
on technical and vocational skills training, stressed the significance of investment in 
R&D capabilities. With these policies Malaysia is aiming to become a 'developed 
nation' (vision 2020) by the year 2020 (Brown 1993; Islam and Chowdhury 1997; 
Salih et al. 1993; Lim and Nesadurai 1997). 
In summary, fulfilling domestic market needs had been the major motive of 
promoting industrial activities in Malaysia until early 1970s. The prevailing policies 
changed considerably after 1971 with the introduction of NEP, since it has placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on achieving social equity at the expense of economic 
growth. A major turning point in the industrial history of Malaysia began with the 
introduction of the IMP in the mid 1980s. Since then policies have been directed 
towards achieving more specific objectives such as: (a) increasing exports; (b) 
promoting foreign direct investment; (c) increasing value-added and (d) achieving 
economic growth. Together with these objectives, promoting human resources and 
developing technology status have been added to the policy agenda since the early 
1990s. 
6.2.2 Historical Factors 
Except for a few processing industries inherited from the colonial mle, historical 
factors were not as favourable to industrial development in Malaysia as they were in 
Korea. Under the British colonial system, though the plantation sector was 
significantly developed, the colonial govemment was reluctant to give any preference 
to domestically produced manufactured goods, predicting that such efforts would 
create unfavourable effects. These effects included reducing the import duty revenue 
and raising the domestic prices of some of the goods consumed by plantation workers, 
thereby adding upward pressure on wages and reducing the profits of the estates. 
Thus, with liftle support from the colonial govemment, at the time of the 
independence Malaysia remained an economy largely dependent on the production of 
primary commodities (Edwards 1992b). 
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Yet, at one level, the long and continuous socio-political stability enjoyed by 
Malaysia (except for the racial riots of 1969) can be viewed as one of the favourable 
factors conducive to industrial development. Maintaining such a stability was 
possible for Malaysia partly due to the increasing presence of bumiputeras in 
economic activities, an outcome of almost two decades of the NEP. The long-term 
commitment to continuing its national policies, despite changes in leadership, has 
been another contributing factor. The extensive natural resource base of the country-
has given an added advantage for industrial development. Malaysia remained the 
world's major exporter of mbber, tin and palm oil and also has become a significant 
exporter of tropical timber, petroleum and natural gas by the time it began its 
industrialization process. The income received through these exports served as a good 
foundation for spearheading rapid industrial development (Fong 1989). 
6.2.3 Decision Making Process 
As noted above, systematic efforts towards policy formulation and implementation for 
promoting industries were evident in Malaysia only after the introduction of NEP and 
the First Outline Perspective Plan (OPPl) in 1971. These efforts were fiirther 
strengthened by the subsequently introduced IMP in 1986 and the NDP in 1991, along 
with successive Five Year Development Plans. In this endeavour the Ministry of 
Intemational Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) played a 
quite significant role, whilst the Federal Industrial Development Authority, formed in 
1965, was supportive in the process of coordinating the industrial policies. 
Despite continuous govemment efforts and a long-term commitment to 
industrial development, carrying out the decision making processes effectively has 
become a difficult task for Malaysia, for several reasons. Firstly, policy makers in 
ethnically-divided Malaysia was not fortunate enough to enjoy an autonomy in 
decision making like in Korea which is ethnically homogeneous. The unequal wealth 
distribution between ethnic groups has been a major concem for Malaysia for a long 
period of time. These socio-political circumstances led Malaysian policy makers to 
place priority on achieving social objectives - especially the redistribution of wealth 
and economic activities from non Malays to the Malay community - over and above 
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the economic efficiency. For example, firms seeking state support, either in the form 
of tax reHef or protection from imports, had to undertake to employ at least 30 per 
cent of Malays at ail levels. Secondly, the process of efficient and effective decision 
making was hindered by the lack of an integrated approach between institutions, and 
the lack of clear administrative guidance, in particular in terms of the performance 
standards required of fimis in retum for the benefits and support received from the 
state. 
6.2.4 Industrial Structure 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) dominate the industrial stmcture in Malaysia, 
specially in the initial stage of industrialization process. The state has actively 
participated in the production process, through the creation of new public corporations 
and the extension of the range of operations of existing ones. In particular, they were 
prominent until the mid 1980s in production activities like food processing, agro 
based, timber based and building material industries. To boost bumiputera 
participation in commercial and industrial activities, and especially to employ and 
train bumiputera for executive and management positions, concerted efforts have been 
made by the state, either through holding equity shares in the new joint ventures in 
tmst for the bumiputeras, initiating joint ventures with the private sector or buying up 
viable private companies and transferring them to private bumiputera ownership 
(Fong 1989). Direct state involvement in manufacturing activities became even more 
widespread with the launching of the heavy industry program in the early 1980s. 
Due to the lack of initiatives from the domestic private sector, and also for the 
purpose of boosting bumiputera participation, such state participation was deemed to 
be required for Malaysia. But due to the lack of experience many of the SOEs, except 
for a few such as Petronas and the National Petroleum Company, have not been able 
to show financial retums at a satisfactory level. This, coupled with the deteriorating 
macroeconomic situation in the mid 1980s, induced the govemment to gradually 
•* These activities are largely carried out by the various SOEs including Perbadanan Nasional (Pemas) 
Urban Development Authority, State Economic Development Corporations and MARA (Majlis 
Amanah Rakyat or the Council of Tmst for the People). 
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introduce privatization, listing some SOEs on the stock exchange and restmcturing the 
SOEs, while keeping some strategic industrial sectors such as automobile 
manufacturing under state ownership. With a comprehensive and broad ranging 
privatization programmes and other incentives, for example the Privatization Master 
Plan in 1991, the abolition of the development tax, the reduction in the corporation tax 
and so forth, the private sector has tended to play a more leading role since the earl}' 
1990s (Lall 1996; Islam and Chowdhury 1997; Brown 1993; Lim and Nesadurai 
1997). 
Realising the importance of private sector participation in decision making 
activities, the govemment initiated several steps such as introducing the concept of 
Malaysia Incorporated, setting up the Capital Issues Committee and the Foreign 
Investment Committee in the Economic Planning Unit, and the Malaysian Business 
Council (MBC) in the early 1990s. The primary objective of these activities was to 
stimulate private-public participation through: (a) coordinating local and foreign 
investments; (b) advising the private sector on participation in new ventures; (c) 
coordinating the industrial development strategies to achieve the objective of the NEP 
in increasing bumiputera participation in corporate activities; and (d) identifying and 
removing many of the unnecessary bureaucratic red tape hindering investments (Fong 
1989; Lall 1996; Lim and Nesadurai 1997). 
6.3 Diversity ofPolicies over the Period of 1960-1997 
Malaysia started its industriaHsation process by following import substitution 
industrialization policies (ISI). The first phase of ISI (roughly between 1957-1970) 
was continued for a longer period than in Korea.^ Most of the industries established 
during this phase were either of the assembly or packaging type and were dominated 
by local Chinese-owned firms. They were relatively capital intensive, mainly due to 
the incentives given under the Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958, which granted 
' According to Anuwar (1992) there are three major phases: import substitution (1958-68); export 
orientation (1968- 80); and export led growth with second round import substitution (1980- to date). 
This legislation authorized the Minister of Commerce and Industry to grant "pioneer status" to a 
company that convinced him that the domestic industry was not now of a scale sufficient to meet the 
requirements for continued development in Malaysia, the prospects were favourable for the further 
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pioneer status to manufacturing industries provided that those industries fulfilled 
certain conditions. 
In effect, while broadening the industrial base, the ISI helped to diversify the 
economy, to reduce excessive dependence on imported consumer goods, to utilise 
some domestic natural resources and to create employment opportunities. In 
particular, the ISI was successful in the resource-based industries such as tobacco, 
furniture, mbber products, wood products, and food and beverages (Salleh 1994). 
However, the ISI policies continued with minor reference to encouraging 
manufacturing exports. Over time, the scope for import substitution became more 
limited and it was difficult to find new opportunities for expansion mainly due to the 
relatively small domestic market. 
These circumstances made Malaysia reconsider its industrial development 
strategies. As a result, Malaysia gradually shifted its emphasis towards export 
oriented industrialization (EOI) - largely based upon labour intensive industries in the 
1970s. Of these, the electronics assembly and electrical equipment, and the 
textiles/garments industries played a significant role. For the promotion of EOI, 
pioneer status and tax reliefs, which had been granted previously, were further 
extended provided that industries satisfied a certain fixed percentage of bumiputera 
equity ownership. The establishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and State Economic 
Development Corporations - funded by the federal govemment - and the provision of 
generous incentives have added further stimulus in promoting EOI (see Table 6.2 for 
details). 
The EOI phase, begun in 1970s, has been continued placing more emphasis on 
consumer durables, intermediate inputs and capital goods. As in Korea, protection 
was also continued for the industries that served the domestic market (Lall 1996). 
Until the introduction of the IMP in the mid 1980s, trade policies, especially the 
degree of protection, were not considered important as a tool of industrial promotion, 
since they were imposed for revenue collection purposes. However, efforts have been 
development of the industry, and that it was in the public interest to encourage the industry (Bmton et 
al. 1992, p. 260). 
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made, after the introduction of IMP, to design trade policies in line with the overall 
development strategy (Brown 1993). 
Hi spite of the steady progress, the industriaHzation process began to 
experience a number of stmctural problems by the early 1980s. The continuous 
emphasis of the NEP resuHed in inefficient SOEs and accumulation of bad debts -
mainly from the bumiputera enterprises. The manufacturing sector remained 
relatively isolated from the rest of the economy, and was highly concentrated in a few 
activities such as the electronics and electrical machinery, textiles and garment 
industries. Industrial exports were largely supplied by the FTZs. In response to these 
concems, the govemment attempted to stimulate a broader based phase of industrial 
development, by establishing heavy industries. 
The heavy industries drive was mainly initiated for the purpose of accelerating 
the pace of industriaHzation, by deepening and broadening the country's industrial 
base. However, it created fiirther problems in the economy. Owing to the huge 
investments in heavy industries, Malaysia's fiscal and extemal debt increased 
dramatically. For example, the debt service ratio (extemal) rose from 4 per cent to 27 
per cent during the period between 1980-1985 (Agrawal et al., 1996, p. 4.36). This 
situation was further aggravated by a sharp fall in the intemational prices of 
Malaysia's major commodity exports (mbber and tin), resulting in a dramatic decline 
in export revenue. This fall was mainly due to the second oil crisis and the recession 
in the OECD economies. Several other factors such as the crash of the electronics 
industry due to global overcapacity, the appreciation of the ringgit and the rising unit 
cost of production further reinforced manufacturing and economic slowdown. A 
combination of these factors led to a negative GDP growth (-1.1 per cent) in 1985 for 
the first time since independence (Okamoto 1994). 
The economy recovered by the late 1980s, largely as a result of private 
investment, particularly due to foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and an overall 
increase in competitiveness following ringgit depreciation. Several extemal factors, in 
fact, contributed to this investment boom. The appreciation of the yen and rising 
production costs in Japan, rising wages and the resulting reduced competitiveness of 
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firms, and the withdrawal of preferential status from the Asian NICs, encouraged 
foreign investors to shift some of their industries to Malaysia^ (Lim and Nesadurai 
1997; Rasiah and Anuwar 1995). 
To continue this economic progress it was felt that further changes in 
development policies were required. To revitalize the economy, firstly, steps were 
taken to expand the domestic as well as foreign private sector participation, while 
reducing the direct role of the govemment in production activities. Under the 
Promotion of Investments Act in 1986, new incentive packages were introduced for 
this purpose. Within these new reforms, the state's direct role in the economy would 
be focused on a limited number of strategic activities such as investment in 
infrastmcture - mainly in building super highways, industrial estates, industrial parks 
and upgrading airport and ports, promoting human capital development and 
encouraging technological progress. Secondly, measures were taken to liberalize 
trade, especially since 1994. Under this program, tariff duties on most of the food and 
consumer good items were reduced. Along with these changes, Malaysia has recorded 
a significant economic as well as industrial progress since the mid 1980s (Brown 
1993; Islam and Chowdhury 1997; Okamoto 1994; Lim and Nesadurai 1997). 
This satisfactory economic performance has somewhat slowed down in the 
latter part of 1997 due to the adverse effects from the currency crisis, which also 
affected several other countries in the region. A combination of both intemal and 
extemal factors has been largely responsible for this situation. The successful 
economic performance and deliberate policies for attracting foreign capital inflows 
have contributed to the rapid growth of net capital inflows. Persistent current account 
deficits, and short-term borrowing together with certain extemal factors such as 
slowing down of demand for exports and losses of intemational competitiveness, have 
added further pressure worsening the situation. Along with the crisis, difficulties 
arose in managing the macroeconomic and exchange rate policy. A downtum in 
equity prices was also evident. To overcome these adverse effects the authorities 
' The Plaza Accord of 1985 ttiggered the yen appreciation. The Generalized System of Preferences 
was withdrawn in Febmary 1988. 
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Table 6.2 Incentives and Institutional Support for Promoting Industries in 
Malaysia, 1957-1997 
1957-1970 
Main Strategy - Import Substitution 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance (1958) - granted pioneer status to manufacturing industties 
Incentives: Exemption from income tax 2-5 years; tariff concessions; duty exemptions on imported 
capital equipment and machinery 
Malaysian Industtial Development Finance (1960) - provided fmance 
Malaysian Stock Exchange (1964) - promoted capital market 
Federal Industtial Development Authority (1965) - promoted and monitored manufacturing growth 
Investment Incentives Act (1968) - extended pioneer status and tax relief for industties which 
possessed certain fixed percentage of bumiputera equity ownership; offered tax holidays for firms 
which had been granted pioneer status; those established in designated development areas and 
those who incorporated a specific amount of domestic inputs into their products 
1971-1980 
Main Strategy - Promotion of Light Export Industries/Import Substitution 
Incentives: Extended pioneer status and tax relief provided that firms satisfied bumiputera equity 
ownership requirements; expenses incurred in export promotion were allowed double deduction 
from tax; firms that exported more than 20 per cent of their products were offered accelerated 
depreciation allowance; export allowance of 5 per cent of the free on board (f o.b) value of export 
sales 
New Economic Policies (1971) 
Free Trade Zone Act (1971) - empowered to designate industtial sites as Free Trade Zones 
Incentives:T?iX concessions; land at below market rates; stteamlined customs formalities; duty free 
import of raw materials and capital equipment; accelerated depreciation allowance; deduction of 
overseas promotion expenses fi-om tax; projects that involved exporting were permitted 100 per 
cent foreign ownership 
Amendment of Customs Act of (1967) - set up Licensed Manufacttu-ing Warehouses 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (1973) - promoted capital market 
Industrial Coordination Act (1975) - created a system of licenses for all new and existing frnns 
(except those employmg less than 25 fiill-time workers with capital less than $25000) required 
them to obtain approval fi-om the MITI for technology agreements involving foreign capital 
1981-1997 
Main Strategy - Export Promotion/Import Substitution (heavy industries) 
Incentives: Expanded mcentives to foreign mvestors allowing 100 per cent equity ownership if 
exporting 80 per cent of products; 79 per cent equity ownership if exportuig between 51-79 per 
cent of products; exemption of income tax for high technology companies for five years (provided 
that they spend at least 1 per cent of gross sales for R&D expendittire on annual basis and the 
percentage of science and technical graduates to total work force were at least 7 per cent), tax 
exemption for five years for pioneer industties; investtnent tax allowance of 60 per cent; tax 
exemption for 10 years or investtnent tax allowance of 100 per cent for 5 years for projects with 
heavy capital investtnent and high technology which generated extensive linkages; double 
deduction for expenses incurred in promoting exports (supply office samples abroad, export 
market research, preperation offenders for supply of goods overseas, cost of maintaining sales 
offices overseas), research and development investment and ttaining expenses; mitiated an export 
credit refinancing scheme to provide finance for exporters at preferential rates of interest; an export 
allowance of 5 per cent based on the FOB value of export sales; double deduction of export credit 
insurance premiums to encourage exporters to penettate into non-ttaditional markets; indusfrial 
building allowance, which allowed companies to obtain 10 per cent initial allowance, an annual 
allowance of 2 per cent for buildings used as warehouses, as bulk storage installations for stormg 
goods for export, for purposes of approved research, and industtial ttaining 
Heavy Industty Corporation of Malaysia (1981) - planed, invested and managed projects in the 
field of heavy industties (continued) 
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Standards and industtial Research Institute of Malaysia (1984) - developed industtial linkages; 
inttoduced ISO 9u00, quality certification programme of the Intemational Organization for 
Standardization 
New Investment Fund (1985) - encouraged domestic private investment 
Industtial Master Plan (1986) 
Promotion of Investment Act (1986) 
Malaysian Institute for Microelectronics Systems (1986) - developed local capabilities in micro 
electtonics 
Intensification of Research in Priority Areas Program (1986) - stimulated RicD in 
microelecttonics, biotechnology, information and communications, and advanced materials 
National Science and Technology Policy (1986) - promoted technology 
Relaxed the ceilings of Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) and equity requirements (1985-86) -
relaxed ICA requirements from shareholders ftmds of M$ 1 million or a full-time workforce in 
excess of 50 persons in 1985 to M$ 2.5 milhon or a full-time work force in excess of 75 persons; 
all new foreign investment between 1986-1990, were exempted from the bumiputera equity 
requirements 
Amended Investment Incentives Act of (1968 (1986) - offered incentives to FTZ firms to stimulate 
them to purchase their parts and components locally; developed the technical capability of local 
vendors 
Industtial Adjustment Fund (1987) - encouraged domestic private investment 
Promote SMEs (1989) - automatic pioneer status; an increase in reinvestment allowance from 40 
to 50 per cent; flill exemption of import duty and surtax on raw materials, components and 
machinery; double deduction on cost of ttaining with the approved institutions 
Action Plan for Industtial Technology Development (1990) - improved R&D infrastmcture 
Industtial Technical Assistance Fund (1990) - modernised and enhanced technical capacity of 
SMEs funds provided to carry out feasibility study, product development and design, quality and 
productivity, and market development 
Promoted subconttacting (1991-92) - inttoduced a 30 per cent local sourcing requirements. Anchor 
company Program - offered assistance companies involving electtic/electtonics activities 
Set up technology parks - promoted R&D 
Set up ceramic park - developed ceramic industry 
National Development Policies (1991) - promoted human resources and technology infrastmcture 
Second Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000) - emphasized National Development Policies while 
providing guidelines for industtial policies 
Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (1992) - commercialised research results of 
universities and research institutions and developed indigenous technology 
Malaysia Industiy Govemment Group of High Technology - identified new markets, business and 
investment opportunities 
Human Resource Development Act (1993) - promoted human resources ; HRD Fund (firms 
employ 50 or more are required to conttibute 1 per cent of their pay roU); for firms whose 
employment size between 10-49 were provided 200 per cent subsidy for approved expenses, 
inttoduced Integrated Action Plan for HRD 
Liberalization of Trade (1994) - tariff duties of food and consumer good items were reduced 
Capital Market Liberalization (1995) - raised efficiency and competitiveness of financial and 
capital markets 
Second Indusfrial Master Plan (1996) - sttessed human resources, industtial deepening, targeting 
high tech and capital intensive products 
Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Futtires Exchange (1996) - improved financial activities 
Sources: Fong (1989); Taylor and Ward (1994); Lim and Nesadurai (1997); Islam and Chowdhury 
(1997); Rasiah and Anuwar (1995); Rasiah (1995); Kanapathy (1994). 
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intervened in exchange rate market, opted to allow the nnggit to depreciate and 
announced an emergency economic package in early December 1997, includiiig 
further expenditure cuts and a slowing down of infrastmcture spending. Though, 
Malaysia appears to be lightly touched by this crisis than the other economies in the 
region, these developments are beyond the scope of present study. 
6.4 Diverse Policy Instruments 
The diversity of poHcies implemented in Malaysia, reviewed above, m tum implies 
that a variety of policy instmments have been appHed in Malaysia for the purpose of 
overcoming market deficiencies. While the specific content of the policy packages 
used for industrial promotion was in many respects similar to that found in other 
countries, many of these instmments used were biased towards achieving country 
specific requirements such as boosting bumiputera participation. The extent, form 
and rationale for using these various instmments in the context of Malaysia will be 
discussed under two subheadings as import substitution related measures and export 
promotion and growth-related measures. It is important to note that organizing the 
measures adopted for industrial promotion under these two categories becomes 
difficult, due to the simultaneous application of these measures in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, measures that have been taken towards fiilfilling financial needs and 
promoting small and medium scale industries are discussed under the import 
substitution heading, since those measures have been largely directed towards 
stimulating bumiputera participation. 
6.4.1 Import Substitution Related Measures 
Fulfilling domestic market needs has been a major motive of promoting industries in 
Malaysia until 1970. hidustries begun during the first phase of ISI have been largely 
promoted through the incentives given under the Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 
1958,^  which granted pioneer status to manufacturing industries provided that those 
^ "This legislation authorized the Minister of Commerce and Industry to grant" pioneer stattis" to a 
company that convinced him that the domestic industry was not now of a scale sufficient to meet the 
requirements for continued development in Malaysia, the prospects were favourable for the further 
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industries fulfilled certain conditions. Primarily it allowed exemption from income 
tax for a period of 2-5 years. The length of the tax holidays was dependent upon the 
amount of initial fixed capital expenditure. For example, projects which were over 
$250,000 were granted five-year tax holidays. The subsequently introduced 
Investment Incentives Act of 1968 further extended tax holidays to firms that had been 
granted pioneer status. Also under this Act establishments which did not qualify for 
pioneer status were granted tax credits. Additional incentives in the form of tax 
holidays were also granted to firms which were estabHshed in designated development 
areas and to those incorporating a specific amount of domestic inputs into their 
products (Fong 1989). 
These generous incentives played a significant role in attracting FDI. 
Stimulated by incentives, most of the initial foreign investments to Malaysia were 
attracted for defensive reasons. This means that firms which had been exporting to 
Malaysia were interested in setting up firms for the purpose of protecting their market 
share. In particular, the foreign direct investment that was attracted in the area of 
tyres, pharmaceuticals, electronics, fertilisers and the chemical and petroleum 
industries largely came for this reason (Kanapathy 1984). 
The measures applied by Malaysia for its initial ISI phase, however, were 
different from those of Korea in a number of respects. Firstiy, Malaysia relied less on 
protective measures for promoting import substituting industries. As Bmton et al. 
(1992) and Okamoto (1994) noted, Malaysia has maintained a modest level of 
protection compared to countries at a similar level of development. Maintaining such 
a modest level of protection was possible for Malaysia because it enjoyed a strong and 
favourable balance of payments position. Secondly, in its initial phase of ISI, not 
much enthusiasm was evident for promoting products for export markets. Partly, lack 
of policy initiatives were responsible for this outcome since almost all import-
substituting industries were bound by export restriction clauses in their initial stages 
(Kanaphathy 1984). The ethnic tensions that existed between the Malay govemment 
and the Chinese business sector may also have held back concerted efforts to promote 
development of the industry, and that it was in the public interest to encourage the industry" (Bmton et 
al. 1992, p. 260). 
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the local private sector in more complex activities (Lall 1996). In due course, the 
scope for import substitution became more limited and it was difficult to find new 
opportunities for expansion, mainly due to the relatively small domestic market. 
Though the ISI policy continued afterwards, during the 1970s policy emphasis 
was more biased towards export oriented industrialization. However, ISI policies 
became prominent again in the early 1980s, with the emphasis on heavy industries and 
on certain strategic industries. This latter phase was somewhat different from the 
earHer phase of ISI because, contrary to former policies, policy makers placed more 
emphasis on encouraging industries to produce for both domestic and export markets. 
(a) Measures for Promoting Heavy Industries and Industrial Targeting 
Fears of increasing protectionism in Westem markets, rising labour costs, lack of 
industrial linkages and integration experienced in the operation of both ISI and EOI 
strategies in previous periods, and the necessity of building up of her own industrial 
elites and industrial culture, led Malaysia to reconsider its prevaiHng industrial 
strategy. Consequently, Malaysia made steps to expand its industrial stmcture by 
initiating heavy industry policy in the 1980s. To carry out all the activities relating to 
the heavy industry drive, including planning and investment, the Heavy Industries 
Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) was set up in 1981, under the direct supervision of 
the Prime Minister. Though some of the heavy industries were owned by foreign 
firms, the majority were under the control of the state, mainly due to the lack of 
response from the private sector since such projects involved high costs, and risks and 
long gestation periods (Lall 1996). As in Korea, most of these industries were capital 
intensive and emphasis was also placed on developing capital and producer goods. 
By initiating heavy industries the govemment aimed to achieve a number of 
objectives: (a) accelerating the pace of industriaHsation, by deepening and broadening 
the country's industrial base; (b) redistributing national income; (c) increasing the 
utilisation of natural resources; (d) enhancing technological capability by 
Under the HICOM, cement, sponge iron, steel, pulp and paper and pettochemical industtial projects 
have been established. 
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collaborating with foreign firms and by investing in local R&D and (e) developing 
inter-industry linkages, ft was expected that HICOM would prim^arily concentrate on 
upstream manufacturing activities, thus providing an industrial base while allowing 
the private sector to take an initiative in setting up downstream industries (Lall 1996). 
HICOM mainly undertook two strategies in promoting heavy industries: joint 
ventures with foreign partners and protection. Due to the lack of industrial experience 
and as a way of enhancing technology, including production processes and product 
development, and of training local personnel at the managerial, engineering, 
supervisory and technical level, a series of joint ventures were initiated by HICOM. 
These involved with foreign partners such as Honda, Suzuki, Yamaha and Mitsubishi 
in a number of fields including iron and steel, cement, automobiles and small intemal 
combustion engines. A number of energy refining and utilising projects, an ammonia-
urea fertiliser project and production facilities for the processing of natural gas were 
also initiated under the heavy industries policy (Bowie 1994). 
Protective measures were used as another key policy instmment for promoting 
heavy industries. In general, though Malaysia had maintained a relatively low level of 
protection previously, the degree of protection was raised significantly for these 
industries. For example the govemment imposed a total ban on the import of steel 
bars in 1984, the tariff on imported cement was raised up to 50 per cent of the 
imported value and the import duty on completely built motor vehicles was raised 
from 90 per cent to 100 per cent in 1984 (Anuwar 1989, p. 306). Apart from that, in 
order to produce at their maximum capacity, the govemment also provided export 
subsidies (for example for the Proton car project) to these industries (Okamoto 1994). 
Despite the measures adopted for stimulating exports, only the automobile industry 
showed significant progress in terms of exports. 
Against this background, the IMP introduced significant changes in the 
industrial development process of Malaysia. The MP, sought to encourage the 
private sector by indicating the strategic direction of industry policy and by inducing 
potential investors through administrative guidance and incentives. Hi addition, 
industrial planning was refocussed from a largely market-oriented approach to a 
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substantially target-oriented approach. As an initial step, the IMP emphasised 12 key 
industrial sub-sectors for industrial expansion, comprising seven resource based 
industries in which Malaysia enjoyed comparative advantage and five other non-
resource based industries (see Table 6.3 for details). The IMP also identified a 
number of priority products and product groups for development and export 
promotion and rationalisation. Hidustries which interrelated with each other, and had 
Hnkages with other sectors of the national economy such as the agriculture, mining 
and service sectors, were considered as priority industries under this process. In 
particular, three categories were identified as potential products to be developed, 
namely: (a) those having potential comparative advantages and thus requiring fiirther 
support from the govemment with respect to technology, manpower, new investment 
and infrastmcture; (b) those considered essential for the national economy but 
currently suffering from inefficiency and non-competitiveness and thus requiring 
modemization and rationalization; and (c) those to be promoted as export oriented 
products (UNDP, 1985, p.26). This industrial targeting process was further extended 
with the introduction of Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development in 1990. 
Accordingly, six industries were identified as strategic industries for further 
development (Rasiah and Anuwar 1995; Brown 1993). 
Table 6.3 Targeted/Strategic Industries in Malaysia 
Period 
Industrial Master Plan 1986 
Action Plan for Industrial Technology 
Development (APITD) 1990 
Industries 
Resource Based 
Rubber Products, Palm Oil Products, Food 
Processing, Wood Based Industries, 
Chemicals and Petrochemical, Non Ferrous 
Metal, Non Metallic Mineral 
Non-Resource Based 
Electronics and Electrical Equipments, 
Transport Equipments, Machinery and 
Engineering Products, Ferrous Metal 
Products, Textiles and Apparel 
Information Technology, Electronics, 
Biotechnology, Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology, Advanced Materials 
Technology, Energy 
Source: UNDP (1985); Rasiah and Anuwar (1995). 
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Except for specifying targeted industries in its planning process, and providing 
tax and fmancial incentives, the intensive strategies such as promoting competition 
among strategic industries, the use of administrative guidance and requiring strong 
performance standards that applied in Korea are hardly evident in Malaysia. 
Performance of heavy industries was not up to expectations. Many experienced huge 
losses. Mismanagement, lack of industrial experience and unfavourable world 
economic conditions were largely responsible for this outcome. To impro\e the 
situation, therefore, by the late 1980s, the govemment gradually abandoned the role of 
state management, while encouraging private, foreign and non-Malay participation. 
Measures were also taken in rationalising certain industries such as the motor vehicle 
(Proton), steel manufacturing and the palm oil industry, which suffered from excess 
capacity (Fong 1989).^° 
(b) Measures for Fulfilling Financial Needs 
The Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF), the Bank Bumiputera and the 
Development Bank of Malaysia played an important role in providing finance. The 
former assisted through financing viable new industrial projects and the latter two 
through helping to mobilize mral savings and by supplying loans and capital to 
potential Malay entrepreneurs. In addition to that, to cover huge public investment in 
heavy industries, Malaysia relied heavily on extemal sources of finance, as did Korea. 
Despite the efforts of these institutions and the domination of the commercial banking 
sector by two state-owned companies, the domestic financial system played a 
relatively minor role in Malaysia compared to Korea. The subservient role of the 
domestic financial sector may perhaps be attributed to the relative importance of other 
financial avenues in the economy such as massive FDI flows, the development of the 
capital market, and the private sector's preference for financing their investment 
through retained eamings and equity (Agrawal et al. 1996; Brown 1993). 
'" IMP suggested that Proton should be given priority while rationalizing the other heavy industties. 
Under this program it was expected to provide support for producing a medium range passenger car for 
Proton and asking other assemblers to produce other range of vehicles thus limiting production to 
handful of producers each specialising on specific range. 
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Apart from the FDI flows, the next most important source of finance in 
Malaysia was the capital market Since the 1960s Malaysia had paid special attention 
to promoting capital markets by forming the Malaysian Stock Exchange, initially with 
a trading floor in Singapore and, in 1964, with a trading floor in Kuala Lumpur 
(Brown 1993)." Until the early 1980s, the role of capital market was minor, due to 
the relatively erratic capital fomiation and excessive speculation. With continuous 
development of the regulatory framework, however, the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE), had achieved intemational status as the world's thirteenth most 
highly capitalized market with a total capitalization close to US$ 200 billion by the 
early 1990s (Lim and Nesadurai 1997). Through a series of reforms, such as 
improving the trading system, creating a unified securities commission, and 
introducing legislation to estabHsh a financial futures and options exchange, 
continuing attempts were made to improve the activities of the capital market. More 
importantly, to address the needs of SMEs, a second board was added to the KLSE in 
1988. Particularly after the Sixth Five Year Development Plan (1991-95), financial 
policy aimed to increase the operations of the capital market, encompassing 
developments in the equity and debt markets and the futures and options exchanges. 
Financial activities were fiirther strengthened by the launching of the Kuala Lumpur 
Options and Financial Futures Exchange (KLOFFE) in early 1996. 
{c) Measures for Promoting Small and Medium Scale Enterprises 
In seeking to accelerate the industrial path of Malaysia, the NDP recognized that it 
was essential to promote small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as a means of 
reducing the dependence on multinationals. The government's overall objective in 
promoting these enterprises was and still is to develop local entrepreneurship, to 
create productive employment, and to increase the productivity and incomes of small 
entrepreneurs, hi particular, through these activities it was expected to increase Malay 
participation in the economy. For these purposes, food processing, wood based 
products, light engineering, plastics and ceramics were identified as potential sectors 
(Fong 1989; Islam and Chowdhury 1997). 
" In 1973, the Exchange was split into the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore. 
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Promotion of the SMEs was considered to be necessary for promoting inter-
industry Hnkages between exports and domestic sectors, to build a more integrated 
and sound industrial stmcture (Kanapathy 1994). In addition to the vendor, 
subcontracting and anchor programmes that will be discussed later, SMEs were 
encouraged through training, advisory and consultancy and financial ser\ices provided 
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by various agencies. To facilitate industrial support facilities and to integrate SMEs 
with large scale enterprises, steps were undertaken in the context of overall industrial 
estate planning through the location of SMEs within the existing industrial estates 
(Fong 1989). Financing, another important tool in promoting SMEs, has also been 
made available to these industries under preferential terms and conditions. In this 
respect, for example, the Credit Guarantee Corporation, initiated in 1975, encouraged 
commercial banks to provide more loans to SMEs, in addition to its primary task of 
providing guaranteed cover for credit facilities made available by commercial banks 
for financing their capital requirements. To modernise and enhance the technological 
capability of SMEs, another major step was made in 1990, by establishing the 
hidustrial Technical Assistance Fund (ITAF). Under this initiative, four programmes 
were introduced, to provide support for feasibility studies, product development and 
design, productivity and market development. Grants provided under this scheme met 
the 50 per cent of the costs for these activities. However, priority was given to SMEs 
that were promoted under the Promotion of Investment Act of 1986 (Kassim 1995). 
Further, SMEs were allowed to have tax free holidays and investment tax credits 
while encouraging them to participate in exports and industrial fairs (Rasiah and 
Anuwar 1995). 
Hi spite of these efforts, the SME sector plays a relatively minor role in the 
economy by the eariy 1990. A bias in incentives towards greater capital intensity and 
the overwhelming attention paid to equity and bumiputera participation have been 
partly responsible for the lack of progress in the SME sector. To overcome some of 
these weaknesses, the original incentive system was reoriented to remove capital 
'^  Several agencies such, the Rural Industry Development Authority (later renamed as the Council of 
Tmst for Indigenous People or MARA), the NPC, and the Ministry of National and Rural 
Development, played a significant role for providing services to SMEs. 
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biases by amending the Investment Incentives Act of 1968. Accordingly a tax free 
holiday v/as made independent of the quantum of investment, the nature of the product 
and the location of the firm. And the export level became the major determinant of 
the duration of the tax free holiday. Along with these changes, tax incentives, 
including the investment tax credit and the accelerated depreciation allowances 
initiated with the 1989 Budget, were further extended to SMEs. Further, in 
govemment procurement SMEs were given preferential treatment (Kanapathy 1994). 
Providing these generous incentives, though Malaysia was able to attract a small 
number of domestic firms into new industries such as telecommunication, the overall 
contribution of these firms in terms of exports, technology and R&D still remains at 
low level. 
6.4.2 Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
ReaHsing some of the limitations of its initial ISI phase, Malaysia has made 
considerable efforts towards promoting export oriented industries since the early 
1970s. Starting with light manufacturing industries, Malaysia has gradually entered 
into the production of high value-added and technology intensive products. With a 
view to promoting exports, Malaysia offered generous incentives, encouraged foreign 
direct investment through establishing FTZs and extended assistance through various 
institutional mechanisms. To maintain sustainable industrial and economic growth, 
further attempts such as promoting technology, R&D, human resources and industrial 
stmcture have also been made. 
{a) Measures for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment 
It is believed that foreign direct investment (FDI), by providing capital resources to 
finance investment activities, transferring technological know-how and helping to 
penetrate overseas markets, plays an important role in developing countries. In 
addition to these common benefits, FDI was encouraged in Malaysia for two other 
basic reasons. First, Malaysian policy makers thought that FDI would lead to the 
establishment of large-scale firms. Secondly, given their favourable historical 
experience of FDI, in particular the contributions made by the British through trading 
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and financial companies to the continuity to the economy, policy makers were 
optimistic about the role of foreign investment in Malaysia. Coupled with these 
reasons, the fact thai there was less participation of Malays than of Chinese in 
manufacturing activities made the promotion of FDI appealing for political and 
economic reasons (Bmton et al. 1992). 
To maximize these benefits, Malaysia like other developing countries, 
encouraged FDI from the outset of its industrialization process. Two factors, (a) 
liberal poHcies and (b) generous incentive packages and privileges, facilitated through 
the estabHshment of FTZs, industrial estates and Licensed Manufacturing Warehouses 
(LMWs), largely influenced the flow of FDI into the economy of Malaysia. 
Malaysia largely encouraged FDI through liberal policies until the early 1970s. 
After the NEP in 1971, however, a certain mles in relation to foreign equity ownership 
was stressed for industrial projects that were substantially dependent on the domestic 
market and for projects involving the extraction and primary processing of non-
renewable domestic resources. Nevertheless, projects that involved manufacturing for 
export market were permitted to have 100 per cent foreign ownership. 
The ownership restmcturing process continued fiirther with govemment 
sponsored takeovers of foreign companies and also with the enactment of the 
Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA) of 1975. This Act required manufacturers to 
obtain operating licenses and made the issuing of licenses dependent on the firm 
meeting ownership quotas. Accordingly, aH new and existing firms (except those 
employing less than 25 full-time workers and with capital less than $25000) were 
required to obtain approval from MITI for technology agreements involving foreign 
capital (Brown 1993). Relaxing some of these requirements by the mid 1980s, 
however, the govemment actively supported foreign participation as the principle 
vehicle for rapidly expanding capital and technology intensive industries. To provide 
a further boost to FDI, a variety of measures were introduced. These mainly included: 
(a) introducing laws to limit the ability of national labour unions to press for higher 
wages and improved employee working conditions; (b) relaxing domestic equity 
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requirements, and mles containing the employment of expatriate employees (Bowie 
1994). 
These measures were further complemented by the Promotion of Investment 
Act of 1986. This Act expanded the incentives available to foreign investors, and in 
particular it allowed more flexibility on the part of authorities to approve higher 
foreign equity participation (Lall 1996). For example, under the Promotion of 
Investment Act of 1986, foreign investors were allowed to hold up to 100 per cent 
equity in a firm if the lafter exported 80 per cent or more of its production. Foreign 
equity ownership up to 79 per cent was allowed if the firm's exports were between 51 
per cent and 79 per cent, depending on factors such as the level of technology, spin off 
effects, size of the investment, location, value-added and the utilisation of locally 
produced raw materials and components (Anuwar 1992). Later, these incentives were 
further expanded allowing foreign investors to hold up to 100 per cent equity provided 
they exported 50 per cent or more of their production, employed 350 full-time 
Malaysian workers consistent with the racial composition of the country, and did not 
directly compete with domestic products. Tax rates on corporate profits were lowered 
and tariffs were reduced on business equipment. 
Realising that the ICA remained as one of the obstacles hindering new 
investment and the expansion of existing enterprises, in 1985 the govemment relaxed 
the ceiling for ICA coverage to firms with shareholder funds of $1 million or a full-
time workforce in excess of 50 persons. This ceiling was further raised to $2.5 
million or a full-time workforce in excess of 75 persons in 1986. At the same time, 
the government took some steps in relaxing its stance on redistribution. Accordingly, 
in 1986, the govemment announced that all new foreign investment between 1986 and 
1990 would be exempt from the bumiputera equity requirements (Fong 1989). 
In addition to liberalisation policies, the major factors in attracting FDI have 
been largely seen as the establishment of FTZs, industrial estates and LMWs. With 
Through the amendments made in the Customs Act of 1967, export oriented firms located outside 
FTZs were recognized as LMWs thus facilitating those firms to apply for the same privileges enjoyed 
by the FTZ firms. 
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the initiation of the Free Trade Zone Act in 1971, a number of FTZs - the first, the 
Bayan Lepas Free Trade Zone, and two others, Prai and Prai Wharf - were set up 
under the Penang Development Corporation to further facilitate FDI in 1972. 
Following those as models, another eight FTZs were established and another six sites 
were proposed as FTZs in other parts of the country. The FTZ Act of 1971, 
empowered to designate industrial sites as FTZ, and provided essential infrastmcture 
and customs clearance facilities. Firms located in a FTZ could import all their import 
requirements (raw materials and components) duty free and export their products 
without customs formalities. To obtain those privileges firms were, however, required 
to export at least 80 per cent of their products (Fong 1989; Lim and Nesadurai 1997). 
Through the setting up of a growth triangle with Singapore and Indonesia, attempts 
were also made to attract new investments into Johor. Another growth triangle was 
planned with Thailand and the Sumatra province of Indonesia, to promote outward 
labour intensive activities from Penang (Lall 1996). 
In general, FTZs have been seen as successfiil in enhancing output, export 
promotion and employment creation. Nevertheless, owing to certain inherited 
weaknesses, their presence generated less than expected results for industrial 
development. The majority of FTZ firms were involved in electronics and electrical 
components, and textile manufacturing, and a significant portion of manufacturing 
export income of Malaysia was derived through these two sectors. Electronics 
exports, for instance, account for over one-half of the country's manufactured exports 
produced in the FTZs by the early 1990. Despite these contributions, FTZs appears to 
be economic enclaves without substantial economic linkages with the rest of the 
economy. Moreover, preferential treatments in the form of incentives provided to 
FTZs distorted factor prices and contributed to a dualistic industrial stmcture. Firms 
in the FTZs could import their needed components duty free and did not have to pay 
any taxes on their exports. This process encouraged firms to use imported 
components, resulting in the continued absence of linkages with the economy, and 
firms could remain in the FTZ without making further investments outside the FTZ. 
To overcome some of the problems noted above, amendments introduced in the 
Investment Incentives Act of 1986, proposed specific incentives to FTZ firms to 
purchase their parts and components locally (Fong 1989, p. 210). 
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{b) Measures for Promoting Technology Development 
Hiitial step towards promoting technology in Malaysia was evident with the 
establishment of Technology Transfer Unit (TTU) for the purpose of screening 
technology transfer agreements, following the implementation of the Industrial 
Coordination Act of 1975, Under this Act, all manufacturing firms which signed 
technology transfer agreements with foreign companies were required to get approval 
from the TTU. In this process, the TTU ensured that the agreement will (i) accord 
with national interests, (ii) impose fair and justifiable restrictions on the Malaysian 
party and (iii) the payments of fees, wherever applicable will be commensurate with 
the level of technology to be transferred and will not have adverse effects on 
Malaysia's balance of payments. In addition, with the view of maximising potential 
benefits, the TTU has laid down a number of guidelines regarding purchase of 
components and intermediate inputs; insisted that all technical fees or royalty 
payments be based on net sales (after deducting discount or retums, transport costs, 
insurance, duties, taxes and any other charges from gross sales) and intervened in 
demanding that consent for sales outside the restricted territories should not be 
unreasonably withheld. 
Except the measures initiated by the TTU, until the mid 1980s, generating 
employment opportunities and enhancing enfrepreneur skills were the major motives 
for atfracting FDI. Realising the importance of technology development however, 
with the launching of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) and the Hidustrial master Plan 
(1986-95) in early 1986, Malaysia started to pay greater attention to the development 
of industrial technology and to initiate poHcy guidelines for the national development 
of science and technology. Policy emphasis on technology development further 
continued with the Second Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000). This plan has 
stressed the importance of making science and technology as an integral component of 
socio economic planning and development which entails building competence in 
strategic and knowledge based technologies, and promoting a science and technology 
culture in the process of building a modem economy. 
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While continuing political commitment and increasing public awareness on 
technology development Malaysia intensified technology screening process further 
with the introduction of an Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development 
(APITD), in 1990. In this process, MITI played a significant role with the support of 
the Malaysian Extemal Trade Development Corporation and the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority (MIDA). When approving technology transfer agreements, 
MITI is particularly concemed with the level of technology, local equity participation, 
local content, export share of output, patents, trademarks, investment level, R&D 
facilities, human resource training, removal of restrictions on sales market, the 
continuing use of technology after the license expires, and the possibility of 
transferring improvements of technology involved to licensor. Little efforts however 
are yet evident on monitoring or ex post appraisal of technology transfer agreements 
The lack of experience and expertise who are capable to assess the technology content 
that is imparted to domestic licensees moreover hindered the effective operation of 
technology screening process (Rasiah and Anuwar 1995; Hadi 1994; Anuwar 1992). 
As far as technology transfers in Malaysia are concemed, technology transfer 
agreements (TTAs) between subsidiaries in Malaysia and parents firms abroad, have 
become a main source. As Rasiah and Anuwar (1995) noted, studies show that FDI 
has contributed positively in terms of formal and informal technology transfer, 
improving efficiency''* and human capital deepening, especially in the 
electric/electronics (semiconductor), machine tools, plastic, tyres, telecommunication 
components and the textiles and garment industries. Attempts were also made to 
promote technology transfer, through the promotion of subcontracting relationships 
and through the anchor company program.'^ To stimulate subcontracting, financial 
incentives were subjected to the fulfilment of a 30 per cent local sourcing condition in 
1991. Moreover, the govemment encouraged firms to acquire part or all of foreign 
firms in strategic technology areas. Accordingly, South Korea's Heavy Industry 
•* The techniques such as total quality management (TQM), total productive maintenance (TPM) Just in 
Time (JIT) quahty conttol circles (QCCs) statistical process conttol and integrated materials resource 
planning (MRPII), which developed with Japanese investments are widely used as efficiency building 
tools in Malaysia. 
Under the anchor company scheme mainly electtic/electtonics firms( Sapura and Sharp Roxy, . 
Matsushita Electtic, Sony electtonics, Hitachi Elecfronic Products, JVC Elecfronics and Philip//JVC 
Video) received assistance from the MITI beginning with 1992 (Rasiah and Anuwar 1995, p. 5). 
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Corporation ventured into building ships for the foreign market, and the Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) entered a joint venture with 
Hambrecht and Quinst to access the latter's network of high technology industries 
(Rasiah and Anuwar 1995, pp. 10-11). 
Hi addition to technology screening, more selective policies have been adopted 
in relation to export oriented foreign fimis. For example, by using incentives MIDA 
encouraged FDI into higher value-added, more technology intensive activities. To 
strengthen technology development further, the govemment made steps to expand 
from relatively low tech industrial estates and FTZs to highly specialised industrial 
parks with much higher value-added and high tech industries. By 1995, there are five 
such highly specialized industrial parks in Malaysia (Lim and Nesadurai 1997). 
The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) was responsible for 
implementing poHcies to attract foreign investment. It operated a number of branches 
in various intemational capitals, functioning as an adviser to MITI on the formulation 
of industrial policies, undertaking economic feasibility studies of industrial 
possibilities and promotional work, and facilitating exchange of information and 
coordination among institutions involved in industrial development. It also assisted 
private investors in identifying viable industries, organising investment seminars and 
investment missions abroad, and acts as an intermediary for local private investors and 
foreign investors. In one observer's view, MIDA's concerted efforts enabled Malaysia 
to attract more electronics firms and also to enter the high-tech export path quickly 
(Lall 1993). 
(c) Measures for Promoting R&D 
Recognising the critical need for R&D, since late 1980s, the IMP and the successive 
development plans (Fifth, Sixth and Seventh) have made considerable efforts to 
improve the public sector R&D infrastmcture. This emphasis was further intensified 
with the APITD introduced in 1990. On the whole, these initiatives stressed the 
importance of increasing R&D funds allocated to R&D institutions, the 
commercialization of research results, and the interaction between private firms and 
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public R&D institutes. Emphasis on industrial deepening stressed further with the 
introduction of the Second IMP in 1996. As outlined in this plan, ft was expected to 
target high tech, capital intensive, labour saving processes, advanced information 
technology products and to deepen of Malaysia's industrial stmcture into manufacture 
of end products (Lim and Nesadurai 1997; Brown 1993; Rasiah and Anmvar 1995; 
Lall 1996). 
This policy emphasis was primarily supported through the estabHshment of a 
variety of state agencies. Their activities, in general, ranged from providing financial, 
advisory and consultancy services to speciaHsed research and development facilities. 
Among others, the Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM), 
the Malaysian Institute for Microelectronics Systems (MMOS), the Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), the Malaysia Industry Govemment 
Group of High Technology (MIGHT), the National Productivity Corporation (NPC), 
have been playing a significant role in these activities.'^ 
Besides these institutional supports, several other measures have been taken to 
stimulate R&D. One such measure was the introduction of the Intensification of 
Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) Programme in 1986. Along with this programme, a 
number of new technology areas, such as microelectronics, biotechnology, 
information and communications and advanced materials, considered as critical to the 
economy. Other important measures included the establishment of technological 
parks in Bukit Jalil and Johor, the high technology park in Kulim to promote 
commercialisation and application of technology through nurturing of entrepreneurs, 
and the Chemor Ceramic Park to enhance the development of the ceramic industry. 
Like other countries, R&D was further promoted through the provision of generous 
incentives. For example, under the Promotion of Investment Act 1986, firms which 
were categorised as high technology companies were given full tax exemption of 
statutory income for five years, provided that they had an expenditure of at least 1 per 
cent of gross sales for local R&D expenditure on annual basis and the percentage of 
'^  Moreover, the institutions such as the Rubber Research Instimte, the Malaysian Rubber Products 
Research Organization, the Malaysian Agriculmral Research Instimte, the Forest Research Instimte, and 
the Palm Oil Research Institute carry out research and development activities. 
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science and technical graduates to total work force of at least 7 per cent (Brown 1993; 
Rasiah and Anuwar 1995). 
Despite these attempts, in terms of R&D Malaysia has so far made a little 
progress. Heavy reliance on FDI and imported technology, lack of eariy policy 
initiatives to promote indigenous teclmology and lack of private sector initiatives 
towards R&D, may partly be responsible for the slow progress. In addition, the 
amount spent on R&D in Malaysia is still small with compared to other countries in 
Asia. As Lim and Nesadurai (1997, p. 203) noted, total expenditure on R&D 
spending remains less than 1 per cent of GDP in 1995. This rate of R&D spending is 
less than half the rate in South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, most of the funds 
allocated for industrial research remained under-utilized. As Lim and Nesadurai 
(1997, p. 206) noted, according to the 1993 review of IRPA projects, "industrial 
research was allocated only 28 per cent of IRPA funding compared to 47 per cent for 
agricultural R&D. Moreover, only 46 per cent of the industrial research funds were 
actually used compared to a 90 per cent utilisation rate of the agricultural R&D 
allocation." 
(d) Measures for Promoting Human Resources 
With continuous economic growth, Malaysia confronted another critical problem, 
1 7 • • 
labour shortages in the skilled, technical and professional categones. Recognizing 
these shortcomings, Malaysia attempted to address them, especially after the mid 
1980s. As part of their attempt, the Human Resource Development (HRD) Act 
introduced in 1993 replaced the Double Deduction Training Incentive for firms 
employing 50 or more. This Act required firms employing 50 or more to contribute 1 
per cent of their payroll to the HRD Fund, which was administered by the HRD 
Council. Under this program firms were able to claim approved expenses relating to 
human resource development. To promote human resources amongst SMEs, the HRD 
Fund was further extended to firms with an employment size of 10-49 persons, and 
with a subsidy of 200 per cent for every approved expense incurred. Several other 
" According to Lim and Nesadurai (1997, p. 195-203) Malaysia now has full employment, with labour 
demand outsttipping supply by almost 2 to 1, and have an average of 8.4 researchers per firm. 
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measures such as announcing an Integrated Action Plan for human resource 
development, introducing liberal policies to permft industries to recmit foreign semi-
skilled, skilled and professional personnel and encouraging skilled and professional 
Malaysians working overseas to retum back to Malaysia were introduced with the 
view of overcoming skilled labour shortages. (Lim and Nesadurai 1997; Rasiah and 
Anuwar 1995; Brown 1993). 
6.5 Conclusion 
Malaysia was primarily dependent on primary production sector, centred on the mines 
and plantations, until it began systematic efforts towards promoting manufacturing 
industries with the introduction of the New Economic PoHcies in 1971. Well 
endowed with natural resources, but with little industrial base inherited from colonial 
mle, it has made remarkable economic and industrial progress over the past three 
decades. 
An examination of the nature and incidence of industrial policies of Malaysia 
reveals that they differ from that of many comparable countries on a number of 
accounts. Firstly, differences with other countries both in policy measures and their 
application, are notable in Malaysia, due to its overwhelming emphasis on achieving 
social equity and also due to its heavy reliance on foreign direct investment. 
Secondly, due to certain country-specific factors, such as the vast array of 
natural resources, the ethnic composition, the lack of autonomy in decision making, 
and the lack of private sector (Malay) participation, several other differences in policy 
application are evident in Malaysia with compared to the comparable countries. 
Thirdly, many of the essential ingredients that may be required for effective 
policy implementation, such as performance standards, continuous follow up 
procedures, an emphasis on efficiency and directed measures to maximize potential 
benefits from specific initiatives, were absent in Malaysia. 
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7. Diversity and Incidence of Industrial Policies in Thailand, 
1960-1997 
7.1 Introduction 
Thailand encompasses a large geographical area, well endowed with natural resources. 
It is centrally located in South East Asia with a population of 59.4 milHon in 1995, 
thus potentially offering a large domestic market. Like other developing countries, it 
has been a predominantly agricultural country until it made concerted efforts towards 
industrialization with the introduction of its Third Economic and Social Development 
Plan in 1972. 
As with Korea and Malaysia, during the last three decades Thailand has 
achieved remarkable economic as well as industrial growth and has also emerged as 
one of the fastest growing economies in the world. As can be seen from the Table 7.1 
(column 2), Thailand has managed to increase fts real GNP per capita almost fourfold 
during the period 1970-1995 and has achieved an average annual GDP growth rate of 
more than 6 per cent during that period. 
The manufacturing sector of Thailand has also shown remarkable resuhs, both 
in terms of value-added and exports. As the figures in Table 7.1 (column 5 and 6) 
demonstrate, manufacturing sector value-added as a percentage of GDP increased 
from nearly 13 per cent to 28 per cent while the relative contribution of the 
agricultural sector has decreased from 36 per cent to 12 per cent over the period 1960-
1995. Similarly impressive resufts are evident with regards to exports. According to 
the data shown in Table 7.1 (column 7), manufacturing sector exports accounted for 
only 2 per cent of merchandise exports in 1965. By 1975, their contribution had 
increased to 14 per cent. Subsequently, manufacturing sector exports grew at an 
increasing rate and have become a leading sector in the economy of Thailand, 
contributing 73 per cent of merchandise exports by 1995. 
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Table 7.1 Economic Indicators of Thailand, 1960-1995 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
GNP per 
Capita 
-
493 
567 
715 
840 
1275 
1777 
GDP 
(% growth)* 
-
6.9 
4.7 
5.9 
4.2 
9.2 
6.8 
Manufacturing 
Value-Added 
(% growth)* 
-
9.5 
8.1 
6.7 
3.6 
13.0 
8.7 
Manufacturing 
Value-Added 
(% GDP) 
12.5 
14.2 
15.9 
18.7 
21.5 
21.9 
27.2 
28.5 
Agriculture 
Value-Added 
(% GDP) 
36.4 
31.9 
25.9 
26.9 
23.2 
15.8 
12.7 
10.8 
Manufacturing 
Exports 
(% Merch. Exp) 
2.0 
4.7 
14.7 
25.2 
38.1 
63.1 
73.1 
Manufacturing 
Exports 
(% growth)* 
-
5.0 
2.7 
8.3 
6.2 
16.0 
11.0 
Notes: - Data is not available. 
* Five Year Average (data are in constant $US, 1987 prices). 
Source: World Tables, World Bank, ANU. 
The published literature attributes this overall success to a variety of both 
intemal and extemal factors. Though there is no uniform view most commentators, 
(such as Warr 1993, 1995; Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996; Winwan 1994; 
Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997; Poapongsakom 1995) have attributed this recent 
economic and industrial success to intemal factors, in particular to the pmdent state 
economic policies. Among others it is beheved that economic policies such as sound 
macroeconomic policies, in particular conservative financial and fiscal policies, frade 
and industrial policies have been largely influential for this remarkable economic 
success, which made Thailand part of the East Asian miracle, ft has also been claimed 
(Falkus 1995; UNIDO 1992; Suphachalasai 1995; Sen 1996) that certain other 
extemal factors such as favourable trends in world markets for Thai manufactured 
products, American spending during the Vietnam War, the impact of Japanese 
economic growth and growth of the other NICs - providing export markets and 
foreign capital investment - have also contributed. 
Like the previous Chapters 5 and 6, the main objective of this chapter is to 
examine the incidence of industrial poHcies in Thailand over the period 1960-1997. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2, explores diverse country-specific 
factors, including the objectives of industrial poHcies in Thailand, historical factors, 
the decision making process, and the relative roles of the state and of market 
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mechanisms. The diversity of poHcies implemented over the period of 1960-1997 is 
examined in Section 7.3. The policy instmments applied in Thailand for promoting 
industries are again discussed under two broad categories, namely import substitution 
related measures, and export promotion and growth related measures in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Diverse Country-Specific Factors 
7.2.1 Objectives of Industrial Policies 
The industrial policy objectives of Thailand appear to be less explicit and less 
ambitious than those of other comparable countries in Asia. Thailand did not have a 
specific industrial plan like Malaysia nor did it follow intensive industry specific 
intervention policies like Korea. Rather industrialization in Thailand came about 
through policies that formed part of the Economic and Social Development Plans 
implemented since the early 1960s. 
Both the First (1961-66) and the Second (1967-71) Economic and Social 
Development Plans, while proclaiming import substitution as the major industrial 
strategy, placed emphasis on the utilization of domestic raw materials and on the 
promotion of labour intensive industries in addition to achieving overall economic 
growth (Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997). This policy stance continued until the late 
1960s, and the industrialization process was largely encouraged through private sector 
participation. 
Recognizing the constraints of import substitution and realising positive 
results of export led growth in countries like Japan and Korea, however, Thailand also 
began to shift its emphasis towards export led growth. As a resuft, beginning with the 
Third Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-76), Thailand placed priority on 
export promotion. This plan also paid attention to setting up specific priorities for 
reducing the growing disparities between urban and mral areas and between sectors. 
The subsequent Economic and Social Development Plans, continued their 
emphasis on export development, but also focused on several other objectives. For 
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instance, in addition to promoting large scale exporting firms and trading companies, 
the Fourth (1977-81) and the Fifth (1982-86) Economic and Social Development 
Plans (1982-86) were formulated for the purpose of achieving the development and 
conservation of economic resources and environment, diversification and increasing 
efficiency of production in rural areas, the development of principal cities and the 
improvement of Bangkok, and the dispersion of basic and social services. 
Placing priority on export promotion and spatial balance, the Sixth Economic 
and Social Development Plan (1987-91) emphasised improving the administrative 
stmcture and stimulating the private sector role in the economy. Recognizing the long 
felt need for industrial upgrading, the Seventh (1992-96) Economic and Social 
Development Plan stressed the importance of industrial deepening, which it proposed 
to achieve by developing basic industries, promoting environmentally friendly 
industries and the diversification of markets. Overall these latter plans placed more 
emphasis on the quality of growth rather than the rate of grow1;h (UNIDO 1992; 
Suphachalasai 1995; Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996; Islam and Chowdhury 1997). 
Summing up, promoting import substitution industries was a major objective 
of Thailand's industrial policy until the early 1970s. Thereafter, export promotion 
became the main thmst. This latter objective, coupled with the dispersion of 
manufacturing industries to provincial areas, has been given prime importance in the 
economic policies of Thailand during the past two decades. Industrial upgrading, 
which is considered to be necessary for sustained growth in the industrial sector, has 
only come into the policy agenda in the early 1990s. 
7.2.2 Historical Factors 
Thailand had been fortunate enough to be an independent country without foreign 
invasion. Historical factors have played a relatively minor role in its industrial 
development in Thailand compared with Korea and Malaysia. Available evidence 
suggests that Thailand benefited considerably from American aid and military 
expenditure throughout much of the 1950s, 1960s and eariy 1970s. More importantiy. 
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the American miHtary presence during the Vietnam War led to a significant 
improvement in Thailand's infrastmcture (Falkus 1995). 
7.2.3 Decision Making Process 
The decision making process of Thailand has a number of distinguishing features and 
differs from that of other countries in a number of respects. Firstly, the goveming 
stmcture of Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament. 
Thailand's political history is dominated by the authoritarian miHtary governments, 
with brief periods of democracy, and this has led to some instability. Nevertheless, 
this political instability has not become a major threat to the economic activities. The 
close connection between the military and Thai politics appears to have had some 
influential effects on the economy. The Thai political system is organized in such a 
way that political leaders have had to be acceptable to the military. Hence most of the 
political leaders either are or have recently been senior military service men. The 
military implicitly has exercised a certain amount of control over economic activities. 
The strong military connections in part prevent wide ideological differences in 
economic matters. In particular, all major parties agree that it is vital to preserve Thai 
traditions and institutions and especially to remain loyal to the monarch (Warr and 
Nidhiprabha 1996, pp. 3-7). 
Secondly, economic decision making is carried out under the guidance of four 
major agencies: the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 
which is mainly responsible for planning public investment projects and for preparing 
the five year Economic and Social Development Plans; the Ministry of Finance, which 
deals with the revenue; the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), which is in charge of the 
expenditure side of the Budget; and the Bank of Thailand, which decides on the 
appropriate methods for public sector borrowing. These four institutions contribute to 
industrial promotion in various ways. For example the NESDB identifies industries 
that should be promoted, while the Fiscal Policy Office of the Ministry of Finance 
operates a comprehensive tax refund system called tax rebates, for all taxes incurred in 
the production of goods subsequently exported. 
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hi addition to these four agencies, several other agencies are involved in the 
decision making process. The Board of Investment (BOI) plays a dominant role in 
determining promotional measures. The Ministry of Hidustry controls the 
establishment and expansion of factories and production plants and the use of local 
contents in production. The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (HEAT), 
established in 1972 controlled by the Ministry of Hidustry, develops and manages 
industrial estates (lEs), providing investors with necessary services and utiHties at a 
lower cost. 
Although all these institutions contribute to the overall development of the 
industrial sector and the economy, lack of coordination and inconsistent views 
between various agencies have hindered effective policy implementation in Thailand. 
For instance, the Economic and Social Development Plan, which is prepared by the 
NESDB, called for goverrmient support of small scale industries. In contrast, the BOI, 
which had the power to ignore the objectives of the national plans, favoured large 
scale capital intensive industries (Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997; Warr and 
Nidhiprabha 1996). 
Thirdly, Thailand's decision making process is somewhat more biased towards 
conservative economic policies than other comparable Asian countries. In particular, 
policy makers have been interested in maintaining a balance of trade and the value of 
the baht. Thailand was successful in maintaining a stable exchange rate for a long 
period of time. This was partly possible due to the contiol of domestic inflation and 
the sound level of intemational reserves. These conservative poHcies, in particular in 
relation to the exchange rate, appear to have not only provided incentive for export 
expansion but also helped to attract direct foreign investment. In this process. Thai 
policy makers adhered to similar basic political and economic philosophies. That 
means achieving economic growth has become a major motive. Further they all 
shared the belief that market forces combined with pmdent public sector infrastmcture 
investment should be the principal means for achieving economic growth. 
In the mid 1990s, the lEAT is managing twenty-one industtial estates (Poapongsakom and Fuller 
1997, p. 158). 
Poapongsakom (1995) holds that, preference towards conservative economic policies 
partly could be attributed to the policy attitudes of senior bureaucrats. Partly, the 
World Bank recommendations appear to be influential in maintaining such policies. 
7.2.4 Industrial Structure 
Compared with other comparable countries such as Korea and Malaysia, the Thai 
govemment plays a limited role in industrial activities. The ideological values of Thai 
politicians, as well as of the poHcy makers, are partly responsible for the limfted 
govemment role. Contrary to the prevailing practices in some other East Asian 
countries, they took the view that govemment should provide a supportive role within 
the framework of a free market economy. Historically, the government's role was 
limfted to maintaining social order and financial stability. Thus the role of the public 
sector was confined largely to tax collection, provision of a limited range of public 
services and the commercial operation of public enterprises. However, export 
pessimism - in the wake of collapse of the Korean war boom, falling prices of primary 
commodities, and a fear of over dependence on a narrow range of primary product 
exports - led to expanded state involvement in economic activities in the early 1950s 
(Falkus 1995, p. 22). Along with the introduction of the Industrial Promotion Act in 
1954, therefore, the government's role in industrial activities began to expand. Under 
this Act a number of state enterprises were initiated in Thailand. The majority of the 
products produced by these enterprises were based on the simple processing of local 
foodstuffs and primary products. These products were protected through tariffs and 
geared primarily to the domestic market. 
Due to a change in political leadership and macroeconomic difficulties, by the 
1980s the govemment gradually intensified its role in economic affairs. State-owned 
entities were created to exploit the country's natural resources, provide public utilities, 
create basic infrastmctural facilities and undertake manufacturing ventures that were 
considered important for the rapid transformation of the country. Nevertheless, public 
sector direct participation in production ventures remained only in limited activities, 
such as the production of soda ash, zinc smelting, petrochemical industries, natural 
gas, paper manufacture and sugar milling (Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996, pp. 67-68). 
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This limited public sector participation on the one hand reflected Thailand's 
ideological preferences - a free market economy. On the other hand it implied the 
high relative significance of the private sector. Since the inception of its 
industriaHzation process, the private sector, both domestic and foreign, has played a 
dominant role in Thailand. Since late 1950s, foHowing the recommendation of the 
World Bank, private sector participation was encouraged in Thailand. With fts 
privatization program, which began in mid 1980s, the role of the private sector 
expanded more rapidly. In addition, the Seventh Economic and Social Development 
Plan emphasized the need for reducing role of govemment as the principal economic 
stimulator, by limiting public expenditure and encouraging private investment (Islam 
and Chowdhury 1997; Winwan 1994). 
The private sector enjoys great freedom in their business activities. Unlike 
Indonesia and Malaysia, there are no deliberate attempts to promote indigenous people 
in Thailand. Irrespective of the nationality, therefore, business people, which include 
the dominant Thai majority and the rest of the ethnic groups, enjoy greater freedom in 
their business activities than in Malaysia. The cottage and small scale industries are 
mostly Thai-owned and are dominant in sectors such as gems and jewellery, garments, 
auto parts and food processing. Technologically more sophisticated industries, and 
basic industries, are controlled by the medium and large scale firms, the majority are 
foreign owned. There are also signs of developing vertically integrated large business 
groups, mainly Sino-Thai firms, which are supported by the top commercial banks. 
As regards to the private sector, two developments are noteworthy. Firstly, the 
private sector in Thailand is more organized, in terms of industry associations and 
similar bodies, than in other comparable countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. 
For example, a number of business associations have been formed, namely the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Thai Industries and the Thai Bankers 
Association. These associations further enabled the formation of the so-called Private 
Consultative Committee (PCC), with membership from all these associations and a 
rotating chairmanship (Dhiratayakinant 1995, p. 106). These organizations facilitate 
negotiations and discussions of the problems and requirements of the private sector, 
with govemment officials. Since the mid 1980s, these organizations have often been 
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consulted by ministry officials and macroeconomic technocrats for decision making 
purposes. 
Secondly, there has been evidence of increasing coordination between the 
private sector and public sector than over the past two decades. Despite several 
attempts to formalize an active public-private partnership, prior to the 1980s the 
private sector had never been prominent in Thai public decision making. With the 
formation of the Joint PubHc-Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC) in 1981, 
however, there were signs of increasing cooperation between the private and public 
sectors. The establishment of this committee (JPPCC) indicated the government's 
determination both to seek advice and cooperation from the private sector in solving 
national economic problems and to assist the development of the private sector. Since 
its inception this committee has focused primarily on: (1) reviewing and improving 
laws and regulations that obstmct private entrepreneurial activities; (2) policy 
formulation; (3) information collection and dissemination; (4) developing agriculture 
and the agro industry and (5) developing a provincial partnership (Dhiratayakinant 
1995, pp. 106-110). 
7.3 Diversity ofPolicies over the Period 1960-1997 
During the 1950s Thailand did not have a pressing need to develop the manufacturing 
sector because of the strength of the agricultural sector, a sound balance of payments 
position and satisfactory employment growth. Realising the danger of depending on a 
limited range of primary products vulnerable to frequent price fluctuations, however, 
by the 1960s, like other countries, Thailand started its industrialisation process by 
initiating import substitution policies. The main objective of following these policies 
was to reduce Thailand's dependence on imports of foreign goods, thereby saving 
foreign exchange and raising income levels through increased domestic value-added. 
During the 1960s, industries that were based on the country's natural resources, which 
mainly included food processing (e.g. rice milling), were particularly encouraged 
(Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, p. 148). 
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Protection was widely used as a main tool in stimulating industries. The 
majority of the industries protected during the 1960s were capital intensive and large 
industries (Suphachalasai 1995). The protective system has been biased against the 
agro-based industries and towards the manufacturing sector in both import competing 
and non-import competing. Among the manufacturing assembly industries, motor 
vehicles have largely been promoted by providing a large tariff differential along with 
tax concessions. It is also reported that protection given to final products was 
relatively high compared to inputs and capital goods and thus discouraging the 
production of inputs and capital goods (Wawn 1982; UNIDO 1992; Warr 1993). 
During this early import substitution period, economic growth was impressive, 
thanks to both favourable intemal and extemal factors. In particular, favourable world 
demand for Thai products and US military spending in the country did much to 
provide such impressive economic achievements (Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 71). 
However, by the latter half of the 1960s Thai poHcy makers realised that the potential 
for their import substitution policies was reaching its limit. At the same time Thailand 
was experiencing balance of payments problems, mainly due to the stagnation of 
exports (Urata and Yokota 1994). 
To cope with these problems, it was recognized that policy changes were 
necessary and the Third Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-76) called for 
the fostering of labour intensive industries through the promotion of exports. As a 
resuft, since the mid 1970s, Thailand's economic plarmers and their academic advisers 
have shared an interest in promoting exports. With the enactment of the Investment 
Promotion Act in 1972, attention gradually shifted away from import substitution 
towards export promotion. This shift of interest, though arising mainly from slow 
progress and the unfavourable effects of import substituting industries, was also 
required to address the macro economic problems faced by Thailand at that time. In 
addition, the remarkable economic progress of Japan and other NICs, perceived to be 
achieved through export led growth, had influential effects on changing the policy 
stance in Thailand (Falkus 1995). Despite this poHcy change, the govemment 
maintained the import substitution policy in the area of consumer durables and 
intermediate goods. 
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The industrial policies specified in the Third Economic and Social 
development Plan set priorities for the types of exports to be promoted, namely the 
products of industries using domestic raw materials and labour intensive processes 
located in regions outside the Bangkok (Dhiratayakinant 1995, p. 101). As in the 
period of import substitution, export promoting policies favoured large scale 
industries and agro-based industries such as rice milling, frozen sea food and canned 
fmit, which use agricultural products as raw materials. Along with the modification 
of the Investment Promotion Act of 1972, which extended tax incentives to promote 
investment, trading companies were also promoted (Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 
79). With this revised Act, import tax was removed from imported inputs used in 
export activities, and business tax was Hfted from exported products (Kraiyudht 1995, 
p. 104). There was a growing emphasis on developing labour intensive export 
oriented industries, such as garments, mbber products, wood products, jewellery and 
footwear. In particular, by the mid 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in the 
production of electronic products. Rice cookers, television parts, electronic 
condensers, electric fans were produced, largely for the export market. Efforts were 
also made to increase value-added, by producing more complex products such as 
facsimiles, cellular telephones, cordless telephones and satellite receivers (Winwan 
1994, p. 63). 
Export oriented industries were encouraged by providing various incentives, 
such as: tax privileges and refunds; tax exemptions on imported raw materials, 
components or re-exported items; electricity cost reductions; marketing assistance, 
such as by organizing intemational trade exhibitions, and trade missions and by 
establishing commercial and trade offices abroad; streamlining customs procedures 
and abolishing urmecessary regulations; establishing export processing zones and 
bonded warehouses; and a drawback system on customs duties (for more details on 
these incentives see Tables 7.2 and 7.4). The generous incentives further included: 
guarantees against nationalization, price control and competition from new state 
enterprises; temporary import surcharges and bans against competitive imports; and 
additional incentives for exports and for investment in special zones outside Bangkok. 
Promoted firms were also entitled to request additional protection in the form of 
import surcharges. In addition to these measures, the Bank of Thailand provided 
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credit assistance either in the form of concessional interest rates, by discounting loans 
to manufacturers, or by export promissory notes (Falkus 1995, p. 23; Urata and 
Yokota 1994, p. 446). 
Though the policy emphasis was shifted towards export promotion, tariff 
protection continued. Fairly high tariff protection, averaging around 30 per cent, 
continued until the early 1980s (Suphachalasai 1995, p. 67). Though attempts have 
been made to reduce import tariffs on raw materials, intermediate products and capital 
machinery from time to time since the early 1980s, due to the ongoing fiscal and 
balance of payments deficits those attempts have not been successfiil up to the mid 
1990s (Dhiratayakinant 1995). 
With the initiation of the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1977-81), several further policy changes were evident in the economy of Thailand. 
Most importantly, Thailand began its second import substitution period, with the 
formulation of the large scale industrial development programme (Eastem Seaboard 
Industrial Development Programme). The discovery of natural gas led to the 
proposed developments in industrial sectors, particularly heavy industries like steel, 
gas, oil processing and petrochemicals. By introducing this industrialization program 
it was also expected to achieve regional development. 
Since Thailand has been heavily dependent on oil imports, the first and second 
oil price increases severely affected the economy by the late 1970s. At the same time 
Thailand also suffered from a number of other macroeconomic problems, such as low 
levels of foreign exchange reserves, increasing extemal debt and a budget deficit. To 
overcome these problems, from 1981 onwards, several major economic changes were 
introduced: foreign borrowing was brought under confrol; the exchange rate was 
devalued; export taxes and import surcharges were reduced; and the fiscal deficit was 
This program involves a large scale planned investment that covered three provinces along the eastem 
coast of Thailand. In Chon Buri Province, the Laem Chabang area was the designated location for light 
and export oriented industties. The Rayong area was to house heavy industties mainly the 
pettochemical complex at Mab Ta Put. Further inland is the Chachoengsao area, which was to site 
various agro-based industties (Dhiratayakinant 1995, p. 105). 
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Table 7.2 Incentives and Institutional Support for Promoting Industries in 
Thailand, 1960-1997 
1960-1970 
Main Strategy - Import Substitution 
Promoted large and capital incentive industties usmg large tariff differentials, tax concessions and 
quantitative resttictions 
New Investment Promotion Act (1960) - set up Board of Investment (BOI); select industties for 
promotion and issue Investment Promotion certificates 
Industtial Finance Corporation of Thailand (1960) - provide long term project finance, and 
support industties by holding shares 
National Applied Science and Research Instimte (1963) - engaged in R&D in applied science to 
promote and utilize natural resources 
1971-1980 
Main Strategy - Promotion of Light Export Industries/Import Substitution 
Incentives: Finance at concessionary rates by discounting loans or by export promissory notes; 
import surcharges/tax rebate; permission to double the cost of ttansportation, electricity and water 
supply for deduction from taxable corporate income, and permission to deduct from the taxable 
corporate income up to 35 per cent of the investment costs of installing infrastmcture facilities for 
10 years firom the date of income earning (see Table 7.3 for FDI incentives) 
Local content requirement (1971) - imposed local content requirement for assembling motor 
vehicles - local content requttement has increased from 6.6 per cent for passenger vehicles and 11-
15 per cent for commercial vehicles to 25 per cent for both 
Industtial Estate Authority (1972) - develop and manage industtial estates 
Rationalization (1971-78) - imposed limits on vehicle type, models, and engine size; imposed a 
partial ban on completely built-up vehicle in 1978 
Changes in foreign direct investment - emphasised on majority Thai ownership; Inttoduction of 
Alien Business Law and Alien Occupation Law 
Revision of Investment Promotion Act (1977) - extended tax incentives and promote ttading 
companies 
Ministry of Science and Technology and Energy 1979 - promote science and technology 
1981-1997 
Main Strategy - Export Promotion /Import Substitution 
Reduced protection; promoted small scale/high value-added industties; extended drawback system 
Formation of Joint Public Private Consultative Committee (1981) - to build up cooperation 
between public and private sector 
Tariff reforms/ liberalization attempts - planned to reduce the number of tariff rates from 60 to 5 
per cent by 1997 which included 0-5 per cent for raw materials in short supply, 5 per cent for other 
raw materials, 10 per cent for intermediate products and 20 per cent for finished products, 
liberalized foreign exchange ttansactions in 1990, allowed banks to offer foreign exchange account 
if foreign ttansactions not exceeding $ 50000; delegated power to licence factories to provincial 
authorities 
Direct foreign investment - ownership requirements eased depending on the extent of exports -
firms export more than 50 per cent of its output can have majority of foreign share, firms export all 
of its output are allowed 100 per cent foreign ownership 
Local content requirement - local content requirement increased up to 35 per cent for both 
passenger cars and commercial vehicles by the 1980s and later in 1990s increased to 54 per cent 
for passenger vehicles and 80 per cent for commercial vehicles ^ _ ^ _ 
Source: UNIDO (1992); Suphachalasai (1995); Dhiratayakinant (1995); Winwan (1994); Christensen et 
al. (1993); Doner (1991); Sripaipan (1995). 
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transformed into a surplus (Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, p. 150). Tariff rates were 
rationaHzed with the objective of reducing the sectoral variation in effective rates, by 
lowering nominal rates to a maximum of 60 per cent (Islam and Chowdhury 1997, p. 
261). These changes were primarily aimed at reducing the bias against export and 
heavy industries, improving efficiency and the operation of the market mechanism, 
and thereby strengthening competitiveness in the domestic as well as the world 
market. Along with these changes, the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate 
and the intemational relocation of light manufacturing industries during the 1980s 
resulted in an export boom in Thailand. 
Reducing sectoral variations in tariffs was, however, not as successful as 
expected, due to the heavy dependence on tariffs as part of total revenue. In the early 
1980s the revenues from these tariffs accounted for 20 per cent of the government's 
total revenue (Urata and Yokota 1994, p. 447). Faced with this situation, the 
govemment raised import tax rates on machinery and other products in 1985, while 
strengthening export promotion measures by providing further incentives. However, 
in the early 1990s a number of drastic measures were initiated, to further liberalize the 
economy, and improve the market mechanism and also to promote industries. For 
instance, as part of the liberalization policy, complying with Article 8 of the 
Intemational Monetary Fund of May 1990, the second phase of liberalization of 
foreign exchange came into effect in April 1991. At the same time Thailand made an 
offer to GATT to reduce import duties on 1700 additional items. For example, as of 
October 1990, the tariff rate for production machinery was reduced from 20-40 per 
cent to 5 per cent (Sripaipan 1995, p. 149). Changes made, during the 1990s to 
improve the market mechanism suggest that Thailand is aware of the importance of 
improving competitiveness, to face the challenges arising from both developed as well 
as developing countries. 
7.4 Diverse Policy Instruments 
The previous discussion makes it clear that until the late 1960s import substitution 
policies dominated in Thailand. Afterwards, the Thai govemment altematively 
applied, and even sometimes simultaneously applied, both import substitution and 
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export promotion policies, but overall placed more emphasis on the latter. As noted 
earlier, protective policies were applied mainly to encourage import substituting 
industries whereas generous incentives were employed to stimulate export promoting 
industries, ft is often difficult to find the boundaries between the instmments appHed 
for promoting import substitution and for export promotion. Nevertheless, as in the 
previous two chapters, instmments applied for industrial promotion in Thailand will 
be discussed under those two broad categories, as import substitution related measures 
and export promotion and growth related measures. 
7.4.1 Import Substitution Related Measures 
(a) Measures for Promoting Industrial Targeting 
Though certain industry specific intervention strategies were adopted prior to the 
1990s, they were neither intensive nor well coordinated and planned. In particular, 
Thailand did not follow an ambitious program for developing heavy and chemical 
industries like that of Korea. Instead, successive Economic and Social Development 
Plans, beginning with the Second Economic and Social Development Plan, specified 
that certain industries require to be promoted. Taking these plans as a broad 
framework the Board of Investment (BOI) prepared a list of industries eligible for 
promotional privileges. 
The BOI, established in 1960 under the New Investment Promotion Act, played 
an active role in Thailand's industrialization process, particularly in activities relating 
to industrial promotion. Its main activities included identifying industries for 
promotion, issuing promotional certificates and negotiating incentive packages known 
as "promotional investment privileges". The BOI is chaired by the Prime Minister 
and involves several ministers, and therefore it has considerable authority. Although 
initially its activities were subject to cabinet approval, the introduction of the 
Promotion of Industrial Investment Act of 1977 allowed ft more flexibility and 
independence in carrying out its activities (Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997). 
Expanding its activities further during the early 1990s, the BOI sent missions abroad 
to attract investors to specific target areas of investment. There is evidence that in the 
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early 1990s the BOI began paying attention to supporting projects which gave priority 
to the transfer of technology and to developing the core industries benefiting related 
industries (Winwan 1994). BOI has also extended fts services, from being an 
incentive granting agency to being a service oriented adviser, providing technical 
expertise on investment related issues. 
The criteria used for selecting industries for promotional privileges are not 
made explicit and appear to be subjected to change from time to time. As noted 
earlier, development plans provide broad guidelines that are helpful in selecting 
industries for promotion. For instance, the Second Economic and Social 
Development Plan stressed the importance of promoting industries with growth 
potential. Industries identified for promotion under this plan thus included paper, 
chemical fertilizer, iron and steel, automobile assembly, cement, and textiles 
(Dhiratayakinant 1995, p. 101). Though the subsequent development plans specified 
certain industries for promotion, industrial targeting was given less priority in the 
poHcy agenda of Thailand until the early 1990s. 
Table 7.3 Targeted/Strategic Industries in Thailand 
Period Industries* 
The Seventh Economic and Social Development Electtonics, Metal Working and Machinery, 
Plan (1992-96) Pettochemical and Plastic, Textile, Food, Gems and 
Jewellery, Iron and Steel 
Note: * Within these industties certain products were identified for the purpose of technology 
upgrading (for further details see Table 7.5). 
Source: Sripaipan (1995, pp.166-167). 
More specific and explicit attempts towards industrial targeting became 
evident with the introduction of the Seventh Economic and Social Development Plan. 
For the first time, this plan targeted industries at sectoral level. The main economic 
criteria used for selection of industries included industry growth potential, 
competitiveness in intemational markets and linkage effects. Technology assessment 
criteria contained four factors, namely dynamism, versality, viability and accessibility. 
Together with these aspects, and with recognition of the social and environment 
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impact, seven industries (see Table 7.3) were selected as targeted industries under this 
plan (Sripaipan 1995, pp. 165-166). 
Table 7.4 Incentives of the Thai Board of Investment 
7. Guarantees 
Against nationalization 
Against competition of new state enterprises 
Against state monopolization of the sale of products similar to those produced by promoted person 
Against price conttols 
Permission to export 
Against imports by govemment agencies or state enterprises with taxes exempted 
. Protection Measures (subject to justification and needs) 
Imposition of surcharge on foreign products at a rate not exceeding 50 per cent of the CIF value for 
a period not more than 1 year at a time. 
Import ban on competitive products 
Authority by the Chairman to order any assisting actions or tax relief measures for the benefit of 
promoted projects 
. Permissions 
To bring in foreign nationals to undertake investment feasibility stadies 
To bring in foreign technicians and experts to work under promoted projects 
To own land for carrying out promoted activities 
To take or remit abroad foreign currency 
. Tax Incentives 
Exemption of business taxes on imported machinery 
50 per cent import duty reduction on machinery which is subject to import duty greater than or 
equal to 10 per cent 
Reduction of import duties and business taxes up to 90 per cent on imported raw materials and 
components 
Exemption of corporate income taxes 3 to 8 years with permission to carry forward losses and 
deduct them as expenses for up to 5 years 
Exertption of up to 5 years on withholding tax on goodwill, royalties or fees remitted abroad. 
Exclusion from taxable income of dividends derived from promoted enterprises during the income 
tax holiday 
. Additional Incentives for Export Enterprises 
Exemption of import duties and business taxes on imported raw materials and components 
Exemption of import duties and business taxes on re-exported items 
Allowance to deduct from taxable corporate income the amount equivalent to 5 per cent of an 
increase in income derived from exports over the previous years, excluding costs of insurance and 
ttansportation. 
Source: Thai Board of Investtnent as cited in Sen (1996, p. 146). 
A promotional certificate was the main tool applied for stimulating these 
industries. In order to enjoy promotional privileges, prospective investors had to first 
apply for promotional certificates. Those eligible for promotional certificates received 
preferential treatment. Typically such treatments included generous tax incentives, 
tariff exemptions, a guarantee of govemment protection from nationalization and from 
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direct competition by state enterprises, and guarantees of rights of profit and of capital 
repatriation (see Table 7.4). The range of incentives differed between the industries, 
depending on priority rankings in the promotion policy. 
Initially, industries were categorised into three groups and the extent of 
incentives depended on the categories to which an industry' belonged. For example, 
those industries categorised as group A normally received the highest level of 
promotion and were fully exempted from import duties and from business and sales 
tax on raw materials for five years, whereas group B industries were exempted to the 
extent of 50 per cent, and group C industries were exempted to the extent of one third, 
of these duties and taxes.^ 
This promotional privileges system begun in the 1960s continued until the 
1970s without much change except the merging of categories A and B. During this 
period almost all promotional certificates were awarded to the firms producing for the 
domestic market. By the 1980s, however, a few but significant changes were evident 
in this promotional system. Most importantly, the BOI gave priority to export 
projects, particularly to ones using local inputs. Projects which provided employment, 
were located outside the Bangkok and were in investment promotion zones, were also 
encouraged. At the same time separate categories were aboHshed. The projects that 
attracted the most generous incentives included: projects that generate significant 
employment opportunities; located outside Bangkok; support energy conservation and 
import substitution of energy; generate savings and foreign exchange eamings; and 
projects that are complementary to the development of basic industries (UNIDO 1992; 
Sen 1996). 
The methods applied for industrial promotion in Thailand in general, and 
industrial targeting in particular, suffered from a number of weaknesses. Firstly, 
through its industrial promotion Thailand consistently attempted to achieve a variety 
^ Industties were categorised into three groups: Group A included capital intensive industties such as 
the chemicals, electtical appliance, automobile and shipbuilding industties. Group B included 
assembling industties such as ttansport equipment assembly, agriculttiral machinery assembly, electtical 
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of objectives, some of which were in conflict. This has been the case up to the 
Seventh Economic and Social Development Plan. For instance the Sixth Economic 
and Social Development Plan called for the promotion of export oriented and small 
scale industries, while focusing on achieving regional balance simultaneously. It also 
emphasized the promotion of agrobased industries and engineering industries 
(Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, p. 150). 
Secondly, the absence of an integrated approach regarding industrial 
promotion hindered industrial progress. Due to the very nature of the decision making 
stmcture of Thailand, industrial activities are handled by a number of institutions. 
This makes it difficult to maintain a consistent approach. For instance, the NESDB 
specified the industries that they considered suitable for promotion. Under these 
specifications the BOI tried to promote industries mainly through promotional 
privileges. The latter however enjoying more powers, sometimes acted contrary to the 
NESDB plans. Thus, though the Economic and Social Development Plan specified 
the promotion of small scale industries, the BOI favoured large scale capital intensive 
industries (Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, p. 149). 
Thirdly, industrial promotion appeared to be less effective than it might have 
been because of certain administrative weaknesses. Among others, frequent changes 
of promotional criteria and the absence of consistent policies in granting promotional 
privileges, were particularly noteworthy (Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 80). Further, 
none of the implementing authorities developed performance criteria for measuring 
success against the stated policy objectives, and hence rarely evaluated in formal 
terms the performance of the firms that they promoted through these poHcies. 
appliance assembly. Group C included labour intensive and service industties such as food processing, 
clothing and textiles, hotels and intemational shipping (Suphachalasai 1995, p. 77). 
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7.4.2 Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
(a) Measures for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment has played a significant role in the industrialization process 
of Thailand. From the outset of its industrialisation process, Thailand followed 
liberal policies towards foreign investment and foreign companies were welcome for 
all manufacturing activities. Particularly, the Thai govemment did not make any 
distinction between domestic and foreign investment when providing incentives. 
Incentives such as the exemption from import duties and business taxes on imported 
raw materials, components, and re-export items, and selective exemption from 
business taxes and export duties applied equally to Thai or foreign firms since the 
early 1970s (Sen 1996, p. 147). Further, foreign firms which received the BOI 
promotion were entitled to obtaining all facilities without any restrictions. In 
particular, firms located in industrial zones and export processing zones were allowed 
to own land, bring in expatriate staff together with their spouses and dependents, and 
were exempt from import duties, business taxes on machinery for processing goods 
and on factory constmction materials^ (UNIDO 1992, p. 70). 
Nevertheless, and in spite of its general, laissez-faire approach to foreign 
capital, some limited restrictions were introduced in the 1970s. Due to the widespread 
nationalist sentiment, there were tighter investment controls after 1972. Two laws, 
namely the Alien Business Law and the Alien Occupation Law (1972), which 
emphasised Thai ownership came into force. The former specified certain business 
activities that could be undertaken only by firms with a majority of Thai ownership 
while the latter reserved certain occupations for Thai citizens mostly in services, 
handicrafts and agriculture (Suphachalasai 1995, p. 81). 
For example, foreign direct investment increased from US$ 45 million in 1970 to US$ 2.5 billion by 
1985. During 1970-75 foreign direct investment accounted for around 60 per cent of total capital 
inflow (Suphachalasai 1995, p. 78). 
Some resttictions however have been imposed regarding land ownership, and employing foreign 
expattiates. Foreigners were not allowed to own land in Thailand so they had to rely on long-term leases 
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As a cheap production site, Thailand appeared to be attractive to many foreign 
investors. Foreign investment in sectors like electrical appliances and parts, electronic 
and communications equipment and parts, toys and plastic products, motor vehicle 
components and parts and textiles, was attracted for this reason among others 
(UNIDO 1992, p. 67). Generous tax and tariff incentives, duty drawbacks and 
rebates, the streamlined application procedure and the professional manner in which 
the BOI interacted with potential investors - assisting potential investors both Thai 
and foreign to identify promising new projects and find partners for joint ventures -
also encouraged foreign direct investment in Thailand. The establishment of bonded 
warehouses and export processing zones involving the provision of generous 
incentives have been further influential in attracting investment.^ For instance, firms 
which engaged exclusively in manufacturing for exports were allowed to set up 
bonded warehouses and import duty free inputs for their export products. Firms 
located in EPZs were also provided with infrastmcture support and foreign investors 
were given freedom to own land, bring in foreign experts and remit foreign exchange 
abroad (Sen 1996, pp. 147-148). 
There were no explicit measures promoting indigenous firms through foreign 
investment, except the requirement of the majority of local equity needed for 
obtaining BOI incentives. This implicit requirement encouraged joint ventures. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the BOI favoured import substituting projects and joint 
ventures with Thai nationals. By the 1980s export oriented projects were given 
priority and ownership requirements were also eased depending on the extent of 
exports. Thus, firms where more than 50 per cent of output was produced for exports 
were allowed to have a majority of foreign share and firms which exported all of their 
output were authorized to have 100 per cent foreign ownership (Christensen et al. 
1993, p. 18). 
and there were some resttictions on the number of foreign technicians and managers who could work in 
Thailand (Christensen et al. 1993, p. 17). 
* By 1989, there were eighty nine factories which has given bonded warehouse states and four export 
processing zones. 
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In its initial period of industrialization, the US was the most important source 
of foreign direct investment, mainly in the areas of mineral resources and 
manufacturing. Since the mid 1980s, Japanese investment has played a dominant role 
in the economy of Thailand. Japanese investment went into areas where a Thai 
industrial base was almost absent, for example motor cars and electrical appliances, 
and where existing Thai industries required technical expertise, for example synthetic 
spinning and synthetic fibre production. Thus, Japanese direct investment in Thailand 
was largely concentrated in industries such as textiles, metals, electrical machinery 
and automobiles. Japanese investment appeared to have been effective in promoting 
coordination in industrial upgrading in some industries. For example, the Japanese 
hitemational Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been the major supporter of the Metal 
Working and Machinery Industries Development Institute, which provided technical 
support for small and medium sized firms (Christensen et al. 1993, p. 25). Apart 
from, that Japanese investment has been contributing to the Thai economy in several 
other ways. It has promoted market linkages between Thai and Japanese firms, 
developed sub-confracting networks, promoted information flows (for example, 
cooperation clubs in the automobile industry, which facilitated sharing information 
among Japanese and Thai makers of components) and strengthened the resources and 
capabilities of Thai firms to boost their bargaining power with the bureaucracy. 
Despite the continuous inflow of foreign direct investment to Thailand, the 
progress made in terms of the assimilation of technology appeared to be less 
satisfactory. The enclave nature of much foreign investment, such as in export 
processing zones, the preference of foreign investors' for buying foreign technology, 
and the lack of policy initiatives may have been partly responsible for the limited 
progress in technology development. 
' The appreciation of yen since tiie Plaza Accord of 1985 and the resultant need to avoid rismg labour 
costs in the home country, given the existence of a cheap and relatively efficient labour force in 
Thailand basically prompted the expansion of Japanese direct investment in Thailand. 
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(b) Measures for Promoting Technology 
Except the regulations regarding local content requirements, the measures introduced 
towards promoting food processing, gem and jewellery industries and some erratic 
measures towards rationalization of assembly industries, little effort had been taken in 
Thailand up to the mid 1990s to promote indigenous technology and to encourage 
industrial deepening. At that time four industries namely, motor vehicle assembly, 
motor cycle production, electric wire and steel production were subjected to local 
content requirements. In the case of motor vehicles, assemblers were required to 
source 54 per cent of their requirement of passenger car parts and 80 per cent of pick 
up tmck parts from domestic supplies by the late 1980s (UNIDO 1992, p. 136; Doner 
1991, p. 46; Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 80). 
Though the local content policy in assembly industries has been somewhat 
successful in achieving expected targets - as Doner (1991, p. 47) stated "Thai local 
content is acknowledged to be the highest in Southeast Asia" - this policy initiative 
has suffered from a number of weaknesses. Firstly, the local content policy allowed 
manufacturers to decide themselves which parts they would produce locally and 
therefore there was not much influence in raising domestic technological capabilities. 
Moreover, parts production involves substantial foreign exchange outlays since those 
industries largely depend on imports of raw materials and machinery (roughly 60 per 
cent for the early 1980s are included imported parts). 
The other significant measure that has been adopted for industrial upgrading is 
rationalization. Like the local content requirement, this has largely been limited to 
motor assembly industries. There was no control regarding the entry of assembling 
auto firms into Thailand in its early period of industrialization. By doing so it was 
expected that the competition would force weak firms from the market. This policy 
stance led to an increasing number of inefficient firms. To improve the efficiency of 
these firms, by early 1970s, there was a growing concem about the rationalization of 
industries. As a result, the Ministry of Industries announced several steps to 
rationalize the auto industry, particularly imposing limits on vehicle types, models, 
engine sizes, minimum capacity and investment in 1971. This rationaHzation process, 
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however, did not long last. With changes in political power, Hmitations imposed on 
vehicle type, engine size and model were dropped in 1972. Later in 1978 the 
govemment again adopted certain measures with the objective of improving the 
quaHty of Thai assembling products, including: a partial ban on CBU (completely 
built-up vehicle) imports and tariff revisions; a gradual increase and change in the 
method for computing local content and a ban on new assembly plants and vehicle 
models. The evidence suggests that this rationalization process was somewhat 
successful in the case of the diesel engine project, since the BOI decided to allow no 
more than three manufacturers. The overall success of both local content 
requirements and the rationalization process was, however, hindered by the conflicts 
of interest between Thai auto assemblers and parts manufacturers (UNIDO 1992, p. 
139; Doner 1991, p. 48, 199).^ 
In addition to the measures noted above, a wide variety of agencies were 
established to deal with the areas of science and technology. These mainly included: 
the establishment of the National Research Council in 1956, to encourage research 
and development and to systematically increase the scientific and technological 
capability of the country; the National Applied Science Research Institute in 1963, to 
take charge of implementing research in applied sciences and to promote and utilize 
natural resources; and the Ministry of Science Technology and Energy (MOSTE) in 
1979, for setting national policy and for planning in science technology and energy. 
The ability to sustaining economic growth in Thailand is widely seen to 
depend on the extent of improvement of technological status and human capital. 
Policy circles in Thailand have long been aware of their need to improve technological 
capabilities and since the early 1980s steps have been taken to improve both these 
aspects. ReaHsing the importance of technology development, for the first time, the 
Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) of Thailand focused on 
improving the technological status of the economy. This plan emphasised two issues: 
Regarding new tax reforms, local auto assemblers argued that those reforms would discriminate 
against locally produced cars in favour of imported ones and therefore they have called for a revision of 
the new tax stmcture. Further they pointed out that high production cost in the case of the automobile 
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the use of science and technology to increase production efficiency and the 
modification or improvement of imported technology. To achieve these objectives, 
this plan stressed the need for promoting the collection of basic data essential to 
technological development and appropriate foreign technology transfer, for increasing 
the country's scientific and technological research and for developing capability and 
mobilizing manpower for scientific and technological development. 
While maintaining similar objectives to those specified in the previous plan, 
the Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan of Thailand emphasized two other 
key issues: the necessity for developing cooperation between science and technology 
(S&T) units of all govemment agencies and the private sector; and establishing 
effective linkage between developers and users of S&T. To address these issues, this 
plan proposed: (1) to implement a S&T management system and infrastmcture 
development; (2) to increase the efficiency of S&T activities; (3) to undertake S&T 
manpower development and (4) to increase the efficiency of production (Sripaipan 
1995, p. 151). 
Likewise, the Seventh Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996) 
set targets (see Table 7.5 for industries targeted for technology development) to 
expand the use of technology in industry. These targets included: increase 
productivity at a rate of 2.6 per cent per annum; increase the supply of science and 
technology manpower in categories such as engineers, scientists, agriculturists, 
technicians and researchers; and increase the R&D expenditure to 0.75 per cent of 
GNP by 1996. 
To achieve those targets it was proposed to stimulate the private sector to 
utilize more technology by: 
• creating a competftive atmosphere, providing fiscal incentives, disseminating 
technologies to industries, improving govemment regulations and supporting the 
development of specific technologies for the targeted industries; 
industty was largely due to the high local content and therefore they demanded a reduction in local 
content requirements instead of reduction in import taxes. 
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• increasing the efficiency of technology acquisition and transfer, by building up 
bargaining power, promoting the diffusion of imported technology, upgrading the 
technological capability of state enterprises and monitoring the technology transfer 
program of large projects; 
• developing S&T manpower by accelerating the production of scientists, engineers, 
mathematicians and skilled labor in areas of high demand, building up the stock of 
university teachers and researchers, stressing the urgency for training and 
improving the working environment of academic staff; 
• organizing the R&D system to support industrial development by concentrating 
R&D on the selection, adaptation and improvement of imported technology, 
reorienting public R&D institutes to solve the technical problems of industry, 
supporting research in education institutions to serve as S&T knowledge centres; 
and 
• increasing the role of private sector R&D, through fiscal and financial incentives, 
domestic market development and intellectual property protection, and by 
developing R&D as a career for researchers (Sripaipan 1995, pp. 163-65). 
Such proposed measures had an impact in promoting an awareness of the role of 
science and technology among the private sector and in policy circles. Continuing 
emphasis on technology development thus led to the development of a number of 
science and technology cooperation agreements with foreign countries. With 
assistance from the US, thus Thailand was able to estabHsh a science and technology 
development project with total funds of US$ 49 million over a period of seven years. 
The introduction of the Law for Development of Science and Technology can be cited 
as another important step. Under this law the Science and Technology Development 
Board (STDB) was estabHshed, to administer a Science and Technology Development 
Fund, which obtained funds from the govemment and other sources, including 
intemational agencies. The law also established three national centers: the National 
Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology; the National Centre for Metals 
and Materials Technology (NCMMT) and the National Electronics and Computer 
Technology Centre (NECTEC). These were specialized research institutes with the 
role of carrying out research and development, both in-house and under contract from 
industry. These national centres emphasized three areas, namely biotechnology. 
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materials and electronics, which were designated as three targeted areas. In addition 
to these initiatives, low interest soft loans and fiscal incentives for R&D projects 
promoted by the BOI have been provided to stimulate the private sector. About 1200 
scholarships for advanced degrees in science and technology in industrialized 
countries were granted for future researchers and university teachers. Moreover, 
realising certain weaknesses, especially the lack of cooperation between various R&D 
institutions, attempts have been made by the Ministry of Science Technology and 
Enviromnent to foster university-research-industry Hnkages along the lines of a 
proposed science park concept (Sripaipan 1995, pp. 150-163; UNIDO 1992, p. 29). 
Table 7.5 Key Technologies and Proposed Strategies under the Seventh (1992-96) 
Economic and Social Development Plan in Thailand 
Key Technologies 
Electtonics - computer aided technologies; 
software engineering; circuit design process; 
technology production management; and 
mechanical technology 
Metal Working and Machinery - computer aided 
technologies; production management and metal 
working technologies such as casting, forging 
machining, heat tteatment, electtoplating and 
stamping 
Pettochemical and Plastic - compounding moulds 
for plastic products and production management 
technologies 
Textiles - the efficient use of modem machinery; 
production management and textile chemical 
technology 
Food - sterilization; production management; 
packaging and waste management 
Gems and Jewellery - a set of colour standards 
for gems; computer aided technologies and 
precious metal metallurgy 
Iron and Steel - ladle technology; steel alloying 
Proposed Strategies 
Promotion of investments in high technology 
products manufacturing; promotion of needed 
supporting industties; promotion of product 
design and development of target products such as 
personal computers small PABX mobile 
telephone, facsimile and application-specific 
integrated circuits (ASIC) 
Promotion of investment in machine tools 
industry; promotion of metal working industries; 
promotion of mould and die industry 
development; and development of automotive 
parts such as engines, ttansmissions, steering 
systems, and suspension systems 
Improving plastics properties from commodity 
plastics to intermediate and engineermg plastics; 
and establishing a design centte to provide 
products, mould and die design. 
Subconttacting of world famous brand name 
manufacturing; promotion of investment for 
dyeing industry; and promotion for switching to 
modem machinery 
Planting of fruits and vegetables to industry 
standard; the use of modem machinery and 
incentives for waste utilization technologies 
Establishing gem standards; R&D m precious 
metal alloying; and tariff rate reduction for R&D 
equipment 
Increasing the efficiency of furnaces; and 
acquiring alloy steel casting technology 
Source: Sripaipan (1995, pp. 166-167). 
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(c) Measures for Promoting Human Resources and R&D 
Thailand largely relied on imported capital goods and foreign direct investment for its 
technology acquisition requirements. Though foreign direct investment contributed to 
the economy in the form of product management and process technology, the 
contribution was less significant with regard to design or product specific technology. 
The overall status of science and technology in Thailand, especially R&D and human 
capital generation, remained at a comparatively low level in comparison to other 
comparable Asian countries. On the one hand, the lower innovative capacity of Thai 
companies was indicated by the low level of expenditure on R&D. Thai companies 
only invested 0.1 per cent of their sales on R&D in the late 1980s which is well below 
the Asian NIEs (Sripaipan 1995, p. 159). The presence of multinational firms is 
another reason. Having their parent company situated abroad, where major innovative 
activities are undertaken, these firms do not feel the need to undertake development 
work locally. Apart from these factors, excess demand due to a high growth economy; 
govemment poHcies that limited the number of companies entering individual sectors; 
high import taxes on R&D equipment and precision instmments; taxes on royalties 
and license fees for foreign technology; and shortage of technical manpower have all 
been cited as factors that further discouraged R&D development (Sripaipan 1995, p. 
159). 
(d) Measures for Fulfilling Financial Needs 
Control over the allocation of loan funds, which was considered to be a powerful tool 
in controlling industrial development in countries such as Korea, has been less 
significant in the economy of Thailand, perhaps due to the nature of its financial 
stmcture. Like many other developing counfiies, Thailand's financial market contains 
both organized and unorganized sectors. In the former, commercial banks play a 
dominant role. Contrary to the prevailing practices in other Asian countries, these 
commercial banks are controlled by the private sector. In the 1990s, sixteen local 
banks, owned by families of Chinese origin, and fourteen foreign banks were involved 
in financial activities in Thailand. Besides providing finance to industries, the banks 
also provide services in intemational trade and money fransfers, loan guarantees, 
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syndicated loans for industries specified by the Bank of Thailand and direct joint 
investment in private business securities. Local banks appear to be more organized 
and, under the Thai Bankers Association, they exercise certain amount of control over 
the activities affecting the banking industry. For example, they collectively set the 
standard rates for service charges and loan rates. This type of activity has become 
possible partly due to the concentrafion of ownership and also to their ability to 
function as a cartel-like stmcture (Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 39). 
However, the Bank of Thailand exercises a certain amount of control over the 
activities of banks, particularly through legislation to limit concentration and by 
setting ceiHngs on both deposit and lending rates. With the objective of providing 
finance for priority sectors at concessional rates, the Bank of Thailand also started 
rediscount facilities. This facility is operated through the commercial banks and has 
been available for short-term credit since the 1950s. Initially, though this 
rediscounted facility has largely been allocated to rice exports, it has later been 
extended to other agricultural and industrial activities (Sen 1996, p. 148). Apart from 
the commercial banks, the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand, established in 
1960, also plays a significant role by providing long-term project finance for private 
industries and by holding shares in companies in order to strengthen the confidence of 
shareholders, particularly at the initial stage. 
Although there are some regulations on domestic borrowing and lending rates, 
private foreign borrowing has been relatively free in Thailand. Commercial banks and 
large companies have used this foreign borrowing as a means of adjusting their 
liquidity positions.^ However, this process has certain impHcations for Thailand's 
financial system. In particular, this feature makes local liquidity highly responsive to 
changes in foreign interest rates and exchange rates, thus often creating excess 
liquidity when the world interest rate declines. This occurs because local commercial 
"It seems that when the foreign interest rate was high or when there was speculation about a bhat 
devaluation, capital inflow tended to slow down. Capital outflows, while officially requiring Bank of 
Thailand approval occur through quasi legal channels such as ttansfer pricing. Domestic interest rates 
consttained by the ceilings set by the Bank of Thailand do not rise correspondingly. As a result, 
liquidity in the domestic money market is tight. The reverse is tme when foreign interest rates are low 
or the baht is sttong" (Warra and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 42). 
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banks have a rather limited portfolio choice, since the country's capital market is not 
well developed and capftal outflow in the form of investing in foreign assets is tightiy 
regulated (Warra and Nidhiprabha 1996, p. 42). Relaxing this regulatory 
environment, several financial market reforms were introduced in the early 1990s. 
These reforms extended the capacity of commercial banks to engage in foreign 
exchange transactions without seeking prior approval from the Bank of Thailand, and 
HberaHzed capital account transactions (Islam and Chowdhury 1997). These reforms 
were among many factors relevant to the financial crisis in Thailand and other 
countries of East Asia in late 1997, but this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
{e) Measures for Promoting Regionalization of Industries 
One of the most notable features of Thailand's industrial development is the high 
concentration of industries surrounding Bangkok. According to the available 
evidence in 1987, manufacturing establishments in Bangkok and surrounding 
provinces accounted for nearly 60 per cent of all manufacturing establishments in the 
whole kingdom (Poapongsakom 1995, p. 116). To address this issue, a number of 
steps have been taken by successive governments in Thailand. For example, the BOI 
included certain regional policy elements in its incentive packages, particularly by 
providing special incentives for industries located outside the Bangkok area. 
With the objective of reducing the concentration of industries in Bangkok and 
surrounding cities, and more generally for regional development, the BOI introduced 
different zones, announcing that firms located outside Bangkok would be given 
preferential privileges. Initially, in 1973, the BOI designated seventy-two districts in 
twenty-one provinces as investment promotion zones. Due to the difficulties in 
promoting such a large number of areas with limited resources, in 1978 the location 
scheme was altered to four zones and later in 1987 these promotional zones were 
further limited to three zones (Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, pp. 156-157). 
The BOI promotion approach of 1987 divided the country's 73 
provinces into three different investment promotion zones. Zone 1: Bangkok and its 
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Table 7.6 Spatial Aspects of Board of Investment Incentives and Privileges in 
Thailand, 1978-1993 
1978-82 
Special Incentives 
Business Tax on Sales: 50 per cent reduction for 5 years for Zones 1 and 2 and lEs; 75 per cent for 
Zones 3 and 4 
Corporate Income Tax: 50 per cent reduction for 5 years; double deduction of ttansport costs for 8 
years for Zones 1, 2 and lEs; 10 years for Zones 3 and 4; deduction of 10 per cent of cost of 
installing or building infrastmctore facilities for Zones 1 and 2; 20 per cent for Zones 3 and 4 
1983-1987 
Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
• 3-5 years depending on level of investment or employment, extendible to 8 years for projects 
which: save or eam $US 500,000 net foreign exchange in first three years, an agro-based, used 
domestic supplies for 50 per cent of total production cost, and locate factories in lEs or outside 
Bangkok. 
Tax Exemption Machinery and Equipment 
• Projects located in lEs, in Bangkok and Samut Prakam; projects that export 80 per cent of output 
Special Incentives 
• Corporate Income Tax: 50 per cent reduction for 5 years for Zones 1, 2, 3, 4 or lEs and outside 
Bangkok if invest 300 million baht, employ 200 persons, save or eam US$ 1 million net foreign 
exchange in the first 3 years, an agro-based, and export 50 per cent of output; double deduction of 
10 per cent of the costs of installing or building infrastmcmre for Zones 1 and 2; 20 per cent for 
Zones 3 and 4 
1985 (Projects in lEs) 
Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
• Additional exemption for 3 more years for projects located in lEs in Zones 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Tax Exemption Machinery and Equipment 
• Tax exemption for projects located in lEs, in Bangkok and Samut Prakam regardless of exports 
Special Incentives 
• Business Tax on Sales: 90 per cent reduction for first 3 years and 75 per cent for following 2 years 
for projects in lEs, in Chiang Mai and Lampbun for proposals submitted before 12/31/1988 
• Corporate Income Tax: 50 per cent reduction for 5 years for projects located m lEs, m Zones 1, 2, 
3, and 4 
1987-1988 
Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
• Zone 1: exemption of 3 years for projects satisfying 2 or more of following: export less than 80 per 
cent, eam foreign exchange, employ 200 people 
• Zone 2: 3 year exemption extendible up to 5 years for projects which eam foreign exchange, an 
agro based, use domestic supplies for at least 60 per cent of inputs, employ 200 persons, locate in 
lEs 
• Zone 3: for target activities 4 year exemption extendible up to 8 years; for projects which eam 
foreign exchange, an agro based, use domestic supplies for at least 50 percent of inputs, employ 
200 persons, located in lEs. ^ 
Tax Exemption Machinery and Equipment 
• Zone 1: no exemption except projects which export not less than 80 per cent 
• Zone 2: 50 per cent reduction except the followmg projects which will be granted full exemption: 
export not less than 80 per cent, locate in lEs 
• Zone 3: exemption for both target and general activities 
Special Incentives (all projects located in Zone 3) 
• Business tax on sales: 90 per cent reduction for 5 years 
• Corporate income tax; 50 per cent reduction for 5 years; double deduction from taxable income of 
water, electticity and ttansport costs for 10 years; deduction from net profit of 25 per cent of costs 
of installing or building infrastmcture 
Other Incentives 
• For target activities in Zone 3: 50 per cent reduction of import duty and business tax on raw 
213 
materials used to produce for the domestic market; for I year; exemption of import duty and 
business tax materials used for manufacture of exports for 5 years 
1989 to April 1993 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
• Zone 1: exemption of 3 years for projects satisfying one of the following: export not less than 80 
per cent and locate in IE; produce or supply specific raw materials or parts and locate in IE 
• Zone 2: 3 year exemption extendible up to 5 years for projects which eam foreign exchange, 
produce or supply specific raw materials or parts, an agro-based, use domestic supplies for at least 
60 per cent of inputs, locate in lEs 
• Zone 3: same as previous except general activities can obtain exemption for up to 8 years 
Tax Exemption Machinery and Equipment 
• Zone 1: no exemption except projects which export not less than 80 per cent or are classified under 
category 5.49; produce or supply specific raw materials or parts; locate in IE 
Zone 2: 50 per cent reduction except the following projects which would be fully exempted (export 
80 per cent or more, are classified under category 5.49, produce or supply specific raw materials or 
parts, manufacture engineering products, an agro-based, use domestic supplies for at least 60 per 
cent of inputs, locate in lEs 
Zone 3: exemption for both target and general activities 
Special Incentives (All projects located in Zone 3) 
• Business tax on sales.- 90 per cent reduction for 5 years 
• Corporate income tax.- 50 per cent reduction for 5 years; double deduction from taxable income of 
water, electticity and ttansport costs for 10 years; deduction from net profit of 25 per cent of costs 
of installing or building infrastmcture 
Other Incentives 
• For target activities in Zone 3: 50 per cent reduction of import duty and business tax on raw 
materials used to produce for the domestic market for 1 year; exemption of import duty and 
busmess tax on raw materials used for manufacture of exports for 5 years 
1993 onwards 
Corporate Income Tax Exemption 
• Zone 1: 3 years exemption if located in IE, promoted zone and export 80 per cent or more of 
industtial output; (if these criteria are not satisfied no exemption is granted) 
• Zone 2: 3 years exemption extended to 7 years if located in an IE or promoted Zone 
• Zone 3: 8 years tax exemption 
Tax Exemption Machinery and Equipment 
• Zone 1: 50 per cent reduction on machinery if located in IE, promoted Zone or if export 80 per cent 
or more of total sales as long as machinery is not included in the tariff reduction notification of the 
Ministry of Finance and subject to duty greater than or equal to 10 per cent of value 
• Zone 2: 50 per cent import duty reduction on machinery subject to same resttictions as Zone 1 
• Zone 3: exempt from import duty on machinery 
Special Incentives 
• Zone 3: double deduction from taxable income for water, electticity and ttansport costs for 10 
years from the date of first sales; 25 per cent of the installation costs or constmction costs 
associated with projects infrastmcture facilities is deductible from net profit 
Other Incentives 
• Zone 1: exempt from duty on raw or essential materials used in export products for a period of one 
year, for projects exporting at least 30 per cent of total sales 
• Zone 2: exempt from duty on raw or essential materials used in export products for a period of one 
year if export at least 30 per cent of total sales 
• Zone 3: exempt from duty on raw or essential materials used in export products for five years if 
export at least 30 per cent of total sales; 75 per cent reduction of duty on raw and essential 
materials used for domestic sales production for five years, renewable armually 
Source: Biggs et al. (1990, cited in Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, pp. 179-181). 
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five neighbouring provinces. Zone 2: ten provinces surrounding Zone 1, and Zone 3: 
the rest of the country plus the Eastem Seaboard Development Region.'° Industnes 
located in Zone 3 were entitled to obtain increased promotional privileges, such as 
reductions in import duties on raw materials and components and corporate tax 
exemptions for five years, whereas industries located in other zones were provided 
with less generous privileges (see Table 7.6 for more details). In general, since the 
mid 1980s the BOI ceased to grant investment privileges to projects located around 
Bangkok, but it has made exceptions for large export oriented firms with at least 200 
employees. By the early 1990s, these restrictions became much more severe. For 
instance, under the criteria issued in 1993, certain industries would no longer be 
promoted if they were located in Zone 1, even if they were primarily exporters. 
Accordingly, promotional privileges are exclusively limited to textile producers 
located in Zone 3 and electronics firms locating in either Zone 2 or Zone 3 
(Poapongsakom and Fuller 1997, p. 157). 
7.5 Conclusion 
Like other developing countries, Thailand had predominantly been dependent upon 
agriculture when it began its industrialization process in the early 1960s. Within a 
short period of time however, Thailand has been able to achieve remarkable economic 
and industrial progress 
Study of the incidence of industrial policies of Thailand reveals a number of 
distinguishing features, that again differ from other comparable countries on several 
accounts. Firstly, differences are evident in pohcy measures and applications, since 
the Govemment of Thailand has exercised limited control over industrial activities 
compared to countries like Korea and Malaysia. Thailand neither followed specific 
industrial plan-nor followed industry specific intervention as intensively as in Korea. 
Secondly, in addition to export promotion, generation of employment and achieving 
economic growth, Thailand has made concerted efforts towards promoting spatial 
balance, primarily due to the concentration of manufacturing industries around the 
'° See UNIDO (1992, p. 70) for details. 
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vicinity of Bangkok. Thirdly, for her technology transfer needs Thailand also largely 
relies on foreign direct investment as did Malaysia. 
Certain country-specific factors, such as an enthusiastic private sector, the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by policy makers in decision making, the shared 
ideological values of the policy makers in terms of preference for market mechanisms, 
and goveming stmcture of Thailand, which was also different from other comparable 
countries, have played a significant role in the industrial development process in 
Thailand. 
The diversity apparent in policy measures and their applications across the 
three countries reviewed (Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) is likely to be significant in 
terms of the analyses of their industrial performance. Thus, an analysis incorporating 
these diversities may be necessary to obtain meaningful results in terms of the 
outcome or impact of industrial policies. 
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Part C: Measuring the Incidence and Effects of Industrial Policies: 
The Case Study of Korea 
8. Measuring the Incidence 
8.1 Introduction 
As has been discussed in Chapter 1, the role of govemment m economic development, 
particularly in industrial development, has been one of the contentious issues in 
economics. It is widely acknowledged that there may be a wide range of deviations 
from the competitive market paradigm - sunk costs, economies of scale, oligopoly, 
extemalities and complementarities, information and coordination failures, incomplete 
markets - which may justify govemment intervention to generate a more socially 
beneficial outcome. Yet, there has not been a consensus among economists on the 
potential role of govemment in achieving an improved outcome, even where market 
deficiencies occur. Some argue that deviations from the market paradigm are limited, 
and undue interferences from the govemment may lead to an ineffective outcome. By 
contrast, others argue that market failures are so pervasive in practice that in certain 
circumstances, govemment intervention can be effective. 
Reaching a consensus view has become even more difficult, partly due to the 
lack of empirical evidence proving any of these theoretical arguments and partly due 
to the mixed results reported from the few existing empirical studies. This is 
particularly the case in regard to views supporting govemment intervention, to which 
this thesis pays particular attention. For instance, as it is clear from the discussions in 
Chapter 3, very few explicit empirical studies have been carried out which examine 
the economic effects of govemment intervention, in particular the effects of industry 
specific intervention. Moreover, these studies have so far failed to establish 
unambiguous conclusions regarding the effectiveness of industrial policies partly 
because of various empirical and conceptual shortcomings. 
Firstly, the existing studies do not apply a uniform conceptual mechanism. 
The terms 'industrial policy' and 'industry specific intervention' are not ordy 
perceived differently but are also analysed with different analytical techniques. As is 
obvious from the discussion of existing empirical studies included in Chapter 3, the 
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methodological differences, arise from either the nature or the scope of the study, are 
in part responsible for generating mixed results for in terms of the effectiveness of 
policy. Secondly, given that with different interpretations and analytical techruques 
used the question of inconsistent results in terms of the effectiveness of policy 
outcome may not be surprising. Nevertheless, almost all the empirical studies 
generalised their specific results in terms of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
industrial policies as a whole. These generalizations however, are questionable on 
several counts. Some empirical studies (Agrawal et al. 1996) derive their conclusions 
by comparing aggregate value-added and exports over various years. The 
improvement or decline of aggregate value-added or exports performances of a 
particular country has a limited value for assessing the effectiveness of industrial 
policies, since these indicators could be influenced by several other extemal as well as 
intemal factors. 
Moreover, the inferences made by the existing empirical analyses of industrial 
policies can be questioned on the grounds of their inability to incorporate the diversity 
of industrial policies into their analytical framework. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 
practice there are more complex situations than presumed by the theories. Against 
this background, it is necessary to pay due attention to the diversity of industrial 
policies, both for identifying industries that have been favoiu-ed over others and for 
analysing their tme impact on the economy. However, the effects of govemment 
intervention have been evaluated by almost all the existing studies, without paying 
due recognition to the diverse aspects or the incidence of industrial policies. 
Against this background what is now required is fiirther empirical analyses 
diat incorporate these diversity into their analytical techniques. Given tiie complex 
nature of these diversities, ft may also be important to analyse the effectiveness of 
industrial policies on country-specific basis. As part of this process, this study will 
make an initial attempt to apply the broad methodology outline above (see Chapter 4) 
to evaluate the effectiveness of industrial policies in Korea. 
The empirical analysis in relation to Korea, as noted in Chapter 4, will contain 
in three parts. The first part will include measuring the incidence of industrial policies 
and this chapter devoted to this task. Section 8.2 of this chapter includes a brief 
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review of diverse characteristics of sample countries. Section 8.3 contains the 
analytical techniques adopted for ascertaining the magnitude of industrial promotion. 
Incidence measures used as proxies for determining the magnitude of industrial 
promotion in present investigation will be organized under two categories as export 
promotion and growth related measures and import substitution related measures in 
this section. Chapter 9 will develop methods for assessing the potential outcome of 
industrial policy in Korea, while Chapter 10 will examine some evidence in relation to 
the role of industrial policies in generating these outcomes. 
8.2 Diversity ofPolicies: The Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
Broadly speaking, all the sample countries under study started their industrialization 
processes by means of substituting imports, with the hope of satisfying domestic 
market needs and overcoming balance of payment problems. Realising the limitations 
of such approach with the passage of time, however, industrial policies were directed 
towards export promotion. Industrial activities relating both to import substitution 
and export promotion simultaneously continued in all three countries, with their 
priorities changing from time to time. In this process, Korea paid considerable efforts 
to achieving economic growth through its industrial policies while emphasizing the 
importance of national sovereignty and industrial deepening. Malaysia has given 
priority to redressing social imbalances - particularly towards stimulating Malay 
participation - over economic growth for almost two decades, through her process of 
industrialization. Thailand, while continuing both import substitution and export 
promotion, has made concerted efforts towards spatial balance, especially after mid 
1970s, mainly due to the concentration of industries around Bangkok. Although it has 
paid greater attention to economic growth through industrial policies than Malaysia, 
industrial deepening has not given much consideration like Malaysia until late 1980s. 
Overall, it appears that Korea operated her industrial policies with clearly outlined 
objectives than did the other sample countries. 
Apart from the deviations of objectives of industrial policies noted above, two 
other country-specific factors, namely industrial stmcture and the nature of the 
decision making process, which had a significant influence on the industrial 
development process of these countries, are worth mentioning. The industrial 
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stmcture of Korea is entirely different from that of other two countries. In Korea, the 
industrial stmcture is dominated by a small number of large firms - mainly by the 
chaebols which are family owned conglomerates. Though many private sector 
functions - ranging from planning, coordinating and even making decisions regarding 
industrial expansion - have been subjected to the scmtiny of the goverrunent, private 
sector initiatives can be largely credited for the continuous grov^ of Korean 
industries. This is particularly so in relation to their contribution to developing 
indigenous technology, iimovative capacity and sustainable development in the 
industrial sector. As in Korea, the private sector, both foreign and local, continues to 
dominate the industrial sector in Thailand. However, the majority of these firms are 
of medium and small scale. On the contrary, state own enterprises play a major role 
in industrial activities until the mid 1980s, in Malaysia. 
The decision making stmcture is another important ingredient in implementing 
industrial policies effectively, and is also one which varies considerably between 
these three countries. The centralized decision making stmcture of Korea, is staffed 
by the best managerial talent available in the economy, and is relatively free from 
strong pressure groups and enjoys a high degree of autonomy in decision making. 
These characteristics, together with sound institutional mechanisms enabled Korea to 
follow consistent and integrated approach as regards to industrial development. Like 
Korea, Thailand also possesses a decision making stmcture that is free from strong 
pressure groups. Policy makers thus enjoy a considerable autonomy, except indirect 
influences arising from cormption. Even then, distinguished characteristics of 
decision making process of Thailand, in particular the shared belief that market forces 
combined with pmdent public sector infrastmcture are important in achieving 
economic growth, prevent policy makers exercising undue influences on private 
sector decision making . Lack of integrated approach and of consistent views among 
the major institutions, such as National Economic and Social Development Board and 
Board of Investment, have however hindered the progress of its industrial 
development. In contrast to both these countries, interest groups are powerful in the 
economy of Malaysia. Due to the strong influence of interest groups Malaysian 
policy makers have been forced to place priority on achieving social objectives -
especially the redistribution of wealth and of economic activity from non Malays to 
the Malay community - over economic efficiency 
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Apart from these country-specific variances, the measures applied for 
promoting industries also show significant differences across the three countries. All 
the sample countries, have relied on protective measures such as tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions and on various other generous incentives that stimulate export 
promotion, such as tax concessions, preferential loans and so on have been practiced 
elsewhere. In addition to these common measures, Korea has applied a number of 
intensive measures, including control over the allocation of loan funds, and state 
initiated mergers. In particular its application of administrative guidance -
performance standards either setting export/production targets or rewarding winners 
and punishing losers - is most notable. None of these intensive measures have been 
applied to the same degree in either Malaysia or Thailand. 
Differences are also evident between countries with regard to foreign direct 
investment and to fulfilling their technology transfer needs. As it is clear from 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, all three countries have depended upon imported technology and 
foreign direct investment for their technology transfer requirements. However, the 
policy stance towards foreign direct investment in Korea has been somewhat less 
liberal than that of Malaysia and Thailand. In particular, the Korean govemment was 
interested in the quality of the foreign investment rather more than in the quantity of 
that investment. To ensure the fiill potential benefits of foreign direct investment 
were realised, the Govemment of Korea required foreign firms to adapt to national 
priorities, and foreign investment has been subjected to tight investment screening. 
Moreover, Korea has made concerted efforts to develop indigenous technology while 
copying foreign products through 'reverse engineering,' and with emphasis in R&D 
and human capital development. Instead of these extensive efforts, both Malaysia and 
Thailand have mainly relied on foreign direct investment for their technology transfer 
needs. Both these countries have promoted export promoting zones and bonded 
warehouses, for the purpose of atfracting foreign direct investment in larger scale. 
Fewer efforts have yet been made by these countries towards improving indigenous 
technology and towards also obtaining the fiill potential benefits of foreign direct 
investment. The relative absence of such measures in these countries could partly be 
atttibuted to the lack of skilled manpower capable to develop indigenous technologies 
and to monitor technology fransfer agreements. 
222 
A somewhat similar story is evident as regards to industry specific 
intervention also. As it is clear from the discussion included in Chapter 5, among 
Asian countries Korea applied industry specific intervention most vigorously, more 
often with strong preferential treatments of related industries. Over the period 1973-
81, Korea deliberately encouraged heavy and chemical industries, which were capital 
and knowledge intensive in nature. The criteria for selecting these hidustries, though 
not always made explicitly clear, in general favoured industries which were seem to 
have fiiture growth potential, long-term competitive advantage and linkage effects on 
other industries. When compared to Korea, industry specific intervention was not so 
intensive in both Malaysia and Thailand. Through its industry specific intervention 
policies, Malaysia has placed significant emphasis on promoting resource based 
industries (since early 1980s), in addition to the some heavy industries which are 
capital intensive. As a country well endowed with natural resources, Malaysia 
considered that promoting resource based industries provided an avenue for gaining 
comparative advantage and enhancing linkage effects. As it is clear from Chapter 7, 
the concept of industry specific intervention is rarely used in the literature for 
describing industrial policies in Thailand. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the 
existence of some industry specific intervention, given the presence of promotional 
privileges in Thailand. By providing these promotional privileges, Thailand expects 
to promote industries that possess growth potential. As industrialization progressed, 
these promotional privileges have been increasingly directed towards achieving 
spatial balance.
 In light of these factors it is clear that industry specific intervention 
has not been exclusively limited to capital and knowledge intensive industries in both 
Malaysia and Thailand. These characteristics further suggest that sector selection has 
not been common across the three countries. 
In the light of these factors it is clear that it is not appropriate to put all 
countries into one basket as far as the incidence of industrial policies are concemed. 
Put it another way, countries undertake highly individualistic industrialization 
programs. Though there are some common elements between countries, it appears 
that country-specific factors, policy measures applied and sectors identified for 
support, differ significantly between these sample countries. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of industrial policies, therefore, it is important to take into account these 
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diversities. With this task in mind, an altemative analytical method is adopted in the 
following section to measure the incidence of industrial policies in the case of Korea. 
8.3 Empirical Assessment of Incidence Measures 
The broad incidence of industrial policies in Korea, in particular in regard to the 
purposes for which industrial policies have been pursued, the industries to which they 
have been applied, the policy instruments which have been used, and the way in 
which these instmments have changed from time to time over the period 1960-1997, 
have been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Supplementing this qualitative analysis, 
an attempt will be made here to assess the impact of incidence of industrial policies 
quantitatively. 
To carry out this task meaningfully, detailed quantitative analysis of incidence 
measures and of industrial performance over a long period, and at a disaggregated 
level, would be appropriate. However, this case study has been of necessity 
undertaken without access to the unpublished data resources of the Korean 
Govemment and its agencies. Relying only on published sources seems that finding 
data representing incidence measures at disaggregated level is a difficult task, and this 
is tme also for data representing industrial performance indicators such as value-
added, and exports at disaggregated industry level over long period of time. Subject 
to these data constraints, an initial empirical investigation of incidence measures for 
diese at disaggregated level is carried out in the following section, while performance 
measures are addressed in Chapter 9. Given the data limitations, these analyzes can 
be taken as illustrative only. But they are intended to show that a detailed application 
of the proposed methodology, using access to unpublished data sets, would be 
valuable in terms of the empirical assessment of the impact of industrial policies. 
As part of this empirical assessment, an attempt will be made to assess the 
magnitude of industrial promotion in each industrial sector (at two-digit ISIC level). 
For this task, the dynamic characteristics of a number of selected industrial policy 
measures, which have been used to stimulate industrial development, will be 
reviewed. The primary purpose of this exercise is to ascertain the extent of industry 
specific intervention at disaggregated level, while incorporating the diverse 
224 
characteristics of industrial policies into the analytical framework. With the aid of 
these incidence measures an analytical framework will be set up so as to separate 
higHly promoted industries, by various criteria, from less promoted industries. 
8.3.1 Assessing the Magnitude of Industrial Promotion with Incidence Measures 
There is ample evidence, reviewed in Chapter 5, that Korea played an intensive role in 
planning, monitoring and inducing private firms to invest in targeted industries. 
However, it is much less clear in detail which industries were promoted, and to what 
extent they were promoted at the expense of others in given periods. In general, the 
available empirical literature (see Chapter 3) cites the heavy and chemical industries 
as the ones which have been largely promoted through preferential treatments relative 
to other industries. Except for the fact that these heavy and chemical industries are 
specified as targeted indusfries in the development plans (see Table 5.3), one can not 
find logical evidence justifying this general perception. In contrast, some others 
(Rodrik 1994b; Hong 1979) point out that preferential treatment has also been given 
to light manufacturing industries, such as textiles and clothing and electronics. The 
ambiguity regarding the targeted industries remains partly because of the lack of 
measurement criteria for identifying preferentially treated industries from others. 
More specifically, no attempt has yet been made to determine the extent of 
preferential treatment, other than stating that certain industries have been 
preferentially treated through financial, tax and other incentives. 
To be able to decide which industries were preferred, and the extent of 
preferential treatment some kind of measurement criteria are therefore required. For 
this task, this study will develop incidence measures as proxies for measuring the 
magnitude of industrial promotion in particular industries, at particular times. Given 
die comprehensive, dynamic nature of industrial policies as discussed in Chapters 2 
and 4, setting up a framework for analytical purposes becomes a difficuft task. 
Nevertheless, incidence measures, which represent proxies for evaluating the 
magnitude of industrial promotion, will be organised under two broad criteria, namely 
export promotion and growth measures and import substitution measures. 
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The organization of incidence measures under these two broad criteria is due 
to two main reasons. Firstly, these two categories represent Korea's major policy 
goals over the period being studied. As the available evidence suggests, Korea 
pursued its industrialization process for the purpose of achieving the primary 
objectives of increasing exports, enhancing other growth related measures such as 
developing technological capability and achieving self-sufficiency in certain industrial 
products. For instance, as noted in Chapter 5, the most important policy goals that 
were outlined in the consecutive Five Year Development Plans in Korea were (1) 
export promotion and growth in the manufacturing sector (2) the promotion of 
industrial self sufficiency in selected heavy and chemical manufacturing industries 
and (3) technology development (Suh 1981; Hong 1979). 
These policy priorities have been encouraged through various measures 
including financial and tax incentives, subsidies and protective measures. Ample 
evidence suggests (Lee 1987; Sakong 1993) that these incentive measures, were more 
often subjected to the fiilfilment of policy priorities such as promoting exports, value-
added and propagate technologies. For example, preferential loans were largely 
allocated to preferred industries depending on their ability to satisfy export targets. 
Likewise, a varying combination of tax, financial and tariff incentives has been used 
in Korea to achieving its desired goals. 
Secondly, these two categories reflect the two major types of policy measures 
used in Korea. Korea often applied both import substitution and export promotion 
measures simultaneously, but with varying degree of intensity in different policy 
periods. As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2, Korea has undergone four major 
policy reforms during the period 1960-97: the import substitution phase (1950-1960); 
the export oriented (light) industrialization phase (1961-72); the Heavy and Chemical 
industry phase (1973-1981); and the stabilization phase while eliminating industry 
specific intervention (1982 onwards). Of these, the first three phases, particularly the 
period between 1961-81 are most notable as far as the industrialization process in 
Korea is concemed. In the subsequent period, beginning with 1982, Korea began to 
reverse its existing policy package. For example, with the stabilization measures 
inttoduced in 1982, the importance of industry specific intervention began to diminish 
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gradually over the time, with the policy emphasis shifting to a functional approach 
and liberalization. 
In its imtial stage of industrialization, until the 1960s, policy instruments were 
biased towards protective measures. By imposing quantitative restrictions and high 
tariffs, import substitution in light manufacturing industries, such as textiles and 
clothing, and food were promoted during this period. Export promotion policies 
became prominent as time passed, and as a result analysts began to identify the period 
after 1962 as the export oriented growth phase in Korea's development. Although the 
policy emphasis has shifted towards export promotion, Korea continued its import 
substitution focus, with the objective of reducing Korea's import dependence on 
heavy and chemical products. This was carried out selectively by the use of various 
promotional measures including (1) income and other business tax exemptions and 
reductions, (2) generous depreciation allowances, (3) an investment-tax deduction 
system, under which capital investment could be used to reduce taxable income, (4) 
long-term preferential loan provisions, (5) tariff protection and import restriction 
measures and (7) an industrial park system, by which the govemment provided such 
facilities as electricity, railway transportation facilities, bridges, the sanitary and 
sewage system, and the water system (Suh 1981; Hong 1979). 
Due to the factors noted above, and considering the importance attached to the 
simultaneous application of both export promotion and import substitution measures, 
the inclusion of both export promotion and growth measures and import substitution 
measures is important to ascertain the magnitude of industrial promotion. However, 
this task is severely constrained by the lack of published data on incidence measures 
at the sectoral (disaggregated) level. Therefore the quantitative analysis of incidence 
measures will be limited to the period 1960-1981.' The selection of this period is 
primarily due to the lack of data representing incidence measures at the sectoral level. 
But, as previously noted, this period may be viewed as the most important period, as 
far as measuring the incidence of industtial policies is concemed, because of the 
active govemment intervention and the adoption of intensive measures in this period. 
Due to the unavailability of data, in some cases the closest available year is taken as a proxy. 
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(i) Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
In this section an attempt will be made to examine the extent of industrial promotion 
received by each industrial sector at the two-digit level through export promotion and 
growth related measures. Two proxies, namely financial and tax incentives and 
incentives and associated measures related to technology development, will be 
included in this category to represent incidence measures and thereby to ascertain the 
extent of industrial promotion of each sector under certain assumptions. These cover 
the incentives that have been applied to promote exports, generate value-added and 
enhance technology. The evidence included in Chapter 5 suggests that financial and 
tax incentives have been largely directed towards export promotion. In addition, 
contrary to the prevailing practices in other countries, many of the import substitution 
industries in Korea have been encouraged for producing for export markets from the 
inception. On these grounds, it is reasonable to assume that most of the tax and 
financial incentives and the technology related measures have been applied for the 
purpose of promoting exports and growth. 
It is important to note, however, that drawing clear boundaries between export 
promotion and growth related measures and import substitution related measures is a 
difficult task in the case of Korea, since it has applied both measures simultaneously. 
Therefore treating tax and financial incentives and measures related to technology 
development as export promotion and growth related measures must be undertaken 
subject to qualifications. 
(a) Financial and Tax Incentives 
Theoretically, investment incentives are supported on the basis of market failure 
arguments arising from extemalities from production. Since extemalities create 
benefits that cannot be captured by the producers that generate the spillovers, they 
create a "wedge" between the private and social rates of retum. It is argued that, 
under these circumstances, an incentive to private investors up to the amount of this 
"wedge" might be warranted, to optimize total net benefits to society (UNCTAD 
1996, p. 9). Nevertheless, as we have seen, counter arguments can also raised against 
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these incentives, stating that they may mtroduce distortions in the production stmcture 
and also lead to unfair trade practices. 
In practice, investment incentives are widely used in developing countries as a 
tool for stimulating industries. The case of Korea provides several examples of this 
nature. Efficient allocation and maximum mobilization of capital resources were 
deemed necessary for Korea, due to chronic capital shortages since the initiation of its 
modemization process. Various policy tools were adopted by the govemment in this 
regard, ranging from direct govemment investment in some sectors to more 
sophisticated indirect incentives. The latter included generous financial and tax 
incentives that were directed towards promoting priority industries and desired goals, 
especially the promotion of exports. Despite widespread application of these 
incentives, finding published data at the sectoral level has been a difficult task. 
Therefore a proxy will be used in this study to represent these incentives, subject to 
certain assumptions. 
To represent both financial and tax incentives, the sectoral level cost of capital 
estimates which are available from a comprehensive study "Public Policy, Corporate 
Finance and Investment" carried out by Kwack (1985) will be applied in this study. 
These data are the best available source to date, since they cover all aspects of 
financial and tax incentives. For example, when estimating financial incentives, this 
study has taken into account the details such as the interest rate differential between 
policy loans and general loans, the proportion of policy loans (such as export loans), 
depreciation rates and inflation. Similarly, when estimating tax incentives, the details 
such as the statutory maximum corporate tax rates, surtax rates, investment tax 
credfts, tax holidays and direct exemptions from tax etc. have taken into account. 
However, it is important to note that these cost of capital estimates have been 
derived in this study under several assumptions and through various stages of 
estimation. Owing to the lack of detailed historical data on the performance of 
various tax incentives, for instance, this study has largely resorted to the statutory 
information and has ignored incentives for small and medium sized firms. When 
estimating the cost of capital, it assumed that Korean firms resort to the curb market 
for a marginal increase in their investment financing. With these assumptions, the 
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cost of capital estimates denote the margmal cost of capital of large corporations m 
Korea. 
These cost of capital estimates for Korea are reported in the Kwack study at 
the three-digft ISIC level, for three types of assets, for the period 1960-83. For the 
present investigation, these data have been adjusted at the two-digit ISIC level while 
adding three types of assets together. These data are then used to estimate the subsidy 
effects as outlined below. 
Measures of the distortions introduced into the cost of capital by govemment 
policies are calculated for each industrial sector in this study by taking the difference 
between a base cost of capital and the net estimated cost of capital. Thus, to obtain a 
measure of the subsidy effects, the cost of capital of each industry is estimated relative 
to the industrial sector with lowest cost of capital, which is paper and paper products. 
The subsidy effects shown in Table 8.1 are measured relative to the cost of capital in 
this base industry, and will understate the tme subsidy effect to the extent that there 
were some subsidies to this industry. It is assumed that this industry specific subsidy 
effect can be used as a measure of the financial and tax incentives received by that 
particular industrial categories. 
The primary objective of this exercise, as noted earlier, is to ascertain the 
extent of industrial promotion through financial and tax incentives which are taken to 
be targeted at promoting export and growth. As can be seen in Table 8.1, and also 
Chart 8,1, three industrial sectors - Basic Metal, Fab, Metal and Chemicals^ - have 
enjoyed more privileges in terms of tax and financial incentives than other industries. 
Overall, these data suggest that, through tax and financial incentives, Korea favoured 
those three industries more than other industries. 
Hereafter, mdusttial sectors will be mdicated with a short version as appears in Chart 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 Estimated Subsidy Effects by Industry, 1963-1983 
Sector 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Non Metallic Mmeral 
Basic Metal 
Fabricated Metal 
1963-69 
2.66 
3.02 
3.68 
0.00 
5.44 
2.40 
9.08 
4.48 
1970-76 
2.20 
4.87 
5.45 
0.00 
4.69 
2.23 
7.60 
5.90 
1977-83 
1.86 
5.50 
4.41 
0.00 
5.74 
2.27 
9.77 
6.93 
Average 
2.24 
4.46 
4.51 
0.00 
5.29 
2.30 
8.82 
5.77 
Source: Estimates of the author, based on capital cost estimates from Kwack (1985, p.I03-l 10). 
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(b) Incentives and Associated Measures Related to Technology Development 
For the purpose of enhancing technology development, countries use a variety of 
techniques such as promoting foreign direct investment, joint ventures, technology 
licensing and subsidies for R&D. Developing countries, which are lacking the 
required knowledge, skills and experience with compared to developed countries, tend 
to vigorously promote these techniques, in addition to providing generous fiscal, 
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financial and other incentives such as subsidized infrastmcture. In fact, the range of 
incentives available to multinational corporations, and the number of countries that 
offer such incentives, have increased considerably over the last two decades. In 
addition, many countries, especially developing countries, are using these incentives 
as tools of an overall industrial policy, linking such incentives to different objectives, 
mainly targeting investment activities to boost exports, technology and high value-
added. 
As a latecomer, Korea has also depended on foreign technology and used tax 
and financial incentives to promote industries that introduce and propagate advanced 
technologies. However, as noted in Chapter 5, the Korean policy stance towards 
promoting technology differs from other developing countries in certain respects. 
Firstly, they did not encourage foreign direct investment on a large scale as did other 
countries. Secondly, attempts were always made by Korea to maximize the potential 
benefits of technology transfer, while imposing certain requirements such as 
compatibility with policy goals, technology screening and so on. That means that 
only investments that were deemed beneficial to the economy were allowed. 
Considering the significance attached to technology development and thereby 
industrial development in Korea, the present investigation will select measures 
associated with technology development as another aspect of export promotion and 
growth related measures. Needless to say, the practical difficulties associated with 
constmcting such measures, specially the lack of data and the lack of transparency of 
these incentives at the sectoral level, is severe. 
Subject to these limitations, data representing number of foreign direct 
investment and technology licensing projects, presented in the study of Lee (1988) 
will be selected as a proxy for the extent of industrial promotion by these reasons. 
These data will be used here under the assumption that they reflect the policy 
priorities of Korea, especially promoting technology development. It is also assumed 
diat die number of projects, in a given industry in a given period, can be taken as a 
measure of die incentives provided or the priority attached to that particular sector. 
Given that no information available on the aspects of these projects (scale, intensity 
and cost), this clearly a large but necessary assumption. 
232 
Table 8. 2 Number of Technology Licensing Projects, 1962-1981 
Sector 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Basic Metal 
Fabricated Metal 
1962-71 
8 
14 
0 
4 
83 
12 
29 
135 
1972-76 
7 
24 
0 
3 
93 
9 
45 
210 
1977-81 
30 
41 
0 
7 
225 
34 
105 
653 
Total 
45 
79 
0 
14 
401 
55 
179 
998 
Source: Ministry of Finance as cited in Lee (1988, p. 190). 
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Table 8.3 Number of Foreign Direct Investment Projects, 1962-1981 
Sector 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Basic Metal 
Fabricated Metal 
1962-71 
13 
50 
0 
7 
53 
18 
20 
109 
1972-76 
24 
100 
0 
17 
88 
28 
66 
308 
1977-81 
13 
10 
0 
6 
31 
7 
21 
89 
Total 
50 
160 
0 
30 
172 
53 
107 
506 
Source: Ministry of Finance, as cited in Lee (1988, p. 190). 
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Foreign Direct Investment by Industry 
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Source: As for Table 8.3. 
Thus die data presented in Table 8.2 and 8.3, and in Charts 8,2 and 8.3, can be 
taken as a rough indicator of the level of industry specific intervention, in terms of the 
number of technology licensing and foreign direct investment projects. Both 
indicators again reveal comparatively higher preference to the three industries noted 
above - Fab. Metal, Chemicals and Basic Metal - relative to the light industrial 
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categories. The Fab. Metal sector has attracted the highest number of both technology 
licensing (998 projects) and foreign direct investment projects (506 projects) during 
the period 1962-81, The other most preferred sectors in terms of technology include 
Chemicals and Basic Metal sectors. The former has obtained 401 technology 
licensing projects and 172 direct investment projects, while the latter has attracted 179 
technology licensing projects and 107 foreign direct investment projects. These data 
also implicitly suggests the growing importance of technology licensing relative to 
that of foreign direct investment, since there were relatively higher proportion of 
technology licensing projects than that of foreign direct investment, especially after 
early 1970s, But any such conclusion must be tempered by the absence of any scale 
data for individual projects, either on the value of the technology licensed or the level 
of foreign investment, 
(ii) Import Substitution Related Measures 
(a) Protective Measures 
Protective measures, which have the effect of creating incentives for domestic 
production, have been largely applied by countries to address foreign exchange 
problems and to stimulate industries, in particular import substituting infant 
industries. In general it is argued that a newly created industry carmot immediately be 
expected to compete with its established rivals and therefore requires an initial, 
temporary phase of special assistance and/or protection. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical debates discussed in Chapter I, protective 
measures were applied in Korea, like many other developing countries, to address 
foreign exchange deficiencies and to stimulate industries, in particular import 
substituting infant industries. Hence, domestic markets were sheltered through the 
increased price of imported goods, either through direct quantitative restrictions or 
through the imposition of customs duties upon them. To ascertain the magnitude of 
protection received by each industrial category, tariff and non-tariff barriers data 
presented in the study of Kim (1988) will be used here as a mean of representing 
import substitution measures. The available evidence suggests (Chapter 5) that some 
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industries, in particular import substituting industries, have been protected more 
extensively than other industries. 
The average tariff rates data obtained from Kim (1988) have been estimated 
by dividing actual collections of tariff revenue by the value of commodity imports. 
Though the effective rates would have been more suitable for meaningful evaluation, 
such information was not available at the disaggregated level. Thus the data reported 
in the Kim study at the three-digit level on Korean Standard Industry Classification 
were adjusted for the present investigation on ISIC classification at two-digit level. 
Table 8. 4 Average Tariff Rates by Industry, 1966-1983 (per cent) 
Sector 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Basic Metal 
Fabricated Metal 
1966 
128 
78 
59 
44 
34 
54 
38 
35 
1970 
95 
97 
63 
48 
46 
60 
42 
37 
1975 
88 
78 
57 
41 
36 
53 
40 
31 
1980 
81 
53 
43 
27 
28 
37 
26 
25 
1983 
81 
53 
43 
27 
28 
37 
26 
25 
Source: (Kim 1988, p. 90). 
The resultant data are presented in Table 8.4. Accordingly, light 
manufacturing industries such as Food and Textiles have been protected through tariff 
measures more than other sectors. Though the overall protection provided through 
tariff measures has been declining over the years, the average tariff rates have 
remained quite high for these two sectors until the 1980s, The average tariff rates for 
heavy and chemical industrial categories are relatively low when compared to the rest 
of the industrial sectors. 
Non-tariff barriers data, obtained from Kim (1988) indicates the degree of 
import restrictions by industry. These data are presented in Table 8.5, As these data 
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illustrate, during its initial stage of industrial development until mid 1970s Korea, has 
widely applied non-tariff barriers as a tool of promoting hidustries. Though the 
number of commodities that have been subjected to non-tariff barriers has decreased 
substantially since early 1980s, a considerable number of commodities in the Food, 
Textiles, Chemicals and Fab. Metal industries were protected through these measures 
even after 1980, Due to the inconsistent and irregular pattem of non-tariff barriers, 
however, it is difficult to derive a conclusion in relation to industrial promotion from 
these figures. 
Table 8.5 Non-Tariff Barriers by Industry, 1966-1983 (per cent) 
Sector 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Wood &. Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Basic Metal 
Fabricated Metal 
1966 
91 
98 
93 
98 
88 
94 
93 
98 
1970 
92 
79 
49 
65 
67 
20 
34 
59 
1975 
86 
75 
40 
68 
67 
22 
32 
72 
1980 
71 
29 
28 
28 
57 
6 
15 
58 
1983 
71 
29 
15 
7 
38 
5 
8 
46 
Source: Kim (1988, p. 34). 
Table 8,6 demonstrates the protective measures consolidating both tariff and 
non tariff barriers data,^  obtained from Kim (1988), As the figures in this table 
indicate, almost all the industrial sectors in Korea, regardless of whether they are light 
or heavy and chemical industries, were significantly protected through tariff and non 
tariff measures in the 1960s, Thus, these figures partly reflect the significance of the 
import substitution strategies followed in early period. After 1970, as the data in 
Table 8,6 illustrate, the role played by protective measures was gradually diminishing. 
Partly, this reduced role of protective measures could be attributed to the change of 
the policy regime from import substitution to export promotion. 
See Appendix 8.1 for the estunation procedures adopted for obtammg these data. 
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Table 8. 6 Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers by Industry, 1966-1983 (per cent) 
Sector 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Basic Metal 
Fabricated Metal 
1966 
0.70 
0.65 
0.58 
0.61 
0.52 
0.59 
0.55 
0.59 
1970 
0.68 
0.63 
0.36 
0.45 
0.43 
0.23 
0.27 
0.41 
1975 
0.62 
0.56 
0.31 
0.46 
0.42 
0.23 
0.25 
0.45 
1980 
0.50 
0.26 
0.24 
0.22 
0.34 
0.11 
0.14 
0.36 
1983 
0.50 
0.26 
0.17 
0.11 
0.25 
0.11 
0.10 
0.30 
Source: Kim (1988, p. 35). 
Chart 8.4 
Average Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers by Industry 
ki 
1966 1970 1975 1980 1983 
I Food n Textiles B Wood Q) Paper o Chemicals B Non Metallic • Basic Metal B Fab. Metal 
Source: As for Table 8.6. 
Overall, the data presented in Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6, and in Chart 8.4 
demonstrates the variation in the protective measures among different industrial 
sectors and over time. Accordingly, promotion of industries through protective 
measures appears to be more biased towards light industries such as Food and Textiles 
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sectors. Yet, some heavy and chemical industries, - Fab, Metal and Chemicals - have 
also been protected significantly through protective measures. 
Since these protective measures are applied for dual purposes - promoting 
industries and for saving foreign exchange - conclusions based on protective 
measures should require a caution. For example, as Hong (1979, p, 108) noted: 
the protection of import competing goods such as textiles began in the fifties and 
has continued into the seventies. The fact that those products which are now 
Korea's major export items, such as textiles, are still protected by severe (tariff 
and) quantitative import restrictions may reflect pressure from the manufactures 
who are afraid of conspicuous consumption of foreign goods by the well-to-do. It 
also probably reflects the desire of the govemment to prevent even a small amount 
of foreign exchange "waste" on what are considered to be non-essential imports. 
Although the general perception - heavy and chemical industries were 
promoted more than that of light industries during the 1973-81 (high intervention) 
period is not strongly supported by these data,'^  ample evidence suggests (Suh, 1981; 
Hong 1979; Yoo 1991) that most of the machinery, automobiles, ships, electrical 
machinery, chemicals (organic and inorganic) petrochemical products and many 
miscellaneous manufactures which were domestically produced were not only listed 
as restricted but also had the largest number of prohibited and quota items. 
(iii) Estimating the Rank 
Taking the incidence measures on export promotion and growth related measures and 
import substitution related measures as a guide, in this section, industries will be 
grouped into two groups as highly promoted and less promoted industries according 
to the level of promotion received by each industrial sector. The purpose of this 
exercise is to identify the industrial sectors that have been particularly subjected to 
preferential tteatments over other sectors. For this purpose, industries will be ranked 
according to the magnitude of industrial promotion, under the assumption that the 
higher the incentives received by each industrial sector the higher was the promotion 
of such industrial sectors. The estimated ranks are presented in Table 8.7 and 8.8. 
'' However, this statement must be treated with some caution, as Lee (1996) state because of tariff 
exemptions on imported materials for export firms and key mdustries, the actual tariff rates have been 
substantially lower than the official rates. 
^ Procedures adopted in rankmg industries will be explamed m Appendix 8.1. 
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The rank appearing in the second column in Table 8,7, is derived from the data 
contained in the fourth column of Table 8,1, The correspondmg ranks were estunated 
under the assumption that the higher the subsidy effects on particular industiial 
sectors the higher will be the incentives or the extent of hidustrial promotion received 
by each industrial sector. For example, the Basic Metal sector had the highest average 
estimated subsidy effect, as shown in Table 8,1, and it was assigned the highest rank 
(8). 
The third column - technology measures - appearing in Table 8.7 is estunated 
by taking into account fourth columns of both Tables 8,2 and 8,3, The corresponding 
ranks were obtained here under the assumption that the higher the incentives 
provided, or the priorities attached in attracting technology licensing/foreign direct 
investment, the higher will be the number of projects. For example, the Fab. Metal 
sector has attracted the highest number of technology licensing as well as foreign 
direct investment projects. Therefore this sector has assigned the highest rank (8), 
Table 8.7 Rank of Industries on the Basis of Export Promotion and Growth 
Related Measures 
Sector 
Highly Promoted 
Fabricated Metal 
Basic Metal 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Textiles Wearing App, & Leather 
Less Promoted 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Wood & Wood Products 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Paper & Paper Products 
Tax/Financial 
Incentives 
7 
8 
6 
4 
3 
5 
2 
1 
Technology 
Measures 
8 
6 
7 
5 
4 
1 
3 
2 
Overall 
Composite 
Rank 
7,5 
7,0 
6,5 
4,5 
3,5 
3,0 
2,5 
1.5 
Source: Table 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
To determine the overall ranking in terms of promotion received by each 
industrial sector on the basis of export promotion and growth related measures, 
consolidating both of these incidence measures, the overall composite rank has been 
estimated by taking an average figure of the ranks appearing in columns 2 and 3, As 
indicated in column 4, Table 8.7, four industrial sectors - Fab, Metal, Basic Metal, 
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Chemicals and Textiles - have been promoted more than other sectors on the basis of 
export and growth related measures. These results thus broadly confirm the general 
perception, that heavy and chemical industries have been promoted over the others for 
these policy measures. 
Table 8,8 demonstrates the industries that have been largely promoted through 
import substitution related measures. The ranks appearing in this table are estimated 
using the data presented in Table 8,6, since those measures reflect both tariff and non-
tariff barriers,^ These ranks are estimated under the assumption that the higher the 
protection received by each industrial sector the higher will be the industrial 
promotion. 
The rankings of industries on the basis of import substitution related measures, 
as shovm in Table 8,8, indicate that two light industries, - Food and Textiles - and 
two heavy and chemical industries - Fab, Metal and Chemicals - have been promoted 
more extensively over the others. 
Table 8.8 Rank of Industries on the Basis of Import Substitution Related 
Measures 
Sector 
Highly Promoted 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Textiles Wearing App. & Leather 
Fabricated Metal 
Chemical & Chemical Products 
Less Promoted 
Paper & Paper Products 
Wood & Wood Products 
Basic Metal 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Protective 
Measures 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Soiu-ce: Table 8.6. 
Overall, it appears (as die rankings of Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 indicates) that 
two heavy and chemical industrial sectors (Fab. Metal, Chemicals) have been more 
See Appendix 8.1 for the procedure adopted for ranking import substitution related measures. 
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heavily promoted than other industries, through both export promotion and growth 
related measures and import substitution related measures. Further, the comparatively 
higher ranking of the Textiles sector suggests that Korea's preferential treatinents has 
not at all been limited exclusively to the heavy and chemical industries. While, 
because of the highly aggregate nature of the industrial classification (two-digit level) 
and also the limitation of the data, though it is difficult to derive a firm conclusion, 
these resuhs suggests that the general perception of considering heavy and chemical 
industries as the promoted industries in Korea can be misleading. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The preceding section of this chapter has assessed the magnitude of industrial 
promotion with the aid of incidence measures, which are organized under two broad 
policy categories, namely export promotion and growth related measures and import 
substitution related measures. This analysis reveals several important points. 
Firstly, it appears that there is no consistent pattem across different types of 
incidence measures applied for industrial promotion. Of the three incidence measures 
applied, tax and financial incentives and the measures adopted for promoting 
technology development, our results indicate that they are biased towards promoting 
Heavy and Chemical industries. On the contrary, protective measures were tilted 
towards promoting industries like Food and Textiles. However, caution is required 
regarding these conclusions, since the data representing incidence measures are 
proxies and are applied here under certain assumptions, and therefore may not reveal 
the tme picture of the incidence of industrial policy. 
Secondly, these incidence measures appear to be dynamic. They are quite 
frequently subject to change, not only from one industrial sector to other but also with 
the time. These characteristics may partly attributed to changes in policy direction 
and also to other social and economic adjustments. 
Thirdly, when the overall impact of industrial promotion is assessed by 
combining both export promotion and growth related and import substitution related 
measures, it is evident that combination of both heavy and chemical and light 
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industries have been promoted over the others in the case of Korea. But the 
comparatively high level of promotion received by the Textiles sector suggests that 
industry specific intervention has not been exclusively limited to the heavy and 
chemical sector. 
Overall, this analysis of incidence measures suggests that, due to the dynamic 
nature of incidence measures, and their variation across industries, to understand the 
impact of industrial policies it is important to identify the magnitude, timing and the 
direction of industrial promotion. Studies which attempts to assess the impact of 
industrial policy without undertaking a detailed incidence analyses are likely to give 
misleading results. 
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Appendix 8.1 Estimation Procedures 
Number of technology licensing and direct foreign investment projects appear in 
Tables 8,2 and 8,3 respectively, which were obtained from Lee (1988) have been 
reported at two-digit level. However, several adjustments have been made with 
regard to these data since the reported data were not accorded with ISIC classification. 
There were no technology licensing or direct foreign investment projects under the 
category of Wood & Wood Products. 
Data appears in Tables 8,4, 8,5 and 8,6 which were available in Kim (1988) at 
three-digit levels were adjusted for two-digit levels for the present study. Data in 
Table 8,6, have been calculated by applying the method used by (Lee 1996), since 
original data indicates the rate of import liberalization in percentages. Following Lee 
thus the resultant data reported in Table 8,6 were calculated as (100 - the rate of 
import liberalization) and presented as per cent. 
Since the data in Table 8,6 vary from time to time, to estimate the rankings 
appear in Table 8,8, firstly the rankings were estimated for each year indicated in 
Table 8,6 separately. Next, taking the average of all the five resultant rankings, the 
estimates appear in Table 8,8 were obtained. 
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9. Identifying Potential Outcome 
9.1 Introduction 
As noted in earlier chapters, many factors affect economic outcomes in a particular 
coimtry, both in overall terms and at the sectoral level. Many of these factors - such 
as global economic trends, technology shifts and macroeconomic and cyclical factors 
- affect virtually all countries. Thus it will be a mistake to freat actual economic 
outcomes as the potential outcomes of industrial policies, unless it is possible to 
correct for these common factors. In this chapter we develop a response to this 
problem, referred to as identifying the potential outcomes of industrial policies, by 
benchmarking Korea's economic performance at the sectoral level against that of 
comparable countries. More specifically Korea's industrial sector performance in 
terms of value-added and exports, at the two-digit ISIC (Intemational Standard 
Industrial Classification) level, will be compared with that of selected benchmark 
countries over the period 1970-1996, Thus of course still leaves open the possibility 
that these potential outcomes are due to intemal factors or policies other than 
industrial policies. This issue is taken up in Chapter 10, 
This chapter assesses the potential outcome of industrial policies in Korea, in 
terms of value-added and exports and in comparison with selected benchmark 
countries. Section 9,2 firstly discusses the selection of benchmark countries. Then 
follows the evaluation of relative industrial performance, with several estimated 
indicators based on exports and value-added at the two-digit level in Korea compared 
to the benchmark countries. 
9.2 Industrial Performance in Terms of Value-Added and Exports: Comparative 
Analysis with Selected Benchmark Countries 
Comparison of performance of value-added or exports with benchmark countries, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4,3, is useful since it provides (a) an insight about the 
relative performance of the industrial sector in Korea in terms of comparative 
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countries (b) a way of recognizing the effects of common extemal events such as 
favourable world demand conditions, world recessions and so forth and (c) a method 
to identify the implications of intemal factors, including the outcome of industrial 
policies. In other words, since all the countries under the observation are exposed to 
similar extemal conditions, if there are differences in performances those differences 
could be attributed to intemal factors. In that respect, if the performance of the 
industrial sector in Korea is relatively better than that of benchmark countries, those 
performance differences may be attributed to intemal circumstances, including but not 
only the impact of industrial policies. 
9.2.1. Selection of Benchmark Countries 
Three criteria are relevant to the selection of benchmark countries are that, as a whole, 
the benchmark group provides a neutral policy base against which to assess the 
potential outcomes of Korean policy, that they shared common characteristics with 
Korea at the start of the period being studied and were exposed to similar extemal 
factors and that good, industry specific data is available for them. 
Ideally, the comparison should be made with benchmark countries that had not 
been pursued industrial policies extensively. Such a comparison would clearly 
distinguish the difference in performance between those which followed policy 
intervention intensively and those which did not. However, this becomes impossible 
due to the non-availability of both policy and outcome information at the sectoral 
level. Under these circumstances a group of developing countries, which exhibits 
similar characteristics with respect to initial per capita, industrial stmcture and 
industrial composition as compared with Korea, which have had a wide range of 
policy regimes and for which adequate data are available, have been selected as 
benchmark countries. Table 9,1 illustrates the basic characteristics of the benchmark 
countries reviewed for this study, and countries which highlighted are fmally selected. 
Initially, five countries were selected as benchmark countries including 
Turkey, Philippines, Colombia, Paraguay and Taiwan, since these countiies possess 
similar characteristics to the sample country in terms of GNP per capita, industrial 
output and industrial composition. 
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Due to the unavailability of data at the sectoral level (two-digit) for Turkey, 
Colombia and Paraguay, another set of countries with notable sunilar characteristics 
was chosen. Those included India, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Mexico and Chile, Of these 
countries, complete set of sectoral data is available only for India, Mexico, and Chile, 
Finally, for comparison with the industrial performance of Korea, five countries -
Taiwan, India, Philippines, Mexico and Chile - were selected as benchmark 
countries. These five countries will be referred in this study as "Benchmark 
Countries" (BC). 
9.2.2 Evaluating Industrial Performance in Terms of Value-Added and Exports 
In this analysis, we assume that if intemal factors, in particular industrial policies, 
have had any impact on industrial performance in Korea, the relative performance of 
value-added and exports in promoted industries in Korea will be higher than that of 
benchmark countries. If there is supportive evidence to justify the above assumption, 
then we will be able to make inferences regarding the potential outcome of policy 
intervention. 
To investigate the above assumption in relation to industrial performance in 
Korea in comparison with benchmark countries, using sectoral value-added and 
exports, a number of measurement criteria will be estimated and applied in the 
following section. These measurement criteria are (i) Value-added and exports in 
Korea compared to the benchmark countries, (ii) Index of Value-Added and Exports 
compared to the benchmark countries and (iii) Sectoral value-added as a share of 
GDP and sectoral exports as a share of sectoral world exports. All these estimates 
will be prepared over the period 1970-1996, using data (in $US Thousands) obtained 
from the Intemational Economic Databank of Australian National University, at two-
digh ISIC level, 
(i) Value-Added and Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries 
As an initial step of the empirical analysis, in this section, value-added and exports in 
Korea at the two-digit level are compared with similar values for the benchmark 
countries. The primary objective of this excise is to compare Korean industrial 
248 
performance with that of benchmark countries and to determine whether the relative 
performance of the former and the latter over the observed period 1970-1996, on an 
industry by industry basis. For this purpose a measure is estimated dividmg the 
sectoral value-added (and exports) of each industrial sector in Korea, in real $US 
(1990=100), by the average value of that variable for the benchmark countries over 
the period 1970-1996,' If that particular measure is greater than one, it indicates that 
Korean value-added and exports are higher than the average level for the benchmark 
countries, or vice versa for values less than one. The results are presented in Table 
9,2 
As to be expected given Korea's overall economic growth over the period, and 
as can be seen from Table 9.2, industrial performance in terms of value-added was 
impressive in Korea as compared to the benchmark countries over the period 1970-
1996, in all industries. Though only a handful of industrial sectors (Food, Wood and 
Non Metallic) demonstrated a similar or slightly higher level of value-added (greater 
than one) in 1970, all the industrial sectors in Korea achieved a ratio of over 3 by 
1996. In particular, the relative growth shown by Fab, Metal, Basic Metal, Textiles 
and Paper sectors are quite notable. As can be seen from Table 9.2, their value-added 
contribution were comparatively small in 1970. However, by 1977, Fab. Metal and 
Textiles sectors were able to increase their value-added contribution more than double 
that of the benchmark countries. Gradually improving their value-added contribution 
over the years, these two sectors have managed to increase their value-added ratio to 
more than 6 times the level of the benchmark countries by 1996, 
A similar evaluation as that of value-added has been carried out with respect to 
exports, and Table 9.3 presents the estimates in relation to exports in Korea, compared 
to the benchmark countries over the period 1970-1996. As can be seen from this 
Table, in all industrial sectors the ratio of exports in Korea to exports in the 
benchmark countries was relatively low, except in Wood, and Textiles Sectors, in 
1970, This relatively low ratio suggests that the majority of the mdustries was either 
at the infant stage or was producing only for the domestic market, in 1970 
' Estimation procedures are explained in Appendix 9.1. 
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Table 9.2 Value-Added in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 1970-
1996 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated 
Metal 
0.47 
0,43 
0,49 
0,71 
0,99 
0,95 
1,46 
2.25 
2.74 
2.43 
1,79 
1,83 
2,50 
3.12 
2,87 
2.91 
3,60 
3,94 
4,55 
4,93 
5,58 
6,06 
5,50 
6,32 
7.60 
9,98 
9.64 
Basic 
Metal 
0,17 
0,19 
0,25 
0,56 
0,51 
0,62 
0,78 
1,27 
1,59 
1,58 
1,21 
1,35 
1,74 
1,85 
1.82 
1,66 
2.18 
2.30 
2.30 
2.69 
3,15 
4,48 
3,89 
3,86 
4.27 
4,98 
5,18 
Chemicals 
0,81 
0,94 
0,86 
0,95 
1,03 
1,31 
1,66 
1.97 
2.29 
2.24 
2.06 
2.06 
2,33 
2.23 
2.05 
1,92 
2,07 
2.18 
2.51 
2.90 
3.60 
3,30 
3,25 
3,52 
3,73 
4,47 
4,80 
•k 
Textiles 
0.68 
0,76 
0.90 
1.09 
1.37 
2.08 
2.74 
2.96 
3.43 
3.00 
2.69 
2.99 
3.12 
3.26 
3.13 
3.19 
3.53 
4.03 
4.69 
4.60 
4.60 
5.98 
6.05 
6.03 
6.66 
7.73 
6.88 
Less Promoted Industries* 
Non 
Metallic 
1,00 
1,09 
0,99 
1,03 
1.15 
1,34 
1.50 
2.16 
2.42 
2.72 
2.03 
1.63 
1.79 
2.27 
2.24 
2.11 
2.82 
2.79 
3.13 
3.59 
4.11 
4.88 
4.39 
4.35 
4.67 
6.56 
6.37 
Wood 
1.06 
1.33 
1,18 
1,60 
1,82 
1,76 
1.95 
3.08 
3.37 
2.22 
1.48 
1.50 
2.38 
2.39 
2.24 
2.11 
1.89 
1.86 
2.46 
2.93 
4.11 
5.67 
5.72 
6.40 
7,66 
8,51 
8,20 
Food 
1,02 
1,00 
1,07 
0,87 
0,95 
0,98 
1.45 
1.93 
2.38 
2.03 
1.79 
1.84 
1.96 
2.35 
2,02 
1,94 
2.11 
2.23 
2.46 
2.70 
2.80 
3.11 
2.85 
2.83 
2.94 
3.44 
3.28 
Paper 
0.62 
0.72 
0.73 
0.74 
0.79 
0.94 
1.14 
1.79 
2.00 
1.87 
1.54 
1.51 
2.25 
2.83 
2.45 
2.63 
2.81 
3.14 
3.49 
3.86 
4.64 
5.06 
5.12 
6.11 
6.37 
7.36 
7.26 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Note:* Data are presented according to the ranks of export promotion and growth related measures. 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Metal 
Basic Metal 
Chemicals & Chemical Products 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Wood& Wood Products 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Paper & Paper Products 
Memorandum Item 
Period 
1970 
1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Basic Chemicals Textiles 
Metal Metal 
7537 2235 I229I 9528 
928962 139398 1347028 175451 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non Wood Food 
Metallic 
3322 I98I 14333 
93966 34325 I6I769 
Paper 
2824 
92876 
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Table 9.3 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated 
Metal 
0.59 
0.65 
0.85 
1,34 
1,77 
2,02 
2,50 
2,98 
2,84 
2,72 
2,05 
2,35 
3,43 
3,31 
3,32 
3,49 
2.93 
3,33 
3,74 
3,22 
3,21 
3,07 
2,43 
2,46 
2,61 
2,78 
2.43 
Basic Chemicals 
Metal 
0,08 0.55 
0,17 0,73 
0,57 1.21 
0,74 1,58 
1.00 2.09 
0,74 2,44 
0,91 3.12 
1,15 3,23 
1.49 3.36 
1,81 3.26 
2.30 3.01 
3,40 2,94 
4.09 3,53 
3,02 3,39 
3,41 3,58 
3,16 3,87 
3,27 3,21 
3.23 3.31 
3,20 3,67 
3.06 3,42 
2.88 3.76 
3.29 4.03 
3.55 4,13 
3,58 3,89 
3,23 3.86 
2,48 3,83 
2,53 4,37 
* 
Textiles 
1,55 
1,70 
1,79 
2,42 
2,46 
3,26 
3,31 
3,65 
3.96 
3.59 
3.12 
3.44 
3.64 
3.37 
3.25 
3.24 
3.36 
3.56 
4.58 
3.88 
3.66 
3.26 
3.15 
3.26 
3.10 
2.78 
2.60 
Less Promoted Industries* 
Non 
Metallic 
0.61 
0.84 
1.13 
1,55 
2,14 
2.65 
3,09 
3,00 
2.84 
2.64 
3.00 
3.78 
3.77 
2.12 
1.57 
1.51 
1.72 
1.62 
1.81 
1.97 
1.69 
1.51 
1.20 
1.28 
1.28 
1.27 
1.25 
Wood Food 
2,32 0.07 
2.92 0.09 
2.76 0.14 
2.87 0,26 
2,19 0,21 
2.77 0.42 
2.71 0.31 
2.75 0,39 
2.31 0.41 
1.80 0.35 
1.39 0.48 
1.40 0.50 
0.96 0.35 
0,57 0,38 
0,46 0.34 
0.39 0.37 
0.43 0.37 
0.48 0.45 
0,54 0,53 
0.56 0.56 
0.62 0.56 
0.51 0.47 
0.41 0,47 
0,43 0,51 
0.51 0.55 
0.55 0.49 
0.48 0,59 
Paper 
0.08 
0.20 
0,51 
2,00 
1,13 
1,50 
1,49 
1,81 
2,04 
1,42 
1.57 
1.67 
1.62 
1.23 
1.54 
1.62 
1.69 
2.10 
2.17 
2.07 
2.13 
2.00 
1.49 
1.61 
1.88 
1.80 
2,20 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Note:* Data are presented according to the ranks of export promotion and growth related measures. 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Metal 
Basic Metal 
Chemicals & Chemical Products 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Wood& Wood Products 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Paper & Paper Products 
Memorandum Item 
Exports in Korea in Thousands $US (1990 prices) 
Period 
1970 
1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Basic Chemicals Textiles 
Metal Metal 
2191 674 1382 10648 
621232 64510 195864 172753 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non Wood Food Paper 
Metallic 
210 2989 436 42 
7352 4498 12747 13735 
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With the passage of time, Korea has been able to mcrease her export 
contribution. By 1974, almost all sectors, except the Food and Basic Metal sectors, 
had been able to increase their export contribution to more than that of the benchmark 
countries. Moreover, Korea has maintained a steady progress m terms of export 
contribution, especially in industrial sectors such as Fab. Metal, Basic Metal, 
Chemicals and Textiles. Gradually increasing their export contribution over the 
years, these four sectors have managed to increase their export ratio to more than 
double the level of the benchmark countries by 1996. 
(ii) Index of Value-Added and Exports 
To investigate the relative performance of value-added and exports in Korea over the 
period 1970-1996, taking 1970 as a base year, as a second step, the figures reported in 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3, have been converted into indexes. These indexes are referred to 
here as the Index of Value-Added and Index of Exports respectively. With these 
measures it is possible to examine the extent of relative industrial performance, 
especially the changes in individual industrial sectors in Korea as compared to the 
benchmark countries. 
Table 9,4 shows the Index of Value-Added over the period 1970-1996. As the 
data in this Table indicate, almost all the industrial sectors in Korea have made a 
strong progress in terms of value-added over the period 1970-1996. Some cyclical 
fluctuations are, however, evident, especially in early 1970s and 1980s. The cyclical 
fluctuations in early 1970s may be attributed to the decline in investment demand, 
partly caused by a tight credit policy and rapid increases in prices. The resulting fall 
in real investment slowed Korean economy considerably during 1970-72. Extemal 
factors such as the oil crisis, and a recession in advanced industrial countries also had 
some impact on this cyclical dovmtum. Likewise, numerous intemal factors such as 
restmcturing of the industrial incentive measures, restrictive monetary policy, 
political and social imrest following the assassination of President Park, as well as 
extemal factors including second oil price increase and recession in major industrial 
countries, contributed to the cyclical downtum in early 1980s. 
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Table 9.4 Index of Value-Added in Korea 
1970-199( 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
5 
Highly Promoted Industries' 
Fabricated Basic Chemicals 
Metal Metal 
100 100 100 
91 112 116 
104 147 106 
151 329 117 
211 300 127 
202 365 162 
311 459 205 
479 747 243 
583 935 283 
517 929 277 
381 712 254 
389 794 254 
532 1024 288 
664 1088 275 
611 1071 253 
619 976 237 
766 1282 256 
838 1353 269 
968 1353 310 
1049 1582 358 
1187 1853 444 
1289 2635 407 
1170 2288 401 
1345 2271 435 
1617 2512 460 
2123 2929 552 
2051 3047 593 
Compared to the Benchmark Countries 
k 
Textiles 
100 
112 
132 
160 
201 
306 
403 
435 
504 
441 
396 
440 
459 
479 
460 
469 
519 
593 
690 
676 
676 
879 
890 
887 
979 
1137 
1012 
) 
Less Promoted Industries* 
Non Wood Food 
Metallic 
100 100 100 
109 125 98 
99 111 105 
103 151 85 
115 172 93 
134 166 96 
150 184 142 
216 291 189 
242 318 233 
272 209 199 
203 140 175 
163 142 180 
179 225 192 
227 225 230 
224 211 198 
211 199 190 
282 178 207 
279 175 219 
313 232 241 
359 276 265 
411 388 275 
488 535 305 
439 540 279 
435 604 277 
467 723 288 
656 803 337 
637 774 322 
Paper 
100 
116 
118 
119 
127 
152 
184 
289 
323 
302 
248 
244 
363 
456 
395 
424 
453 
506 
563 
623 
748 
816 
826 
985 
1027 
1187 
1171 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Note: * Data are presented according to the ranks of export promotion and growth related measures. 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Metal 
Basic Metal 
Chemicals & Chemical Products 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Wood& Wood Products 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Paper & Paper Products 
Memorandum Item 
Value-Added in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries 
Period 
1970 
1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Basic Chemicals Textiles 
Metal38 Metal 
0.47 0.17 0.81 0.68 
9.64 5.18 4.80 6.88 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non 
Metallic 
1.00 
6.37 
Wood Food 
1.06 1.02 
8.20 3.28 
Paper 
0.62 
7.26 
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Table 9.5 Index of Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries, 
1970-1996 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Basic 
Metal Metal 
100 100 
no 213 
144 713 
227 925 
300 1250 
342 925 
424 1138 
505 1438 
481 1863 
461 2263 
347 2875 
398 4250 
581 5113 
561 3775 
563 4263 
592 3950 
497 4088 
564 4038 
634 4000 
546 3825 
544 3600 
520 4113 
412 4438 
417 4475 
442 4038 
471 3100 
412 3163 
Chemicals 
100 
133 
220 
287 
380 
444 
567 
587 
611 
593 
547 
535 
642 
616 
651 
704 
584 
602 
667 
622 
684 
733 
751 
707 
702 
696 
795 
* 
Textiles 
100 
110 
115 
156 
159 
210 
214 
235 
255 
232 
201 
222 
235 
217 
210 
209 
217 
230 
295 
250 
236 
210 
203 
210 
200 
179 
168 
Non 
Metallic 
100 
138 
185 
254 
351 
434 
507 
492 
466 
433 
492 
620 
618 
348 
257 
248 
282 
266 
297 
323 
277 
248 
197 
210 
210 
208 
205 
Less Promoted Industries' 
Wood 
100 
126 
119 
124 
94 
119 
117 
119 
100 
78 
60 
60 
41 
25 
20 
17 
19 
21 
23 
24 
27 
22 
18 
19 
22 
24 
21 
Food 
100 
129 
200 
371 
300 
600 
443 
557 
586 
500 
686 
714 
500 
543 
486 
529 
529 
643 
757 
800 
800 
671 
671 
729 
786 
700 
843 
IT 
Paper 
100 
250 
638 
2500 
1413 
1875 
1863 
2263 
2550 
1775 
1963 
2088 
2025 
1538 
1925 
2025 
2113 
2625 
2713 
2588 
2663 
2500 
1863 
2013 
2350 
2250 
2750 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production Data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Note: * Data are presented according to the ranks of export promotion and growth related measures 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Metal 
Basic Metal 
Chemicals & Chemical Products 
Textiles Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non Metallic Mineral 
Wood & Wood Products 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 
Paper & Paper Product 
Memorandum Item 
Exports in Korea Compared to the Benchmark Countries 
Period 
1970 
1996 
Highly Promoted Industries 
Fabricated Basic Chemicals Textiles 
Metal Metal 
0.59 0.08 0.55 1.55 
2.43 2.53 4.37 2.60 
Less Promoted Industries 
Non 
Metallic 
0.61 
1.25 
Wood Food 
2.32 0.07 
0.48 0.59 
Paper 
0.08 
2.20 
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Despite these cyclical changes, the data presented in Table 9.4 clearly indicate 
a number of important features. Firstly, during the period 1973-78, and also after 
1985, almost all the industrial sectors achieved a strong progress in terms of value-
added. Secondly, the performance of four industrial sectors in Korea is more 
prominent than that of the other four, as compared to the benchmark countries. These 
industrial sectors namely Basic Metal, Fab, Metal, Paper and Textiles have recorded 
nearly 30, 20, 11 and 10 fold increases compared to the benchmark countries over the 
period 1970-1996, 
Similar estimates as that of value-added, but with respect to exports are 
presented in Table 9,5, This Table demonstrates the Index of Exports in Korea 
compared to the benchmark countries over the period 1970-1996. As can be seen 
from the Table 9,5, all industrial sectors, except Wood in Korea have achieved a 
satisfactory progress in terms of exports, compared to the benchmark countries over 
the observed period. Cyclical fluctuations in exports are more frequent among 
industrial sectors and vary from one industrial sector to the other except the common 
cyclical dovmtum experienced in the late 1970s, A series of intemal as well as 
extemal factors that have been specified earlier in relation to the slow down of 
performance of value-added, might also have affected unfavourably for export 
performances in late 1970s, 
In addition to the cyclical fluctuations noted above, data presented in Table 9,5 
reveal a number of interesting points. Firstly, like in the case of value-added, during 
the period between 1972-78, all the industrial sectors except Wood have shown a 
steady progress in terms of exports. Secondly, the export performance of Basic Metal 
and Paper are relatively higher than other sectors in Korea compared to the 
benchmark countries. Strikingly higher performance in these two sectors is largely 
due to Korea's ability to increase the share in exports an increasing rate than that of 
benchmark counfries. Thirdly, export performance of several industrial sectors 
including Textiles, Wood and Non Metallic, are not only relatively low in Korea but 
also have dramatically decreased compared to the benchmark countries. 
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(iii) Sectoral Value-Added as a Share of GDP and Sectoral Exports as a Share of 
Sectoral World Exports 
The empirical analyses outlined in the previous sections provide useful msights about 
industrial performances. However, those indicators may have limitations when they 
are used for comparison purposes. Because intemal relative prices, changing relative 
prices over time, foreign exchange regimes and rates etc. may exert sigruficant 
influence on those indicators. To examine the contribution of an industrial sector in 
the context of the overall economy, as a third step, therefore another measure will be 
applied in this section. This measure - sectoral value-added as a share GDP in Korea 
(per cent) - for the benchmark countries and for Korea during the period 1970-1996 
respectively are presented in Table 9.6. As the data in this table and respective graphs 
(Charts 9.1a and 9,1b) demonstrate value-added as a share of GDP in almost all the 
industrial sectors are higher in Korea than that of the benchmark countries. This in 
tum suggests that the relative importance of industrial sector in the economy of Korea 
than that of the benchmark countries. One can question the comparison of value-
added as a share of GDP in Korea compared to the benchmark countries, saying that 
Korea is a relatively small country and its Gross Domestic Product largely consists of 
industrial production. However, as noted earlier, and as can be seen from Table 9.1 
which demonstrates the stmctural characteristics of the benchmark countries, at the 
initial stage Korea either remained far behind or demonstrated similar levels as 
regards to many of the relevant characteristics for example industrial output, share of 
industry in Gross Domestic Product etc. In that respect, the superior performance of 
value-added in Korea could be considered as a significant achievement. 
The data appear in Table 9.6 and respective graphs reveal several changes 
which vary from industry to industry. For instance, in sectors like Food and Textiles, 
sectoral value-added as a share of GDP is although comparatively higher in initial 
years, their relative contribution is gradually decreasing since the latter half of 1980s, 
Nevertheless, rest of the sectors has shown a gradual improvement of their share of 
value-added in GDP, The value-added contribution in sectors like Fab. Metal, Basic 
Metal and Chemicals are prominent than that of others. Overall these changes suggest 
that Korea is gradually transforming its industrial stmcture from light, low value-
added industries towards high value-added and technology intensive industries. 
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Further, though the benchmark countries are also consolidating their position and 
gradually improving their value-added contribution, Korea is still in the lead in its 
value-added contribution in most of the sectors, in particular in Fab. Metal and 
Chemicals. 
Similarly, to evaluate the export performances fiirther, we will apply another 
measure - sectoral exports as a share of sectoral world exports - for the benchmark 
countries as well as for Korea, for the period 1970-1996 respectively, and these data 
are presented in Table 9.7. With this measure it is also possible to examine whether 
Korea has been able to increase her market share over the time. As the data in Table 
9,7 and respective graphs (Chart 9,2 (a) and (b)) illustrate, Korea has been able to 
increase her market share in almost all the industrial exports except Food and Wood 
sectors. In particular, sectoral exports as a share of sectoral world exports are more 
notable in sectors such as Fab, Metal, Basic Metal, Chemicals and Textiles compared 
to the benchmark countries. Another interesting characteristic is that all these sectors 
in which have gained comparatively higher performance, except the Textiles had 
export performances well below the benchmark countries in 1970, Starting from 
1973, however all these sectors began to outperform than that of the benchmark 
countries. 
As it is clear from the above analyses, almost all the performance indicators 
of value-added and exports applied, indicate relatively superior performance for 
Korea compared to the benchmark countries. With these results it is possible to 
conclude that intemal factors, possibly industrial policies might have contributed to 
the successfiil performance in Korea. Since favourable industrial performance may be 
a result of a combination of several factors, to decide whether industrial policies in 
fact play any decisive role, however, more explicit analyses are required. Owing to 
the data consfraints though this latter task has become difficult, to be able to make 
inferences, further empirical investigations will be carried out in the next chapter 
using the estimates reported in step 3, since these estimates may provide valuable 
insights regarding the impact of industrial policies than that of the estimates reported 
in step 1 and step 2. 
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9.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the performance of each industrial sector at two-digit level 
by applying various measurement indicators of value-added and exports in 
comparison to a number of selected benchmark countries. Since all the countries 
under the observation face similar extemal conditions, we assume that if there are 
performance differences between Korea and benchmark countries those differences 
could be attributed to the intemal factors. 
The empirical results included in this chapter reveal a number of important 
points. Firstly, as it is evident, all the six major indicators we applied for examining 
relative industrial performance (Value-added and exports as compared to the 
benchmark countries. Index of Value-Added, Index of Exports, Sectoral value-added 
as a share of GDP, and Sectoral exports as share of sectoral world exports) reveal that 
Korea has recorded relatively higher performance in the majority of industrial sectors 
than that of the benchmark countries. Secondly, when all these evidences are taken 
together it is possible to conclude that comparatively higher industrial performance of 
Korea might have been achieved through the process of effective management of 
intemal factors. 
These empirical resuhs fiuther suggest that industrial performances are more 
often susceptible to both intemal and extemal changes. Therefore, a caution is 
required for interpreting the performances of value-added and exports as a policy 
outcome. In fact, more explicit empirical investigations are required to ascertain 
whether these strong industrial performances could be attributed to deliberate 
govemment intervention efforts or industrial policies. Subject to limitation of data, 
this latter task will be carrying out in the next chapter using the estimates presented in 
step 3 of this chapter since those data would provide more valuable insights gauging 
the impact of industrial policies. 
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Chart 9.1b Value-Added as a Share of GDP in Less Promoted Industries 
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Appendix 9.1 Estimation Procedures Adopted for Performance Variables 
Estimation of value-added and exports as compared to the benchmark countries 
Value-added and exports data at two-digit ISIC level for Korea as well as benchmark 
countries were obtained from the Australian National University (Intemational 
Economic Data Bank), over the period 1970-1996. These data are available in 
thousand US dollars. To obtain real values these data are deflated using producer 
price index in U.S.A (1990 prices) since it was unable to find producer price indexes 
or another suitable indicator for benchmark countries. 
To estimate the value-added figures appearing in Table 9.2, first of all real 
value-added of the five benchmark countries were added together for each year at the 
two-digit level, and the average value-added for benchmark countries for each 
industry is estimated. Next, to obtain the estimates appearing in Table 9.2, real value-
added for each year at the two-digit level in Korea was divided by the corresponding 
values for the benchmark countries. The estimates appearing in Table 9.3 are also 
obtained by following a similar process. 
The data appearing in Table 9.6 are estimated by dividing sectoral real value-
added by real total Gross Domestic Product values for Korea and benchmark 
countries. Since total value-added data at sectoral level was not available, total Gross 
Domestic Product value data obtained from the World Bank Data Tables of Australian 
National University is applied for these estimates. 
Data appearing in Table 9.7 are estimated dividing sectoral real exports by 
sectoral real world exports. 
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10. The Effectiveness of Industrial Policy: An Imtial 
Application of the Framework 
10.1 Introduction 
The empirical analyses included in Chapter 9 revealed that industrial sector performance, 
in terms of both value-added and exports, was generally stronger in Korea than in the 
benchmark countries. To what extent can this impressive performance be attributed to 
govemment intervention, or more specifically, to the industrial policies in place during 
the period under study? To be able to answer this question, more explicit analyses, such 
as an evaluation of the association between industrial performance and measures of the 
incidence of industrial policy, are required. 
Owing to the limited data on incidence measures, however, it is difficult to carry 
out such an explicit analysis. Nevertheless, as a third step in the empirical assessment, 
three altemative empirical tests will be applied in this chapter to investigate whether it 
may be possible to attribute superior industrial performance in Korea to govemment 
intervention. Firstly, the aggregate performance of highly promoted groups, both those 
that are based on export promotion and growth related measures and those based on 
import substitution related measures, will be compared with that of less promoted groups 
and also with outcomes in the benchmark countries. This will be helpful for the purpose 
of investigating whether there are systematic differences in performances between the 
two groups. Secondly, this study will examine the industrial performance of various 
groups of industries in Korea, relative to that of benchmark countries, with special regard 
to differences between the periods before and after 1982, the year in which the strongly 
interventionist policies began to be dismantled. The purpose of this exercise is to 
examine whether the performance in the high intervention period in Korea differs 
significandy from that of the subsequent period. Thirdly, the relationship between 
incidence measures and relative industiial performance will be examined, in a very 
preliminary way, using a regression analysis with panel data. 
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These three altemative tests will be used to investigate whether inferences can be 
made regarding the effectiveness of industrial policies. More specifically, we consider 
that if govemment intervention, especially industry specific intervention, has had any 
impact on industrial performances in Korea, then: 
(a) highly promoted industries will show positively higher performance dian 
similar industries in benchmark countries, and also than less promoted 
industries within Korea; 
(b) industiial performances in Korea in general, and that of the highly promoted 
groups in particular, will be better relative to that of benchmark countries 
during the high intervention period, but this relative performance will be less 
marked after the scaling down of intervention; and 
(c) there should be a positive and a statistically significant relationship between 
incidence measures and relative industrial performance measures over the 
policy intervention period. 
The empirical evidence on the above three statements may be used for deriving 
inferences regarding the effectiveness of govemment intervention, in particular of 
industry specific intervention. However, it is important to note that these empirical tests 
have their own limitations, and therefore any inferences must be made subject to 
qualifications. For example, for the first empirical test included in this chapter, we will 
apply the classification of industries as highly promoted and less promoted groups on the 
basis of the limited data on incidence measures available for Korea. These industry 
groups are compared with similar groups of industries in the benchmark countries. The 
benchmark countries are chosen as countries similar to Korea at the start of the period, 
and as on balance a policy neutral base. These assumptions may be inaccurate in various 
possible ways. Similarly, the second empirical test included in this chapter will compare 
the performance between Korea and benchmark countries between policy periods. As far 
as the incidence of industrial policies is concerned, though the base years selected for the 
comparison may be suitable for Korea in many ways, these base years may not reflect 
continued policy neutrality in the benchmark countries. Lags in the efl"ects of policy are 
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also often long and uncertain, so again the choice of years may misrepresent the impact 
of policy. The third empirical test - a regression analysis with panel data - also has 
severe limitations, mainly due to the quality of data available for this study. Therefore, 
given limited data and with other limitations in the techniques applied, any inferences 
made through these empirical tests must be subject to heavy qualifications. 
In this context, a central purpose of this chapter is to explore the viability of the 
overall approach to the assessment of the effectiveness of industry policy. Even if the 
limitations of the data currently available preclude firm conclusions about the substantive 
topic, this analysis may indicate whether the framework used is sufficiently promising to 
be worthy of a detailed analysis with access to better data sources. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 will analyse the performance 
differences between highly promoted groups and less promoted groups, on the basis of 
export promotion and growth related measures and also of import substitution related 
measures, for both Korea and the benchmark countries. Then Section 10.3 will examine 
whether there are apparent differences in industrial performance in Korea during the high 
intervention period and the period after 1982, again in comparison to the benchmark 
countiies. The final section of this chapter (Section 10.4) will explore the association 
between incidence measures and relative industrial performances using panel regression. 
10.2 Differential Performance of Industry Groups by Policy Stance 
As oudined previously, the industiial performance analyses included in Chapter 9 
demonstiate that, both in terms of value-added and exports, the Korean performance was 
relatively better than that of benchmark countiies over the period 1970-96. To ascertain 
whether there is any association between these results and policy factors, more 
specifically govemment intervention, in this section we will examine the performance 
differences between highly promoted groups and less promoted groups in Korea and the 
benchmark countiies. The underlying assumption when carrying out this comparison is 
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that a necessary condition for policy being effective is that the highly promoted group 
should have a relatively higher performance than that of the less promoted group. 
10.2.1 Differential Performance of Industry Groups Based on Export Promotion 
and Growth Related Measures 
For the present investigation we will use aggregate value-added and export data for the 
two categories - the highly promoted (HP) group and the less promoted (LP) group -
based on the industry ranks of export promotion and growth policy measures (Table 8.7). 
Accordingly, the highly promoted group will include four industrial sectors (Fabricated 
Metals, Basic Metals, Chemicals, and Textiles) and the less promoted group will include 
the other four industrial sectors (Non Metallic Minerals, Wood, Food, and Paper). 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the most convenient form of outcome comparison with 
the benchmark countries for these measures is relative industry value-added as a share of 
GDP and relative industry exports as a share of world exports. Table 10.1 and Charts 
10.1 to 10.8 provide the aggregated data for industry value-added shares, and for industry 
shares of world exports, for Korea and the benchmark countries. The data are provided 
for the two groups of industries, are expressed in index form, using 1970 (=100) as the 
base year, and cover the period 1970-1996. These estimates reveal a number of 
important characteristics. 
Firstiy, as clearly demonstrated by the data in Table 10.1 (columns 2 and 3) and 
Chart 10.1, the performance of value-added in the highly promoted group in Korea is 
much better than that of the same group in benchmark countiies during the period 1970-
1996. By 1996 the relevant index for Korea had reached 325 (the value-added share of 
GDP for the highly promoted groups was 225 per cent higher than in 1970), the index 
value for the benchmark countiies was only 160. The data also illustrate that value-added 
as a share of GDP in this particular group in Korea grew especially rapidly relative to the 
benchmark countiies until early 1980s. Indeed, by 1982 the value-added share of GDP in 
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Table 10.1 Differential Performance of Industry Groups, by Policy Stance in Korea 
and Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
Value-Added as a Share of GDP 
HP-BC 
100 
94 
91 
100 
102 
92 
95 
91 
97 
101 
97 
96 
96 
104 
122 
121 
138 
153 
159 
163 
157 
160 
165 
154 
148 
169 
160 
(1970=100) 
ffl»-K LP-BC LP-K 
100 100 100 
103 99 104 
112 98 107 
149 109 103 
153 115 103 
165 113 103 
180 115 109 
189 110 122 
207 111 127 
188 112 108 
192 107 111 
206 102 107 
200 110 108 
205 108 112 
222 122 110 
215 117 102 
230 132 102 
246 140 101 
249 144 100 
251 151 105 
271 146 111 
271 152 117 
272 155 116 
278 149 117 
295 143 115 
322 152 114 
325 143 110 
Exports 
HP-BC 
100 
97 
98 
104 
107 
95 
120 
111 
112 
115 
127 
136 
128 
153 
163 
157 
158 
167 
167 
176 
166 
179 
187 
198 
198 
219 
228 
as a Share of World Exports 
(1970=100) 
m»-K LP-BC 
100 100 
126 102 
162 106 
230 119 
258 125 
280 116 
378 132 
397 137 
442 138 
426 145 
439 146 
542 157 
585 152 
623 182 
673 188 
652 175 
636 179 
706 193 
827 182 
768 172 
703 141 
742 155 
747 168 
793 175 
767 164 
778 169 
784 171 
LP-K 
100 
128 
143 
200 
154 
188 
237 
263 
247 
210 
210 
260 
221 
176 
155 
143 
160 
185 
195 
194 
153 
145 
132 
148 
152 
152 
163 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Notes: HP-BC - Highly Promoted group in benchmark countries 
HP-K - Highly Promoted group in Korea 
LP-BC - Less Promoted group in benchmark countries 
LP-K - Less Promoted group in Korea 
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Chart 10.1 
Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Stance in Benchmark 
Countries and Korea, 1970-1996 
( Highly promoted group based on export promotbn and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.2 
Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Stance in Benchmark 
Countries and Korea, 1970-1996 
( Less promoted group based on export pronation and growth related measures) 
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this group of industries was double the 1970 level (index level 200) in Korea but lower 
than the 1970 level in the benchmark countries (index level 96). 
Secondly, the performance of value-added as a share of GDP in the less promoted 
group in Korea is less impressive compared to the similar group in the benchmark 
countries during the period. By 1996 the index for this group of industries stood at 143 
for the benchmark countries and at only 110 for Korea. As can be seen in Table 10.1 
(columns 4 and 5) and Chart 10.2, the performance in this particular group in Korea 
deviates little from that of the benchmark countries until the mid 1980s (index values of 
108 and 110 for Korea and the benchmark countries in 1982 respectively). However, the 
Korean performance fell behind that of the benchmark countries thereafter - the strong 
expansion in the share of these industries in the benchmark countries after the mid 1980s 
did not take place in Korea. 
The above two basic characteristics are more clearly evident when the comparison 
between the two policy groups is made by for Korea and the benchmark countries 
separately. The relevant estimates from Table 10.1 (columns 2, 3, 4 and 5) are displayed 
in Charts 10.3 and Chart 10.4 in this manner. As is clearly evident from these charts, 
value-added as a share of GDP in the highly promoted group in Korea is not only 
comparatively higher but is also increasing at a higher rate than in the less promoted 
group. By contrast, as can be seen from Chart 10.4, the performance of the two industry 
groups in terms of value-added as a share of GDP in the benchmark countries follows a 
quite similar path for the two industiy groups. While the highly promoted group 
remained behind that of less promoted group during the initial period, since the mid 
1980s the share of value-added in GDP of the highly promoted group was higher than 
that of less promoted group. Nevertheless, the performance of value-added as share of 
GDP in highly promoted group in Korea was still well in advance of that in the 
benchmark countries. 
Using similar measures as those employed for value-added, the aggregate 
performance of exports as a share of world exports for industry groups can also be 
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Chart 10.3 
Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups, by Policy 
Stance in Korea, 1970-1996 
(Industry groups based on export promotbn and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.4 
Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups by Policy 
Stance in Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
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studied. The resultant values of exports as a share of world exports, for highly promoted 
and less promoted groups defined in terms of the export promotion and growth related 
measures, are presented in Table 10.1 for benchmark countiies and Korea respectively, 
for the period 1970-1996. These estimated results also demonstrate a number of 
interesting characteristics of the differences in performance between the two groups. 
Firstiy, the performance of exports as a share of world exports in the highly 
promoted group in Korea is much stronger than that of the same group in the benchmark 
countries. As can be seen from the estimates in Table 10.1 (columns 6 and 7) and Chart 
10.5, exports as a share of world exports in this particular group in Korea have increased 
dramatically, both absolutely and relative to that of a similar group in the benchmark 
countries. By 1996 the relevant index for Korea had reached 784 (an increase of 684 per 
cent) while for the benchmark countries it was at 228 (an increase of 128 per cent). Thus 
the highly promoted industries in Korea recorded by 1996 more than a five-fold increase 
in their share of world exports, when compared to the benchmark countries. 
Secondly, the performance of Korea in terms of exports as a share of world 
exports in the less promoted group, though showing higher levels during the early part of 
the overall period, remained sluggish relative to the performance of the same industries in 
the benchmark countries in the latter part of the observed period. As the respective 
estimates, in Table 10.1 (columns 8 and 9) and Chart 10.6, clearly indicate, the 
performance of exports as a share of world exports in this particular group in Korea were 
considerably stionger during the 1970s and early 1980s than in the benchmark countries. 
But during the 1980s the export performance of these industries declined in Korea while 
sti-engthening in the benchmark countiies. As a result of these various trends, the index 
numbers for the Korea and the benchmark countries were almost identical by 1996. 
The performance differences of exports as a share of world exports between the 
highly promoted and the less promoted groups are again more clearly evident when the 
comparison is made taking Korea and the benchmark countries separately. The story 
shown by analysing the value-added measure is quite closely replicated with exports. 
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Chart 10.5 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea, 1970-1996 
( Highly promoted group based on export promotbn and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.6 
Differential Perfonnance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmark Countries 
and Korea, 1970-1996 
( Less prontjted group based on export prontJtbn and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.7 
Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups, by Policy 
Stance in Korea, 1970-1996 
(Industry groups based on export promotbn and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.8 
Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups, by Policy 
Stance in Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
(Industry groups based on export pronx)tbn and growth related measures) 
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The data in Table 10.1 (columns 6, 7, 8 and 9) and Charts 10.7 and 10.8 illustrate the 
performance of exports as a share of world exports in the highly promoted and the less 
promoted groups for Korea and the benchmark countries respectively. As Chart 10.7 
shows, exports as a share of world exports in the highly promoted group in Korea were 
not only relatively higher but also increased at a significandy higher rate than those of the 
less promoted group until the early 1990s. By conti-ast in the benchmark countries, as can 
be seen from Chart 10.8, the performance of exports as a share of world exports in less 
promoted groups was higher than in the highly promoted industries until the early 1990s. 
The difference between Korea and the benchmark countries in terms of the relative export 
performance of the two industry groups is quite remarkable. 
Table 10.2 Growth Rates by Policy Stance, 1970-96 
(Based on export promotion and growth related measures) 
Industry Groups 
Highly Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Less Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Average Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
Value-Added as a 
Share of GDP 
4.6 
1.8 
0.4 
1.4 
Exports as a Share of 
World Exports 
8.2 
3.2 
1.9 
2.1 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
To express in a different way the performance differences between industry 
groups, annual average growth rates of value-added as a share of GDP and of exports as a 
share of world exports by policy stance, have been calculated, and are presented in Table 
10.2. These data summarise the main results from the analysis above. First, the 
performance of the highly promoted group in Korea is much better, compared to the same 
group in the benchmark countiies and both in terms of value-added and of exports, than 
that of the less promoted group for both variables. The average annual growth rates for 
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Korea are more than double those of the benchmark countiies for the highly promoted 
group, but are lower for Korea for the less promoted group. Second, for Korea, the 
growth rates for both variables are much higher for the highly promoted than for the less 
promoted group, while for the benchmark countiies the differential is modest. 
10.2.2 Differential Performance of Industry Groups based on Import Substitution 
Related Measures 
To examine performance differences according to policy stance further, in this section we 
will use aggregate data on two different groups of industries - highly promoted (HP) and 
less promoted (LP) - defined in terms of import substitution policies and hence in terms 
of the ranks appearing in Table 8.8. Accordingly, on the basis of import substitution 
related measures, the highly promoted group will include four industrial sectors (Food, 
Textiles, Fabricated Metals and Chemicals) and the less promoted group includes the 
other four industrial sectors (Paper, Wood, Basic Metals and Non Metallic Minerals). It 
is important to note that, though the order of rank based on import substitution related 
measures differs significantly from that of export promotion and growth measures, only 
one change is made in assembling the new industry groups. This is the inclusion of the 
Food, in the highly promoted group in place of Basic Metals, which moves to the less 
promoted group. The commonality of three industries in the highly promoted group 
reflects the Korean tendency to use a range of different instruments to support a particular 
industiy. Nevertheless, in spite of the relatively limited change in the composition of the 
two groups, some significant performance differences are apparent. These reflect, of 
course, the relative effects of the two industries that have been interchanged. 
The differential performance of Korea and the benchmark countries in terms of 
value-added as a share of GDP and exports as a share of world exports, for industry 
groups that are based on import substitution related measures and for the period 1970-96, 
are presented in Table 10.3 and the respective charts. Some of the main results of this 
exercise are noted below. 
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Table 10.3 Differential Performance of Industry Groups, by Policy Stance in Korea 
and Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Import Substitution Related Measures 
Value-Added as a Share of GDP 
HP-BC 
100 
97 
97 
107 
105 
103 
107 
105 
107 
110 
103 
100 
106 
111 
131 
129 
150 
164 
167 
172 
167 
175 
180 
169 
163 
182 
173 
(1970 
HP-K 
100 
102 
110 
125 
127 
139 
155 
164 
175 
152 
157 
164 
161 
165 
175 
169 
178 
189 
189 
191 
204 
203 
205 
210 
221 
238 
238 
=100) 
LP-BC 
100 
91 
82 
90 
110 
86 
86 
76 
84 
91 
92 
90 
85 
90 
99 
97 
101 
112 
123 
126 
118 
114 
115 
109 
105 
117 
109 
LP-K 
100 
110 
108 
151 
152 
140 
131 
151 
170 
165 
166 
167 
165 
174 
179 
167 
169 
173 
176 
186 
204 
222 
217 
217 
219 
227 
224 
Exports 
HP-BC 
100 
108 
112 
118 
132 
119 
135 
129 
129 
130 
145 
158 
151 
168 
182 
176 
178 
184 
180 
187 
170 
190 
196 
206 
206 
227 
233 
as a Share of World Exports 
(1970= 
HP-K 
100 
125 
151 
218 
234 
281 
358 
379 
415 
379 
381 
464 
485 
521 
567 
564 
544 
610 
724 
662 
598 
624 
604 
637 
635 
659 
659 
=100) 
LP-BC 
100 
91 
91 
104 
100 
91 
116 
116 
119 
127 
128 
134 
128 
165 
167 
155 
158 
173 
168 
163 
140 
147 
161 
170 
160 
166 
172 
LP-K 
100 
129 
152 
211 
176 
189 
256 
282 
274 
255 
265 
333 
315 
272 
256 
227 
248 
276 
294 
295 
253 
258 
267 
294 
277 
266 
282 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Notes: HP-BC - Highly Promoted group in benchmark countries 
HP-K - Highly Promoted group in Korea 
LP-BC - Less Promoted group in benchmark countries 
LP-K - Less Promoted group in Korea 
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Chart 10.9 
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Chart 10.11 
Differential Performance of Value-Added between Industry Groups, by Policy 
Stance in Korea, 1970-1996 
(tidustry groups based on by import substitution related measures) 
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Firstiy, as can be seen from Table 10.3 (columns 2 and 3) and Chart 10.9, the 
performance of Korea in value-added as a share of GDP in the highly promoted group, 
defined in terms of import substitution measures, is bett;er than that of the same group in 
benchmark countries. Like in the estimates reported in the previous section, the relative 
performance of this particular group in Korea is particularly noticeable in the early part of 
the period. However, there is a much less favourable relative performance of Korea in 
the later part of the period than observed with the earlier definition of the highly 
promoted group (Chart 10.1). Further, in both periods the better relative performance in 
Korea is only about half that reported in Table 10.1 for the case in which the highly 
promoted group is defined in terms of export and growth measures. 
Secondly, the performance of value-added as a share of GDP in the less promoted 
group, defined in terms of import substitution measures, is also relatively higher in Korea 
than in the same group of industries in benchmark countries. As can be seen from the 
estimates of Table 10.3 (columns 4 and 5) and Chart 10.10, Korean performance in this 
particular sector remained at comparatively higher levels than that of a similar group in 
benchmark countries throughout the observed period. Indeed, in terms of this definition 
of highly promoted and less promoted groups of industries, the relative performance of 
Korea is stionger in the less promoted industries. 
This conclusion can be brought out in another way by comparing the performance 
of the two countiy groupings individually in terms of value-added as a share of GDP for 
the industry groups. When Korea and the benchmark countries are considered separately 
there is no significant difference between two groups in the case of Korea, as can be seen 
from Chart 10.11. By contiast, in the benchmark countiies the performance of value-
added as a share of GDP in the highly promoted group is much stionger than in the other 
group (see Chart 10.12). 
Exports as a share of world exports in the highly promoted group based on import 
substitution measures in Korea show a much stionger relative performance than that of 
value-added. As can be seen from Table 10.3 (columns 6 and 7) and Chart 10.13, exports 
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as a share of world exports in that particular group in Korea has shown remarkable 
growth relative to the same group in the benchmark countries. This growth in Korean 
relative exports for highly promoted industries defined in this way is almost comparable 
to that when this group is defined in terms of export and growth promotion measures. 
Similarly impressive results are evident for the less promoted group based on 
import substitution measures in Korea. As the data in Table 10.3 (columns 8 and 9) and 
Chart 10.14 shows, Korean performance in terms of exports as a share of world exports in 
that particular group remain higher than that of a similar group in benchmark countries 
over the whole period. 
Finally, using comparisons within Korea and the benchmark countries taken 
individually, it is clearly evident from Chart 10.15 that the export performance in the 
highly promoted group in Korea is significandy higher than that of less promoted group. 
However, most of this superior performance emerged after 1982. For the benchmark 
countries, exports as a share of world exports in the highly promoted group remained 
higher than that of less promoted group for the whole period, although the differential 
was not nearly as large as for Korea. 
To further investigate the performance differences between the two industry 
groups based on import substitution measures, the annual average growth rates for value-
added as a share of GDP and for exports as a share of worid exports have been calculated 
for the period 1970-96. These estimates are presented in Table 10.4. They show that the 
annual average growth rates for the highly promoted group in Korea are higher for both 
indicators than those of the same group in the benchmark countries. 
But, by contrast with the figures based on the export and growth definition, the 
annual average growth rates of value-added and exports of less promoted group in Korea 
are also comparatively higher than that of benchmark countiies. Thus, on the import 
substitution definition of the promotion groups, there is litde difference in outcomes 
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Chart 10.13 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmari< 
Countries and Korea, 1970-1996 
( Highly promoted group based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.14 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Stance in Benchmari< Countries 
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Chart 10.15 
Differential Performance of Exports between Industty Groups, by Policy 
Stance in Korea, 1970-1996 
(Industry groups based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.16 
Differential Performance of Exports between Industry Groups, by Policy 
Stance in Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
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between the highly promoted and the less promoted growth, relative to trends in the 
benchmark countries. 
Table 10.4 Growth Rates by Policy Stance, 1970-96 
(Based on import substitution related measures) 
Industry Groups 
Highly Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Less Promoted Groups 
Korea 
Benchmark Countiies 
Average Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
Value-Added as a 
Share of GDP 
3.4 
2.1 
3.2 
0.3 
Exports as a Share of 
World Exports 
7.5 
3.3 
4.1 
2.1 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Overall, all the empirical evidence covered in sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2 reveals 
several important conclusions. One is that the value-added and export performance of the 
highly promoted groups in Korea is much stronger than that of the same group in the 
benchmark countries. Moreover, the value-added and export performance of the highly 
promoted group is also much stronger than that of the less promoted group within Korea. 
Further, the performance of the highly promoted group, defined in terms of export 
promotion and growth measures, is stionger relative to that of the benchmark countries 
than that of a similar group defined in terms of import substitution measures. These 
results are consistent with the view that industrial policies have had a significant impact 
on Korean industiial development and that export promotion and growth measures might 
be more beneficial to an economy than import substitution measures. 
' These results are however subjected to qualifications due to the simultaneous application of export 
promotion and import substitution in Korea. 
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10.3 Differential Performances of Industry Groups by Policy Periods 
As a second step in exploring the possible association between superior industrial 
performance and govemment intervention in Korea, in this section we will examine 
whether there are apparent differences in performance in terms of value-added and 
exports between Korea and benchmark countries during the so-called high intervention 
period and the period thereafter. If govemment intervention has had any significant 
impact on the performance of the industrial sector in Korea, the value-added and exports 
of manufacturing in general, and of the highly promoted group in particular, will show 
stronger growth relative to the benchmark countries during the high intervention period 
than in the period thereafter. 
For this purpose, in this section we examine value-added and export performance 
for the highly promoted and less promoted groups, based on both definitions, for the 
benchmark countries and for Korea for the period between 1970-82 and 1982-1996. The 
available literature frequentiy cites the 1970s as the high intervention period and those 
policy initiatives changed significandy with the introduction of comprehensive 
stabilization measures since 1982 (see Chapter 5 Section 5.3). In this analysis therefore 
the period (1970-82) is selected to represent the high intervention period, and for that 
period data are adjusted taking 1970 (=100) as the base year. The latter period represents 
the period after the high intervention phase and for this period data are adjusted taking 
1982 (=100) as the base year. 
10.3.1 Differential Performance of Industry Groups by Policy Periods, based on 
the Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
In this section the performance differences in terms of value-added and exports between 
industiy groups, defined in terms of export promotion and growth related measures, for 
the benchmark countiies and Korea for the periods 1970-82 and 1982-1996 respectively, 
will be examined. The relevant data are presented in Table 10.5. The top part of this 
table shows values taking 1970 as the base year while the bottom part indicates the 
values taking 1982 (=100) as the base year. 
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Data on value-added as a share of GDP for the highly promoted group so defined 
are presented, for benchmark countries and Korea for periods 1970-82 and 1982-96 
respectively, in Table 10.5 (column 2 and 3), Chart 10.17 and Chart 10.18. Similar data 
for value-added as a share of GDP in the less promoted group are presented in Table 
10.5 (column 4 and 5), Chart 10.19 and Chart 10.20. 
For the highly promoted group, value-added as a share of GDP doubled in Korea 
over the period 1970-82, whde falling shghtiy in the benchmark countiies. This strong 
relative growth was not maintained over 1982-96, for which period the increase in the 
share of this group of industries in GDP was very similar in Korea and the benchmark 
countries. Thus the higher relative level achieved in Korea by 1982 was maintained but 
not increased after 1982. The performance gap of value-added as a share of GDP 
between benchmark countries and Korea is notable between the period 1985-1993. For 
the less promoted group, there was little difference between trends in Korea and the 
benchmark countries over the 1970-82 period, but value-added as a share of GDP fell in 
Korea relative to the benchmark countries after 1985. Along with benchmark countries 
though Korean performance has improved between 1988-1992, the gap in performance of 
value-added as a share of GDP in less promoted group continued throughout 1985-1996. 
Thus these data are consistent with a significant policy effect - there was stiong relative 
growth in Korea in the promoted industries in the intervention period, but this was 
evident neither in the non-intervention period nor in the less promoted group. Further, 
the relative position of the highly promoted sector was better sustained after 1982 than 
that of the less promoted group of industries. 
The picture is broadly similar for exports. Estimates of exports as a share of 
worid exports for the highly promoted group, again defined in terms of export promotion 
and growth measures, for the benchmark countries and Korea and for two periods, are 
presented in Table 10.5 (columns 6 and 7), Chart 10.21 and Chart 10.22 respectively. 
Like the estimates of value-added, these figures reveal impressive results during the high 
intervention period in Korea - Korea shows much sti-onger growth in export shares than 
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Table 10.5 Differential Performances of Industry Groups, by Policy Periods in 
Korea and Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Export Promotion and Growth Related Measures 
Value-Added as a Share of GDP 
HP-BC 
100 
94 
91 
100 
102 
92 
95 
91 
97 
101 
97 
96 
96 
HP-BC 
100 
108 
127 
126 
144 
159 
166 
169 
163 
167 
171 
160 
154 
176 
167 
HP-K 
100 
103 
112 
149 
153 
165 
180 
189 
207 
188 
192 
206 
200 
HP-K 
100 
103 
111 
108 
115 
123 
125 
126 
136 
135 
136 
139 
148 
161 
163 
LP-BC LP-K 
100 100 
99 104 
98 107 
109 103 
115 103 
113 103 
115 109 
110 122 
111 127 
112 108 
107 111 
102 107 
110 108 
LP-BC LP-K 
100 100 
98 104 
111 101 
106 95 
120 94 
127 93 
131 93 
137 97 
132 103 
138 109 
140 108 
135 108 
130 107 
138 105 
130 102 
Exports 
HP-BC 
100 
97 
98 
104 
107 
95 
120 
111 
112 
115 
127 
136 
128 
HP-BC 
100 
119 
127 
122 
123 
130 
130 
137 
129 
139 
146 
154 
154 
171 
178 
as a Share of World 
HP-K LP-BC 
100 100 
126 102 
162 106 
230 119 
258 125 
280 116 
378 132 
397 137 
442 138 
426 145 
439 146 
542 157 
585 152 
HP-K LP-BC 
100 100 
106 120 
115 124 
111 116 
109 118 
121 127 
141 120 
131 114 
120 93 
127 102 
128 111 
135 115 
131 108 
133 111 
134 113 
Exports 
LP-K 
100 
128 
143 
200 
154 
188 
237 
263 
247 
210 
210 
260 
221 
LPK 
100 
80 
70 
65 
73 
84 
88 
88 
69 
66 
60 
67 
69 
69 
74 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Notes: HP-BC - Highly Promoted group in benchmark countries 
HP-K - Highly Promoted group in Korea 
LP-BC - Less Promoted group in benchmark countries 
LP-K - Less Promoted group in Korea 
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Chart 10.17 
Differential Perfomiance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1970-82 
(Hghly promoted group based on export promotion and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.19 
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Chart 10.21 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmart< Countries, 1970-82 
( Highly promoted group based on export protrotbn and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.22 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries 
( Highly promoted group based on export pronx)tion and growth related measures) 
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Chart 10.23 
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Chart 10.24 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1982-96 
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the benchmark countries during the high intervention period. After the high intervention 
period, as can be clearly seen from Chart 10.22, Korean performance in this particular 
respect remains well behind that of the similar group in the benchmark countries during 
the observed period except the period 1988-89. 
.For the less promoted group (Table 10.5 (columns 8 and 9), Chart 10.23 and 
Chart 10.24) the estimates again indicate a comparatively higher growth in the export 
share in Korea than in the benchmark countries during the high intervention period, 
although the differential is much less marked than for the highly promoted industiies. 
As with value-added, the performance in this particular group in Korea is much weaker 
than in the benchmark countries after the high intervention period.. The gap in 
performance of exports as a share of world exports in less promoted group in Korea has 
widened significandy until 1985. Though the gap in performance in Korea narrowed 
somewhat during the period 1986-89, remained throughout 1982-1992. 
Table 10.6 Growth Rates by Policy Periods, 1970-82 and 1982-96 
(Based on export promotion and growth related measures) 
Industry Groups 
Highly Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Less Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Average Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
Value-Added as a 
Share of GDP 
1970-82 1982-96 
5.9 3.5 
-0.3 3.7 
0.6 0.1 
0.8 1.9 
Exports as a Share 
of World Exports 
1970-82 1982-96 
15.9 2.1 
2.1 4.2 
6.8 -2.2 
3.6 0.8 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
To further investigate performance differences between policy periods, average 
annual rates of growth for value-added and exports for industry groups have also been 
calculated. The resultant figures for industry groups based on export promotion and 
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growth related measures are presented in Table 10.6. For both value-added and exports, 
the striking feature of the table is the big differences between Korea and the benchmark 
countries in the highly promoted group in the interventionist period. For these industiies 
and this period, the value added share rose by 5.9 per cent per annum in Korea but fell 0.3 
per cent for the benchmark countries, while the export share rose by 15.9 per cent per 
annum for Korea but by only 2.1 per cent for the benchmark countries. For five of the 
other six cells shown in the table, the benchmark country growth rate was higher than that 
of Korea. It is only in exports in the less promoted group in the early period that Korea 
also has some margin over the benchmark countries. Thus for industry groups defined in 
terms of export and growth related measures, the stronger relative performance of Korea 
is heavily concentrated in the highly promoted industries in the interventionist period. 
This is consistent with a strong policy effect, for policies directed at exports and growth. 
10.3.2 Differential Performance of Industry Groups by Policy Periods, based on 
Import Substitution Related Measures 
In this section we will examine the performance differences between industry groups 
defined in terms of import substitution measures, both in terms of value-added and 
exports, for the benchmark countries and Korea for the periods 1970-82 and 1982-1996 
respectively. Following a similar approach to that adopted for estimating values reported 
in section 10.3.1, the aggregate values of value-added as a share of GDP and exports as a 
share of world exports for industry groups for the benchmark countries and Korea are 
presented in Table 10.7. 
As in the results reported in previous section, growth in the value-added share for 
the highly promoted group, defined in terms of import substitution measures, is also 
impressive in Korea during the high intervention period. As can be seen from Table 10.7 
(columns 2 and 3) and Chart 10.25, the increase in the value-added share for this group in 
Korea is higher than that of the similar group in benchmark countries during 1970-82, 
although the differential is only about half that for value added on the export and growth 
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Table 10.7 Differential Performances of Industry Groups, by Policy Periods in 
Korea and Benchmark Countries, 1970-1996 
Period 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Import Substitution Related Measures 
Value-Added as a 
HP-BC 
100 
97 
97 
107 
105 
103 
107 
104 
107 
110 
103 
100 
106 
HP-BC 
100 
104 
123 
121 
141 
154 
157 
162 
157 
165 
169 
159 
154 
171 
163 
HP-K 
100 
102 
110 
125 
127 
139 
155 
164 
175 
152 
157 
164 
161 
HP-K 
100 
103 
109 
105 
111 
118 
118 
119 
128 
127 
128 
131 
138 
148 
149 
I Share of GDP 
LP-BC LP-K 
100 100 
91 110 
82 108 
90 151 
110 152 
86 140 
86 131 
76 151 
84 170 
91 165 
92 166 
90 167 
85 165 
LP-BC LP-K 
100 100 
105 106 
117 108 
114 101 
119 102 
131 105 
145 107 
147 113 
139 124 
134 135 
135 131 
128 131 
123 133 
137 138 
128 136 
Exports as a 
HP-BC 
100 
108 
112 
118 
132 
119 
135 
129 
129 
130 
145 
158 
151 
HP-BC 
100 
112 
121 
117 
118 
123 
119 
124 
113 
126 
130 
137 
137 
151 
155 
Share of World Exports 
HP-K 
100 
125 
151 
218 
234 
281 
358 
379 
415 
379 
381 
464 
485 
HP-K 
100 
107 
117 
116 
112 
126 
149 
137 
123 
129 
125 
131 
131 
136 
136 
LP-BC 
100 
91 
91 
104 
100 
91 
116 
116 
119 
127 
128 
134 
128 
LP-BC 
100 
129 
131 
121 
123 
135 
132 
127 
109 
115 
126 
132 
125 
130 
134 
LP-K 
100 
129 
152 
211 
176 
189 
256 
282 
274 
255 
265 
333 
315 
LP-K 
100 
86 
81 
72 
79 
88 
94 
94 
80 
82 
85 
94 
88 
84 
90 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
Notes: HP-BC - Highly Promoted group in benchmark countries 
HP-K - Highly Promoted group in Korea 
LP-BC - Less Promoted group in benchmark countries 
LP-K - Less Promoted group in Korea 
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Chart 10.25 
Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1970-82 
(Highly promoted group based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.26 
Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1982-96 
(Highly promoted group based on inport substitution related measures) 
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Chart 10.27 
Differential Perfonnance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1970-82 
(Less promoted group based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.28 
Differential Performance of Value-Added by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmark Countries, 1982-96 
(Less promoted group based on inport substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.29 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1970-82 
( Highly promoted group based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.30 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmart< Countries, 1982-96 
( Highly prorroted group based on import substitutbn related nreasures) 
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Chart 10.31 
Differential Perfonnance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1970-82 
( Less promoted group based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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Chart 10.32 
Differential Performance of Exports by Policy Periods in Korea and 
Benchmari< Countries, 1982-96 
( Less promoted group based on import substitutbn related measures) 
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definition of the highly promoted group. However, as Chart 10.26 illustrates, this strong 
relative performance for Korea is not sustained after the high intervention period. 
This result might be thought to be indicative of a policy effect, but one thing that 
is striking when using this definition of the highly and less promoted groups is that 
similar results are evident as regards to the performance of value-added as a share of 
GDP for the two groups. Both in 1982 and in 1996 the index values for the value-added 
share in Korea are quite close for the highly promoted and the less promoted groups, and 
there is no evidence of superior performance for the policy group. Indeed, relative to the 
benchmark countries, the performance of the less promoted group was stronger than that 
of the promoted group. As the estimates of value-added as share of GDP presented in 
Table 10.7 (column 4 and 5) and Chart 10.27 illustrate, the value added share for the less 
promoted group in Korea remained well above that of the similar group in benchmark 
countries during the high intervention period, more so than for the highly promoted 
group. Further, Chart 10.28 shows that value-added as a share of GDP in the less 
promoted industries in Korea was stronger than that in the benchmark countries by 1996 
(on a 1970 base), in spite of being behind that of the similar group in those benchmark 
countries until the early 1990s. 
As for the results reported in the previous section, exports as a share of world 
exports in industry groups that are based on import substitution related measures also 
indicate much stronger results during the high intervention period than during the period 
afterwards. As can be seen from the estimates in Table 10.7 (column 6 and 7) and Chart 
10.29, the performance of exports as a share of world exports in the highly promoted 
group in Korea is relatively higher than that of the similar group in benchmark countries 
during the high intervention period. However, the performance of exports as a share of 
world exports in that particular group in Korea, as the corresponding estimates and Chart 
10.30 indicate, was, except for the couple of years in mid 1980s, was weaker than that of 
the similar group in benchmark countries after the high intervention period. 
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Exports as a share of world exports in the less promoted group by this definition 
in Korea also indicate comparatively higher performances during the high intervention 
period. As the estimates in Table 10.7 (column 8 and 9) and Chart 10.31 demonstrate 
performance of exports as a share of world exports in this particular group in Korea is 
comparatively higher than that of the similar group in benchmark countries during the 
high intervention period. However, performance in this particular group, as the 
respective estimates and Chart 10.32 illustrate, is not that impressive after the high 
intervention period. The performance gap widened between 1982-1986, though 
narrowed afterwards, has continued throughout the observed period. 
To further investigate the performance differences between policy periods, 
average annual rate of growth of value-added and exports have also been estimated for 
industry groups that are based on import substitution related measures. The resultant 
estimates for two industry groups, for Korea and benchmark countries for the period 
1970-82 and 1982-96, are presented in Table 10.8. 
Table 10.8 Growth Rates by Policy Periods, 1970-82 and 1982-96 
(Based on import substitution related measures) 
Industry Groups 
Highly Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Less Promoted Group 
Korea 
Benchmark Countries 
Average Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
Value-Added as a 
Share of GDP 
1970-82 1982-96 
4.3 2.7 
0.9 3.2 
4.7 1.8 
-0.9 1.4 
Exports as a Share 
of World Exports 
1970-82 1982-96 
14.1 2.2 
3.5 3.1 
10.0 -0.8 
2.1 2.1 
Source: Estimates based on Trade and Production data accessed through lEDB (ANU). 
As for the estimates reported in Table 10.8, the average annual rates of growth of 
value-added and exports for both industry groups in Korea, based on import substitution 
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related measures, are higher during the high intervention period than during the period 
thereafter. Further, during the high intervention period the average annual rates of 
growth of value-added and exports for both groups are also higher than that of the similar 
groups in benchmark countries, and the reverse results are evident in Korea, for both 
industry groups, compared to the similar groups in benchmark countries after the high 
intervention period. The key point, however, is that there is no significant difference 
between the highly promoted and the less promoted groups in these data, and hence these 
results are inconsistent with a significant policy effect, for policies focused on import 
substitution. 
The results of the analyses undertaken in 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 can be convenientiy 
summarised in terms of Tables 10.6 and 10.8. For industry groupings defined in terms of 
export and growth measures (Table 10.6), the striking feature of the table, for both value-
added and exports, is the big difference between Korea and the benchmark countiies in 
the highly promoted group in the interventionist period. For these industries and this 
period, the value added share in GDP rose by 5.9 per cent per annum in Korea but fell 0.3 
per cent for the benchmark countries, while the export share rose by 15.9 per cent per 
annum for Korea but by only 2.1 per cent for the benchmark countries. For five of the 
other six cells shown in the table, the benchmark country growth rate was higher than that 
of Korea. It is only in exports in the less promoted group in the early period that Korea 
also has some margin over the benchmark countries. Thus for industry groups defined in 
terms of export and growth related measures, the stronger relative performance of Korea 
is heavily concentrated in the highly promoted industries in the interventionist period. 
This is consistent with a strong impact of the relevant industrial policies, namely those 
focused on exports and growth. 
For industry groupings defined in terms of import substitution measures (Table 
10.8), the estimates for both outcome variables and for both industry groups in Korea 
show comparatively higher performance during the high intervention period than 
thereafter. During 1970-82 the average annual rate of growth of both the value-added 
and the export share for both groups are also comparatively higher than that of the similar 
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groups in benchmark countries. Substantially opposing results are evident in Korea 
relative to the similar groups in benchmark countries for both industry groups after die 
high intervention period. But the key point here is there is no difference evident in the 
performance of the highly promoted and the less promoted industry groups - for both 
Korea's performance is stronger than that of the benchmark countiies over 1970-82 and, 
with one marginal exception, weaker than that of the benchmark countries over 1982-96. 
Thus these data are inconsistent with a strong impact of industrial policies based on 
import substitution on Korean industrial outcomes.' 
10.4 Regression Analysis: Industrial Performance and Incidence Measures, Using 
Panel Data 
As a third step in the empirical assessment, we use panel data on incidence and outcome 
measures for Korea to explore the impact of govemment intervention on the strong 
industrial performances of value-added and exports outlined in Chapter 9. In this 
analysis, we assume that if govemment intervention in Korea has any substantial impact 
on industrial performance there should be positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the measures of the incidence of industrial policies and of the 
potential outcomes of those policies constmcted in Chapters 8 and 9. To examine this 
statement (with regard to value-added performance) we will apply the following model: 
Valit = Pi + P2^°^it'^Pp^(:it'^P4f^iit'^P5t'^riit + P(,nontit + ^ it (1) 
where i stands for the ith industiial sector and t for the t th time period. The dependent 
variable vau denotes value-added as a share of GDP in Korea as compared to benchmark 
countries (here the difference between the value-added shares in Korea and in the 
benchmark countries at the sectoral (two-digit) level, 1970-1985). The independent 
variables are those constructed in Chapter 8 to measure incidence within the limitations 
of the available data, namely COSJY , which denotes the subsidy effect of financial and tax 
' These results however, require a caution since both export promotion and import substitution measures 
are simultaneously applied in Korea. 
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incentives; tecu, which denotes the extent of technology licensing; fdi^^, which denotes 
the incidence of foreign direct investment; tariu, which is a measure of the extent of tariff 
barriers across industiies; and nonta, which is a measure of non tariff barriers. The 
variables are defined so that p,,p,,p,,p, and p, will be positive and statistically 
significant if the policies which these variables represent have a positive impact on the 
value-added share. 
As will be clear from earlier chapters, the data available for the panel regression 
are very limited, being confined by the availability of the incidence measures. We have 
32 observations for each of the incidence and outcome variables, consisting of eight 
industry sectors (at the two-digit level) for each of four time periods. For incidence 
measures such as tec - number of technology licensing projects and fdi - number of 
foreign direct investment projects, data are available only for four time periods (1962-71, 
1972-76, 1977-81, and 1982-86). Therefore, data representing cos - subsidy effects of 
financial and tax incentives, are also adjusted for these time periods for the regression 
analysis. Since data are not available for such time periods for tari - average tariff rates 
and nont - non- tariff barriers, for these two incidence measures data for four 
representative years (1966, 1970, 1975 and 1980) are applied for the regression analysis. 
Data for outcome variables are only available for the period 1970-1996. To represent 
outcome variables, the difference of value-added as a share of GDP and also the 
difference of exports as a share of world exports in Korea compared to benchmark 
countiies for four time periods (1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985) are used for the regression. 
For this reason, the analysis here can be indicative only. 
The association between value-added and incidence measures has been examined 
using the above noted model (1), with the Shazam statistical package. The initial results 
showed that all of the variables had the expected sign, but that only two variables 
(technology licensing and tariffs) appeared to be statistically significant at 5 per cent 
level. No evidence of autocorrelation and multicoUinearity was found. However, there 
was evidence of heteroscedasticity, both according to Goldfeld-Quandt test (GQ test) and 
also Brushch- Pagan-Godfrey Test. Given the presence of heteroscedasticity, since the 
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Table 10.9 Panel Regression for Value-Added ' 
Independent Variables" 
Financial and tax incentives 
Technology licensing 
Foreign direct investment 
Tariff 
Non- tariff barriers 
R Square 
DW 
Estimation technique 
Number of observations 
Coefficients (t value) 
10.9(a) 
0.0009 
(1.01) 
0.00005 
(7.69) 
0.000008 
(0.47) 
0.0004 
(4.45) 
0.00001 
(0.16) 
0.7939 
2.09 
WLS 
32 
10.9 (b) 
0.0003 
(0.28) 
0.00003 
(3.14) 
0.000004 
(0.11) 
0.4890 
1.76 
WLS 
32 
10.9(c) 
0.0001 
(1.67) 
0.00004 
(0.41) 
0.1399 
2.07 
WLS 
32 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is the value-added as a share of GDP in Korea with compared to 
benchmark countries (difference of value-added between Korea and benchmark countries at 
two digit level) 1970-1985. 
(b) The independent variables are: cos - subsidy effects of financial and tax incentives; /re-
number of technology licensing projects; fdi - number of foreign direct investment projects; 
tari- average tariff rates (per cent); nont - non- tariff barriers (per cent). These variables are at 
two-digit level, for the period 1965-1985. 
properties of the OLS estimators are no longer reliable, remedial measures were taken by 
using White's heteroscedasticity consistent variances and standard errors. Since this 
method is more suitable for large samples, as noted in (Gujarati, 1995, p. 383) corrective 
measures were applied after selecting a suitable variable to transform the data. To find 
the suitable variable as weights for transforming data, the error term \i j was plotted 
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against each explanatory variable. It was found that the variance of ^i was more likely to 
be proportional to the variable fdi than to any of the other variables. Therefore fdi was 
selected as the suitable variable for transforming the data for model 1. 
Table 10.9 reports the estimation results after taking remedial measures for 
heteroscedasticity. Column 2 of Table 10.9 demonstrates the estimated regression results 
for model 1, which examines the association between value-added and the incidence 
measures. These regression results of 10.9 (a) suggest that all the incidence measures 
may have a positive relationship with value-added. However, only for two variables, 
namely technology licensing and tariffs, were the coefficients statistically significant at 5 
per cent level. Coefficients of those two variables are close to zero and denote very weak 
relationship. 
Likewise, using the same data for the incidence measures, the following model (2) 
is applied to examine the association between value-added performance and export 
promotion and growth measures only. As in the previous model, here we expect that 
p,, /33 and p, will be positive and statistically significant. 
Valit = )3i + j82 cos/r + P^^ecu + ^4 fdi it + l^it (^^ 
The estimated results of model (2), after following similar procedures to those 
described in relation to model (1), are presented in Table 10.9 (column 3). According to 
the regression results of 10.9 (b), all the export promotion and growth related measures 
create a positive impact on value-added performance, but only the technology licensing 
variable is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Similarly, to examine the association between import substitution related 
measures and value-added, the following model (3) is applied and we expect that p, and 
p, will be positive and statistically significant 
Valit ^Pi^Pl tari it + fi^f^ntit + /^// ^' 
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The estimated results of model (3) are presented in Table 10.9 as 10.9 (c). These 
results indicate that both import substitution measures show the expected signs, but none 
of the variables is statistically significant. 
In like manner, the association between exports and the incidence measures is 
examined in this section following a similar model to that used for value-added. The 
model (4) below is applied here, with similar independent variables and also with the 
assumptions as noted previously (model 1). In this model, the dependent variable 
Expn represents exports as a share of world exports for i th sector at the t th time period, 
for Korea as compared to the benchmark countries (here, the difference between the 
export shares for Korea and the benchmark countries at the sectoral (two-digit) level 
1970-1985). 
Expi^ = Pl + ^2COS/f + ^ 3?ec/f + P4 fdi^^ + P^tariit + P^nontu + Hit ^^^ 
Column 2 of Table 10.10 reports the estimated regression results of model (4), 
which examines the association between exports and incidence measures, after taking 
remedial measures for heteroscedasticity. As can be seen from 10.10 (a), three variables 
(financial and tax incentives, technology licensing and tariff) show the expected signs. 
The other two variables, namely foreign direct investment and non-tariff barriers, are 
negatively correlated with export performance. But only one variable (tariffs) is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
To investigate the association between export performance and export promotion 
and growth related measures only, a similar model to that of model (4), with minor 
alterations, will also be employed. Based on similar assumptions as that of model (2), the 
following model (5) is estimated and the results appear in Table 10.10 as 10.10 (b). 
Expi^ = Pi + p2 cosit + P3 tecit + ^4 fdi it + l^u (^) 
The estimated results indicate that two variables (financial and tax incentives and 
technology licensing) have expected signs. Like previous results, the variable 
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representing foreign direct investment is negatively correlated with the performance of 
exports. However, only one variable (financial and tax incentives) is statistically 
significant at 5 per cent level. 
Table 10.10 Panel Regression for Exports * 
Independent Variables'' 
Financial and tax incentives 
Technology licensing 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Tariff 
Non- tariff Barrier 
R squared 
DW 
Estimation technique 
Number of observations 
Coefficients (t values) 
10.10(a) 
0.0009 
(1.08) 
0.000009 
(1.54) 
-0.000008 
(-0.52) 
0.0002 
(2.53) 
-0.00009 
(-1.03) 
0.3118 
2.42 
WLS 
32 
10.10(b) 
0.0017 
(2.77) 
0.000006 
(0.06) 
-0.00003 
(-1.35) 
0.2601 
2.22 
WLS 
32 
10.10(c) 
0.00004 
(0.66) 
-0.0001 
(-1.96) 
0.1175 
2.5 
WLS 
32 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is the exports as a share of world exports in Korea with 
compared to benchmark countries (differences of exports as a share of worid exports 
between Korea and benchmark countries at two-digit level) 1970-1985. 
(b) See note b in Table 10.9. 
Similarly, the association between exports and import substitution related 
measures only has also been examined. For this purpose, with similar assumptions and 
independent variables as of model (3), the model (6) is estimated and the results are 
presented in Table 10.10 as regression 10.10 (c). 
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Expif = ^1 + P2tariit + P^nontu + Hn (6) 
The results of this model (6) indicate that the tariff has a positive sign but it is not 
statistically significant. The non-tariff barriers variable, though showing a statistically 
significant coefficient, is negatively correlated with exports. 
As noted earlier, these regression results are subject to qualifications for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, we use pooled regression where time series and cross sectional 
observations are combined. In such a procedure it is implicitly assumed that the 
regression parameters do not change over time and that they do not differ between 
various cross sectional units. It is also assumed that the error variance is homoscedastic 
and the error term in the observed function at time t is uncorrelated. However, the 
incidence measures we apply for the regression appear to vary significandy not only from 
one industrial sector to the other but also from one period to other. Further, significant 
outliers are evident in the data relating to technology licensing and foreign direct 
investment. Secondly, these results are based on a small sample. Thirdly, we applied a 
number of proxies to represent incidence measures, and these are likely to be of limited 
reliability for detailed econometric work. 
Overall, given these various limitations, it is not surprising that the results of this 
initial regression analysis lead to no definitive conclusions. While these results suggests 
that incidence measures may have a positive influence on value-added, since all the 
incidence variables are positively cortelated with the performance of value-added, many 
of the variables are statistically insignificant. It is likely that a much more detailed panel 
data set, and perhaps a model which takes account of other factors influencing the 
relationship between incidence and outcome variables, would be necessary for the impact 
of industiial policy on sectoral outcomes to be assessed by rigorous econometric analysis 
within the overall framework suggested here. 
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10.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, three empirical tests have been applied to investigate the question 
of whether the striking performance of much of Korean industry after 1970 can be 
attiibuted to industrial policies. The results of the first two tests are consistent with the 
view that there was a strong impact of industrial policies focused on exports and growth 
on industrial performance in Korea over the period 1970-82, although the results of the 
third test are inconclusive. 
In terms of the first two tests, there is a marked difference in the performance of 
Korean industries, relative to those of the benchmark countries, over the two periods, on 
the two outcome variables used. However, for groupings defined in terms of export and 
growth measures, this was tme for both outcome variables only for the highly promoted 
group. For groupings defined in terms of import substitution measures, there is little 
discemible difference between the comparative performance of the highly promoted and 
the less promoted group. Thus these results are consistent with the view that industrial 
policies targeting exports and growth had a significant impact on Korean industrial 
development over the 1970-82 period. But they are not consistent with the view that 
industrial policies targeting import substitution had a similar impact, at least when 
assessed in terms of exports and value added outcome variables. 
The third test uses regression analysis on panel data for incidence and outcome 
variables, to test a simple model of the impact of policy measures on outcomes. While 
generally the variables have the expected sign, in most cases they fail standard 
significance tests, and the results can at best be described as inconclusive. This is not 
surprising, given the severe limitations on the data available for this purpose. A much 
more detailed panel data set, and a model which takes account of other factors 
influencing the relationship between incidence and outcome variables, may give more 
definitive results. 
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